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This scientific anthology elucidates new views on emergency management 
and understanding the unforeseen in society and learning processes by 
introducing the concept of samhandling, a Norwegian term that connotes 
interaction, collaboration, cooperation and coordination in one word.
Interaction: “Samhandling” Under Risk. A Step Ahead of the Unfore-
seen has a background in several research projects: Military Peda-
gogies (2004–2008), Leadership, Collaboration and Samhandling in 
Flexible Organizations (2006–2010), respectively resulting in two scien-
tific anthologies and, not least, the research program “Educational Basic 
Research on the Unforeseen” (2010–2015). The latter program resulted in 
the research-based anthology Pedagogy for the Unforeseen, a collaborative 
work by 20 scholars (Torgersen, 2015, see Chapter 1). In connection with 
these projects, there have been countless presentations at research confer-
ences around the world, including the Conference for the Society for Risk 
Analysis – Europe (SRA-E) and the Congress of the Nordic Educational 
Research Association (NERA).
One of the most important findings reported in Pedagogy for the 
Unforeseen was the identification of several generic competence struc-
tures that must be developed to cope with unforeseen events in all its 
phases. The various generic competence structures were assembled in 
a didactic model called The Strategic Didactic Model for the Unforeseen 
(SD-UN). A key competence structure was samhandling. The present 
anthology elaborates on what this samhandling competence can be and 
how this competence can be developed. 
After the scientific anthology Pedagogy for the Unforeseen was 
launched on the United Nations’ International Day of Peace (Septem-
ber 21, 2015) at the House of Literature in Oslo, my research group and 
I immediately began investigating the scientific contexts of the research 
we had completed during the last decade. In this work, the following peo-
ple contributed in particular: Professor Herner Saeverot (Western Nor-
way University of Applied Sciences), Associate Professor Trygve Steiro 
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(Norwegian University of Science and Technology), Professor Torbjørn 
Rundmo (Norwegian University of Science and Technology), Researcher 
Tone Cecilie Carlsten (Nordic Institute for Studies in Innovation, 
Research and Education), Lieutenant Colonel Bjørn Eidsvaag (Norwe-
gian Defense University College), Associated Professor Leif Inge Mag-
nussen (University of Southeast Norway), Lieutenant Colonel Marius 
Herberg (Norwegian Ministry of Defense) and Assistant professor Gila 
Hammer Furnes (Western Norway University of Applied Sciences). After 
several weeks of theoretical and practical analyzes, we were left with the 
following research question:
What are the basic structures of the concept of samhandling under risk and how 
can samhandling be created when conditions are unpredictable?
This research question became the start of the research project “Interac-
tion: Samhandling Under Risk. A Step Ahead of the Unforeseen”. To go 
one step further within such a complex issue, it was necessary to gather 
some of the most prominent researchers working on the topic of samhan-
dling, embracing several disciplines, methodological perspectives and 
sectors. This resulted in 28 research studies conducted by a total of 32 
contributors. They are all presented in this anthology. 
This scientific anthology conveys new knowledge that forms the basis 
for a new view on strategic, emergency-preparedness management, and 
understanding of the unforeseen in society and in learning processes. 
The approach is interdisciplinary but has a particular focus on disciplines 
such as pedagogy, psychology, health sciences, military science and 
organization and management, applied in various industries and sectors 
related to practical examples, experiences and challenges. The book’s 
primary target group is the scientific research community within these 
disciplines. 
Originally, this anthology was intended to be written in Norwegian, 
which would mean that it would only be accessible to Scandinavians. 
The reason for this was that we found the Norwegian word samhan-
dling closely linked to cultural aspects. The Norwegian word samhan-
dling equates with English terms like “interaction”, “social interaction”, 
“collaboration”, “cooperation”, “coordination”, “join forces with”, “joint 
preface
7
action”, “teamwork” and “working together” (see also Chapters 1 and 
2). If we had translated samhandling to one of the English equivalents, 
we believe that some nuances would have been lost in translation. How-
ever, thanks to conference participants at The Society for Risk Analysis 
Europe (SRA-E) in Maastricht 2015, Bath 2016 and Lisbon 2017, there was 
a strong request that our work should be written in English and there-
fore made accessible to a wider audience. This clearly has its advantages. 
But samhandling is also closely linked, as we see it, to a Norwegian and 
Scandinavian context that readers should be aware of and reflect upon. 
However, these nuances are also the very reason why the international 
research community wanted to know more and participate in a discus-
sion about this context. I therefore hope for understanding for our choice 
of using the Norwegian word samhandling more or less throughout the 
entire anthology. At the same time, I am optimistic that this choice may 
contribute to further interest, conceptual discussions and research on 
nuanced and basic processes connected to the topic of samhandling, of 
benefit for all worldwide. An example can be the conceptualization made 
in Chapter 28, where the concept samhandling is linked globally and dis-
cussed in light of the corresponding Japanese expressions. 
Due to our global perspective, additional international research jour-
neys and field studies were also conducted to gain insights into how differ-
ent countries, cultures and businesses perceive and relate to phenomena 
such as samhandling and the unforeseen. In particular, I will mention 
the stay in Japan in the autumn of 2017, including visits to the National 
Defense Academy (NDA) in Yokosuka (Obaradai). I would like to express 
my sincere gratitude to Professor Hitoshi Kawano, Dean at the NDA, for 
very useful and professional contributions. Furthermore, I would like to 
highlight visits to safari guide training schools in Kenya and Tanzania, 
with particular focus on learning processes related to the interpretation of 
hazard signals in nature and measures for unforeseen events in the field.
This anthology may be read in any order, but because several con-
cepts and models are commonly used throughout the anthology, such as 
samhandling, “interaction”, “unforeseen”, “SUR structures” and “Bow-tie 
model/UN SUR model”, I suggest it is a good idea to start by reading 
Chapters 1 and 2. The last chapter, Chapter 28, aggregates the findings 
8
preface
from the other chapters and suggests an overall model and definition of 
“SUR structures”.
The project has been administered by the Norwegian Defense Univer-
sity College (NDUC) and has been part of the basic research program 
“The Unforeseen”. I have been the leader and editor of the project, with 
very good support from and interaction with Herner, Tone Cecilie and 
Bjørn, as well as the rest of the contributors to this anthology. However, 
special thanks must be given to Trygve Steiro at the Norwegian Univer-
sity of Science and Technology, for the overall effort that he has contrib-
uted, both professionally and editorially along the way.
With a total of 32 researchers as well as an administrative support 
group, both at NDUC and the individual researchers’ institutions, this 
has not only been a continuous and hard-working research group. We 
have become a solid research community, with enormous enthusiasm, 
motivation and commitment to basic research. In addition to almost daily 
contact with each other, there have been several research seminars with 
presentations and discussions of findings as part of the quality assurance. 
Each contributor has also participated in conferences and other research 
dissemination within their own fields of study, discussing their results 
with their own research and academic environments along the way. As 
such, this work is the result of favors from all researchers and institutions 
involved.
All of this has been carried out in a good, “old-fashioned”, basic 
research spirit, without commercial motives or interference in the choice 
of research topics. Our slogan has been:
Basic research for the benefit of society – SAMHANDLING under risk: 
There is no doubt that the message of the book is more relevant than ever …!
With this slogan, we have suggested a benefit to global society. Therefore, 
I give my sincere thanks to all researchers, supporters and institutions 
who have had faith in this project throughout the last three years.
An anthology like this is dependent on many. Thanks to the pub-
lisher, Cappelen Damm Akademisk, and the publishing editors Dorte 
Østreng and Simon Aase, who have contributed with their expertise and 
professionalism throughout the work on manuscripts. Thanks also to the 
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publisher’s proofreaders and reviewers who have contributed to quality 
assurance of the chapters along the way. In addition, several in our scien-
tific network, both nationally and internationally, contributed with aca-
demic input and critical feedback to our findings and texts throughout 
the three years, for whose efforts we are sincerely grateful. Furthermore, 
we thank our students, at both bachelor, master and PhD levels, who have 
contributed to discussions and provided feedback along the way.
I believe that our project work and this anthology can, at least, con-
tribute to a new way of thinking in strategic preparedness management 
and corresponding subject areas, with particular emphasis on developing 
interpersonal competence to meet unforeseen events in all their forms. 
Obviously, the anthology does not provide exhaustive answers. Nev-
ertheless, I hope that it may serve as a stepping stone towards providing 
some principles for a way of thinking that can contribute to reflection on 
existing practices, and, not least, encourage further research. We trust 
that readers do not stop with our words and discoveries but actively draw 
on their own perspectives, experiences and findings, to get yet another 
step closer to how samhandling may work best when it counts the most.
Finally, as was underlined in Pedagogy for the Unforeseen (p. 7, my 
translation): 
The Unforeseen (UN) affects everyone in one way or another, both in earlier 
times, here and now, and in the future. Therefore, my main message is that 
everyone should develop a relationship to the UN and should also, in their own 
way, try to prevent dangerous and unwanted situations from occurring, while at 
the same time seeing opportunities for learning and development in unforeseen 
and spontaneous situations that occur along the way, both in teaching and in 
the rest of the world.
This book is dedicated to you all, and all of us who have contributed hope 
that the book, directly and indirectly, may contribute to better samhan-
dling, both in general and when it counts the most, and to knowledge, 
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Section I: Educational Samhandling 
Structures
This research focuses on the concepts and challenges involved in con-
sidering samhandling as a separate phenomenon in general and in light 
of competence and under unpredictable conditions in particular. This 
is important for learning and improvement processes, including educa-




Samhandling Under Risk (SUR) –  
Theoretical Foundation as a 
Common Frame of Reference
Glenn-Egil Torgersen
Norwegian Defence University College
Abstract: The main objective of this chapter is to clarify some key and overall the-
oretical and conceptual frameworks underlying the research project “Samhandling 
Under Risk” (SUR), as discussed in the various chapters of this anthology. The overall 
research question is: What are the basic structures of the concept of samhandling un-
der risk and how can samhandling be created when the conditions are unpredictable? 
This chapter explains in particular the terms “samhandling” (SAM), “the Unforeseen” 
(UN), “Risk” and “SUR structures”. Furthermore, these concepts are explored more 
deeply in relation to each other, which also frames the main approach of the antho-
logy. As a basis, a specific understanding of “The Nature of the Unforeseen”, an ex-
panded and customized Bow-tie Model, as well as a clarification of the boundaries 
enclosing the research field are compared to traditional risk analysis and training in 
what is already known and in dealing with probable threats. Although the individual 
studies reported in this anthology also have their own specific angles regarding these 
concepts and models, they have nevertheless been based on these. The core focus is 
also on learning in the light of organizational learning and SUR. The boundaries, chal-
lenges and the anthology’s focus on learning are also expressed in the more general 
and overall question: How can we as a society prepare ourselves for the unforeseen, 
the events and threats at the outer reaches of what we have trained for? A more in-
depth explanation about the background of this research project is also given in the 
preface of the anthology. 
Keywords: Samhandling, interaction, unforeseen, preparedness, resilience, risk, 
training, organizational learning.
Citation: Torgersen, G.-E. (2018). Samhandling Under Risk (SUR) – Theoretical Founda-
tion as a Common Frame of Reverence. In G.-E. Torgersen (Ed.), Interaction: ‘Samhand-
ling’ Under Risk. A Step Ahead of the Unforeseen (pp. 19–38). Oslo: Cappelen Damm 
Akademisk. DOI: https://doi.org/10.23865/noasp.36.ch1
License: CC BY-NC 4.0
chapter 1
20
Background: Problem and purpose
This anthology focuses on samhandling (which equates with “interaction” 
or “collaboration”) under risk and unpredictable conditions (SUR), when 
little or nothing goes according to plan. Examples of this may be the ter-
rorist acts that occurred in Norway on the 22nd of July 2011, the tsunami 
in the India Sea in 2004, nuclear accidents, cyber attacks or unwanted 
incidents in the health service. Crises like this hit suddenly and unpre-
dictably, and the risk is high. In view of societal security and prepar-
edness, threats and events in the outer limits of what has already been 
prepared for and trained must also be handled. However, both experi-
ence and studies show that it is often the interaction (samhandling) itself 
which fails in such situations (Bammer & Smithson, 2009). One of the 
main findings from the studies reported in the anthology Pedagogy for 
the Unforeseen (Torgersen, 2015) was that samhandling is one of the key 
processes for both the prevention and handling of unforeseen threats and 
incidents. At the same time, future research on societal security should 
not focus purely on previous crises or events. Next time a crisis emerges, 
it may be in a completely different area that requires a completely differ-
ent type of knowledge, or other actions and reactions.
The present anthology is based on samhandling as a phenomenon 
under risk and unpredictable conditions. A challenge that this book aims 
to address is the creation of a bridge of competence between samhandling 
theory, the unforeseen and practical challenges that some industries and 
sectors may face under risk and unpredictable conditions. The question is 
thus, whether there may be some basic skills or knowledge structures that 
different organizations should emphasize in their competence develop-
ment in order to be better at interacting (samhandling) under such condi-
tions. The book’s overall research question is as follows: 
What are the basic structures of the concept of samhandling under risk and how 
can samhandling be created when the conditions are unpredictable? Or, in a more 
concentrated form: What should be emphasized in order to achieve samhandling 
under risk and unpredictable conditions (SUR)?
Based upon this question, the anthology tries to drill in samhandling as a 
phenomenon related to different industries and disciplines. The purpose 
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of this work is to find out if any basic relational processes exist that can 
give us insight into being better at samhandling under risk (SUR), thus 
forming the approach to a more general, SUR-oriented way of thinking. 
The approach is interdisciplinary but with a special focus on disciplines 
such as pedagogy, psychology, health sciences, military science and 
organization and management, and further applied to various industries 
and sectors related to practical examples and challenges. In this work, a 
wide range of research methods have been used.
One way to go is to look back, learn from mistakes made in previous 
crises and unwanted events. This will provide an important competence 
basis. However, it is also necessary to try to develop new and other ways 
of thinking and action options that can be included in the overall compe-
tence basis. This is necessary to meet future crises and unforeseen events 
that can take new forms and frameworks, in completely new ways and 
different areas than before. Here, there is an improvement potential in 
relation to today’s readiness, but this cannot be achieved using simple 
and quick, short cut solutions. 
Interaction: “Samhandling” Under Risk. A Step Ahead of the Unfore-
seen is intended to be a research-based contribution to such knowledge. 
We have seen, all too often, that both research and experience reports 
from accidents and serious events only investigate the depths of mis-
takes, weaknesses and deficiencies or what makes a success, to a limited 
extent. Then the results are usually characterized by general and overall 
descriptions of current phenomena, where the measures are quantified to 
be more or less of something, such as more and better training on sam-
handling and better preparation for meeting unforeseen events. However, 
what should be trained using which educational methods is often over-
looked or taken for granted, as if there are solutions to this from before, 
that can be easily picked up and implemented in practice. This is not the 
case. Such knowledge must be developed step by step and samhandling 
under risk is a contribution to this process.
In other words, the contributions of this anthology attempt to inves-
tigate profound processes or forms of knowledge that underlie the phe-
nomenon of samhandling, especially under risk and unpredictable 
conditions. These factors are referred to in this anthology as “structures”. 
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The structures that we believe should be emphasized to develop samhan-
dling under risk are referred to as “SUR structures”. If we can identify any 
of these, it can provide better opportunities for developing knowledge in 
a more targeted and secure way, compared to developing the skills that 
are actually needed to be better at samhandling under risk.
The individual studies reported in the chapters of the anthology are 
based on such a foundation in their subject and problem areas, and 
present specific findings that can help these structures become clearer. 
In this way, they can form the basis for strategic leadership develop-
ment, curricula and training plans, both specifically within the prob-
lem area and in general, related to the development of competence 
for SUR.
The final chapter in the anthology (Chapter 28) attempts to build 
more general and aggregated features of the SUR structures, primarily 
based on the different findings in the anthology, but also based on indi-
vidual studies and findings. The aim is that these more aggregated SUR 
structures, together with the specific findings in the other chapters, can 
reveal what, in our view, should be emphasized to develop SUR oriented 
competence, both at individual, group and organizational levels. These 
structures must, however, be adapted, developed and integrated by the 
individual industry and translated into the tasks and challenges that the 
various industries specifically or potentially may face.
Frameworks: Samhandling, risk  
and the unforeseen
There are three key concepts that form a common frame of reference 
for this anthology. They are “samhandling”, “risk” and “the unforeseen” 
or “unpredictable conditions”. As a theoretical platform, the different 
studies in the anthology have been based on a common definition and 
understanding of these – as a starting point. However, that does not mean 
that the studies have been ruled by these. Understanding of concepts has 
formed a reference framework, as a research methodological approach, 
to channel this complex problem area into a manageable research area. 
Thus, each chapter has its own unique and nuanced understanding of 
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these concepts, adapted to the specific discipline, industry, and theoret-
ical and methodological foundation. Current understanding beyond the 
general frame of reference is explained in the individual chapters, where 
it has been necessary to present the professional nuances in the best pos-
sible way.
The term samhandling
Generally speaking, theories of samhandling concern how relationships 
occur between people, what is needed for this to happen and what conse-
quences this may have, possibly also with regard to technology, both on 
an individual, group, and organizational and social level. This may also 
include international (political) samhandling (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009, 
see also Chapter 2). The key issue is the consequences of such samhan-
dling, or what is desired by the samhandling.
This anthology deals with samhandling in a more practical and sit-
uational framework than those found in general theories of social 
interaction, intergroup contact theory, intersubjectivity and symbolic 
interactionism, as we can see in the psychological and sociological inter-
action and interaction theories of, among others, George H. Mead (1934), 
Gordon W. Allport (1954), Herbert Blumer (1969), Alfred Schütz (2005), 
Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann (1966), Émile Durkheim (2000/1895), 
Max Weber (Fivelsdal, 2002), Erving Goffman (1983) and last but not 
least, Robert Axelrod (1984; 1997). Such theories and models nevertheless 
underpin several of the chapters of the anthology, but it is not the purpose 
of this anthology to provide exhaustive descriptions of these.
In Interaction: “Samhandling” Under Risk, on the other hand, we focus 
specifically on knowledge and competence development related to the 
concept of samhandling, in the context of risk and unpredictable condi-
tions, including more professions to solve common challenges. A similar 
link between samhandling, specific contexts and practice-oriented stud-
ies and cases is commonly referred to as “interprofessional cooperation” 
(Crawford, 2012; Barr et al., 2005). Studies of such complex phenomena 
require both close industry orientation, exploring the unique challenges 
of industry and their solutions, and interdisciplinary approaches. In this 
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anthology, we need to engage with the samhandling phenomenon in light 
of three thematic categories: 
(1) Education and training (educational structures); 
(2) Organization and leadership (organizational structures); and 
(3) Industry-oriented actions and operations (operational structures). 
The term samhandling (SAM) is widely used in Norway, both by 
politicians and researchers, in connection with societal security, var-
ious reforms and sectoral activities, such as emergency preparedness, 
health and education. Collaboration is also focused on in suprana-
tional networks, such as the United Nations and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). At the same time, 
the concept of samhandling is used both at the organizational, group 
and individual levels in connection with strategic management, com-
petence management and training, including technology structures. 
Collaboration is thus engaged in, in all sectors and at all levels, in 
relation to how organizations can prepare for and handle unforeseen 
events.
However, samhandling is not self-evident and it does not occur in a 
vacuum. Samhandling is developed and built up by underlying relational 
processes or structures, between people, organizations and technology. 
Confidence and reciprocity are examples of underlying structures which 
may be necessary for samhandling (Brown, 2016; Stanton, 2011; Torgersen 
& Steiro, 2009; Siegrist, et al., 2007; Fukuyama, 1995). However, many 
studies on samhandling focus on its occurrence under predictable con-
ditions, where the outcome does not necessarily involve risk. Examples 
of this may be samhandling at an office or meeting, or well-planned exer-
cises and scenarios in connection with training. But what if the samhan-
dling takes place in a risky situation and the conditions are otherwise 
unpredictable? How do these underlying structures behave and which 
of them are the most important for samhandling? Can different struc-
tures have different meanings depending on the phase of the sequence of 
events – prevention phase, during the event and the recovery phase? Such 
basic questions are addressed in this anthology.
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Relational ambition level and conceptual choice
In this book, we have mainly chosen to use the Norwegian word samhan-
dling as a term. A meta-analysis reported in the book Leadership, Samhan-
dling and Education in Flexible Organizations (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009, 
see also Chapter 2), showed that the Norwegian concept of samhandling 
has many shades of meaning and theoretical modes, as well as several 
practical aspects that distinguish the phenomenon of samhandling from 
other Norwegian concepts, such as samarbeid, samvirke, samordning, 
samspill, koordinering and teamarbeid. The differences between these are 
mainly at the relational level of ambition, where samhandling is consid-
ered to represent the highest level of ambition (see Chapter 2). This means 
that it fulfils several more underlying processes than the other terms. 
Similar shades of meaning are also found in the English terms “(social) 
interaction”, “collaboration”, “cooperation”, “coordination”, “join forces 
with”, “joint action” and plain “teamwork” or “working together”. 
However, none of the different concepts, neither the Norwegian nor the 
English, may be classified in a uniquely-defined hierarchical system or tax-
onomy. Here it is not the word or term in itself that is most important. 
Rather, what is crucial are the underlying processes and forms of knowl-
edge that are defined within the term. The underlying processes create 
the level of ambition and these are important for practice. However, many 
people make use of these words differently, causing misunderstandings 
and different expectations with regard to the content of the term and the 
practical implications. Therefore, it is necessary to be aware of the specific 
term’s usage, not least where these concepts form the basis for competence 
development and concrete action under risk and unpredictable conditions.
Definition
In essence, we have assumed that the English word “interaction” rep-
resents one of the highest relational ambition levels. These English- 
language expressions equate, but are not identical in all cases, with the 
Norwegian term samhandling, as we have seen. Therefore, we have chosen 
to use the Norwegian verb although the book is written in English. We 
have also been encouraged to do this by our colleagues internationally, so 
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that they can also gain insight into the shades of meaning that we think 
are unique to the Norwegian concept of samhandling (see Preface). How-
ever, and we emphasize this, the choice has not been easy, as the English 
expressions in many cases correspond well. Nevertheless, we have chosen 
to do so, as it may generate further interesting academic and research dis-
cussions and analyzes when selecting terms for articulation of nuanced 
relational processes on complex phenomena (see SUR structures). For 
example, it may be associated with the development of curricula for train-
ing of specific skills in order to improve samhandling (see also Chapter 8), 
where specific areas of competence for training should be expressed and 
articulated in the plans as a basis for both planning, implementation and 
evaluation of human resource development. Another example of the need 
for such conscious and clarified conceptual use is the analysis, identifica-
tion and conceptualization of specific experiences from events, which in 
turn form the basis for education and training.
As a starting point for most of the studies in this anthology, the follow-
ing definition of samhandling is used: 
Samhandling is an open and mutual communication and development between 
participants, who develop skills and complement each other in terms of ex-
pertise, either directly, face-to-face, or mediated by technology or manually. 
It involves working towards common goals. The relationship between partic-
ipants at any given time relies on trust, involvement, rationality and industry 
knowledge. (Translated from Torgersen & Steiro, 2009:130.) 
In Chapter 2, the background of this definition of samhandling is elabo-
rated upon. Here, the concept of samhandling is also explained and com-
pared with similar words and expressions in English. Nevertheless, there 
will be some chapters that do not use the Norwegian word, primarily for 
academic reasons, where the English expression best fits the meaning of 
content in light of professional traditions and articulation. In some con-
texts, there will also be some mixed use, where the author has felt that it 
best corresponds to the academic message they intend to convey. In other 
words, the concepts of expression and choice of expressions in regard 
to relational processes are made consciously throughout the anthology, 
where the main objective is to convey professional shades of meaning 
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and individuality in the best possible way. Thus, it has not been the aim 
to use the Norwegian word samhandling purely for the sake of the word. 
Professional nuances and precision in communicating the message have 
been the main intention throughout the anthology.
Risk and the unforeseen
There are a number of definitions of risk related to different contexts and 
disciplines (e.g. see Aven, 2014:230–232). In a more general societal per-
spective, we also find the risk concept associated with uncertainty and 
dangers related to social development often with the term “Risk society” 
(see in particular Beck, 1992; Nielsen, 2015). In the present book, the con-
cept of risk is used broadly, with special focus on various types of risks 
and situations, and the concept that conveys the particular nuance is 
used in the chapters as necessary.
By “risk” we mean the superset of this anthology, that the outcome 
of an event that develops under unpredictable conditions may be uncer-
tain or unknown. In consequence, the outcome is unwanted, potentially 
a risk to life, property, material or other perceived valuables, in general 
or in a given context. An uncertain outcome can also provide potentially 
positive and desired consequences, for example, in relation to learning 
in an educational context, which is not scheduled in advance. In such 
situations, it is important to seize opportunities to leverage situations for 
learning and/or desired purposes.
There is a close connection between the terms “risk” and “the unfore-
seen” (UN). The term “Black Swans” (Taleb, 2007), is often used as a 
metaphor for surprising and unexpected events. UN in our context is an 
overarching concept, covering underlying concepts with different shades 
of meaning, such as the “unpredictable”, “uncertain”, “unexpected”, 
“surprising”, “unknown”, “unimaginable”, “improbable” and “random” 
(Kvernbekk et al., 2015:31). As the main framework of this book, the fol-
lowing definition is used to describe UN: 
A relatively unknown event or situation that occurs relatively unexpectedly and 
with relatively low probability or predictability to the individual, group or commu-
nity that experience and handle the event. (Translated from Torgersen, 2015:30.) 
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The Nature of UN
“Relatively” is the core part of the definition. An unforeseen event will 
depend on viewpoint or perspective. An event could occur which is 
unforeseen for some actors (e.g. society or emergency services), but which 
is expected and planned for by others (e.g. the terrorist act on 22nd July 
2011 at Utøya and the Government quarters in Oslo). An unforeseen 
event can be described in three different time dimensions: (1) Chrono-
logical time, where the event develops in a causal timeline from the first 
sign of danger (which is/is not identified or ignored), maybe via possible 
barriers, to an event (UN-0). This way of thinking means that, expressed 
objectively, there are no such things as unforeseen events – only signs 
of danger which are not perceived; (2) Messianic time, where the event 
is perceived to occur without any forewarning; and (3) UN-0, expresses 
the exact moment when the event occurs and the time immediately 
following. All events in the two last dimensions will be perceived as 
unforeseen – especially in UN-0 – as they happen immediately and sur-
prisingly. Those who are experiencing the event will, though, as times 
elapses, gather information and connect it to former experiences that can 
indicate the event’s content and possible further progress. 
These three time dimensions are key bases for developing training for 
unforeseen events. When training for UN-0, it is important to focus on 
the ability to register details during chaos, also called “holding the space”, 
for concurrent learning and sensing the present.
Degrees of the UN
These are based on Kerwin (1993) and Bammer et al.’s (2009:293) concept 
of “different knowns and unknowns” related to the concept of uncertainty, 
primarily from a categorical perspective, such as “known unknowns” 
and “unknown unknowns”. However, in light of our perspective on UN, 
a more continuous principle is established. Unforeseen events can neither 
be “totally unknown” nor “totally known”. However, an event may be 
close to the unknown from previous similar incidents. Brand new forms 
of cyber attacks can be an example (Boe & Torgersen, 2018). Such events 
can be found in a continuum between these fixed extremes, denoted by 
the “continuum field”. Overall, an unforeseen event is divided into five 
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main categories or continuum fields – within a degree of (Torgersen, 
2015): (1) relevance (to the target audience); (2) probability (of occurrence); 
(3) how known or prepared the target audience is in advance; (4) warning 
signs (scope/number); and (5) warning time (for given/identified warning 
signs and exercises, i.e. unannounced exercises). All of these factors will 
contain a different degree of the unforeseen. Thus, they are key factors as 
bases for the planning of learning and training for the unforeseen and can 
be included as part of the script and varied during training. UN-oriented 
training has three didactic approaches: (1) intended (known to the direct-
ing staff – unknown to the participants); (2) spontaneous (unknown to 
all, e.g. in a learning/training situation, to be productive elements); and 
(3) hybrid (planning for possible spontaneous and unannounced situa-
tions that are explored in other intended scripts).
UN, SUR and the Bow-tie Model
As a starting point for the analysis of the term “unforeseen” and unpre-
dictable conditions, this anthology is based on a modified bow-tie model 
(Figure 1). The modified model was developed in Torgersen (2015), 
based on similar models used in traditional risk analysis (Cruz, Peters 
& Shevchenko, 2015). The present model focuses on three main phases 
related to the development of a serious event: preparation, identification 

























of hazard signals and development of barriers (Prevention, Phase 1), 
occurrence of unforeseen event or accident (UN-0, Phase 2) and action/
stabilization (Recovery, Phase 3). In Torgersen (2015), different types of 
competencies were required in each of these phases and, thus, differ-
ent educational arrangements for training and exercises for the three 
phases were also necessary. This model can also be used more generally 
to describe a course of events that does not necessarily involve risks with 
dangerous, harmful or unwanted outcomes. The model (Figure 1) is used 
as a common reference model in the anthology.
Temporality is an important relationship in the context of UN (Aven, 
2014; Kvernbekk et al., 2015). This is because the UN crosses the time span 
between past, present and future. The model shows that if any threats 
pass the existing barriers, an accident or dangerous event may occur 
as a consequence (UN-0). This may in turn cause new events to occur 
(SW – Sidewinders), while others may be stopped or reduced through the 
actions or barriers that are imposed along the way. After that, the situa-
tion stabilizes again. After such events, experiences can be summarized 
and lessons learned that can be translated into new practices to prevent 
similar events later.
In the UN SUR Model in Figure 1.1, the UN is presented as a phenom-
enon of the temporal structure. Here, we call the time span from danger 
signals being recorded until the event is stabilized, a “UN interval”. This 
range shows that “unpredictable conditions” do not only occur at one 
point but may occur and vary, taking different forms along the way, in a 
longer course of events within the range. Statistical thinking and prob-
ability theory tell us that the more information we gather in the phase 
before the event occurs, the easier it will be to predict correctly whether 
the event will occur or not. If the event is completely unpredictable and 
comes surprisingly and unrecognized, the UN interval will be shorter 
and extend from the time the event occurred until we have gathered 
sufficient information to feel we have understood or managed to stabi-
lize the situation. An event is no longer unforeseen once it has occurred. 
However, the range can be drawn out because some events are of such a 
nature that they last for an extended period and because they can launch 
causal chains where the consequences are also unforeseen:
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But the more overview and information we have about both the incident and 
the consequences, the more familiar and clear the situation will be, and then we 
move from the unforeseen to, if not the foreseen, then at least the familiar or 
something that has been seen before. Information that is tabled along the way 
during the event can thus contribute to the development of well-considered hy-
potheses about the immediate future of the event, which is, of course, particu-
larly important in cases where we must learn quickly. In narrative theory this 
is called “memory of the present”. (Translated from Kvernbekk et al., 2015:50.) 
Thus, concurrent learning is essential for both coping with unforeseen 
events and utilizing samhandling for this.
The field model of SUR and UN
Figure 1.2 illustrates the main framework for SUR and UN research, and 
this book’s approach is on vulnerability and threats related to situations 
and events occurring in the unforeseen field (outher field) and of what 
society and different sectors are already prepared for and have trained 
for (inner field). “Basic capabilities” means skills, procedures and equip-
ment to prevent and handle events that are already known and which will 
occur with high probability. This must be at the base (as a foundation), 














trained and practiced, and the vast majority of sectors and emergency 
rooms have very good control over this competence. That’s why they are 
successful in many cases.
On the outer edge of the mastery field lies resilience research (see 
Hollnagel et al., 2006; Hollnagel, 2014), which also aims to develop barri-
ers and “resistance” towards unwanted events. However, the basic princi-
ple here is the focus on events that may occur, that is, assessments based 
on the frequency of past events and the likelihood of what might happen 
to the areas in which the assessments apply. There is no barrier or com-
petence here to prevent or master events that are far beyond likely events.
Outside this field, in the outer boundaries of what society can be pre-
pared for, lies the UN field. The core is to investigate challenges and what 
is needed to express the full potential of samhandling in unpredictable 
risk situations, especially when many actors are involved. These may be 
situations related to terrorism, natural disasters, nuclear accidents, school 
shootings, unwanted events in the health sector, but also in sudden chal-
lenges that occur at large gatherings of people, such as festivals and sports 
events. However, unforeseen events can also happen to smaller groups, 
individuals and in everyday life in general. There may also be situations 
that do not endanger life or material goods, but where development does 
not happen according to plan, for example, in the educational context. 
This book aims to investigate and identify findings that can contribute 
to better expertise in the UN field. At the same time, the outer bounda-
ries, DU field, will decrease. That is, what previously belonged to the DU 
field can eventually be incorporated into the inner fields. Formulated in 
another way, the goal is to practice the skills to handle unforeseen events 
and make samhandling at risk more familiar and internalized within the 
organizations, as part of the basic capabilities. This is illustrated in Figure 
2 as the “expanding field”, which should continuously expand in terms of 
competence for samhandling under risk and unpredictable conditions, 
until this becomes part of the mastery field, i.e. that which is already mas-
tered, able to be managed and can be trained thoroughly and concretely. 
However, and this is very important, at the same time, the competency 
perspective must also be focused on in the development and training 
for events and situations that are in the UN field and the kinds of skill 
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structures and underlying processes that need to be trained should also 
be included, as this book particularly focuses on. There are, therefore, 
continuous development processes and competence exchanges in and 
between these fields. It is essential that these do not stop or stop working 
on the development of knowledge even if something is felt to be within 
the field of mastering. Competence structures for samhandling under risk 
and unpredictable conditions will be present in all fields, but are empha-
sized in the UN field. The chapters and findings in this book also include 
this approach. The last chapter, however, has a particular focus on com-
petence structures for the UN field.
The unforeseen and organizational learning
A traditional view of the unforeseen is that there is always something 
unplanned, unexpected or unforeseen that happens and it is impossible 
to build competence and prepare for every possibility. This view is often 
found in experience reports in the case of accidents, terrorism and other 
serious incidents, and is then often linked to causality in the development 
of the event, for example, where danger signals have been overlooked or 
ignored. Thus, UN is used as one of the reasons why emergency prepared-
ness or barriers failed to prevent the incident from occurring or develop-
ing unwanted consequences or injuries. In other words, “the unforeseen” 
may be used as a legitimate reason for the occurrence of events that it has 
not been possible to plan for or take action to prevent.
This book attempts to develop a somewhat different basis and approach 
to unforeseen events. The essence of this thinking is that, to some extent, 
it may be possible to develop skills to prevent and handle unforeseen 
events. In the scientific anthology Pedagogy for the Unforeseen (Torgersen, 
2015), this view was also discussed, both through theoretical analyzes and 
empirical studies, that it is possible to take a step further in developing 
the competence to understand the nature of unforeseen events and, not 
least, that it may be possible to develop the understanding horizon and 
the competence basis for this. At the same time, it is imperative that this 
approach is not merely understood as the equivalent of having a toolbox 
with completed measures. Instead, it is a knowledge-based vision that 
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is based on continuous efforts, with both basic research and systematic 
competence development within organizations.
Some previous models for organizational learning have also attempted 
to incorporate unforeseen events. An example of this is the SECI model 
of knowledge creation in organizations (SECI: socialization, externaliza-
tion, combination and internalization), developed by Nonaka & Takeuchi 
(1997). The core of this model is that competence in an organization is 
developed through a dialectic process (or spiral) between different actors, 
organizational levels and forms of competence, especially in the relation-
ship between tacit and explicit knowledge. In a research interview, Ikujiro 
Nonaka expresses the following:
“I use the example of a strategic planning method – the PDCA [Plan-Do-
Check-Act] cycle. This cycle starts with planning, but in reality there is always 
something unplanned, unexpected, and/or unforeseen that happens. It is im-
possible to prepare a contingency plan for every possibility. In other words, 
ambiguity, chaos, fluctuation, and uncertainty are the given conditions that we 
have to cope with. This is why we propose the SECI spiral. Socialization is about 
empathizing with reality, and Internalization is about learning by doing. In 
short, the SECI spiral embraces ambiguity, chaos, fluctuation, and uncertainty. 
In addition, we even promote what we call “creative chaos” to further embrace 
diversity. Difference makes differences.” (Kawamura & Nonaka, 2016:648).
However, such models focus on competence or knowledge in an overall 
perspective, with less interventional measures to develop concrete sam-
handling skills to meet unforeseen events. Conversely, this book tries to 
identify and concretize more specific areas of competence that can assist 
in developing samhandling skills under risk and unpredictable condi-
tions, through the studies presented in the chapters and primarily based 
on a concept of communication at a high relational level of ambition (see 
Chapter 2).
Structure: Four sections of the anthology
The thematic approach to the anthology is both industry-oriented, sec-
tor-oriented and cross-sectoral. Most chapters emphasize the use of 
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concepts, problem areas and examples from within individual indus-
tries and agencies/sectors, but also draw lines from overall and cross- 
sectoral approaches. The anthology presents 28 research studies on SUR 
(including Chapter 1) and these are organized in four sections, with 
chapters that focus mainly on concepts and educational perspectives 
linked to SUR in Section I, chapters that focus mainly on organizational 
and leadership approaches in Section II, and chapters describing expe-
riences from SUR in different sectors in Section III. Section IV consists 
of the last chapter (28), based on the main findings from all the previous 
chapters, and deriving the essence of a basic theory for SUR, showing 
general structures that should be emphasized to achieve SUR. 
Section I (Educational Samhandling Structures, Chapters 1–9) intro-
duces research that focuses on the concepts and challenges involved in 
considering samhandling as a separate phenomenon in general and in 
the light of competence and under unpredictable conditions in particu-
lar. This is important for learning and improvement processes, including 
educational and didactical models for SUR. 
Section II (Organizational Samhandling Structures, Chapters 10–18), 
presents research focused on different aspects of leadership, innovation, 
learning and organization in relevant industries, agencies and emer-
gency management, highlighting different research methods, aspects and 
shades of meaning regarding the concept of samhandling competence 
under unpredictable conditions.
Section III (Operational Samhandling Structures, Chapters 19–27), 
introduces research focused on findings and concretizing challenges 
in connection with the concept of samhandling in operational and 
practical relationships, different industries and sectors within society, 
including the defense sector, health sector, emergency preparedness and 
anti-terrorism.
Section IV (Theory Construction and The Way Forward for Further 
Research, Chapter 28), aggregates experiences and findings from all chap-
ters of the book. A number of SUR structures are derived from seman-
tic theory construction. These are described in an overall definition and 
visualized in a model, which in turn, can form the basis of a SUR theory. 
Extended learning and educational models will contribute to achieving 
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this. Further SUR research is needed and one of the ways forward is the 
global perspective, where different languages and cultures can contribute 
to a better understanding of SUR issues.
The division into the three sections entitled educational, organizational 
and operational is not only done to create three professional approaches 
or “lenses” regarding SUR. Neither is the sequence of these sections ran-
dom. The sections and sequence are based on fundamental pedagogical 
thinking about forms of knowledge and cycles of competence and edu-
cation in organizations (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009; Saeverot, 2017). The 
core is that learning perspectives, knowledge structures and articulation 
(identification and conceptualization) of underlying processes for more 
general, competence-related phenomena (in this case, samhandling) and 
the dissemination of these (Section I – Educational Structures) in a given 
context (in this case, SUR) should be of importance to the institution. 
That is, the choice of management strategies and organizational struc-
tures, and how competence development should be organized within 
an organization (Section II – Organizational Structures). It may also 
be important for practical exercises in a given context (Section III – 
Operational Structures). Experience and evaluation of this flow will then 
form the basis for adjustments and improvements in a new cycle. The cor-
responding cycle and competence gap is also found in the competence- 
based, quality assurance model “Competence Assurance Framework” 
(CAF) developed by Skjerve & Torgersen (2007). CAF is based on theo-
retical models of competence chains and planning of learning and com-
petence evaluation in organizations. 
In practice, however, both the sub-elements and structures in these 
three sections are interrelated and the sequence or flow is interdependent 
and integrated. The theoretical division into sections and sequence must 
not be perceived as absolute, causal or categorical. However, this theoret-
ical model of thinking has formed the basis for the sequence of the sec-
tions of the book and the selection of the chapters in each section. Apart 
from Chapters 1 and 2 (in Section I) and Chapter 28 as the last chapter 
of the book (Section IV), there have been no special academic or educa-
tional reasons for the sequence of chapters within each section.
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Abstract: In this chapter we will demonstrate that samhandling has a different 
qualitative meaning from other similar concepts. The term “samhandling” is used 
by many organizations, researchers and textbook authors without clarifying the 
rationale for its use (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). The word samhandling is built on 
a distinct cultural foundation. Therefore, we think it is necessary to describe Nor-
wegian culture briefly, to enable the reader to understand the basis of samhandling. 
The chapter presents a definition of samhandling that was originally presented by 
Torgersen & Steiro (2009). Samhandling is distinguished from cooperation/team-
work by three core attributes which we can call the identity of samhandling: focus 
on complementarity, exchange and utilization of the participants’ various skills, 
experiences, backgrounds and cultures, and coordination of these factors in efforts 
towards a common goal in a work situation or meeting. Samhandling has a higher 
relative ambition level than the corresponding processes covered by the expres-
sions “collaboration”, “cooperation” and “coordination”. Increased complexity and 
relations between stakeholders call for a focus on complementary handling in ac-
tion, that is, samhandling. The following competencies were identified in order for 
good samhandling to occur: trust, assurance, well-being, belonging, clarity, time 
and tolerance. 
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In this chapter, we argue that the term samhandling plays a key role in 
meeting the unforeseen, both in predicting the unforeseen, during an 
impact and in the aftermath of an incident. “Interaction” is often used 
synonymously with traditional notions of “collaboration”, “coordina-
tion” and “cooperation”. Different terms can cover the same processes, 
and we can get the impression of “the emperor’s new clothes”. Concep-
tual change in itself does not, of course, automatically provide benefits. 
The term “samhandling” is used by many organizations, researchers and 
textbook authors, without clarifying the rationale for its use (Torgersen 
& Steiro, 2009). It is important to clarify what is meant by the concepts 
one uses. Clarification makes it easier to identify underlying factors and 
assumptions in the processes covered by the term, respond to them, and 
streamline processes in order to improve products or processes. We will 
find that there are several overlapping and complex meanings for these 
concepts, both in literature and in organizations. We will demonstrate 
in this article that samhandling has a different qualitative meaning from 
the other concepts. Since “interaction” has become a popular contem-
porary concept, there is a risk that it may be used as a sales pitch rather 
than a deliberate scientific justification. However, use of the term may 
also be related to new circumstances, such as technology, unpredictable 
and risky events, new organizational structures and the division of labor. 
These are linked to traditional processes, such as “teamwork”, “coopera-
tion” and “coordination”. On the whole, this is perceived differently to the 
common understanding of the terms “cooperation” and “coordination”. 
There is a need to choose other terms to cover this, despite any differences 
that are clearly identified or articulated.
The concept
The Norwegian concept of samhandling, has no direct equivalent in 
the English language and since samhandling is rooted in a Norwegian 
context, we have kept the word samhandling. The closest translation of 
samhandling is “interaction” or “joint action”. Although these words do 
defining the term samhandling
41
not equate with “interaction” precisely, it is still better than the words 
and expressions that might otherwise be used for collaboration and 
group processes, such as “teamwork”, “cooperation”, “collaboration”, 
or even “join forces with”. There are many definitions for these words 
and they are relatively similar in terms of common knowledge, the focus 
being on people working together. For example, here is a definition of 
“collaboration”:
“The collective work of two or more individuals where the work is undertaken with 
a sense of shared purpose and direction that is attentive, responsive, and adaptive 
to the environment.” (Beyerlin & Harris, 2004:18, sec. ref. Nemiro et al., 2008:1). 
In this definition, the act and the situation are not as prominent as they 
rely on the interaction. In such classic definitions, the focus is “collective”, 
i.e. to do something together (teamwork), either simultaneously or fol-
lowing one another sequentially, each contributing to the whole with his 
own specialty. In other words, a kind of collective effort. After examining 
several definitions of “team”, we have chosen Assmann’s (2008): 
“Team is a small, multidisciplinary group composed for a common purpose and 
the members feel a common responsibility to ensure that they achieve results”.  
Assmann (2008:37).
Levin and Rolfsen (2004:69) have a similar definition, but focus more 
strongly on the relationships between team members:
“A team consists of at least two people who have face-to-face relationships, it must 
exist over a certain period of time, establishing emotional connections between 
members, they must have a common purpose and understanding of performance 
requirements, and must meet specific criteria for membership”.
These definitions describe, in principle, a form of organization rather 
than the process or work being carried out, but nevertheless suggest a 
process carried out by the “team”, in which the collective and joint are 
central. Each individual makes a unique contribution to this holistic pro-
cess, complementing the others involved in an interactive development 
process; individual participants not only contribute with their compe-
tence, they also develop and learn from each other during the process. 
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Technology or equipment is crucial in many complex tasks. This is how 
we perceive the term “interaction”, which we believe describes some-
thing qualitatively different from the concepts of “cooperation” and 
“collaboration”.
The cultural context for samhandling
The word samhandling is built on a distinct cultural foundation. There-
fore, we think it is necessary to describe Norwegian culture briefly, to 
enable the reader to understand the basis of samhandling, making it easier 
to interpret and justify the relevance of the concept. Norway has a small 
economy with a lot of international contact. Historically, the country 
has been highly influenced by social-democratic values (Skorstad, 2002). 
Work and education have been seen as important means for participation 
of citizens, creating welfare and equal opportunities for everyone. The 
Norwegian model of organization is based on a belief in rules and regula-
tions, but in an informal manner. In Norway, there has been a long tradi-
tion of tri-party collaboration, between the authorities, representatives of 
both employers and employees, working in close cooperation to develop 
organizations. The Norwegian Labor Act of 1978 can be seen as a result of 
this. This legislation places a great deal of emphasis on medvirkning, the 
Norwegian term for “participation”. In Norway, this is perceived as a value 
in itself, worth striving for. In Hofstede’s (1991) taxonomy, the Norwegian 
culture is characterized by low power distance and “feminine” values. 
Justice and caring for others are seen as important values. A central value 
in the culture is cultural difference is to limit power aspects (Skarpenes, 
2007). In Norway, as in other Nordic countries, trust is seen as important 
and as a value in itself. Trust is seen as being more beneficial and having 
lower transactional costs than control. This has led international figures 
to advocate looking to the Nordic countries, in developing concepts for 
efficient economic practices (Covey, 2003). However, the Norwegian, or 
rather Nordic view of trust must be seen in relation to both historical and 
cultural contexts. Samhandling can be seen from a perspective of valuing 
interaction and trust, as a means of developing organizations and efforts 
in the community. 
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The technological context for samhandling
We see that technology play an increased role in modern society. The tech-
nological elements play an increasing role for samhandling. One example 
is the F-35 that has several advanced censors that enable it to communicate 
more efficiently with forces on the ground, with other aircrafts and ships 
(Figure 2.1). It collects and distribute information better and provide a better 
situational understanding and alignment which again create a better frame-
work for decision making and in particular meeting the unforeseen. 
Figure 2.1 Illustration of the concept of F-35 (The Joint Strike Fighter) where samhandling is a 
holistic principle. Many actors are involved and there is flow of information between all actors 
(network).
In order to utilize the weapon platform; samhandling, decision making 
processes, plans and procedures need to be developed accordingly to use 
the capacity of the weapon platform. 
Definition of samhandling
Based on a study of 15 organizations (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009), which we 
extracted from the aforementioned examples in table 2.1, we have devel-
oped this definition of samhandling: 
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“Samhandling is an open and mutual communication and development between 
participants, who develop skills and complement each other in terms of expertise, 
either directly, face-to-face, or mediated by technology or by hand power. It in-
volves working towards common goals. The relationship between participants at 
any given time relies on trust, involvement, rationality and industry knowledge.” 
(Torgersen & Steiro, 2009:130).
Based on this definition, we see that samhandling is not a process that is solely 
reserved for management and leadership, but also takes place in production 
and common labor processes in which people work together. Samhandling 
is primarily a way to work or act. Central to interaction is “action”, first and 
foremost a targeted action. This action is shared or exchanged expertise – 
often extensive, specialized, and used in a complementary manner (Steiro 
& Torgersen, 2013; Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). The focus on complementari-
ness can also be seen in the work of Miles and Watkins (2007), supporting 
the notion that interaction is more than the sum of its parts. The definition 
also covers the use of technology. It covers the mediation of technology that 
assist humans like a shuffle. It also covers samhandling over distance by the 
use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). It also includes 
samhandling between robots and robots and humans. 
Another illustrative example is the foundation of the dome of Flor-
ence Cathedral, designed by Fillippo Brunelleschi between 1417–1434. 
Brunelleschi had the bricks laid in a herringbone pattern to support 
the inner dome. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2. King (2000) explains 
this as an action and reaction between the bricks. We can argue that 
they are the same bricks but assigned different roles, and that the action 
and reaction creates interaction, redistributing the forces of pressure 
outwards and downwards. This prevents the dome from collapsing 
inwards. 
For samhandling to occur, one must also be aware that each participant 
contributes with their unique situational understanding (“shared situa-
tional awareness”), based partly on their own perspective and position 
in the organization, and their experiences, culture, knowledge, attitudes, 
emotions and job satisfaction, including recommendations to the inter-
action process (Sandeland & Boudens, 2000). In other words, while tra-
ditional collaborative and cooperative processes are, in principle, subject 
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Figure 2.2 The herring-bone pattern of brickwork designed by Filippo Brunelleschi (1377–1446), 
for the inner dome of Florence Cathedral, which effectively divides the pressure downwards and 
outwards, avoiding an inward collapse (grey arrows). The white arrows symbolize action and 
reaction, thereby creating an interaction. (Photo: Trygve Steiro, 2017).
to collective actions in common vision and understanding, it is in the 
nature of interaction that different situational understanding is required. 
Furthermore, it is the process or “way forward” towards a common 
understanding or use of the various skills, such as problem-solving tools, 
to create a product or reach a goal, which is unique to the interaction 
process. Interaction subsequently includes an awareness of relationships 
and the participants’ interactions or exchanges (Steiro & Torgersen, 2013). 
Martin, Nolte & Vitolo (2016) have investigated crisis management and 
underlined the importance of the fours Cs; communication, cooperation, 
coordination and collaboration (Figure 2.3). 
Increased complexity and relations between stakeholders call for a 
focus on complementary handling in action, that is samhandling. We 
scaffold on the work of Martin et al. (2016), but argue in this article that 
samhandling is closest to the unforeseen. 
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Figure 2.3 The relation between the unforeseen and samhandling [interaction], based partly on 
Martin et al. (2016).
Fifteen indicators of samhandling
In table 2.1, we have listed a number of underlying processes that are 
essential for effective interaction to take place, based on a study carried 
out by Torgersen and Steiro (2009). Of course, this does not mean that 
the indicators can be viewed as universal to all organizations and busi-
nesses. Each organization must choose to develop the conditions that are 
the most meaningful for their activities. However, the list may still be a 
good starting point for such development.
We believe that samhandling, with the points mentioned in the table 2.1 
and a greater focus on activities and how they are performed within the 
interaction, constitute something that is broader and deeper than coop-
eration. However, these conditions do not constitute a direct cause and 
effect relationship in the phenomenon of interaction, but represent rather 
key assumptions and characteristics in our opinion. In other words, the 
organization should consider these factors in the development of interac-
tion processes within the organization. Awareness and training in these 
underlying processes should be carried out, so that they become a natural 
part of the daily interaction processes. This can be achieved through 
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Table 2.1 Key underlying processes that are important for effective interaction, based on the 
experiences of a variety of businesses and theoretical approaches (modified after Torgersen & 
Steiro, 2009:157). 
Underlying process Explanation




Participants complement each other with their unique expertise.
The Ethical Aspect This assumes that all participants have equal value and dignity, 
respect for each other and are willing to take responsibility in the 
interaction process.
Learning Participants learn mutually from each other in the interaction process.
Interaction Training Consists in practicing the above-mentioned conditions that are 
important for interaction. 
Involvement and 
Awareness
Show a willingness and awareness of the need to contribute actively.
Mastering Tools Be able to master various tools that are part of interactions, such as 




Awareness about the organizational structure and culture of the 
organization; be aware of “what is”.
Power Balance Absence of dominance/power balance between participants, with 
a consciousness that the power structures and the experience of 
these may be somewhat different in an interaction process than in 
traditional teams and cooperation.
Precision in 
Communication
Participants express themselves clearly; the knowledge and use of 
presentation skills.
Role Awareness Participants understand each other’s roles, functions and distribution 
of tasks in interactions.
Professional Logic Development of a common understanding of the language and 
industry jargon. This is not necessarily universal and objective but may 
have developed within the organization and only have relevance there. 
The participants must be made aware of the jargon, to enable good 
communication and establish a foundation for interaction.
Sense Development of a kind of accurate understanding of the growth that 
takes place during a samhandling process, and what should be done.
Shared Situational 
Awareness
Participants are conscious of their own understanding and contribute 
to this in the process, creating a mutual understanding and focus 
which accumulates during the interaction process.
Trust, transparency 
and confidence
Participants experience confidence in each other, trust each other and 
are able to give of themselves.
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The identity of samhandling
Activity Theory or Business Theory emphasizes that learning and develop-
ment in humans occur in the interaction between people and their environ-
ment. Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (2003) have developed perspectives 
on learning, and stress that learning occurs through participation in a 
community of practice. Yrjö Engstrom (1999) links this more closely with 
relationships and processes in organizations in general. The core of this 
thinking is action (“human activity”) and interaction (here understood 
as samhandling) between the individual, the other participants and the 
environment they are operating within. In other words, activity theory is 
concerned with the interaction and the processes that occur in and during 
a business operation or action. In this theory, it is clearly stated that the 
various participants complement each other in the overall development 
process. This means that each individual contributes something unique. In 
activity theory, we find clear traces of complementary perspectives tied to 
both learning and the production of something. High-quality knowledge 
is a critical resource of competitive advantages, which relates the concept to 
samhandling. The less standardized the outcome is, the greater its basis on 
“tacit knowledge”. “Tacit knowledge” can be defined as knowledge based 
on intuition and experience (Polyani, 1963; 1967). Nonaka et al. (2001) adds 
that knowledge is developed through interaction between tacit and explicit 
knowledge, and that knowledge development thus consists of one “… con-
tinuous, self-transcending process…” (Nonaka et al., 2001:15–16). In this 
process, they claim that the boundaries of the old self are exceeded so that 
a new self is created, and that this occurs by acquiring a new context, new 
knowledge and a new world order (Prigogine, 1980, in Nonaka et al., 2001:17). 
At the same time, the boundaries between one’s self and others are 
exceeded as knowledge development occurs through interaction between 
individuals, and between individuals and their surroundings (Nonaka 
et al., 2001:16). Furthermore, the authors claim that it is necessary to have a 
context in which knowledge can be created. With regard to the unforeseen, 
this is a crucial factor, which is also covered in the definition of samhan-
dling (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). Trust can be a regarded as a require-
ment that allows samhandling to function as expected. Trust increases the 
degree of knowledge exchange (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), also making it more 
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likely that the receiver will make use of this expertise (Lewin et al., 2004). 
All this is highly important for good samhandling to occur. 
In the definition, we see that samhandling is a process that is not only 
reserved for management and leadership but also occurs in production 
and common work processes, where people work and act together. “Col-
laboration” is primarily a way to work or act. This includes “coordinated 
actions” (see for instance Dale, 1999). In “coordinated actions”, compre-
hensive and specialized skills are shared or exchanged by participants, 
which complement each other. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the term 
“action competence” to refer to the skills needed to contribute in a collab-
orative effort. Furthermore, interaction depends on both individual char-
acteristics and cultural components – and an awareness that diversity of 
expertise is necessary for interaction. Formulated more specifically, we 
can say that dealing with diversity is a skill. The lack of diversity adversely 
affects the effectiveness of complementary expertise. Samhandling is dis-
tinguished from cooperation/ teamwork, by three core attributes, which 
we can call the identity of samhandling:
• focus on complementarity,
• exchange and utilization of the participants’ various skills, experi-
ences, backgrounds and cultures,
• coordination of these factors in efforts towards a common goal in a 
working or meeting process.
In practice, this means that samhandling is built and developed on a com-
mon understanding, with different skills and knowledge contributed and 
exchanged during the working process. Samhandling is both a mind-set 
and a working method. In sum, samhandling involves strategic measures 
that must be planned and organized, and included in the organization’s 
strategic business plans. The goal is “efficient” samhandling. However, we 
do not distinguish between “effective samhandling” and samhandling. 
If a situation or workplace has developed interaction in practice, then 
“efficiency” is already a part of its nature. However, “efficient” is often 
used in everyday speech and strategic terms, usually to emphasize that a 
measure is effective and that it helps to achieve set objectives and results 
in a satisfactory manner. Consequently, we have incorporated “efficient” 
chapter 2
50
Table 2.2 Competencies for samhandling and sources of influence.
Competencies for samhandling Sources of influence
Trust (Norwegian word tillit) Torgersen & Steiro (2009)
Assurance (Norwegian word trygghet) Torgersen & Steiro (2009)
Well-being (Norwegian word trivsel) Torgersen & Steiro (2009)
Belonging (Norwegian word tilhørighet) Torgersen & Steiro (2009)
Clarity (Norwegian word tydelighet) Weick (1987), LaPorte & Consolini (1991), 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2001), Løfdali (2014), Steiro, 
Johansen, Andersen & Olsvik (2013), Fredriksen 
& Moen, 2013, Eggen & Nyrønning (1999), 
Simensen (2005), Leitao (2010)
Time (Norwegian word tid) Weick (1993), Steiro et. al. (2013), Steiro & 
Saksvik (2018), Chapter 22 in this book.
Tolerance (Norwegian word toleranse) Kant (1795/1991), Derrida (2005a; 2005b; 
2000), Torgersen & Steiro (2009), Steiro & 
Torgersen, 2012, Steiro et. al. (2013), see also 
Steiro and Torgersen (2018), Chapter 10 in this 
book for further elaboration regarding tolerance. 
samhandling into our discussion of the term samhandling. “Effective” 
samhandling is identified with the following competencies, four of which 
are identified in Torgersen and Steiro (2009) – namely trust, assurance, 
well-being and belonging. Trust is essential. Based on recent research, 
literature and feedback from lectures, some additional competencies have 
been identified and we present them in table 2.2. They are clarity, time 
and tolerance. On the basis of this, each organization needs to develop 
more specific criteria for “effective” samhandling. 
Conclusion
Samhandling describes something that is completely different from 
“collaboration”. It has a deeper meaning which is more focused on 
interaction, complementary skills, and competencies and how to utilize 
them. Samhandling can be beneficial for occurrences and accidents, as 
illustrated in the Bow-tie in Chapter 1. However, this chapter does not 
provide a standard formula for organizations to develop samhandling. 
Each organization needs to conceptualize this term individually. A 
definition of samhandling is a recommended starting point. However, 
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this chapter presents a foundation that could be useful. In Chapter 14 
(Steiro & Torgersen), 2018, relational aspects regarding samhandling 
are presented and discussed further. 
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This chapter aims to discuss if it is possible to prevent unforeseen events. 
The major focus is on analysis and prevention of unforeseen events with 
negative consequences, such as accidents, catastrophes and acts of terror. 
Such events often take place in complex systems, and failures of appro-
priate organisational interaction and communication among members 
with complementary competence in such systems, may contribute to 
unforeseen events. Risk-analysis methods and tools based on energy- 
barrier models, causal sequence and process models, as well as infor-
mation-processing models, are presented and their applicability in the 
prevention of unforeseen events is discussed. This also includes the Bow-
tie approach, as well as other approaches which take into consideration 
organisational factors and social interaction (Norwegian samhandling). 
The conclusion is that unforeseen events can be prevented. However, in 
the aftermath of the implementation of safety and security measures, it is 
not possible to know which events they prevented, or to obtain knowledge 
about their efficiency. An additional strategy for prevention of unforeseen 
events with negative consequences is proposed.
An unforeseen event may be defined as something that happens sud-
denly and unexpectedly. Such events are seldom a result of an organ-
isation’s operational planning, but they can be side-effects of such 
planning. An unforeseen event may have either positive or negative 
consequences. 
Unforeseen events with positive consequences are perceived to con-
tribute to improvements in quality of life, well-being and happiness. We 
prefer them and like them to happen and consequently, preventing such 
events is not an issue. However, the consequences can also be negative 
and precautionary action is often demanded to mitigate these. Kvern-
bekk, Torgersen and Moe (2015) restrict the concept of ‘unforeseen events’ 
to events only leading to negative consequences. Accordingly, this chap-
ter’s focus is on unforeseen events with negative outcomes, such as acci-
dents, catastrophes and acts of terror. 
To reduce the severity of consequences when an accident, catastrophe 
or act of terror has occurred is, of course, a high-priority community task. 
High priority of emergency preparedness and crew training may improve 
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the handling of foreseen as well as unforeseen events. It aims to reduce 
the level of loss and damage and stabilise the situation after such events. 
It is necessary for society to give priority to loss reduction. However, this 
is not relevant when discussing the prevention of unforeseen events. 
A starting point for further discussion could be to conceptualise events 
with negative consequences as being more or less unforeseen. Events may 
be similar to those which have occurred on previous occasions, but the 
exact point in time for the future occurrence could be difficult to pre-
dict. It is perceived to be an unexpected event when it happens, because 
nobody had foreseen this occurring. When it appears, the severity of 
the consequences may be the same as the previous occasion, but it may 
also be that the consequences differ somewhat from those anticipated by 
examining previous experience. To separate such events from unforeseen 
events, they may be defined as ‘unexpected events’. What characterises 
these events is that it is possible to prevent, as well as stabilise, their con-
sequences by emergency preparedness, crew training and other counter-
measures aimed at loss reduction. 
A truly unforeseen event would be one that has never happened before. 
Ordinarily there will not be any past experience about the characteris-
tics of the specific event or the causal factors that may have contributed 
to its occurrence. Consequently, it would be impossible to give examples 
of such an event before it happens and there is also very little knowl-
edge about the probability of occurrence and severity of consequences if 
it should occur. Is it possible to identify and prevent events even though 
there is no way of imagining what they could be? 
The suitability of risk analysis methods for 
identifying future unforeseen events
In the prevention of accidents, catastrophes and acts of terror, the main 
approach has been to examine and learn from the past through accident 
investigation. Examining ‘causal’ factors of past accidents and catastro-
phes by applying some type of accident analysis method may make it pos-
sible to put countermeasures in place to thwart these factors, preventing 
the same type of accident from happening in the future. 
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While accident investigation only aims to examine causal factors in 
accidents that have already taken place, risk analysis also concerns the 
analysis of potentially-harmful hazards, irrespective of whether or not 
an accident has already taken place, based solely on the existence of 
potentially-harmful forms of energy or other possible factors which may 
have negative consequences if they get out of control. 
Several data sources in addition to, or in place of, past accidents may 
be necessary to conduct a risk analysis (Rausand & Utne, 2009). This 
includes technical data about the amount of potentially-dangerous chem-
icals and forms of energy, available devices on machines, etc. Operational 
data, as well as data on risk sources, reliability and maintenance routines 
may also be included. Exposure is taken into consideration when assess-
ing the ‘level’ of risk as part of such an analysis. Other data sources may 
be meteorological data, data on the possibility of natural catastrophes 
and the possible environmental consequences of an accident or catastro-
phe. Social conditions and political issues may also be important when 
analysing the risk of acts of terror. 
A problem that emerges when dealing with unforeseen events is that 
opportunities of learning from past experience may be scarce compared to 
the prevention of accidents which occur more or less repeatedly. Could it be 
that risk analysis methods and tools are primarily aimed at examining the 
‘level’ of risk when a potentially-harmful risk source has already been iden-
tified and that they are less suited to identifying new and unknown risks?
Risk analysis methods may be divided into: causal sequence and pro-
cess models (Heinrich, 1959; Weaver, 1980; Gibson, 1961; Primrose, Bent-
ley, van der Graaf & Sykes, 1996; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000); human 
reliability and information-processing models (Hale & Glendon, 1987; 
Rasmussen, 1981; Leplat, 1984; Hale & Hale, 1970, Swain & Guttmann, 
1983); and energy-barrier models (Haddon, 1980; Reason, 1994, 1997; 
Primrose, Bentley, van der Graaf & Sykes, 1996). A general problem with 
the available risk analysis tools is that they are only perfunctorily asso-
ciated with a sound theoretical basis. Theoretical perspectives, accident 
models and practical risk analysis tools are often confusingly mixed-up. 
Models are defined as ‘‘theories’’ and risk analysis tools as ‘models’. The 
majority of tools are based on models that do not satisfy the demands 
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for designation as a theory. Due to these problems, the current discus-
sion will incline towards discussing risk analysis without distinguishing 
clearly between theories, models and tools. 
Process and causal sequence models
In process and causal sequence models, accidents, as well as other events 
leading to negative consequences, are perceived to be ‘end results’ or neg-
ative outcomes of a sequence of events. Thus, these models place empha-
sis on events happening in a chain of events, where causal factors and 
effects are defined by their place in a temporal and time-space continuum 
of events and conditions. 
In the domino approach (Heinrich, 1959), an accident is perceived to 
be the end result of a temporal chain of events consisting of the following 
dominoes: social and environmental factors, personality, risk behaviour, 
an event with negative consequences, and injury or loss (as the end result). 
If one of the dominoes preceding the injury falls, those following it will 
also fall. The domino theory forms the basis for risk analysis tools based 
on modelling the process leading forward to a loss of control and injuries. 
Several core analytical techniques or tools have been based on a pro-
cess model approach. Event and Causal Factor Charting (ECFC) is a tool 
for charting the sequence of events in a graphical display. Conditions, 
as well as primary and secondary event sequences ‘causing’ an accident 
or catastrophe, are examined. Event and Causal Factor Analysis (ECFA) 
takes this method a bit further, to determine the causal factors by deduc-
tive reasoning, identifying which events and conditions were necessary 
for an injury to occur. Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a causal sequence 
model which is also defined as a core analytical technique. So-called TIER 
diagrams are often used as part of the analysis to identify root causes, to 
draw decisive conclusions about why the negative event happened. (DOE, 
1999; see also Sklet, 2002)
Process and causal sequence models have been criticised because 
organisational factors in accidents have not been taken into consideration. 
The first to address this was Weaver’s (1980) modified domino model. In 
this model, direct causal factors are separated from operational errors. 
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Introducing the latter type of errors recognises the role of management 
and organisational factors in a chain of events. SHE-management models 
and analysis methods have further developed the focus on such factors. 
Another critique of the domino theory was the focus on one, single, tempo-
ral chain of events, excluding the possibility of examining communication 
processes and social interaction. Benner’s (1975) process theory takes into 
consideration that there could be several participants and parallel, tempo-
ral chains of events. It focuses on communication and social interaction as 
causal factors in accidents and events with other negative consequences.
The STEP analysis tool (Hendrick & Benner, 1987) is based on the 
idea that several participants and actions in temporal and time chains 
of events should be the subjects of analysis. Analysis is not restricted to a 
single linear sequence, as is the case in core analytical techniques. It takes 
into consideration that several activities can take place at the same time. 
This also makes it possible to examine the role of social interaction and 
communication in an organisational setting. 
MTO analysis is a tool which constructs an events and causes dia-
gram, integrating change analysis and barrier analysis in a temporally- 
organised chart of events and causes. A checklist of basic failures includes 
organisational factors, management, technology deficiencies, work man-
agement, social interaction and communication, as well as issues related 
to instructions and procedures, education and competence, and environ-
mental factors (Bento, 1999). 
Process models and risk analysis tools based on such models employ 
a temporal conception of events on a timeline, leading forward to a loss 
of control and injuries. An event preceding the next is conceived to be 
part of the ‘explanation’ of the forthcoming event. Using such a concep-
tion, the timeline understanding of events may easily become mixed 
up with causality, in a way that does not fulfil experimental require-
ments for inferring causality. However, causal factors can be conceived 
from a theoretical as well as a pragmatic point of view. From the prag-
matic perspective, a causal factor is conceived to be one which gives 
the power to control the risk source through manipulation (Rasmussen, 
1990). A thorough definition of causality is not the subject of the current 
discussion.
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Process model-based analytical tools seem to be well-suited to analys-
ing accidents, catastrophes and other events leading to negative conse-
quences, to prevent identical or similar events happening in the future. 
The process, as well as the end result, with positive or negative conse-
quences, has to be known in advance. For analysing unforeseen events 
and the role of communication and social interaction, core analytical 
techniques seem to be inadequate. However, what is interesting about 
several of the process models and analytical tools is that they link acci-
dents, catastrophes and other events with negative consequences to the 
interaction of technical, organisational and social factors. Some of these 
models and analysis tools, such as STEP analysis, seem to be suitable for 
examining the role of social interaction and communication. 
Human reliability and  
information-processing models
In this group of approaches, injuries and loss are perceived as the result of 
‘human error’, caused by limitations in human information-processing 
capacity. The theoretical foundation is provided by psychological infor-
mation processing theories (e.g. Deutsch & Deutsch, 1973; Neisser, 1967, 
Kahneman, 1973). A ‘mismatch’ between system demands and individual 
behaviour is perceived to be the core causal factor in human error. 
Rigby (1970) conceives of human error as behaviour exceeding the 
limits of tolerance within the system in which the person operates, i.e. 
a ‘deviation’ from the norms of the system. Swain and Guttman (1983) 
define human error as an ‘out-of-tolerance action’, in which the limits of 
tolerable performance are defined by the system. In this approach, errors 
are understood to be natural outgrowths of an unfavourable combination 
of people and the situation in which they act. 
In Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), Swain and Guttmann (1983) 
define human error as an act in which a person fails to either carry out 
something correctly, do something as expected, or do something in time. 
Incorrect human outputs are separately categorised as errors of omission 
and errors of commission. Errors of omission occur when someone either 
omits one step in a task or the entire task. Errors of commission comprise 
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selection errors (e.g. reversals and wrong commands), errors of sequence, 
errors of timing (too early or too late), and quantitative errors (too little 
or too much). 
The THERP analysis tool (Swain & Guttmann, 1983) is based on this 
perspective. Estimation of the probability for deviation in task perfor-
mance consists of defining all the possible fault conditions, mapping tasks 
associated with these conditions, estimating the probability of human 
error, evaluating the consequences of these acts, and proposing counter-
measures. The definition of human error is a functional evaluation of the 
consequences of behaviour. Human error is conceived in the same way as 
technical failures. Thus, the human ‘component’ may be overloaded and 
fail in the same manner as technical or mechanical components‘’.
Human reliability analysis has been criticized for the following rea-
sons: The approach is normative. It does not take into consideration the 
complexity of human behaviour. The empirical basis which analysis is 
based on is insufficient and the approach fails to take into consideration 
that the same causal factors may cause errors of omission as well as errors 
of commission (Hale & Glendon, 1987). The approach contributes to an 
explanation but not to an understanding of the role of human error in 
accidents and catastrophes. The core focus of analysis is on information- 
processing capacity;communication and social interaction are not taken 
sufficiently into consideration in analysis, neither as causal factors in 
accidents nor causal factors in accident prevention. It is also less suitable 
for explaining acts of terror. 
A more comprehensive model, proposed by Hale and Glendon (1987), 
integrates elements from several other models. It includes LePlat’s (1984) 
model of safe behaviour, which is based on Rasmussen’s (1981) three levels 
of cognitive functioning, as well as Surrey’s (1968) two-level model. Human 
behaviour can either be skill-based, rule-based or knowledge-based. Skill-
based behaviour is automatically activated in a situation based on obser-
vation. Rule-based behaviour is based on interpretation. It is controlled 
through rules and instructions. Knowledge-based behaviour is based on 
goals and plans to reach goals. Through training, knowledge-based behav-
iour may become rule-based and rule-based behaviour may become skill-
based. Surry (1968) introduces a two-level model distinguishing between 
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the build-up of potentially-hazardous risks and the loss of control. In his 
model, human perception, interpretation, decision-making and action 
are analysed separately in each of the two steps. Hale and Glendon (1987) 
integrate these steps into their model, which distinguishes between input, 
throughput, and output. In this model, the input phase consists of hazard 
identification through the three levels of cognitive-based behaviour (no 
warning signs, warnings, and identification of danger). The throughput 
phase identifies whether or not there is a need for precautionary action. 
If the process of hazard identification has failed, the danger will not be 
controlled and the real risk may continue to be present, or the level of real 
risk may increase. Whether or not the danger is brought under control 
depends on the results of the output phase, i.e. whether or not responsibil-
ity is taken for the implementation of countermeasures, whether or not the 
necessary procedures for how to carry out safety measures are known to 
those responsible for implementation, and whether or not precautionary 
and mitigation measures have been carried out. In addition to the two 
loops presented, the model also contains several other loops. 
The model places the lack of identification of deviations in the input 
phase. In the control of danger, either warning signs of danger or haz-
ard identification must be successful to bring the danger under control. A 
lack of problem identification may be the core reason that an event with 
negative consequences is deemed ‘unforeseen’. This model is classified as 
a systems approach to the control of danger. It specifies cognitive informa-
tion processes, individual-level decisions and behaviour. However, neither 
communication, interaction and social interaction nor contextual factors 
are specified at the same level of detail. Specific contextual factors, e.g. 
situational, organisational and community-related factors that influence 
individual behaviour, are not taken properly into consideration. Hale and 
Glendon’s (1987) model explains very well why accidents can be unexpected 
and even unforeseen, although this was not their primary intention. 
Energy-barrier models
The Bow-tie method (Primrose, Bentley, van der Graaf & Sykes, 1996) is 
one of the most increasingly-accepted and best methods for analysing 
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risks (Crerand, 2005; see also Ruijter & Guldemund, 2016). It can be clas-
sified primarily as an energy-barrier model. However, temporal aspects 
are also given attention. It combines several other analytical methods and 
approaches previously known within risk analysis. To understand the 
strengths and limitations of this method, it needs to be discussed in the 
light of preceding energy-barrier models and approaches to which it relates.
In energy-barrier models (Haddon, 1980), an injury or an event with 
other negative consequences is perceived to take place when energy is 
transferred to the human body. When the energy is above the tolerance 
threshold of the body, this causes an injury. Injuries can be prevented, 
either by placing barriers directly on the energy source, separating the 
energy from the human, or enhancing human resilience, e.g. using per-
sonal protective equipment. In barrier analysis, the hazards, the target of 
the hazard, as well as the barriers have to be identified. The barriers can 
be physical as well as communication and management-related. 
Analysis methods based on the energy-barrier model are suitable pri-
marily when hazards can be identified (DOE, 1999; see also Sklet, 2002). 
In barrier analysis, the hazard or potentially-damaging energy as well as 
the possible target have to be identified. Physical and well as management 
barriers are considered; the latter is more difficult to identify than the 
former. After having identified the barriers, probable causes of barrier 
failure and their consequences are investigated. 
Change analysis aims to examine all deviations in a system that cause 
negative outcomes, by comparing an accident-free situation with an acci-
dent and identifying the differences and their consequences. Accident 
Analysis and Barrier Function analysis are methods of analysis which 
examine ineffective, non-existent and effective barrier functions. In this 
type of analysis, the organisational context as well as the technical sys-
tems are taken into account when analysing past accidents to propose 
effective countermeasures. The BORA analysis method is another tool for 
analysis of barriers, especially suited to the offshore oil and gas extraction 
industry (see Rausand & Utne, 2009, for a thorough description of this 
analysis method).
The logical tree model (Johnson, 1980) is also based on the assumption 
that potentially-harmful forms of energy are causal factors in accidents. 
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Such events could be prevented by countermeasures, which consist of barri-
ers that prevent energy from reaching the human body, for example. MORT 
(Johnsen, 1980) as well as SMORT (Kjellén et al., 1987) are logical tree models, 
based on the identification of specific control factors and management- 
system factors. Causal factors are identified using generic questions. 
These methods are all practical tools for analysing how to prevent inju-
ries and damage. Energy-barrier models focus primarily on the period 
following a ‘deviation’ in a sequence of events. The period before the devi-
ation is not perceived to be a relevant subject for analysis. In the case of 
unforeseen events, hazards as well as their targets are usually unknown. 
These risk analysis methods are not well suited to dealing with such 
events. 
Energy and barrier models are often interchanged with process and 
causal sequence models. Change analysis is also partly a process model. 
The same applies to Accident Analysis and Barrier Function analysis. The 
TRIPOD and Bow-tie models can also be classified as energy-barrier and 
process models, as well as causal sequence models. 
The ‘Swiss cheese model’ (Reason, 1990) is the approach which lies 
behind the TRIPOD as well as the Bow-tie model (Alizadeh & Mos-
hashaei, 2015). Reason (1990) distinguished between active (tokens) and 
latent failures (types). Active failures are errors and violations with an 
immediate negative effect or consequence, usually committed by front-
line operators, crews and traffic controllers etc. In Reason’s model, these 
types of failures include unsafe acts and inadequate defences in interac-
tion with local events. Latent failures, on the other hand, are manage-
ment actions and decisions that have no immediate ‘effect’. They may lay 
‘dormant’ for a period of time, only becoming evident when combined 
with factors such as active failures, technical faults or atypical system 
conditions (Reason, 1990). Latent failures include fallible decisions, line 
management deficiencies and psychological precursors of unsafe acts. 
Unsafe acts are slips, lapses and violations. Psychological precursors 
of unsafe acts include factors such as time pressure and lack of opera-
tor-safety motivation (Reason, 1994; 1997).
In a risk-management system based on this approach, the first infor-
mation loop is the reporting of accidents, injuries and other events with 
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negative consequences. The problem is that this type of information, in 
most cases, is provided too late for proactive measures. The second loop 
consists of identifying and observing unsafe acts at the lower supervisory 
level of an organisation or a system. According to Reason (1990), the most 
effective loop systems are those that identify line management deficien-
cies (loop 3) and psychological precursors of unsafe acts (loop 4). In the 
prevention of accidents and catastrophes, it is more efficient to focus on 
these loops, i.e. on ‘types’ rather than ‘tokens.’ Thus, in the complete TRI-
POD model, organisational failures are conceived to be the main causal 
factors because they may contribute to breaches in barriers during oper-
ational disturbances (Groeneweg, 1998). 
This method identifies basic risk factors for latent failures. An effective 
safety-management system consists of eliminating or reducing the effects 
of the latent failures identified in the model, thereby preventing psycho-
logical precursors, human behaviour that is ‘out of tolerance’ with the 
system, as well as operational imbalances. 
The Bow-tie method, which has been used extensively in the offshore 
oil and gas extraction industry and several other industries (Pidgeon, 
May, Perry & Poppy, 2007), combines fault tree analysis, causal factor 
charting, and event tree analysis (Lewis & Smith, 2010). It is related to 
the TRIPOD in several ways. However, it is debatable whether or not it 
is a step in the right direction when compared to the emphasis placed on 
organisational and social factors in the TRIPOD, in relation to the capac-
ity to understand latent failures in complex and unforeseen events. The 
Bow-tie analysis diagram shows the threats, hazards and consequences 
and aims to identify barriers or control measures, as well as recovery 
measures. Pre and post events are analysed. Barriers show mitigation 
activities (Pidgeon et al., 2007). 
Kvernbekk, Torgersen and Moe (2015) present a modified and extended 
Bow-tie model (see also Chapter 1), especially suited to analysing unfore-
seen events. In addition to being an energy-barrier model, the Bow-tie 
method is also a process model, where the interval between registrations of 
‘warning signs’ prior to an undesirable event is perceived to be important 
for prevention as well as the success of recovery. However, what character-
ises unforeseen events is that the potentially-dangerous hazards leading up 
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to the event are not identified. How it is possible to identify early warning 
signs of non-identified hazards needs to be thoroughly explained. 
To prevent unforeseen events, according to the Bow-tie model, it is 
necessary to focus on warning signs of potentially-hazardous energy that 
could get out of control, i.e. active failures. This type of indicator is related 
to the chain of events leading to loss of control. Typically, they take place 
on a timeline temporally close to the event with negative consequences, 
which means they are active failures. The chain of events will be specific 
and unique for each case or occurrence. Directing efforts at identifying 
active errors as a prevention strategy will not be effective unless identi-
cal events happen repeatedly. Therefore, it should also be explained why 
priority should be given to early identification of active failures in the 
identification of unforeseen events.
Fortunately, major accidents and catastrophes rarely happen and they 
are unique events. The same is true of acts of terror. Unforeseen events 
are also characterised by failures that are unique for each single event. 
It could be argued that when the temporal line of failures is unique, risk 
analysis methods which focus only on active failures and ‘tokens’ will not 
be suitable tools for examining unforeseen events.
Contrary to ‘tokens,’ ‘types’ are latent failures caused by fallible deci-
sions at society and managerial level. What is typical for these types of 
failures is that each of them may cause several different temporal chains 
of actions. By focusing on ‘types’ instead of ‘tokens,’ it is possible to pre-
vent many different action chains which may have negative outcomes. 
Countermeasures aimed at preventing such failures may prevent many 
different action chains and active failures. After the implementation of 
such countermeasures, it will not be exactly clear what types of unfore-
seen events they have prevented. Therefore, it will also be impossible after-
wards to learn anything about which events that have been prevented. 
The core aim of the current paper is to answer the question of whether 
or not it is possible to prevent unforeseen events with negative conse-
quences using risk analysis to identify hazards and warning signals of 
forthcoming injuries and losses. The answer to the question is yes, it is 
possible, but efforts have to focus on latent failures and types. As shown, 
several of the core analytical methods (perhaps even the majority), along 
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with other methods which do not take social interaction into considera-
tion, have limited interest as analytical tools when aiming to analyse rare 
and unforeseen events. However, analytical tools that include examina-
tion of social interaction and parallel temporal chains of events also have 
limitations when it comes to understanding the types of events in focus 
in this chapter. The appropriate accident and risk analysis methods may 
contribute to prevention of the unforeseen; however, learning from past 
experience is not possible, because knowledge about what has been pre-
vented cannot be obtained using these types of analysis. 
Discussion and conclusions
When investigating accidents, catastrophes and acts of terror, risk anal-
ysis may focus on latent failures and human error. After identifying the 
causes of failures and errors, prevention measures can be implemented. 
In Figure 3.1, this is entitled the ‘first route’ to safety and security. 
This model is based on a basic understanding of organisational culture, 
branching out from ‘cultural content’, which is the latent, non-observa-








































Figure 3.1 A heuristic model for understanding events with negative consequences.
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culture (Schein, 1990). Reason (1998) also relates the Swiss cheese model 
to safety culture. Part of ‘cultural content’ are norms and values. These 
influence decisions and can cause latent failures, which are ‘cultural 
manifestations’ that can be observed and analysed. All available accident 
analysis and risk analysis methods are based on the ‘first route’. This is 
mainly a temporal route based on accident and risk analysis approaches.
However, a ‘second route’ could also be proposed (Figure 3.1). Fortu-
nately, accidents, catastrophes and acts of terror do not happen often. 
Because they cause attention when they occur, they may also be perceived 
to be more frequent than they really are. The ‘second route’ in prevention 
of negative events is, accordingly, to explain why negative events occur so 
rarely. Most of the time, events with negative consequences do not happen, 
which makes it of interest to know why. Unlike the majority of risk analy-
sis methods and tools, the ‘second route’ is not concerned with analysing 
specific events that have either happened or could happen in the future. 
The interesting question is not why accidents and other negative events 
take place, but rather, why they take place so rarely. What can be done 
to keep it that way? The ‘second route’ is a non-temporal route based on 
a set of indicators connecting accidents, catastrophes and acts of terror 
to indicators of social interaction, i.e. norms and values, risk perception, 
risk tolerance/acceptance, priority of safety and security, and priority 
of precautionary actions. It may be based on knowledge obtained using 
survey methodology aimed at examining associations between organisa-
tional factors and social interaction. These factors are also connected to 
individual-level behaviour, the status of safety and contingency measures, 
and precautionary actions, as well as risk mitigation measures. Research 
carried out previously has shown these factors to be positively associated 
with accidents in industry as well as in transport. 
The psychometric qualities (reliability and criterion validity) of several 
measurement instruments aimed at measuring all these factors have pre-
viously been examined and found to be related to accidents and catastro-
phes (e.g. Iversen & Rundmo, 2012; Nordfjærn, Jørgensen & Rundmo, 
2011, 2012; Norfjærn, Şimşekoğlu, & Rundmo, 2012; Rundmo 1992; 
Rundmo, 1994a-c; Rundmo, 2000; Rundmo & Iversen, 2004; Rundmo & 
Moen, 2006; Rundmo, Granskaya, & Klempe, 2012). Low scores on these 
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measurement instruments indicate an unsatisfactory safety and security 
level, and high scores indicate a satisfactory level. 
It is interesting to note that measurements of the ‘second route’ can be 
done independently of any specific events or risk sources possibly involv-
ing potentially-hazardous forms of energy. The main focus of accident 
and risk analysis is on factors causing failures in single accidents and 
analysis of other negative events. The focus of prevention efforts should 
be on the opposite. To prevent negative unforeseen as well as foreseen 
events, the most effective countermeasure is to continue doing what has 
previously been shown to successfully ensure that unforeseen events with 
negative consequences do not happen. To focus on success indicators 
could be especially advantageous when the aim is to prevent unforeseen 
events.
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The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how a Workshop-Didaktik1 
perspective can contribute to the development of cooperation (samhan-
dling). In this chapter, I mainly use the term ‘cooperation’. It is this term 
that is most commonly used in the field of educational science interna-
tionally, and largely covers the same meaningful content as the Norwe-
gian word samhandling. Any deviations and additions to the meaning are 
commented on in the text. The text examines the question of how con-
tingency, risk and unpredictability impact upon teaching and learning. 
A Didaktik model, based on Tomasello’s concept of shared intentionality 
and Sennett’s ideas about the worth of cooperation, is provided in this 
chapter. This Workshop-Didaktik answers the question of how people 
can be prepared for cooperation in a complex and changing world, which 
is determined by a combination of uncertainty and contingency.
Risks are estimations of possible (harmful) events that are a part of 
people’s knowledge. The experience of risk results in the collapse of onto-
logical security and a sense of fundamental vulnerability (Giddens, 1990). 
Risk experiences are a mode of considering and mapping the social and 
cultural world. The benchmark for measuring this is the person’s indi-
vidual conceptualization of a meaningful human existence (Bauman, 
1998). However, current society’s complexity contributes to placing risks 
out of reach; there is no place or space for them. Furthermore, there are 
parties (individuals, teams, organizations, governments) that cause risk 
while deciding between different solutions to problems. Such risk pro-
duction makes it impossible to attribute clear causes. Decisions made 
about actions not only contribute to a complex reality, but cause unin-
tended and unpredictable side-effects (contingency). This is also true of 
the development of cooperation. 
Cooperation is the ability to create with others joint intentions and 
joint commitments in cooperative endeavours. It is a human behaviour 
that is functionally integrated and the respective partners have mutually 
agreed upon it in several ways. Furthermore, cooperation is structured by 
1 The German term Didaktik characterizes various theories and research approaches about how 
teaching can instigate learning of content. I will explain that concept more fully presently. 
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the processes of partners’ joint attention and mutual knowledge. Such an 
understanding of cooperation combines both aspects of collective work 
(Beyerlein & Harris, 2004:18) and (mutual) communication processes 
about knowledge (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009:153). 
Contingency
Historically, people’s courses of action have always been challenged by sev-
eral possible alternatives or unforeseen circumstances. Risks (social, eco-
nomic, environmental etc.) are intrinsic in postmodern society; they are 
unpredictable and uncontrollable since the future is unknown (Beck, 1992). 
Such complexity is inherent in postmodern society and causes contin-
gency. As a key concept in postmodern societies, contingency encompasses 
complexity, openness, unpredictability and flexibility. On the one hand, 
contingency describes people’s life experiences, like ambivalence of values, 
insecurity, risk or disorientation. On the other hand, one finds experiences 
like freedom, play and enablement. In other words, contingency describes 
man’s state of being between complete determination and complete inde-
terminacy. However, being part of such processes means that people can-
not avoid having to act. To be able to act, people have to select their actions. 
Significantly, people know that their actions are ‘also being possible other-
wise’ (Luhmann, 1995:25). This ‘also being possible otherwise knowledge 
causes people’s and societies’ developments to be unpredictable and uncon-
trollable. In short, contingency is the basic condition for cooperation and 
educational concepts for cooperation have to take this into consideration.
Contingency and Didaktik 
In education, contingency phenomena (competence, skills, behaviour) 
are presented as ill-defined problems (Hopmann, 2003; Werler, 2015). 
Educational problems (defined in the present, based on knowledge from 
the past and assumptions about the future) appear to be ill-defined, 
since there are no commonly-agreed solutions, and anticipated solutions 
(projections of a desirable future) are a matter of opinion. Ill-defined 
problems are characterised by a highly-complex structure and by doubts 
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regarding the completeness with which a problem can be clarified. In 
addition, such problems cannot be solved by obvious means or methods 
(since it is not knowable what result ‘tools’ will give). At the very least, 
such problems lack components like a clear initial state, permissible oper-
ators and a likely goal state. When trying to solve ill-defined problems, 
one runs into difficulties specifying the initial state, which is necessary for 
formulating possible and adequate actions to modify the initial state and 
reach the goal. In brief, it is hard to find causal relationships in education.
Traditionally, ill-defined problems of education have been institutionally- 
framed (in schools, universities etc.) and teachers have had to find 
immediate, but temporarily-valid solutions. Especially in Central and 
Northern Europe, the ill-defined problem of education has been addressed 
by Didaktik2. The fundamental aspiration of Didaktik is to transform the 
ill-defined problem of the relationship between teaching and learning 
into better-defined models describing how teaching generates learning 
of defined subject matter or skills. Didaktik offers a specific language for 
education which does not originate in other academic disciplines, like 
sociology or psychology (Werler & Saeverot, 2017). Such Didaktik systems 
establish ideas about how and why one should connect the teaching of col-
lective cultural content (matter) with the creation of individual significance 
(meaning) (Hopmann, 2007). It is crucial for the experience of individual 
significance that the learner experiences some of the content as existential 
(Saeverot, 2013). In other words, Didaktik supplies teacher training with a 
well-founded meta-plan, which answers the question of how to impart a 
society’s culture to learners. Such plans bring together fundamental ideas 
about cultural knowledge, and the teaching and learning of this knowledge. 
In short, Didaktik models are characterised by their aspiration to reduce 
both cultural and social complexity and contingency. However, even the 
most advanced concepts of Didaktik are not capable of developing teach-
ing technology that guarantees learners will learn something specific, 
such as particular knowledge or skills (Werler, 2015, 2017). In contrast to 
2 For a more elaborate discussion of the differences between Didaktik and Anglo-American rese-
arch on teaching and learning/curriculum research, see Gundem, 2004; Gundem & Hopmann, 
1998; Hamilton, 1999; Kansanen, 1995a, 1995b; Nordkvelle, 2003. To distinguish the term Didak-
tik from the English word ‘didactic,’ it is written in German. 
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evidence-based teaching methods, the use of Didaktik approaches gener-
ates flexible and viable solutions for teaching.
A Didaktik for cooperation
Postmodern societies can no longer rely on generally-binding traditions, 
nor is there educational technology that prepares one for the unforesee-
able situations of life. Today’s societies are heterogeneous and, in a world 
that is closely interconnected due to technical possibilities, one encoun-
ters a multitude of different forms of life. To solve the inconsistencies 
of postmodern society, like unpredictability or risk, Sennett proposes 
meta-level cooperation as a sound mean to support social liabilities. At 
the same time, cooperation is not binding enough to require unification 
of the parties involved. It is more than simple functioning and demands 
working together on common tasks.
Sennett’s description suggests that cooperation is perceived as some-
thing positive and desirable. Individuals are presented as parties who 
pursue a common goal in which attainment is only achievable through 
cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation requires trust, which often devel-
ops and stabilises as a result of experiences gained in the course of coop-
eration. Recent anthropological studies indicate that man is disposed 
towards a genetically-determined proto-pedagogy (Tomasello, 2009). 
However, not all cooperation is justified; cooperation is a means to an 
end, and not every purpose has moral or legal legitimacy. 
Cooperation’s anthropological basis
Tomasello makes some interesting observations. Based on his research 
on babies, toddlers and great apes, he argues that humans are born coop-
erative and helpful, and that society later corrupts them (Tomasello, 
2009:3). Amongst other things, the research showed that 2-year-old chil-
dren are already able to collaborate by forming shared goals and dividing 
labour among participants in various ways. This ‘shared intentionality’ 
is identified as a species-unique character trait (Hermann et al., 2007). 
‘Shared intentionality’ is characterised as one’s “ability to create with 
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others joint intentions and joint commitments in cooperative endeav-
ours” (Tomasello, 2009: xiii). With reference to the concept of ‘collective 
intentionality,’ (Searle, 1995) ‘shared intentionality’ is sometimes termed 
‘we intentionality’ (Tomasello et.al., 2005:680). However, ‘shared inten-
tionality’ refers to collaborative interactions in which participants have 
a shared goal, demonstrate shared commitment and coordinate their 
actions for pursuing that shared goal (ibid). 
Even if man is primed for cooperation-communicative acts (Tomasello, 
2009:59), which I label as a kind of proto-pedagogy, it must be experienced by 
the parties involved. Such mutual communicative acts form the basic princi-
ples of cooperation. These communicative acts consist of at least three steps. 
Firstly, informing about issues creates coordination and the flow of commu-
nication. Secondly, sharing of valuable resources allows for the development 
of tolerance and trust; and thirdly, complying with social norms (fairness) or 
showing altruistic behaviour creates action-relieving norms or institutions. 
This proto-pedagogy is fundamental, as it allows for the stimulation and reg-
ulation of learning processes, resulting in the ability to read the other’s inten-
tions. However, Sennett (2012) shows that modern society has reshaped the 
basic ability to cooperate through social processes like education.
Cooperation – a skill and a craft to be  
rediscovered again
The question of how to teach and learn cooperation arises in the tension 
between methodical collectivism (Comte, 1853; Durkheim, 1938) and indi-
vidualism (Schumpeter, 1909; Olsen, 1965, Elster, 1982). However, people do 
not only cooperate to solve a given problem for gaining individual benefit, 
but also because they want to find a common solution. It is not only out of 
pure necessity that people cooperate but also for the joy of a common action.
However, Sennett’s central thesis is that modern society has weak-
ened people’s social (and original) ability to cooperate (Sennett, 2012). 
He assesses the omnipresent project work as superficial and instrumen-
tal. In other words, the division of labour in postmodern society has 
robbed it of its social-integrative abilities. Furthermore, he finds that 
ignorance about cooperation has resulted in poorly-designed institutions 
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and technologies. The ideas behind those entities regularly assume that 
human beings are incapable of negotiating complexity. Poor institutional 
design as well as the outlined Didaktik development have contributed to 
institutions where contingency is not wanted. Essentially, this means that 
the potential for cooperation is incapacitated by institutional omissions. 
However, Sennett argues that learning to anticipate the unforeseeable 
in an ever-changing world is possible through cooperation. A main con-
dition for any form of cooperation is to learn to live and work with people 
who think and possibly act differently. Doing things with others and doing 
it better with them than without them is, according to Sennett, a necessary 
skill. So, the general question then arises, how can these skills be rebuilt? 
At this point, Sennett argues that cooperation is not so much a matter 
of a certain moral attitude towards others as it is a matter of skill. Simi-
lar to Tomasello, he argues that cooperation is an embodied craft that is 
conveyed by social rituals (even if they are often deemed as pre-modern). 
In addition, cooperation is framed as a time-limited activity, which is 
learned and reproduced collectively. However, such activities constitute 
individual experiences based on emotions and reason. In the following 
passage, I will develop a Workshop Didaktik for the learning of coopera-
tion, based on the epistemological reasoning above.
Workshop Didaktik
In the world at present, not everybody can be friends with everyone else – 
even if technological possibilities create this impression (i.e. web-based 
social networks). The same is true of ideologies which served, mainly in the 
last century (and even now) to create a violent differentiation against others. 
Confronted with this situation, Sennett suggests reactivating cooperation. 
Cooperation is not binding and does not demand unification of participants. 
Cooperation demands working together with a basis in common tasks. To 
create cooperation, Sennett suggests re-actualizing the model of the work-
shop, to re-build competencies, skills and institutional arrangements sup-
porting the development of cooperation. In other words, the workshop 
is the place and space where cooperation based on dialogue (rather than 
debate) and mutuality (rather than unity) can be established and sustained. 
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Based on historical examples provided by Sennett, one can argue that coop-
erative work is based on work-rhythm, the interplay of verbal and non-ver-
bal language interaction, bodily interaction as well as emotional interaction. 
In short, the foundations for skilful cooperation lie in learning to listen well 
and to discuss. The workshop model creates a place where people can learn 
from one another while they discuss problems, procedures and results. 
I have argued that postmodern educational institutions and technolo-
gies are ill-designed. As individual performance tests or traditional seat-
ing plans show, the design of schools is based on the idea that learners are 
incapable of cooperation or dealing with social complexity. In other words, 
today’s educational processes are characterised by efforts to eliminate con-
tingency, in that institutional design limits people’s developmental poten-
tial for cooperation. According to Sennett (2012:5), cooperation can be 
defined as an exchange in which the participants benefit from the encoun-
ter. However, cooperation also becomes an independent value in rituals, 
both sacred and secular. Any form of cooperation joins people who have 
separate or conflicting interests (ibid.:5). The main feature of cooperation 
is that it allows people to develop characteristics rather than to form them 
according to a defined image (model). The main target of cooperation is 
to create social commitment that is stable, even if people experience per-
manent differences. Cooperation opens up collective space for interaction 
to solve problems. However, the most important fact about cooperation is 
that it requires skill. To function well, one has to do it well. In order to do 
it well, people need to learn to rediscover what seems to be part of their 
anthropological inheritance. They can learn (again) to cooperate.
In the following section, I will elaborate on two basic conditions for 
Workshop Didaktik. 
Ritual and rhythm
Following Sennett̀ s approach (Sennett, 2012), learning for cooperation 
builds on two stages. First, people have to learn rituals at the workshop; sec-
ond, they have to follow a certain rhythm when practicing them. Rituals 
are a way of structuring symbolic exchanges of information regarding the 
solution of problems. They establish powerful social bonds and work as tools 
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to balance cooperation (close to altruism) and competition (close to egoism). 
It should be pointed out that rituals gain intensity when repeated. Normally, 
one would focus on the avoidance of repetition since it is equated with rou-
tine that might dull our senses. Repetition of rituals does not only intensify 
their result, it also helps to improve the coordination of activities.
Rituals work as an intangible structure for people working on practical 
problems. They have the power to transform bodily movements, words or 
objects into symbols. For example, a carpenter’s tool belt symbolizes their 
knowledge of a trade. Furthermore, it expresses their belonging to a cer-
tain group of people. In other words, rituals ‘condense’ meaning. In addi-
tion, rituals canalise a group’s attention, helping to focus on certain actions 
regarding the solution of a problem. The practice of rituals at workshops 
includes everyone also (although this may be done in several ways). 
However, rituals do not only draw on symbolic exchange and creation 
of meaning. Rituals become established if they are practiced and follow a 
certain rhythm. The rhythm of rituals directs people’s skill development. 
Sennett points to three stages of rhythm (Sennett, 2012:200). Firstly, peo-
ple have to build up habits. Secondly, to expand skill development, people 
have to question the established habits. Thirdly, the modified habits must 
be re-ingrained to improve the fluency and confidence of the skill. The 
following quote illustrates that: 
“Faced with a new problem or challenge, the technician will ingrain a response, 
then think about it, then re-ingrain the product of that thinking; varied responses 
will follow the same path, filling the technician’s quiver; in time, the technician will 
learn how to impress his or her individual character within a guiding type-form”. 
(Sennett, 2012:201). 
In other words, rituals are in many ways equivalent to choreographies, 
combining both physical and verbal utterances in way that can be 
repeated, again and again.
At the workshop
Artisans, sharing materials, as well as a variety of tools, characterise the 
workshop. It is a place of shared labour, for the manufacture of collective 
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products. Within each workshop, one will find that the people there share 
the worth of things (raw material, tools) through applying rituals for crit-
ical thinking. However, a workshop is characterised by its communicative 
actions. Amongst other things, artisans at the workshop traditionally crit-
icize the journeyman’s piece of work. Such critical discussion about the 
results of the work process will normally contain suggestions for improve-
ment or for making the processes more efficient. Critical reasoning turns 
a workshop into a place ‘for dialogical communication and informal asso-
ciation.’ (Sennett, 2012:113). This is necessary to question a habit. 
Obviously, when applying dialogic conversation to the evaluation of 
a piece of work, a person should refrain from insisting or arguing. A 
necessary consequence of this type of behaviour is that everyone must 
take someone else’s point of view. Sennett argues (2012:211) that this 
forward-looking style of conversation will result in less aggressive verbal 
force and contribute to reducing anxiety within the space (ibid.:212) of 
dialogic inquiry.
However, workshops are to a large extent driven by working without 
thinking. The application of routines helps people to keep focus on the 
product. Routinised work is interrupted as soon as unknown problems 
occur. To solve such problems, artisans employ critical thinking and dia-
logic conversation to investigate the problem, and to develop different 
routes to solve the problem, following alternative scenarios according 
to the shared materials and tools at hand. Such collective questioning 
of a routine may lead to better routines. Interestingly, through such col-
lective inquiry, non-verbal, bodily gestures can take the place of words. 
Furthermore, demonstration of a revised routine helps to establish trust 
and cooperation (ibid.:205). 
Nevertheless, cooperation requires trust that develops from shared 
experiences. Trust functions as substitute for security and allows peo-
ple to interact even when conditions are uncertain, established knowl-
edge is at stake or it is impossible to predict the future actions of others 
with any degree of certainty. Trust is both a condition for, as well as a 
result of, cooperation. However, trust is developed only when people 
experience opportunities for learning and testing their trust in others 
(Luhmann, 1995). 
workshop-didaktik  for cooperation in  a  contingent world
85
The Didaktik of workshop learning – a model
In the following section I suggest, based on the observations above, 
(Tomasello, Sennett) broadening the limited concepts of cooperative learn-
ing (Gillies, 2016; Kyndt et.al., 2013). Teaching strategies such as this have 
been used to promote reading and writing achievements, understanding 
and conceptual development, problem-solving and higher-order think-
ing. It must be recognized that competitive and individualistic learning 
traditions have, according to a meta-analysis (Johnson & Johnson, 2002), 
positive effects on achievement and attitudes (Kyndt, et al., 2013), on the 
elaboration of people’s speech-competencies (Gillies, 2014) and people’s 
learning capacity (Gillies, 2016). 
The Didaktik of collective workshop learning builds on the anthropo-
logical knowledge that people are able to engage with others in collabo-
rative, co-operative activities with joint goals and intentions, based on 
shared intentionality (Tomasello et al., 2005). In order to illustrate this 
point, let me give you a fictive example: 
In order to save a child from a burning house, a fire brigade has to 
communicate. This communication happens on different levels. In order 
to succeed in such a task, firefighters have to act as goal-directed agents. 
That means that they must develop some shared goal, i.e. saving the life 
of the child – even if they do not fully understand the situation they are 
entering into. In doing this, firefighters perceptually monitor the goal- 
directed behaviour and perceptions of the others. Furthermore, each fire-
fighter knows that he or she can interact with the others on the basis 
of previously-developed (learned) and coordinated action plans (learned 
during basic training), which is manifested in a joint intention (to save 
lives). In other words, each firefighter enacts both the shared goal and 
action plan. Initially, such shared intentionality (based on different forms 
of language (speech, gesture, symbols) allows firefighters to create collab-
orative and cooperative behaviour. 
As shown by the example of the fire brigade, to achieve a com-
mon target everyone must keep focus on what is necessary. Conse-
quently, each person creates an opinion about his or her role-specific 
contribution – interdependently of the others – to achieve the com-
mon target. To coordinate one’s own contribution, individuals need to 
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know about the possible actions of others. Such shared intentionality 
(Tomasello, 2010) is built up in situations where a group of people solve 
problems and are mutually-enabled to observe and reflect on the others’ 
actions whilst contributing to the solution of a problem. The central 
idea is to build up mutual knowledge about possible actions, through 
group-based reflection about various (supportive or negative) actions of 
group members. 
In relation to other models of Didaktik or instruction, this concept 
does not focus on one source of knowledge (i.e. curriculum, textbook). 
The core concept of workshop learning is the shared construction of 
knowledge (e.g. Searle, 1995). Such a rationale transforms the teacher’s 
role; he or she is no longer the source of authoritative knowledge. The 
teacher’s main task then becomes the creation of shared spaces for dia-
logic communication, characterised by teaching processes, which cana-
lise a group’s attention through collective reflection about the actions of 
the group. To create such collective inquiry about people’s experiences, 
perspectives and competencies, several teaching tasks must be initiated: 
1) Group members have to address a proper collaborative task that 
allows all members to decide autonomously about:
– content-related perspectives (topics)
– processes of knowledge production (e.g. division of work)
– the tools to be used
2) Furthermore, both group processes and the production of mutual 
knowledge have to be given (temporal) space that may differ from 
traditional modes of time allocation. This means, above all, that 
there is a corresponding, extended period for the consolidation and 
work of the groups.
3) To enable group members to reflect about processes and applied 
knowledge/competencies, they must be allowed to construe their 
own contributions (participation). 
4) Several tasks for the development of mutual trust have to be carried 
out. Such processes are characterised by the focus on an individ-
ual’s identity formation, as well as on aspects of role making/role 
taking. 
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Unforeseen contexts
Using traditional models of Didaktik, it is impossible to say how the abil-
ity to co-operate in an unforeseen context (UN-Unforeseen) might be 
developed. This is true even if cooperation is chosen as content and/or a 
form of teaching, which is typically the case in collaborative or coopera-
tive learning (Johnson & Johnson, 2002, Kyndt et al., 2013; Gillies, 2014; 
Gillies, 2016). Beyond that, learning cooperation is hard because it is 
about learning to live with people who think differently. 
The suggested Didaktik for cooperation takes into account several con-
ditions. Firstly, it responds positively to the fact that one can never know 
exactly what a learner has to ‘adapt’ to (e.g. due to the unpredictability of 
materials used in the workshop), because the social and cultural condi-
tions one is prepared for through education are in the future and therefore 
never fully predictable. In addition, the model assumes that the environ-
ment is never fully recognisable for learners and teachers. However, a lim-
itation of the suggested perspective is that one can never be sure whether 
learners have adapted themselves optimally to their environment because 
there is no outside observer perspective (‘God’s perspective’).
As the environment changes rapidly and unpredictably, any strictly- 
limited adaptation to such an environment is dysfunctional. When dis-
cussing the bowtie-model, Kvernbekk, Torgersen and Moe (2015:48–50, 
see also Chapter 1) point to the fact that experience of past events 
determines the likelihood of future events (and therefore also possible 
responses). 
Therefore, this Workshop-Didaktik approach promotes cooperation 
through the consideration of redundancy, non-specificity and risk (see 
Tremel, 2002). Rituals that provide information mainly produce redun-
dancy. Furthermore, an abundance of information is created by rhyth-
mic repetition of rituals, for example, through the repetition of gestures 
or repeated discussion of solutions to similar practical problems. How-
ever, ritual and rhythm will prepare learners for being able to cope with 
non-specific and unknown future situations (Kvernbekk, Torgersen & 
Moe 2015:49–50). Redundancy, (i.e positive information richness), is an 
adaptation reserved for unpredictable environmental conditions and 
changes – a kind of silent resource for the unknown future. Non-specificity 
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is a form of adaptation that is regarded as the exclusion of concrete 
details. It is characterised by the fact that it refrains from defined com-
petencies and prepares learners for uncertainty. Hence, the model pro-
posed in the chapter has the potential to generate communication about 
significant symbols in social actions (Mead, 1980), in order to create a 
framework for cooperative behaviour under unpredictable conditions.
Regarding the ill-defined problem of education, one observes that col-
lective inquiry – building on shared intentionality – does not pay atten-
tion to it. The members of the workshop are explicitly focused on viable 
processes and temporarily suitable solutions. They critically negotiate 
both decision-making and reflection (sense-making) under conditions 
of insecurity. This creates a situation where the workshop members are 
controlling their own learning situation. 
Conclusion
The presented model is based on the assumption that cooperation is 
(perceived as) something positive and desirable. However, not all coop-
eration is justified, because cooperation is a means to an end, and not 
every purpose has moral or legal legitimacy. One might think of coop-
eration within terrorist groups, the concerted bullying of colleagues in a 
company, or the anti-competitive concentration of cartels resulting from 
cooperation between companies. Such cooperation is within reach of the 
suggested model too. 
References
Bauman, Z. (1998). Globalization: The Human Consequences. Oxford: Polity Press.
Beyerlein, M. M., & Harris, C. L. (2004). Guiding the Journey to Collaborative Work 
Systems: A Strategic Design Workbook. San Francisco: Pfeiffer.
Comte, A. (1853). The Positive Philosophy of August Comte. Volume II. London: 
Chapman.
Durkheim, E. (1938). The Rules of Sociological Method. New York: The Free Press.
Elster, J. (1982). The Case for Methodological Individualism. Theory and Society, 11, 
453–482.
workshop-didaktik  for cooperation in  a  contingent world
89
Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.
Gillies, R. M. (2014). Developments in cooperative learning: Review of research. 
Anales de Psicología/Annals of Psychology, 30(3), 792–801.
Gillies, R. M. (2016). Cooperative Learning: Review of Research and Practice. 
Australian Journal of Teacher Education, 41(3), 39–54, http://dx.doi.org/10.14221/
ajte.2016v41n3.3
Gundem, B. B. (2004). Understanding European Didactics. In: Ben-Peretz, M., 
Brown, S., & Moon, B. (Eds.). Routledge International Companion to Education. 
London: Routledge. 235–262.
Gundem, B. B. & Hopmann, S. (Eds.). (1998). Didaktik and/or Curriculum: An 
International Dialogue. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Incorporated.
Hamilton, D. (1999). The pedagogic paradox (or why no didactics in England?). 
Pedagogy, Culture and Society, 7(1), 135–152.
Herrmann, E., Call, J., Lloreda, M., Hare, B. & Tomasello, M. (2007). Humans have 
evolved specialized skills of social cognition: The cultural intelligence hypothesis. 
Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Hopmann, St. (2007). Restrained Teaching: the common core of Didaktik. European 
Educational Research Journal, 6(2), 109–124. doi: 10.2304/eerj.2007.6.2.109
Hopmann, St., & Riquarts, K. (1992). Didaktik – didaktikk – didactics. 
NORDEUROPA-forum, 1, 21–24.
Johnson, D. & Johnson, R. (2002). Learning together and alone: Overview and  
meta-analysis. Asia Pacific Journal of Education, 22, 95–105.
Kansanen, P. (1995a). The Deutsche Didaktik. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 27(4), 
347–352.
Kansanen, P. (1995b). The Deutsche Didaktik and the American Research 
on Teaching. In: P. Kansanen, Discussions on Some Educational Issues VI 
Research Report 145. Department of Teacher Education, University of Helsinki. 
(ED394958), 97–118.
Kyndt, E., Raes, E., Lismont, B., Timmers, F., Cascallar, E., & Dochy, F. (2013). A 
meta-analysis of the effects of face-to-face cooperative learning. Do recent studies 
falsify or verify earlier findings? Educational Research Review, 10, 133–149.
Luhmann, N. (1995). Social systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mead, G. H. (1980). Eine behavioristische Erklärung des signifikanten Symbols. In: 
H. Joas (Eds.), George Herbert Mead. Gesammelte Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp. 290–298.
Nordkvelle, Y. (2003). Didactics: From classical rhetoric to kitchen-Latin. Pedagogy, 
Culture and Society, 11(3), 315–330.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
chapter 4
90
Saeverot, H. (2013). Indirect Pedagogy: Some Lessons in Existential Education. 
Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Scheerens, J., & Bosker, R. J. (1997). The Foundations of Educational Effectiveness. 
Oxford: Pergamon.
Schumpeter, J. (1909). On the Concept of Social Value. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 23, 213–32.
Searle, J. R. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Sennett, R. (2012). Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation. Yale: 
Yale University Press.
Tomasello, M. (2009). Why We Cooperate. Cambridge, Massachusets: MIT press.
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding 
and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 28(5), 675–691.
Torgersen, G.E. & Steiro, T. (2009). Ledelse, samhandling og opplæring i fleksible 
organisasjoner. Stjørdal: Læringsforlaget.
Treml, A. K. (2002). Evolutionäre Pädagogik – Umrisse eines Paradigmenwechsels. 
Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 48(5), 652–669.
Kvernbekk, T., Torgersen, G. E. & Moe, I. (2015). Om begrepet det uforutsette. In: G. 
E. Torgersen (Eds.), Pedagogikk for det uforutsette. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 26 – 53.
Werler, T. (2010). Danning og/eller literacy? Et spørsmål om framtidas utdanning. 
In: Midtsundstad, J. & Willbergh, I. (Eds.), Didaktikk – nye teoretiske perspektiver 
på undervisning. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk. 76–96.
Werler, T. (2015). Refleksiv improvisasjon. Undervisning og det uforutsette. In: G.E. 
Torgersen (Eds.) Pedagogikk for det uforutsette. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 283–296.
Werler, T. & Saeverot, H. (2017). Pedagogikk som språk. In: Saeverot, H. & Werler, 




Human Interaction:  
A Mood-Based Perspective
Kristian Firing1 and Odin Fauskevåg2
1Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy; 2Norwegian University of Science 
and Technology
Abstract: During military exercises, crisis situations give the participants mood ex-
periences. By exploring the concept of “mood”, our aim is to contribute to the devel-
opment of new interaction theory. We will explore three perspectives related to mood 
and the possibility of changing mood: (1) A Mood-Based Perspective: Heidegger  
ascribes moods a fundamental role in human life. Before a human being can think 
or feel something, he or she is already attuned, already in a mood that structures 
how reality appears to them; (2) A Rhetorical Perspective: Even though Heidegger 
understands moods as a non-thematized horizon, our moods can nevertheless be 
changed. Here we elaborate on Aristotle’s ideas on rhetoric as the first systematic  
hermeneutics of the interacting, everyday human being; and (3) A Pedagogical 
Perspective: Pedagogy here refers to learning about the development of humans in 
society. An existential part of human existence is to sense moods and be attuned 
to “the other”. Then we have the possibility of changing the mood and establishing 
harmony. Finally, a conceptual model is presented to show the theoretical and prac-
tical implications beyond the military exercise that has been the point of departure 
for this text.
Keywords: Samhandling, mood, interaction, rhetoric, education, organizational 
learning, leadership, unforeseen.
Citation: Firing, K., & Fauskevåg, O. (2018). Human Interaction: A Mood-Based Perspe-
ctive. In G.-E. Torgersen (Ed.), Interaction: ‘Samhandling’ Under Risk. A Step Ahead 
of the Unforeseen (pp. 91–106). Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.23865/noasp.36.ch5




Interaction is the world’s easiest process, when we are not exposed to 
crisis situations. We are inspired here by the concept of interaction as 
described in the Chief-of-Defense’s fundamental view on leadership in 
the Armed Forces (Sunde, 2012). Moreover, interaction, as described by 
Steiro and Torgersen (2015), is of particular interest, because the authors 
connect the concept to risks and unforeseen events in the Armed Forces. 
In their study, an F-16 pilot and a helicopter pilot address the importance 
of presence in the moment and interacting with the crew, respectively. 
Moreover, interaction also gives us associations to music, where interac-
tion is dependent on management, musicians, instruments, voices, plans 
and practice, something we will elaborate on below. 
We use the concept of interaction for two reasons. Firstly, “inter” 
points to the relationship between things or people – in our case, people. 
Secondly, “action” is of particular interest as a doorway into the analysis 
of the mind, as it is so closely linked to thinking and emotions, as illus-
trated in Bruner’s classic triad encompassing action, emotion and think-
ing (Bruner, 1986). Moreover, action also allows us to look into people’s 
social being, as an action is often undertaken in relation to significant 
others (Mead, 1934). People create “their surroundings as well as them-
selves through the actions in which they engage” (Wertsch, 1991:8). Bear-
ing this in mind, we argue that “inter” and “action” fit nicely together in 
the concept of interaction. 
Another important concept in this chapter is the concept of mood. We 
find that on a deeper level and prior to interaction there is mood. Mood 
is found in the whole situation, in relationships and in people (Heidegger, 
1996).
When it comes to understanding a crisis, we will use the Bow Tie 
Model in the analysis (see Chapter 1), including the three phases: 
(1) Warning Signs (Warning Signs), (2) During the Actual Event (UN-0) 
and (3) Creation Phase (Recovery) (Primrose, Bentley, van der Graaf, & 
Sykes, 1996). The key here is to gauge the extent to which a leader can 
enter the actual event, the unforeseen moment, and make a difference. By 
linking mood to such a model, the main question to be addressed in this 
chapter is: How can leaders change mood during crisis situations? 
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Through exploring the concept of “mood”, our aim is to contribute to 
the development of a new interaction theory, and to investigate the possi-
bility of changing mood and establishing harmony, both in crises and in 
our daily lives. We have been inspired by a crisis situation that occurred 
during a military exercise and using this we will explore mood, rhetoric 
and pedagogy.
Crisis situation
A crisis situation unfolds and is expressed in many dimensions. In an 
exercise at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, a crisis was an 
important part of the participants’ experience. Here is a description of 
the event:
The actors, women from the National Performing Arts College, approach the con-
trol post. The four of them talk together for a few minutes. The guards seem to 
lower their mental and physical guard, perhaps because of the blue-eyed women. 
Suddenly, one of the women takes a step backwards and pulls out a gun. One man 
is down – shot on the post. Mayhem ensues. Was he shot, is he dead? The mood 
drifts slowly. People come to see the stretcher. They light candles, conduct a memo-
rial ceremony. The coaches are no longer tutoring; they are simply there together 
with the cadets. Finally, we leave off for reflection.
We sit there in a circle, 40 cadets and seven supervisors. It is cold, sad and com-
pletely dead in the plenary review session. Then some questions arise. The cadets 
ask whether there is any point in practicing grief and whether there is academic 
justification for this. They claim that the situation and the process they have just 
experienced are irresponsible and unethical. A bad mood engulfs both the cadets 
and the coaches. Then one of the coaches raises his hand; he asks for permission to 
speak. “Yes, please help us out of this is,” seems to be the collective response from 
the others, a response expressed without words. 
The young man starts by mirroring the mood of the moment. He puts the feeling 
of anger, fear and grief into words. He asks if these emotions are not precisely part 
of war. He asks several rhetorical questions in a very humble way. During the 
process, we discover that death is within our profession, something we as officers 
have to relate to and cope with. The result is that we are left with the grief. People 
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are crying. There is still a prevalent bad mood in the air. Our thoughts go out to 
“the dead cadet” and to others we have lost in real life. The grief feels real, it is real.
He moves on, takes us further into death and he keeps us there. He tells us about 
“Zombies” and the people who know about death – and the difference. He uses 
Heidegger to emphasize that people know about death and that this is something 
that is particular to human beings. He pushes on and asks us whether death can 
be a mirror of life, whether the dark can bring us the light. Moreover, he argues 
that today we have been visiting death, but we can put it behind us; we now have 
death behind us and life ahead of us. We can be grateful that we are alive, grateful 
for life. Participants are crying again, not out of sorrow but out of joy. The mood 
has changed. The mood is now characterized by joy, gratitude and love. He tells 
us that the operations must continue, this is part of our profession. We were led by 
the young man, and we declared ourselves ready for battle.
By utilizing the Bow Tie Model, we can interpret the crisis in greater 
detail. For the cadets, the actual incident (UN-0) was “the dead cadet”, a 
case that was written into the script with the subsequent ceremonies. For 
the coaches, the actual incident (UN-0) was “the reflection”, something 
which was also written into the script. However, what was not scripted 
was the fact that both the cadets and the supervisors would be enveloped 
and paralyzed by such a “bad mood”. We will let this story serve as the 
backdrop while we adopt a more theoretical approach to the topic, where 
we will explore three concepts: mood, rhetoric and pedagogy.
Mood: An existential dimension
Although moods are an obvious part of a human being’s daily life, they 
are not sufficiently emphasized in philosophy and psychology. When 
investigating the human situation, our starting point tends to be the sub-
ject and how it structures the world. Heidegger’s idea is that this kind 
of investigation starts “too late”. The focus on the self-conscious subject 
overlooks the fact of human existence per se. Before we examine human 
subjectivity, for example in terms of our thoughts or feelings, we have to 
examine our existence, what it means to exist:
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With the cogito sum, Descartes claims to prepare a new and secure foundation 
for philosophy. But what he leaves undetermined in this “radical” beginning 
is the manner of being of the res cognitans, more precisely, the meaning of the 
being of the “sum” (Heidegger, 1996:21). 
Such an examination is what Heidegger understands as ontological. 
It is an investigation of the human as always already existing in a world, 
as being-in-the-world, and he calls the structures of human existence 
existentials (Heidegger, 1996:49–50). An important “discovery” in Heide-
gger’s study is that on this fundamental level, human existence is struc-
tured by moods.
What we indicate ontologically with the term “attunement” is ontically what 
is most familiar and an everyday kind of thing: mood, being in a mood. Prior 
to all psychology of moods, a field which, moreover, still lies fallow, we must 
see this phenomenon as a fundamental existential and outline its structure  
(Heidegger, 1996:126).
Before humans can think, understand or feel anything, our existence 
is already in a mood that structures how reality appears to us; we are 
tuned in to reality. The fundamental ontological role Heidegger ascribes 
to moods in human life may be clarified by an analogy. The fish lives its 
life in water, and its “existence” is structured by the water in which it 
swims. If the fish could reflect on its existence, it would lack objective or 
“outer” reference points to describe what water is and how it is affected by 
it. This can only be described from “within”. This is also the case for how 
moods structure human existence. They are not objects that we can point 
to, but permeate every part of our existence. The lack of reference points 
means that moods have to be investigated phenomenologically: “To let 
what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself.” 
(Heidegger, 1996:30) Thus, it is not possible to adequately grasp moods 
by treating them as objects and understanding them in contrast to other 
objects. Moods express themselves as a dimension of our experience, 
and not as an experienced object, because our experience of the world is 
always already in a mood, and what moods are can only be grasped from 
“inside” the mood. 
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Another way of putting this is that moods are part of the background 
or horizon of human experience, different from the cognitive schema 
or categories by which a subject structures its reality. Moods are pre- 
reflective or pre-subjective; the subject is already inside and affected by a 
horizon of moods when it applies its categories or schemas. “Mood has 
always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes 
possible directing oneself toward something” (Heidegger, 1996:129). The 
mood we are in shows us what meaning reality has for us and the mean-
ing of the situation in which we find ourselves. 
Since moods are fundamental in the sense of being existentials, they 
affect all human practice, not only the subjective aspects, for example 
emotional dimensions. That is, moods are more than “fleeting experiences 
that ‘color’ one’s whole ‘psychic’ condition” (Heidegger, 1996:313). Moods 
express an existential dimension of human existence; this is ontological, 
not ontic. “In attunement lies existentially a disclosive submission to world 
out of which things that matter to us can be encountered. Indeed, in princi-
ple we must ontologically leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘mere 
mood’” (Heidegger, 1996:129–130). Thus, moods affect all aspects of how 
human beings experience reality. If we are in a bad mood, we do not only 
feel the emotion of anger, but we also experience the car as lousy, our work 
as boring and other people as incompetent. Even apparently “emotionless” 
activities, such as theoretical studies, are tuned in to a mood, a mood char-
acterized by calmness and tranquility (Heidegger, 1996:130). Consequently, 
moods structure all our intentional orientation towards reality on a funda-
mental level. “The fact that moods can be spoiled and change only means 
that Dasein1 is always already in a mood” (Heidegger, 1996:126).
The emotional dimensions of moods
Although moods are not reducible to emotions, there is an important 
connection between these phenomena. Emotions are one aspect of how 
the mood, as an existential background, shows itself concretely. Because 
1 Dasein means literary “being there” and is Heidegger’s term for the experience of being, the 
mode of existence, that is peculiar to human beings.
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human existence is always attuned to or in a mood, emotional or affective 
responses to reality may arise. 
And only because the “senses” belong ontologically to a being which has 
the kind of being attuned to being-in-the-world, can they be “touched” and 
“have sense” for something so that what touches them shows itself in an affect  
(Heidegger, 1996:129).
Moods are the background that make emotions as conscious, cognitive 
objects, “visible”. When Heidegger connects emotions or affects with 
moods, he revalues the role of emotions in human life. Emotions can no 
longer be regarded as only the subjective coloring of the objective situ-
ation that humans are a part of (Heidegger, 1996:313). Heidegger’s point 
would be that there is no “objective” situation independent of the mood. 
The “objective” is always already influenced by mood, for example, fear. 
Furthermore, our subjective, emotional responses are affected by mood. 
This means that emotions are more than only subjective or psychic reac-
tions. Even though they are based on the subject, emotions arise on the 
basis of the existential mood of the situation. 
At this point it is possible to give a brief sketch of how Heidegger’s con-
cepts relate to leadership in crisis situations. As described in the introduc-
tory example, a crisis manifests itself among other things in emotional 
responses, like fear or insecurity. The relation between emotions and 
moods implies that such situations also have an existential dimension. 
As a leader, to respond adequately to a crisis, it is not enough to only 
address psychological and emotional responses. Leadership is also about 
understanding and influencing the mood of the situation. Moving into 
the social dimension of mood may bring us closer to the question of how 
leaders may be able to change mood during crisis situations.
The social dimension of moods
To see more clearly the link between leadership and mood as an exis-
tential phenomenon, the concept must be put into more concrete terms. 
As Dreyfus relates, Heidegger discusses moods in a more concrete social 
context in one of his 1929 lectures: 
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A – as we say – a well-disposed person brings a good mood to a group. In this 
case does he produce in himself a psychic experience in order then to transfer 
it to the others […]? Or another person is in a group that in its manner of be-
ing dampens and depresses everything; no one is outgoing. What do we learn 
from this? Moods are not accompanying phenomena; rather, they are the sort 
of thing that determines being-with-one-another in advance. It seems as if, so 
to speak, a mood is in each case already there, like an atmosphere, in which we 
are steeped and by which we are thoroughly determined. It not only seems as if 
this were so, it does so” (Heidegger in Dreyfus, 1991:171).
Two points are important here. Firstly, the constitution of a group must 
be understood according to the concept of mood. A group does not only 
consist of the members’ shared cognitive understanding or their emo-
tional identification with each other. Heidegger sees mood as primary 
in that it constitutes the horizon for the group members’ interaction. We 
do not first understand ourselves as members of a group, whereupon this 
participation is “colorized” by subjective feelings or moods. The mood or 
the atmosphere constitute the background where the quality or dynam-
ics of the group interaction are played out. The mood shapes the mem-
bers’ being-with-one-another – their coherence or harmony. In other 
words, moods are fundamental for understanding and managing group 
interaction.
Secondly, Heidegger’s point is that a well-disposed person, a person 
of character, may influence the mood or atmosphere of the group and 
its interaction. This would be an important way of exercising leadership. 
During crises, for example, a group’s interactions may be challenged 
and result in a bad mood or atmosphere; there might be disharmony. 
Although Heidegger understands moods as a non-thematized horizon, 
it is still possible to master and influence moods (Heidegger, 1996:128). 
Rhetoric: The possibility of changing mood
In traditional, psychological theories of leadership, an important aspect 
is to create motivation by influencing the group members’ emotions. Hei-
degger’s theory opens up an alternative existential approach to leader-
ship: Leadership is about mastering the mood of the group. Moods are 
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neither emotions nor cognitive-psychological objects, and therefore tran-
scend the psychological domain. According to Heidegger, a framework 
that adequately conceptualizes how the mastering of moods is possible 
can be found in Aristotle’s rhetoric.
Rhetoric 
Heidegger perceives rhetoric as a description of social practice and social 
relations, namely as “the first systematic hermeneutics of the everyday-
ness of being-with-another” (Heidegger, 1996:130). Social practices are 
embedded in moods; thus, Aristotle’s rhetoric provides guidelines for 
how social moods can be influenced and changed. 
An important premise for the mastering of moods is that it is impossi-
ble to remove or create moods analogous to emotions. A mood is always 
already there, and only its quality can be altered: “[W]e never master a 
mood by being freed of a mood, but always through a counter mood” 
(Heidegger, 1996:128). To lead the mood in the desired direction, the 
speaker must first have a sense of the specific mood of a group: “The 
speaker speaks to it [the mood] and from it. He needs the understanding 
of the possibility of mood in order to arouse and direct it in the right way” 
(Heidegger, 1996:130). Thus, there are no objective, consistently effective 
techniques for changing moods. Leadership is about sensing the group’s 
specific mood and changing its quality. 
As mentioned above, the mastering of moods refers to the speaker’s 
character or disposition: “The well-disposed person brings a good mood 
to a group” (Heidegger in Dreyfus, 1991:171). Aristotle’s classic model has 
three elements of rhetoric: ethos, logos and pathos, where ethos reflects 
the speaker’s character. Through ethos, the speakers disclose their own 
authority and appear with their values and attitudes. Aristotle describes 
this as follows:
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is 
so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully 
and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, 




Thus, ethos is fundamentally important for credibility. Just think of 
the “I Have a Dream” speech by Martin Luther King Jr. It is a good exam-
ple of the speaker’s character and values and also appears to be highly 
authentic. 
Logos appeals to reason and logical reasoning. It is about transform-
ing the audience from believing one thing to believing another by taking 
them through a number of reasonable steps. The speakers can use for-
mal arguments, where two terms mean that the argument is true: “syllo-
gism”, the use of reason in a somewhat easier and more flexible way, and 
“enthymeme”, the use of examples. The latter is an inductive approach, a 
type of argument that is based on the claim that what is true in one situa-
tion also applies to other situations (Keith & Lundberg, 2008).
Pathos is displayed through passion and empathy, where the speaker 
turns to the listeners and tries to influence their emotions. The case may 
require the speaker to mobilize the listeners’ sense of anger, peace, fear, 
shame or kindness. There is a difference between leaving the audience 
feeling anger or kindness in relation to a counterpart (Aristotle, 2004).
Thus, rhetoric is something more than a blog, YouTube or TED Talks, 
for instance. The art of speech, in line with upgrading the mood to some-
thing existential for the human being, can be upgraded to an opportunity 
to change the mood, which can bring us even closer to the leader’s oppor-
tunity to change the mood during a crisis situation.
Changing mood
To a large degree, rhetoric is a matter of the speaker’s ability to communicate. 
The theoretical approach might be the traditional communication model, a 
linear model with a transmitter and receiver and a message to be transferred. 
This communication model appears problematic because the reality is that 
both parties are cooperating in the process (Bakhtin, 1986). The receiver 
works actively throughout the listening period to prepare his response, while 
the speaker adjusts his utterances and also considers his opposite’s antici-
pated response. It is therefore impossible to separate the parties; the two par-
ties will be in contact with each other, influence each other and develop new 
opinions that neither of the parties had before the dialogue.
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Rhetoric must be understood collectively, not as changing the partic-
ipants’ cognitive understanding or feelings, but as having a sense of the 
mood of a group and meeting in a mood. Only then can he speak into 
the mood, and by being attuned, also change the group’s mood. If one 
continues with the three classic elements of rhetoric, logos, pathos and 
ethos, the latter might stand out as the most important factor. As ethos is 
about being a well-disposed person and person of character, we will now 
address the pedagogical perspective.
Pedagogy: The process towards being attuned 
The Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy has based its pedagogy on the 
concept of learning from experience (Dewey, 1961; Luftforsvarsstaben 
[AirForceStaff], 1995), where there are three important processes: theory, 
practical training and reflection (Firing & Laberg, 2010). This pedagogy 
has given birth to the crisis situation and the coach’s speech presented 
at the beginning of this text. We were inspired by the man who gave his 
speech, as we have been inspired by Martin Luther King Jr. They have 
succeeded in growing through their experiences and were well-trained 
for interaction. 
The Chief-of-Defense expects leaders to be good role models and holds 
that excellent leadership should be expressed through (1) Mission Focus, 
(2) Interaction, and (3) Development (Sunde, 2012). Interaction-oriented 
behavior means improving relationships, increasing motivation, devel-
oping trust and encouraging cohesion. Inspired by the pedagogy as it 
unfolds at the Academy (Firing & Laberg, 2010) and by music, we will 
elaborate on the development of interaction skills through three pro-
cesses: (1) Instrument, (2) Voice, and (3) Being Attuned.
Instrument
As leaders, the most important instrument we have is ourselves. The 
question, then, is how should we tune our “instrument”? Authentic lead-
ership begins with awareness of who we are, which means that leader-
ship emanates from the resources within the leader himself (Avolio & 
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Gardner, 2005). Leadership development involves becoming aware of 
oneself, one’s own thoughts and feelings, and one’s own IQ and EQ. We 
may start with the sharing of “life history” and “trigger events” in smaller 
groups, where we seek awareness of how the individual’s life story gives 
meaning to the person’s thoughts, feelings and behavior in the present. 
Furthermore, we conduct psychological tests that indicate which “notes” 
we have. The cadets write a leader’s logbook throughout the process, a 
written record of what has happened but also how this was experienced 
and which subjects were disclosed to the individual. The intention behind 
all this is to increase self-awareness of who one is – one’s ethos. We focus 
on behavior, cognition and emotion. The leaders disclose more and more 
of their “instrument”.
Voice
As leaders, it is not enough to have a tuned instrument; you also have to 
use your voice in communication with the other. In interpersonal inter-
action, the voice encompasses both the formulation of words, that express 
what you wish to communicate, and the voice timbre, which shows the 
emotional state the person is in. Thinking and emotion are expressed 
through what we say and how it sounds vocally. In some ways, the voice 
is a signature of who we are. The voice may be the carrier of who you are, 
the actual identity of yourself, in relation to “the other”. Having found his 
voice, the leader continues the process of tuning the instrument.
In leadership development, it is important to use others to broaden our 
knowledge about ourselves. This is why the practice of feedback, which 
involves both giving it to others and being able to receive it, is essen-
tial. Many of the experiences here are related to awareness of behavior 
that others experience but have not been aware of themselves. Hence, we 
argue that feedback is like a gift, giving valuable insight about ourselves 
from others’ perspectives, if we dare to be open to it.
The practice of the processes described above – recounting “life history” 
and “triggering events”, writing the leader’s logbook and participating in 
the process of giving and receiving feedback – all takes place within the 
group. This gives cadets a lot of experience in listening to others, seeing 
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others’ perspectives and empathizing. The way we work here ensures that 
we move further from thoughts and feelings to practicing relations and 
interactions with “the other”. This points to the process of being attuned, 
which is something that may be the core quality for leaders if they are to 
change mood during crisis situations.
Being attuned
Tuning our instrument and discovering our own voice means becoming 
aware of ourselves, our own thoughts and feelings and our own Intel-
lectual Quotient (IQ) and Emotional Quotient (EQ) (Goleman, 2006a). 
Furthermore, we should tune our instrument according to experiences 
with relationships and interactions. Tuning our instruments based on 
such experiences makes us attuned to “the other”; we are developing our 
Social Quotient (SQ) (Goleman, 2006b). 
What does it mean to be attuned? From our instrument, we can use 
our voice – both words and voice timbre, thoughts and emotions – in 
relationship to “the other”. The counterparts must see each other. 
Kierkegaard put this best, perhaps, when he said, “If one is truly to suc-
ceed in leading a person to a specific place, one must first and foremost 
take care to find him where he is and begin there” (Kierkegaard, 1859). 
Thus, we must see the “other” where he is. 
We may also understand the concept of being attuned through the 
term “mentalization”. This concept points to the process of seeing “the 
other” from within and oneself from the outside (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & 
Target, 2002). This ability must be practiced. We must practice such skills 
as listening, querying and empathizing, to gain experience about how 
this affects our mentalization ability. The practiced skills will become an 
integrated part of our leader behavior. This ability provides a good foun-
dation for being attuned to “the other”.
It is in the attuned mode, on the interpersonal level, that mood exists 
and can be changed. At this level, the individuals will then be affected 
and changed. Vygotsky points this out through the law of cultural devel-
opment (Vygotsky, 1978:57). People internalize knowledge from the social 
context they are participating in. The social mood will be the starting 
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point from which the individual experiences the mood and the change 
of mood. 
The nature of the mood can be the difference between unhealthy and 
healthy conflicts, and the difference between distrust and trust. There 
are examples of how human error and bad relationships have been the 
cause of accidents in operations. Conversely, we have experienced a mood 
characterized by flow, companionship and harmony. The difference is 
enormous.
A conceptual model of changing mood
Starting with a crisis situation, we have seen how participants may be 
victims of the mood. Through exploring the concept of “mood”, our aim 
has been to contribute to the development of new interaction theory and 
discover the possibility of changing the mood and establishing harmony, 
both in crises and in our daily lives. For this reason, we have developed a 
model (Figure 5.1) that integrates the crisis situation, pedagogy and rhet-
oric with mood. 














The model sees mood as an existential dimension of humans, just as 
the water would be to a fish swimming in a fishbowl. We have kept the 
water in the model, seeing mood as a dimension that envelops human 
existence. However, instead of the fish, we have included such human ele-
ments as crisis situation, pedagogy and rhetoric. We propose the follow-
ing connections: 
1) The crisis situation unfolds in many dimensions, where one of them 
is mood.
2) Pedagogy is the process of developing a well-disposed person; how-
ever, this person cannot reach into the situation directly (dotted line). 
3) Rhetoric mirrors an opportunity for the well-disposed person to 
speak into the situation (solid line). 
4) Mood’s connections to the elements give rise to a paradox: all these 
processes take place within a mood, at the same time as it changes 
and can be changed by mood. 
Through the elements and the indirect and direct connections, the 
model offers opportunities to change mood. This gives the model both 
theoretical and practical implications beyond the military exercises that 
were the point of departure for this text. However, we should not think for 
one moment that leaders can change mood by simply following a model. 
This can only be done through the art of speaking, an art that enables lead-
ers to establish harmony and get their troops ready for further operations. 
Perhaps we can be inspired by the young man who taught us a lesson about 
human interaction, who turned grief and despair into gratitude and love. 
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In this chapter, we analyze teaching where the goal is to enable students at 
the Armed Forces Staff College to master unforeseen events. The students 
are all officers who come from the three branches of the Armed Forces – 
Army, Navy and Air Force. The purpose of the course is to increase 
understanding of joint operations (Andersen, 2016; FHS, 2015). Since 
conflicts and wars rarely follow a familiar pattern, unpredictable factors 
are incorporated into the teaching (Heier, 2015). Kvernbekk, Torgersen 
& Moe (2015) define the unforeseen (UN) as something that appears 
unexpectedly and with low probability for those who experience having 
to deal with it. Torgersen & Steiro (2009) define samhandling [“interac-
tion”] as “… an open and equal communication and development pro-
cess between parties whose competence complements one another […] 
working towards a common goal, where the relationship between parties 
is always based on trust, involvement, rationality and industry knowl-
edge” (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009:130). The unforeseen and samhandling 
are linked to the Bow-Tie Model, which shows the phases before, dur-
ing and after the unforeseen event occurs (Kvernbekk et al., 2015). The 
tied loop shows the preparation phase, UN-0 (Unforeseen state 0 in the 
course of the event) and the impact phase (see Chapter 1). Group lead-
ers should stimulate all three phases in order to increase samhandling. 
Samhandling in the different phases might change, and the model shows 
that the participant changes his or her role from legitimate peripheral 
participant to full participant in social processes. Based on this, we will 
investigate the following issue: How can the supervisor contribute to 
increased samhandling when facing the unforeseen? “Apprenticeship 
Learning,” developed by Lave & Wenger (1991), is used as a framework in 
this chapter.
Apprenticeship
Apprenticeship is rooted in sociocultural learning theory, which empha-
sizes that knowledge is constructed through social interaction (samhan-
dling) within a context, and not primarily through individual processes 
(Lave & Wenger, 1991; Nielsen & Kvale, 1999; Maguire, 1999; Dysthe, 2001). 
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It is common to perceive apprenticeship as a learning process between an 
expert and a novice or student, where the learning occurs both by the 
expert showing and telling the student how to do something and then by 
the student executing the task or assignment while the expert observes 
and guides the action. Guidance is thus a central form of communica-
tion. The student gains a lot of knowledge by observing and perform-
ing actions himself. In this way, knowledge is transmitted that cannot be 
conveyed directly in other ways (Polyani, 1967). Apprenticeship can be 
perceived as a metaphor of the learning process, in which a student learns 
by observing and being supervised by a master (Wackerhausen, 1999). By 
participating in the activity, the novice learns the cognitive structures by 
observing how the master solves the tasks. This form of learning is also 
relevant in military pedagogical (educational) contexts, in which officers 
learn to handle situations that require both quick decisions, interaction 
and concrete action in unpredictable and risky situations, concurrently 
while the situation is ongoing. 
The more experienced officers guide less experienced officers and sol-
diers through given military cases and scenarios that are often based 
on experiences from actual events. Within this framework, learning 
develops through social processes, thus making the students’ active 
participation in social interaction a prerequisite for learning. Lave & 
Wenger’s (1991) theory of Apprenticeship Learning emphasizes that 
through legitimate, peripheral participation in the community’s pro-
ductive activities, the apprentice gradually acquires the essential skills, 
knowledge and values  of the craft, by moving from peripheral participa-
tion to becoming a full member of group and class. From this perspec-
tive, learning consists in acquiring a structure in which students gain 
increasing access to the experts’ domain; in this context, the knowledge 
of the officers.
Competence in mastering such action-oriented and situational events 
is developed not only by reviewing fixed action patterns in advance, or 
through debriefing. Often, creative and unfamiliar solutions are required 
when samhandling involves many participants. This is where Appren-
ticeship Learning has its advantage as an educational tool. Apprentice-
ship Learning captures the components in a concrete way, which can be 
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utilized in the learning situation. Another feature is that the learning 
content is complex and diverse, often consisting of many simultaneous 
and non-linear events that do not seem to belong together, making it pos-
sible to associate these in a cause and effect relationship. Here, there is a 
mix of experience, concrete prior knowledge of proven patterns of action 
and procedures, and very rapid decisions based on the multitude of infor-
mation. In such situations, it is not possible to stop up and review the 
individual events in systematic order to “transfer learning to the pupil”. 
However, the most relevant approaches to observation and guidance 
in such situations, where an overall picture and diversity of knowledge 
structures are part of the learning process. The central part of this learn-
ing context is how the samhandling is carried out between the master and 
the students. 
Lave & Wenger (1991) strongly emphasize that learning can take place 
despite the fact that the participants do not share a common under-
standing. The apprentice’s ability to understand the master’s work is not 
based on the same perception of what they are going to work with. It also 
depends on participation from both sides in an equal manner. Similarly, 
the master’s effectiveness as a teacher does not depend on his ability to 
convey his concepts and perceptions to the apprentice. It is also a result of 
the master’s ability to control participation in such a way that the appren-
tice can develop. Thus, it is their shared participation, not symbols and 
structures that are the starting point of the apprentice. Central charac-
teristics of Apprenticeship Learning are (modified after Lave & Wenger, 
1991; Pratt, 1998; Nielsen & Kvale, 1999):
• Context-dependent, situated learning
• Active participants
• Collective-oriented social learning communities
• Training in practice 
• Dialogue-oriented coach/mentor 
• Process in a social community
• Contemplative knowledge, different abilities and knowledge each 
have their own value
• Students are subordinate to the master
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Description of the educational context at 
the Norwegian Armed Forces Staff College 
[Forsvarets Stabsskole]
Education takes place in the form of group guidance under the direction 
of more-experienced officers. The goal is for students to be able to cope 
with the roles that exist in a normal NATO headquarters and to learn 
how to use NATO’s operational planning strategy. The students come 
from different branches of the defense forces and contribute with their 
individual competence, so that together they can manage to plan a joint 
operation. The samhandling between participants also helps to eliminate 
the division between defense branches.
The group supervisor becomes a form of a master who greatly influences 
the approach of students to the practice community. Students go from 
being peripheral participants to becoming full members of the group or 
class. Through practice-based learning in authentic situations, the students 
learn and eventually become masters. Instead of asking which cognitive 
processes and conceptual structures are involved, we look closer at the task 
of what the master/officer must help to promote in the social environment 
for learning to take place. Vygotsky (1978; 1986) shares the perception of 
learning as a social phenomenon, which emphasizes that learning pri-
marily occurs through participating in a practice community. Vygotsky’s 
(ibid) view of learning and development is expressed from a socio-cultural 
perspective by the development of thought, from the inter-psychological 
(social, interpersonal) to the intra-psychological plan (individual plan).
Method
Our aim is to gain an understanding of the students’ experience of the 
supervision they received; therefore, we conducted both observation and 
qualitative interviews. The first author of this chapter developed an inter-
view guide, conducted the interviews and was responsible for analysis of 
the material.
A semi-structured interview guide was developed in advance, in 
accordance with guidelines issued by Kvale (1997) & Patton (2002). The 
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interview guide was developed to create a structure, so that the com-
mon theme was covered. The interview guide consisted of brief questions 
related to:
• The students’ relationship with the group supervisor 
• The role the supervisor plays in the students’ learning development
• Whether the group is consciously aware of complementary skills 
and how participants experienced that the different skills/back-
grounds of the group appeared in group guidance
• The group supervisor’s influence on samhandling and the relation-
ships within the group
• The group supervisor’s influence on the work process in the group
• Whether this form of group guidance is of practical and profes-
sional relevance for the student group 
• How the relationship between group and process is emphasized in 
the counselling 
In order to attain different perspectives, a semi-structured interview guide 
was used, which covered the same topics but remained, at the same time, 
open and flexible so that topics which emerged during exciting discus-
sions and exchanges of opinion could also be covered. It was necessary to 
search for diversity, variety and breadth when interviewing the inform-
ants, which Kvale (1997) points to as important. The participants were 
asked to describe what they had learned and how they considered the role 
and importance of the supervisor in the samhandling. In the follow-up, 
the interviewer often asked the participants to concretize with examples 
and elaborate on their statements. From a sample of one hundred students, 
five groups consisting of four to five students of both sexes, with varied 
defense force affiliations, background and experience, were selected to be 
interviewed. A total of 23 informants participated in the interviews.
The informants were informed in advance regarding the purpose of 
the study, which was to examine how Apprenticeship Learning is used 
as an educational method to prepare for meeting the unforeseen. The 
interviews were conducted in April/May 2016. Participants was informed 
before the interview and all gave their consent, also allowing the use of 
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sound recording. The interviews were conducted verbally, and later, fully 
transcribed. This made the analysis work conducted afterwards more 
tangible, and made it easier to interpret the material better. In addition, 
an observation form was used to make observations in all the groups 
in advance. This was done for the same reason as the interview guide. 
Observation is useful, both in providing input for the interviews, link-
ing experiences in common, and helping to analyze the material. In this 
way, triangulation of the material is enabled. In particular, emphasis was 
placed on observing the following:
• The activities of the students
• Shared knowledge among the students as well as between the stu-
dents and the supervisors 
• How the supervisor managed his/hers role
The observations correspond to 10 hours of material. Each interview 
lasted one and a half hours. In total, this study covers 17 hours of collected 
material. 
Analysis
Thematic analysis was adopted when interpreting the interview mate-
rial. This is a suitable method for identifying, analyzing and reporting 
patterns within the data analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In contrast 
to other types of qualitative analysis, (such as Grounded Theory, IPA 
or discourse analysis), thematic analysis is not bound to a theoretical 
or epistemological framework (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The analysis can 
therefore be classified as a deductive, thematic analysis or a “top down” 
process, according to Braun & Clarke (2006). A theme was defined as 
“patterned response or meaning within the data set” (Braun & Clarke, 
2006:82). During the process of theme development, themes were con-
tinuously revised, implying, for example, that some themes would be 
subdivided and others would be combined for the purpose of fitting the 
data. This step of the analysis therefore involved a certain degree of inter-
pretation. The interviews showed that all of the students appreciated the 
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basic aspects of participating in the learning community in general, and 
mastery in particular. The fact that learning is added to an exercise that 
is highly relevant and involves active interaction in a professional and 
social community, seems to be success criteria for the teaching plan. This 
is common to all of the groups and is demonstrated in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Categorizing the findings by group and seen in relation to Lave & Wenger’s (1991) 
taxonomy.
Lave and Wenger’s 
(1991) taxonomy










Active participants A few active, the 
majority passive
A few active, the 
majority passive
Everyone actively builds on 













Establishment of a 
sharing culture, everyone 
contributing their 
complementary skills









supervisor has the 
answers.
The supervisor highlights 
the students’ answers, 
consciously repressing his/
hers own answers 






Emphasizing the process 
in the preparation phase 
and the result in the 
consequence phase
Students are 
subordinate to the 
master
The supervisor has 
the blueprint/has 
the right answer/
is the one with the 
right answer
No one is right There is no blueprint; 
open questions, different 
qualities of different 
answers are encouraged
Product or process – or both? 
The analysis reveals that some supervisors mainly emphasize the product, 
while others emphasize how the group reached the result, i.e. the process, 
to a greater extent. The product indicates something about the specific 
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product and solution the group had come to. Furthermore, the product 
was influenced by the supervisors, who made sure that the groups fol-
lowed certain structured patterns of action and worked towards a goal 
that was embodied in doctrines and drills. The process denoted how the 
group worked together to solve the task: 
“It’s not just a simple matter of coming up with a move. You must be prepared to 
explain the analysis behind it and why you think as you do. Then you also stimu-
late learning in the others. Those who always have a ready response are restrained 
so that others can share the limelight.” (Student, Group E). 
In one interview, it was reported that: 
“It is not education we are dealing with. We are doing what we should be doing. 
We are experiencing it. We are forced to be more active. This way of learning leads 
us a step further.” (Student, Group B). 
Another group expressed that: 
“It is very good that the supervisors walk around in the small groups and partic-
ipate, that is very good. They contribute in the discussion, but they do not come 
with the blueprint and specific opinions. They come in and give some hints, and 
often it’s the one that helps to solve the process.” (Student, Group E).
The supervisor’s alternation between process and product was important 
for the samhandling process itself, especially in relation to the develop-
ment of complementary competence and involvement awareness among 
the participants. In the student groups where the supervisors were able 
to create confidence in the preparation phase, the students stated that it 
contributed to a culture in which the participants trusted each other and 
gave of themselves (Groups B and E). The individual saw himself and the 
others as important resources. 
“It’s a very good group that I learn a lot from; people are good at sharing the 
knowledge they have, while the supervisors are open to answering stupid questions 
and without being nailed to the wall”. (Student, Group E). 
“Scaffolding” provides a good illustration of samhandling between mas-
ter and apprentice. The master seeks to give the learner an assistant, 
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which aims to expand the apprentice’s ability to solve different tasks. 
This gives the learner the opportunity to solve tasks that he would not 
otherwise have had. The proximal (also called the nearest) development 
zone (Vygotsky, 1978; 1986), is said to be the difference between the cog-
nitive challenges of a child managing on their own and the tasks the 
child can solve under the influence of an adult or in collaboration with a 
more knowledgeable adult. The same would be also between adults, i.e. 
a master and apprentice. From a samhandling perspective, the relation-
ship between the student and the teacher assumes, as a matter of course, 
that the student actively participates in the educational process. Some 
of the students’ statements illustrate the nearest development zone/
scaffolding: 
“It is very good that the supervisors are available. I noticed this the first week. We 
were going by a map and we were also fumbled about for a long time to find out 
what to do. It was like getting a map distributed, but a map where there were no 
entries in the map. Then the supervisor was there and gave us three key words 
and solved a lot of things for us, putting us on the track so we realized what to do. 
Helped us start the process.” (Student, Group B).
Vygotsky (1978; 1986) believed that teaching and learning had to come 
first and that psychological development would follow as a natural conse-
quence. However, in order for this to happen, the teacher must be able to 
facilitate development-promoting learning processes by using mediating 
tools such as language, signs and symbols, graphic illustrations, theories 
or models that can constitute a “scaffold” for the students, in their efforts 
to exceed the nearest development zone. In addition, the task the students 
are facing should be oriented towards stimulating collective development 
processes, rather than testing their individual learning outcomes.
Furthermore, based on analysis of the material, we find that the men-
tors who focused a lot on the product in the preparation phase did not 
take the unforeseen sufficiently into account. This may indicate that the 
more insecure the supervisors were in their own role, the better they were 
at emphasizing the outcome. As an example, a student claims, “It’s more 
that they resolve the problem rather than providing us with the piece of 
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guidance that will help us to find the answers ourselves.” (Student, Group 
D). There are examples where the students found that the counseling was 
counterproductive. This happened when the supervisors failed to find a 
good balance between process and outcome: 
“So, NATO has no idea how this should be done, and when the supervisor inter-
venes and presents a solution where there is no solution at all, then it disturbs 
the process. I think the supervisors were unsure how to do that. It became a little 
staccato when they appeared.” (Student, Group D).
Utilization of complementary skills
An important task for the supervisors was to utilize and channel the 
participants’ overall competence as well as they could towards com-
mon goals. Complementarys skills and the recognition of complemen-
tary skills are very important for samhandling (Torgersen & Steiro, 2018, 
Chapter 2; Steiro & Torgersen, 2018, Chapter 14). Sometimes the partici-
pants lost motivation. The task was to capture the students’ attention and 
direct them towards the tasks without appearing authoritarian: 
“We strive and sometimes it’s like getting a map out without any entries in the 
map. Then the supervisors provides us with 3–4 keywords that solve a lot for us. 
Puts us on track so we understand what to do.” (Student, Group B). 
We see here a form of more indirect education which does not instruct but 
rather stimulates the use of one’s own competence, which is brought out 
by gaining input or new perspectives (Torgersen, Steiro & Saeverot, 2015; 
Saeverot, 2013; Torgersen & Saeverot, 2012). The quotation above further 
illustrates that the supervisor had to provide the progression here. When 
necessary, the supervisor entered and noticed the need for everyone to 
participate. A “clear process focus” meant that the supervisor invited the 
participants to contribute and followed them up in the process. 
“They have given some good targeted feedback, but at the same time not too much. 
I don’t think I would have learned much more if I had received more advice and 
tips. It might have become a crutch.” (Student, Group B).
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An important task for the supervisors was to split the group into smaller 
subdivisions and place people in roles where they had their strengths. 
This was important in order to highlight complementary skills:
“Our supervisors were clear that we had to use our expertise because the com-
plexity is so great. As a military man, I don’t know how the Navy handles things. 
We must have naval competence. This was expressed clearly when we distributed 
roles.” (Student, Group B). 
Most students felt that dividing sections into smaller groups was posi-
tive. Using this maneuver, the supervisors managed to facilitate a good 
dialogue and contribute to the individual’s knowledge development. A 
student explains: 
“You must be prepared to explain the analysis behind it and why you think as you 
do…Then two things happen – you challenge the person who says it and everyone 
becomes involved in the thinking behind it. It also helps others to participate and 
leads to good discussions.” (Student, Group E). 
The students felt that they became more responsive and reflective in the 
smaller groups. It was easier to contribute with their own perspectives: 
“I pull back in the big group because most people have already ‘steamed on ahead’ 
in the process. I find it hard to be a contributor. But when they divide us into 
smaller groups, it becomes a completely different activity for me and I am able to 
take responsibility for contributing.” (Student, Group E).
Tension between master and student: The  
asymmetric master-apprentice relationship
Supervisors alternated between authoritative and egalitarian styles of 
supervision, which was important for the samhandling process, espe-
cially in relation to the development of trust between all participants. 
Supervisors who used their professional authority, while acknowl-
edging and elevating the students’ competence, succeeded in gaining 
trust: 
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“I’m unused to the degree of firmness. The supervisors are clear about how things 
should be done here. They help to steer us towards the center, not the periphery, as 
a safe way of conducting the operation.” (Student, Group B). 
Supervisors who demonstrated their professional authority early in the 
relationship, while at the same time ensuring equality in human rela-
tions, helped to create trust between supervisor and student, but also 
between the students themselves. An example of such a relationship is 
the group where supervisors and students built up a master-apprentice 
relationship: 
“They don’t just throw the ball back and tell you what you should be thinking. It’s a 
good way to give guidance. They have a lot of experience, professional competence 
and social competence as supervisors. There is a foundation at the base.” (Student, 
Group B).
Even though the relationship was not equal, the parties had confidence 
in each other. There is no need for total equality in the roles between 
student and supervisor. The students should feel safe to reflect and con-
tribute to co-operation. The balance between equality and authority is 
crucial:
“Being able to establish the group’s sense of security has been crucial to learning.” 
(Student, Group E).
A criticism of the Apprenticeship Learning paradigm is that the student 
is supposed to subjecting the master, learn his values and norms in the 
work (Illeris, 2000; Skagen, 2004). The authors argue that this is not com-
patible with modern education, where critical reflection and democratic 
participation are central. The interviews demonstrate that the students 
perceive the practice differently; the supervisor who take on an unam-
biguously authoritative role create a distance between themselves and 
the students at the expense of learning outcomes. On the other hand, in 
group supervision it is important that the supervisor takes on a certain 
amount of authority in the role of master. If there is too much equality 
throughout the process, it appears to lead to a search for direction and 
clarity from the supervisor, according to the interviews.
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In contrast, three of the student groups showed that professional author-
ity that could be used positively, in some cases, was used as a type of power 
(Groups A, C and D). In one group, the students reported that the super-
visor exercised some form of power and demonstrated authority in the 
classroom. In this group, the supervisor had a clear need to demonstrate 
his own professionalism. The students experienced little sense of coping 
on their own; many of them failed to follow the processes in the group and 
they lacked faith in their own contribution. For the students, the supervi-
sor’s dominance was an obstacle to establishing self-confidence and trust. 
“The supervisors have a need to show that they are the sharpest on land, sharpest 
at sea, sharpest in the air. There are students who have several thousand flying 
hours in an F-16, who have led sharp operations in Libya, and have been deeply 
involved in Afghanistan. And then the staff of the school sit there and try to tell 
them what the world looks like.” (Student, Group C).
Here, it is apparent that professional authority is being abused, or at least 
used in a way that does not create trust and security in the group. Torg-
ersen and Steiro (2009) emphasize the key importance of trust in creating 
dependable samhandling. It appears that the instructor assumes a mentor 
perspective rather than a coaching perspective in this context (Steiro & 
Firing, 2009).
Apprenticeship learning and facing  
the unforeseen
If we return to the Bow-Tie Model, as presented by Torgersen (2018), and 
the first chapter of this book, we can present the ideal supervisor role 
in the preparation phase as follows: A process-oriented supervisor with 
authority. In the preparation phase, it is important to work with the coop-
eration indicators of trust, security and openness (Torgersen & Steiro, 
2009; Steiro & Torgersen, 2015). This phase is characterized by partici-
pants becoming familiar with themselves and the others in the group 
and building confidence in relationships. The trust created during the 
preparation phase makes the participants more involved and therefore 
better at contributing their competence: 
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“Yes, because it is the craft we are learning, you know. You don’t learn a craft  
without holding a hammer and that’s what we’re doing.” (Student, Group B).
In the preparation phase, the supervisor uses his or her professional 
authority to create a shared commitment and understanding of the situ-
ation. By virtue of experience and competence, the supervisor can pave 
the way in preparation for meeting the unforeseen. It is important for the 
supervisor to initially build a culture in the group that is based on shared 
understanding. The students need supervisors who are able to display 
leadership, define roles and be clear about expectations. If this is not pos-
sible, the parameters of what you are preparing for will soon become too 
wide open. During this phase, the supervisor should take on the role of 
expert and indicate the direction of the work. The supervisor must facil-
itate the creation of a common frame of reference – a temporary, “shared 
room of understanding” (Dysthe, 2001). 
Supervision by introducing a topic, cue or question that provides some-
thing that can stimulate the group’s alertness and curiosity is favorable 
(Steiro & Firing, 2009). By counteracting instrumental learning, super-
visors can also motivate students to engage in informal learning situa-
tions. Thus, the students dare to engage in broad and ambiguous issues. 
A formal and structured perspective, where the focus is on a specific goal, 
can inhibit learning ability and the prerequisites for meeting complex sit-
uations. The supervisor must establish a foundation of trust in the prepa-
ration phase, so that students dare to steer away from formal learning 
processes and towards the unforeseen (Torgersen, Steiro & Saeverot, 2015).
Authority and process focus are a fruitful combination in the prepa-
ration phase. It is not, however, that a clear process focus excludes any 
kind of authority. On the contrary, students report that departing from 
professional authority in the preparation phase can be a threat to good 
teaching and guidance. Primarily, the task is to organize a process and 
dare to challenge the role of the professional expert. The supervisor’s 
emphasis on academic authority provides the basis for each student to 
take the opportunity to contribute his own expertise and to recognize 
others’ expertise. The supervisor’s most important task in the preparation 
phase is to build trust. As we have seen, the supervisor should be a clear 
role model in building a culture based on trust, security and openness. 
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When the supervisor creates a supportive learning culture in the prepa-
ration phase, it leads to the students becoming bearers of the same cul-
ture. We see that the supervisor provides the basis for what is described 
as “legitimate peripheral participation”.
In UN-0, the supervisor must dare to let go of control to a certain 
extent. The supervisor must trust that the control and steps he has taken 
to facilitate the process during the preparation phase have strengthened 
the students’ ability to handle the unforeseen. The supervisor should 
emphasize an equal and process-oriented tutor style that allows students 
to act according to the circumstances of the situation. For a supervisor, it 
may be challenging to lose control. In asymmetric relationships, there is 
usually a tendency for communication to be centered on the supervisors, 
because they usually know more or master more skills than the others in 
relation to a particular subject, or they are better at expressing themselves. 
By deliberately staying outside of the process, the supervisor encourages a 
symmetrical form of samhandling between the participants, giving each 
student’s voice a greater authority. When the supervisor maintains this 
paradoxical way of exercising the supervisor role, it opens up for guid-
ance with greater learning outcomes.
In the impact phase, we see how some mentors successfully combine 
equality with a focus on results. It is an advantage if the supervisor allows 
students to focus on the result, but at the same time dares to move away 
from the role of an expert who knows the correct answer. The supervi-
sor should visualize the students’ competence and not feel threatened by 
it. The supervisor does not possess a set answer; each student must use 
his/her competence in the UN-0 phase. It is less relevant to point out 
who provides the solution as the answers are the result of a process. In 
the impact phase, it is important that the control dimension is reduced. 
Through the established relationships, the supervisor can be a catalyst, 
in order to raise the students’ awareness regarding the complementary 
processes that have led them to the product. The important thing is not 
the result in itself, but how the students have worked and what processes 
they have used. 
Using an egalitarian guidance style with open-ended questions, the 
supervisor can provide a structure and clarify how the group reaches 
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its outcome. In order to solve the unforeseen in UN-0, the students are 
dependent on complementary skills. Different ways of seeing the matter 
can make important contributions in solving the task. The supervisor 
may, to advantage, restrain his/her professional authority and expert role. 
The supervisors who help strengthen the various contributions are those 
who take a step back, allowing the students to offer their reflections to a 
greater extent. The participants not only contribute different skills, but 
also develop and learn from each other along the way, through what is 
referred to as concurrent learning (Steiro & Torgersen, 2015; 2013). When 
the supervisor helps to create such an awareness, it is not only important 
for the individual’s understanding of roles, but also contributes to a broad 
and complex learning process. Thus, they learn from each other during 
the samhandling process. Production and learning are part of the same 
process and show that learning takes place in a practice community. Such 
complementary contributions are essential for a joint operation to func-
tion effectively (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009).
In the consequence phase, the supervisor should represent a counter-
weight to pure instruction, where logical conclusions about results control 
the conversation. Steiro & Torgersen (2015) argue that guidance should 
facilitate open and exploratory teaching where guidance and coaching 
constitute important components. The prerequisite is that the activities 
not only consist of information that stimulates reason and logic, but also 
open up for emotions and creativity. The supervisor should not main-
tain a tight structure with a given focus on a predetermined product. 
The supervisors should investigate, challenge and test the group’s knowl-
edge and understanding, asking follow-up questions where they assess 
the answers together with the group. The supervisor occupies a coaching 
role, which is appreciated by the students, as seen in this study.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown that if the supervisors can balance the role 
of egalitarian authority and process and outcome in the various phases 
of the Bow-Tie Model, Apprenticeship Learning as a method is appropri-
ate to make the students better prepared for samhandling in anticipation 
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of the unforeseen. The way the supervisor manages his role has a great 
deal of impact on samhandling and learning outcomes. The supervisor’s 
insight and expertise in what is needed to make groups work together 
is decisive. Strengthening and developing samhandling in exercises is 
a suitable education method for military forces in meeting unforeseen 
events, provided that it is done properly, as this study has pointed out. 
The Armed Forces have a long history of experience in training and exer-
cises, but there is still reason to question whether the current teaching 
methods adequately address the unforeseen. Studying how learning takes 
place in practice, what is learned and what tools provide the best learning 
outcomes, is very important. Training under close supervision can prob-
ably serve as a model for other agencies who practice unforeseen events. 
Guided student groups within the Apprenticeship Learning tradition is 
an alternative to traditional education, one that provides insights and val-
uable learning experiences.
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Leading and Managing Interaction 
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Abstract: Leading interaction under risk is one of the aspects of being a leader in 
the police. After the 22nd of July 2011 Norwegian terror attacks it has been pointed 
out that the main explanatory factors as to why interaction under risk turned out 
as it did not necessarily was due to the lack of resources, previous evaluations or 
government plans but rather the lack of living up to these. In organisation theory, -  
psychology and management literature, it is customary to distinguish between 
expressed and actual ways to manage and lead, as well as between the structural- 
instrumental and the institutional perspective. These strands of research address 
how the difference between general and overarching political aims and the execu-
tion of the same aims in practice neither may be neither uncommon nor unex-
pected. However, is it possible to expect more agreement between aims and actual 
behaviour? If so, what may some of the underlying conditions for leading learning 
from experience be? This chapter discusses what some of the underlying conditions 
for leading and managing learning from experience in the case of interaction under 
risk in the police may be. Specifically, conditions of learning located between the 
expressed and executed, that is, between the institutional and cultural.
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In the Official Norwegian Report that followed the acts of terrorism in 
2011, one of the main explanations proposed was that “resources were 
not able to find each other.” (NOU 2012:14:134, chapter author’s transla-
tion) One example given was when police personnel were unable to attain 
resources (i.e. boats) that were available at the scene, and coordinate them-
selves with the situation at hand. Proposed explanations were the lack of 
appropriate tools (e.g. joint communication platforms), and the quality of 
the police work performed. While cross-national exercises have been held 
in Norway (with Swedish colleagues), including joint communication 
platforms, there seems to have been less work done on the performance 
of cooperation under risk, and especially cultural explanations of this 
(Fimreite, Langlo, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2013; Johannessen, 2015). Cultural 
traits and the characteristics of the organization or institution have been 
shown to play a part in the quality of coordination in crisis management 
(Christensen, Danielsen, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2016). However, there is 
still no single optimal “solution or coordination formula that can 
harmonize competing interests, overcome uncertainty and ambigu-
ous government structures, and make policy choices that everyone will 
accept.” (Christensen, Danielsen et al., 2016:330) In other words, there is 
no standard system that is best for dealing with emergencies in general 
(Christensen, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2016b).
At the societal level, the most serious situations are, fortunately, a rare 
occurrence. The importance of being able to lead and manage these events 
when they occur is, however, enormous. A lack thereof can lead to declin-
ing confidence in the principles of democratic governance and govern-
ment (Lægreid & Rykkja, 2014). The problems of governmental planning 
have been described as “ill-defined,” as they “are never solved” and are at 
best “only re-solved – over and over again.” (Rittel & Webber, 1973:160). 
Furthermore, securing public safety has been described as a “wicked prob-
lem”, as it intersects sectors, institutions and organizations (Christensen, 
Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2016a). A specific challenge is that this type of work 
may “fall between different jurisdictions and organizations,” which may 
again result in a situation where the direct treatment of safety issues is 
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perceived as the “responsibility of none.” This may cause the unwanted 
consequence that necessary security measures are not implemented 
(Christensen et al., 2016:34). In addition, solving difficult problems by 
applying the formula of searching for information in order to understand 
them and then re-solve them, “does not work.” (Rittel & Webber, 1973:162). 
A potential way to go about this is to approach a given task, “reducing 
street crime” for instance, using “realistic judgement, the capability to 
appraise ‘exotic’ ideas” along with “trust and credibility” between the per-
sons involved, and a willingness to try one possible approach, “OK, let’s 
try that.” (Rittel & Webber, 1973:164). However, even though these may be 
well-known moves within academia, Ritter and Webber emphasize that 
they may be less welcomed among public authorities and head managers 
in the public sector, as they may be “liable for the consequences of the 
actions they generate” (Rittel & Webber, 1973:167) to a greater extent. What 
does such an approach demand of police leaders and police organizations?
Leading interaction at risk in the police
Leadership is often defined as the process whereby one “individual influ-
ences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal.” (Northouse, 2013:5). 
The key elements of this general definition may be found in a definition 
applied by a Leadership Academy for Policing: “the ability to effectively 
influence and combine individuals and resources to achieve objectives 
that would be otherwise impossible.” (Gibson & Villiers, 2006:6). An 
equally common way of describing the role of a person that is employed 
to influence a group towards such a goal is the distinction between man-
agement and leadership. According to Pierce and Newstrom (2011), “an 
effective manager…needs good managerial skills, and if they are manag-
ing people, possessing good leadership skills will be beneficial,” and vice 
versa, an effective leader “most likely will need good managerial skills.” 
(2011:xi). It is also common to distinguish between leadership that is 
characterized by viewing the process of influencing a group towards 
a goal primarily through the use of transactions, from leadership that 
leads towards a common goal through the use of vision and inclusion 
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of employees’ views (i.e. “transformational leadership,” see e.g. Pierce 
& Newstrom, 2011). Police leadership is described as neither of these 
styles exclusively, but rather as a combination of both (Cockcroft, 2014). 
Despite being described as having a preference for transactional leader-
ship (Silvestri, 2007), some parts of police work may also be associated 
with transformational forms of leadership (Silvestri, Tong, & Brown, 
2013). The dichotomy between transactional and transformational lead-
ership in the police therefore “fails to recognize the nuances of organiza-
tional life,” and a synthesis of the two leadership models may be a way to 
overcome these criticisms (Cockcroft, 2014:12).
In addition to the individual roles of leader and manager, leading and 
managing interaction under risk is influenced by contextual factors such as 
political aims. What is often the case with complex public-sector objectives 
is that they may include inherent contradictory demands (Agevall & Jenner, 
2016; Granér, 2016). Thus, in addition to leadership in general, leading and 
managing interaction under risk in the police is also influenced by its con-
text within the public sector. It is also characterized as a form of leadership 
that has been labelled “operative,” in the sense that it potentially includes 
leading and managing in a context that may pose a threat to the lives of 
civilians and personnel (Olsen & Eid, 2015). Despite the fact that leadership 
within the police may be seen as existing within organizational structures 
that may show similarities to the military, the fire department, as well as 
the Foreign Service (Gordon, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2009; McKay, 2014; 
Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007), one challenge is often the described gap between 
“street cops” and “manager cops” (Reuss-Ianni, 1983/1999). This implies that 
police employees, despite the structure of their work organization, do not 
necessarily do as they are told (Andersson & Tengblad, 2009). Furthermore, 
knowledge-led policing may be questioned and even stopped, on the basis of 
a police personnel’s experience-based knowledge, and professional opinion 
and judgment (see e.g. Gundhus, 2013). 
The Unforeseen
As previously mentioned, some of the most severe cases may also be the 
rarest. The concept of “the unforeseen” (UN) describes “…any act that 
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is relatively unexpected and occurs with relatively low probability or 
predictability to those who experience and must deal with it.” (Kvern-
bekk, Torgersen, & Moe, 2015, 30, translated by the chapter author, se also 
Chapter 1). Examples of how it may be possible to learn from past expe-
riences when preparing for DU are “unannounced exercises,” performed 
without preparation (Torgersen, Steiro, & Saeverot, 2013:2). The result of 
such exercises may not necessarily become visible or known to the partic-
ipants until after the exercise itself, which places emphasis on the role of 
discussion and reflection. Experiences from planned crisis management 
exercises on a national level between the Norwegian Police Service, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces, and other parts of national security (Exercise 
[Øvelse] Tyr), have shown how having the operative leader (e.g. the Chief 
of Police), request of his/her colleagues that they play the part of a “critical 
friend,” may influence decision-making and the potential to lead learning 
from experience (Rosø, 2014).
However, opening up for critical questions alone is not assumed to 
be sufficient to lead and manage interaction under risk, and influence 
the ability to lead learning from experience. Particularly in the police 
it has been shown that opening up for critical input may be challeng-
ing because addressing past issues; for instance, actions that are not 
illegal but still unethical, may expose and potentially self-incriminate 
police personnel (Hoel & Bjørkelo, 2017). The legal framework that 
surrounds and is an inherent part of police work may thus potentially 
hinder leading and managing learning from experience, in the case of 
cooperation under risk. Other potential obstacles may be interpersonal 
factors, such as a form of “institutional shame,” as police employees, by 
definition, do not perform illegal acts (see e.g. Wathne, 2012). Further-
more, the surrounding factors of police work may create a situation in 
which addressing past experiences is not necessarily straightforward 
(Valland, 2016).
One of the intra-organizational factors that may play a part in the pos-
sibility to lead and manage learning from experience in situations includ-
ing interaction at risk, is the socialization process from education towards 
profession (Fekjær, Petersson, & Thomassen, 2014; Granér, 2004; Johan-
nessen, 2015; Lauritz, 2009; Reuss-Ianni, 1983/1999; Roberts, Herrington, 
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Jones, White, & Day, 2016; Rowe, 2005). Several authors have described 
how Swedish police employees may be met with negative reactions from 
leaders and managers when attempting to address work tasks, methods 
and the like, that are perceived as not working well (Kjöller, 2016; Wies-
lander, 2016). Gendered assumptions and explanations have also been 
described as factors that influence police leadership (Haake, 2017). This 
may again limit the potential for leading and managing learning from 
experience under risk.
Basic police education may be described as an institutional educational 
practice, where language and social interaction are perceived as the basis 
for how a social activity is created and recreated (see for instance Phelps, 
Strype, Bellu, Lahlou, & Aandal, 2016; Sjöberg, 2016). An extension of the 
basic training is continuing and further education, for example in lead-
ership and management. Such educational programs are based on the 
view of learning as a lifelong process. Although not part of the same edu-
cational pathway in length and time, continuing and further education 
may be understood as taking part within police organizational and insti-
tutional practice (Sjöberg, 2016). Thus, continuing and further educa-
tion may both be seen as an activity and situation that takes place inside 
and outside “the police”. According to Roberts et al. (2016), “embedding 
education” during the course of professional police working life may 
serve the dual purpose of both increasing “leadership” in the workforce 
as well as ensuring that future police leaders and managers “have the 
high-level, critical and creative thinking skills that complex problems 
require.” (Roberts et al., 2016:26). In this context, leading and managing 
learning from experience through DU activities (cognitive, written, oral 
and physical exercises), may create opportunities for the participants to 
be affected so that they in turn can “see” their experience, and thereby 
enable and engage in an interaction about it. But how does this relate to 
leading and managing interaction under risk? Is it even possible to reflect 
in the moment of action, and especially when the situation is unforeseen? 
On-the-spot reflection may not be perceived as possible in action, as it 
may cause harm to both civilians and police personnel (see e.g., Bergman, 
2017). In this respect, “unannounced exercises,” performed without 
preparation, followed by time for reflection and discussion may be of use.
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However, in order to evolve, learning implies a need. Thus, even though 
cases and exercises of the unforeseen may be useful, learning implies a 
perceived need and openness on the part of participants. A “discrepancy 
experience” is a term used to describe a situation where an experience 
comes into our awareness (Lindseth, 2015). Some describe this as realiz-
ing that one’s current knowledge is insufficient; there is a lack of corre-
spondence between what is expected and what seems to be the case in a 
given situation (Hugaas, 2014). A discrepancy experience is a situation 
“where we notice that something is not correct” and where, although our 
knowledge about what is going on may be good enough, we have rea-
son to doubt (Lindseth, 2012:170, chapter author’s translation). It is this 
doubt that provides the grounds for the discrepancy experience and later 
learning. So, what does it require of leaders and managers to “see” and 
experience a discrepancy and be able to assist and create learning from 
the experience among one’s personnel? Especially when addressing past 
issues may be perceived as a potential threat, leading to self-incrimination 
and the betrayal of one’s team. 
In a study that investigated police cases that were legally correct but not 
necessarily good police practice, the results showed that leading learning 
from experience mainly took the form of strategies such as “straightening 
up” one’s personnel through instrumental, as opposed to reflective, learn-
ing measures (Hoel & Bjørkelo, 2017). Based on the results, suggestions 
for a stimulating climate for reflection and dialogue around the question 
“is this good police work?”, referring to the actual case, were suggested. 
As a way to bring potential cases of police malpractice to the fore, it was 
also suggested that going through the experience of being accused might 
be a way to “see” and experience a discrepancy, thereby creating learning 
from the experience among one’s personnel, and providing a basis for a 
fundamental change of practice. 
Similar to the concept of discrepancy experience, cognitive disso-
nance is assumed to carry with it the potential for change. The concept 
of cognitive dissonance describes the experience of “the gap” between, 
for instance, one’s behavior and one’s basic values (Elliot & Devne, 1994; 
Festinger, 1957). Studies have documented that being able to obtain or 
create dissonance can have a major impact on health behaviors as well as 
chapter 7
134
political affiliations (Bernstein, Alison, Roy, & Wickens, 1997). In the case 
of the lack of police quality in cooperation under risk, being accused of 
poor quality work in a national official report is presumably a potential 
experience that is remembered. However, due to the interpersonal bonds 
between police employees, the processes of socialization and professional 
shame, this alone may not enable learning. Thus, experiences of discrep-
ancies and cognitive dissonance may be examples of underlying condi-
tions for leading and managing learning from experience in the case of 
interaction under risk in the police. But how? 
Some argue that it is the leader and manager’s responsibility to “ensure 
that their team gets the experiences they need to acquire knowledge.” 
(Effron, 2008:229) However, experience in itself may not be enough to 
enable learning. Police leaders may therefore potentially profit from 
arranging “unannounced exercises” of cooperation under risk for their 
personnel, based on previous actual experiences, if these are followed 
by reflection and discussion in a climate of trust. Previous studies 
have documented the impact of trust in teams (Moldjord & Iversen, 
2015). Trust may also play a part in building a future bridge between 
“knowing-in-action” and “reflection-in-action” (Schön, 1992:123). 
“Knowing-in-action” is how we may learn to “see” (observe), “reflect 
on, and describe our knowing-in-action”. We can test our descriptions 
for example by writing down how we usually act in certain situations 
and thereafter observing “what happens when other people try to fol-
low them.” (Schön, 1992:124). On the other hand, “reflection-in-action” 
may be useful when attempting to make sense of “on-the-spot” actions 
(Schön, 1992:125), such as the unnanounced excerises. It may also be of 
value in drawing attention to leading and managing based on change 
and complexity, rather than predictability and control; encouraging 
one to “…take ordinary, everyday experiences seriously,” and shift focus 
from systems to relations, movements and “ongoing ethical and moral 
evaluation” (Johannessen, 2009:225). Thus, nurturing the moral para-
dox of police leadership may in itself “sustain movement and tolerance 
of the known and the unknown – the expected and the unexpected.” 
(Johannessen, 2015:179).
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Conclusion – a model
This chapter has discussed what some of the underlying conditions for 
leading and managing learning from experience in the case of interac-
tion under risk in the police may be. Specifically, conditions of learning 
located between the expressed and executed, that is, between the institu-
tional and cultural that deal with “wicked” problems that in themselves 
may be unsolvable. One of the answers may lie in a model of Leading and 
managing interaction under risk in the police, which takes into account 
both context and potential underlying conditions for learning from 
experience. 
Contextual factors may include (1) leadership style, with both elements 
from transformational and transactional ways of leading and managing; 
(2) its position within the general public sector, with its “wicked prob-
lems” that may be inherently unsolvable; and (3) the influences of inter-
personal and socialization processes, and professional shame. In addition 
to these, there is also the impact of the current reigning economic and 
managerial ideology (e.g. New Public Management (NPM) in public sec-
tor, Christensen & Lægreid, 2001). As a process, a preliminary model of 
leading and managing interaction under risk in the police will have sev-
eral similarities with general models of experiential learning, (such as 
Kolb’s learning circle, cf. e.g., Kolb & Kolb, 2005 and Lauritz, Åström, 
Nyman, & Klingvall, 2012). However, in order to provide “unannounced 
exercises” of cooperation under risk for their personnel based on pre-
vious actual experiences, police leaders and managers may also need 
to take into account notions of leadership that are based to a greater 
extent on complexity in everyday life rather than learning as a linear and 
instrumental process. “Managing the unexpected is not simply an exer-
cise in going down a checklist.” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015:vii). Simultane-
ously, leading and managing under risk also requires adherence to risk 
and action lists during crisis. To sum up, the model proposed here may 
potentially influence all three levels of the bow-tie model (see Chapter 1): 
(1) what will be interpreted as a warning sign in the future; (2) how one 
plans for and reacts to the unforeseen; and (3) how recovery is under-
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Military organizations today must deal with very high levels of uncer-
tainty, as a result of the international political environment, the possi-
bility of direct intervention by formal authorities, and the very nature of 
combat (Posen, 2016). New and changing forms of terrorism and cyber- 
attacks, the latter in combination with other efforts, are also parts of the 
threats both for the Armed forces and for civilian organizations. Lead-
ers, and particular military leaders and leaders responsible for prepar-
edness are now faced with high expectations when handling unforeseen 
situations in combined operations, also related to cyber operations and 
terrorism. Samhandling (interaction) is believed to have an increased 
relevance to meet the challenges. In addition, the level of uncertainty is 
increased because of the mixed motives of organizational participants, 
and the fact that military organizations do not get much realistic prac-
tice (Posen, 2016; Carlsten, Hybertsen & Heggem, 2015; Carlsten, Skaug 
& Haugdal, 2016). Military leaders are now faced with high expectations 
when it comes to handling unforeseen situations. One way of preparing 
new leaders for interaction under uncertain circumstances has been, for 
a long time, to introduce different doctrines into leadership curricula. 
Different doctrines reflect different theoretical decisions. They are given 
relevance in education as a way to illustrate formal examples of what is 
preferred and what is rejected. As doctrines are built on experiences from 
real-life scenarios, as well as on predictions and strategies for possible 
change, they may serve as a way of balancing the branch-specific “hidden 
curriculum”, i.e. an established culture with a set of current values, behav-
ior and thinking that have been developed over time in the organization 
(e.g. Jackson, 1968; Giroux, 1988; Margolis, 2001), with tools to understand 
and develop competence to handle new ways of samhandling in upcoming, 
unforeseen situations. In order to find concrete examples of educational 
planning, using both general and operational doctrines as part of the for-
mal curriculum, we have selected the risk-oriented officer leadership edu-
cation at the Norwegian Military Academy as a specific case in our study.
In this chapter, we aim to present a nuanced professional and peda-
gogical (educational) discussion of how an increased awareness of the 
concept of interaction in the use of military doctrines may contribute to 
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the professionalization of military higher education. The discussion of 
the relevance of such a concept may be of specific importance at a time 
when military higher education is increasingly cooperating with the civil-
ian education sector (Carlsten et al., 2016). Therefore, we argue that this 
chapter is of relevance for both military and civilian higher educational 
institutions.
More specifically, we ask how samhandling (“interaction”) is framed 
within risk-oriented educational planning using military doctrines. 
What concepts are used to describe different types of samhandling in the 
relevant doctrines, and how do those responsible for military educational 
planning judge the relevance of samhandling in the central doctrines? 
The chapter aims at answering the following questions: 
1. What terms are used to identify different constructs and concepts 
of samhandling in doctrines relevant to officer leadership education 
planning at the Norwegian Military Academy? 
2. How do instructors in charge of officer leadership education plan-
ning at the Norwegian Military Academy explain how normative 
understandings of samhandling within different doctrines serve 
to prepare future officers for samhandling in unforeseen and risk- 
oriented situations? 
3. How does the leadership of the Norwegian Military Academy 
explain how doctrines may serve as relevant tools in educational- 
strategic planning?
Doctrines, the unforeseen and samhandling
What is a doctrine and what is its function in terms of getting closer 
to a nuanced understanding of samhandling in risk-oriented educa-
tional planning? In our study, we use central discussions in military and 
educational theory to support us in finding answers to these questions 
(Andersen, 2016; Zapfe, 2016; Honig, 2016; Kronvall & Petersson, 2016; 
Posen, 2016; Slensvik & Ydstebø, 2016; Høiback, 2016; 2013; 2012; 2011; 
Bekkestad, 2012; Jackson, 2013; Torgersen, 2008; Torgersen & Steiro, 
2009; Rasmussen, 2006; Kier, 1997; Gordon, 1997; Posen, 1984). Common 
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to discussions about the role of a doctrine in military theory, is under-
standing its purpose in providing common operational and adminis-
trative procedures, as well as its function as a basis for communication, 
coordination, cooperation and samhandling between military branches 
and member countries. As Høiback (2016) points out, doctrines serve as 
tools for operations, education, and change. These three functions have 
driven defense transformation in Norway, along with threat perception 
and defense spending (Kronvall & Petersson, 2016).
A doctrine is built on a speculation about what is needed in the future – 
in an unforeseen scenario. It is also characterized by a certain inertia, 
and may be understood as a documented tradition more than a guideline 
for unforeseen situations. How well does a doctrine with such an unclar-
ified foundation address samhandling in modern military operations, in 
providing a realistic foundation for ongoing changes? As pointed out in 
Chapter 1 in this book, the unforeseen and samhandling are linked to 
the Bow-Tie Model, which shows the phases before, during and after an 
unforeseen event. Samhandling can be beneficial in relation to occur-
rences and accidents, as illustrated in the Bow-Tie Model. As underlined 
by Torgersen and Steiro in Chapter 2, there is no standard formula for 
organizations for developing samhandling. Each organization should 
conceptualize the term individually. Our claim in this chapter is that the 
study and application of relevant definitions of samhandling, as found 
in central military doctrines, is a recommended starting point in educa-
tional planning. We assume that samhandling as a term embraces a high 
relational ambition level, more than just coordination and communica-
tion (see Chapter 2).
A common understanding of the relevance of terms used to identify 
constructs and concepts of samhandling in doctrines is central to cur-
rent risk-oriented education. In our case, the Norwegian term samhan-
dling is defined according to Chapter 2 in this book: “Samhandling is an 
open and mutual communication and development between participants, 
who develop skills and complement each other in terms of expertise, either 
directly, face-to-face, or mediated by technology or manually. It involves 
working towards common goals. The relationship between participants 
at any given time relies on trust, involvement, rationality and industry 
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knowledge” (see also Torgersen & Steiro, 2009:130). As further pointed 
out by Torgersen and Steiro in Chapter 2, for samhandling to occur, each 
participant must contribute with their unique situational understanding. 
Sørensen (2017) found, in his study of Norwegian civilian maritime crisis 
collaboration exercises, “… a need for greater emphasis on collaboration 
learning and usefulness (…)” Furthermore, he recommends “…adopting 
a national collaboration exercise framework that stresses collaboration 
development rather than continuation of current practices…” (p. 101). 
The unforeseen is by no means a closed concept, but is rather a relatively- 
open expression (Kvernbekk, Torgersen, & Moe, 2015). “In the military 
context, the essence is, in the best possible way, to forestall the unforeseen 
through intelligence gathering, planning, structured training and learning. 
Samhandling is needed to make this happen.” (Bergh & Boe, Chapter 17:310). 
Bergh and Boe (Chapter 17) further write that military commanders are of 
great importance for both the leadership of planning processes in military 
doctrines and military leadership literature. A broader and deeper under-
standing of the concept of samhandling, seen in correspondence with rel-
evant doctrines and both formal and hidden curriculum analyses, could 
provide the basis for more robust and relevant competency development. 
We know from earlier studies of the relevance of Norwegian officer lead-
ership education that concepts and structures related to the unforeseen 
and samhandling are diverse and not made sufficiently explicit in curric-
ula and educational strategies (Carlsten et al., 2015; 2016). 
Samhandling is a precondition for mastering complex crisis situations 
with a high risk of loss of life and materials, where action carried out in an 
integrated process consists of many parties and advanced equipment and 
technology. Such pedagogical (educational) thinking has, among other 
things, a basis in encyclopedic reasoning (diversity in competence) (Torg-
ersen, Steiro & Saeverot, 2015; Torgersen, 2008). Antithetically, ambigu-
ities and a lack of conformity in the use of the concept of samhandling 
between doctrines and curricula could provide weaker and more random 
skill-development in handling unforeseen situations. At the same time, it 
is paramount that education of each individual officer enables a tailoring 
of the concept samhandling, with corresponding competence in specific 
core tasks. Such a correspondence between management documents, 
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concepts and educational content obviously applies to all types of pro-
fessional education, where many parties are involved in the execution of 
competence-demanding tasks, and where the conditions are unforeseen 
and risky.
Samhandling in doctrines relevant to 
educational planning
Does it matter what words and terms are used in the curricula? Yes; as 
indicated above, it is important to choose the right words and expressions 
as the basis for curricula in higher education, especially where education 
is practical and focuses on the development of creativity and innovation 
(Jackson et al., 2006). This kind of training often requires sophisticated 
teaching plans and exercises. It takes time to develop such arrangements. 
It entails that instructors have a sophisticated planning tool based on cur-
rent competency expressions and terms, that serves as a substructure for 
training. In such situations, it is necessary to have a reflected view on key 
terms used to identify concepts such as samhandling, and to what extent 
they involve the same construct or whether there are nuances. Identi-
fying and applying nuanced meanings will have consequences for the 
actual teaching plans and the storyboards for exercises and scenarios. If 
not made explicit, skills that are desired or needed may not necessarily be 
developed in a qualified and secure way, unique to each situation.
Military doctrines are commonly used as a basis for several topics 
in military education, as well as for developing learning objectives and 
content in the higher education institution’s curricula. This applies in 
particular to higher military education for educating officers at staff 
level. Discussions of terms covering the relationship between military 
branches are decisive in developing expertise in both branch-specific 
and cross-branch understandings of interaction and cooperation in 
domestic and international operations. Different concepts relating to 
samhandling, and varying interpretations of how these same different 
concepts relate to branch-specific interaction, will influence what kind 
of competence is desired to be developed among the students. This 
will be of relevance for the teachers’ choice of curriculum content and 
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competency goals, as well as for how teaching and training plans are 
facilitated and evaluated, and should be formulated and written down 
in the school curricula. It is seen as important to use concepts that 
represent the actual and strategic competence desired to be developed 
(O’Neill, 2015; Leash, 2015). 
Doctrines have been the subject of much research during the past few 
years. We know from some of the research that doctrines may be a pow-
erful and efficient tool of direction. As Andersen (2016) points out, they 
may therefore be understood within a paradigm, emphasizing doctrines 
as functional and rationalistic documents. He points out that this under-
standing may be more apparent in joint-operational doctrines than in 
branch-specific doctrines, the reason being that there may be added room 
for sensitivity to cultural tension in branch-specific documents (Ander-
sen, 2016). There is, however, a lack of knowledge regarding if and how 
doctrines, as normative documents serving as a basis for domestic and 
international interaction, may be used for educational purposes as tools 
to ensure interaction in the planning of unforeseen and risk-oriented sit-
uations. In this chapter, therefore, we identify terms used to cover the 
constructs and concepts of interaction, collaboration, cooperation and 
joint force in Norwegian documents and NATO doctrines relevant to 
officer leadership education at the Norwegian Military Academy, and ask 
how relevant they may be as part of a curriculum aiming to build compe-
tence in handling unforeseen situations requiring samhandling. 
Method and materials
Through a thematic document analysis as well as the analysis of an inter-
view study, we have examined if terms used to identify constructs and 
concepts of interaction are used in similar ways, or if they seem to stand 
opposed to each other in educational planning. Studying this possible 
tension empirically, we designed a study where we examined how joint 
and branch-specific operation doctrines are used in officer leadership 
education at the Norwegian Military Academy (Krigsskolen). 
The doctrines were identified through an informal survey among 
central officers in the Norwegian Armed Forces, as well as through the 
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interviews with instructors and leaders at the Academy. More specifically, 
the doctrines were thematically studied according to Research Question 
1, in order to extract the terms that could encompass the construct and 
concept of samhandling, as defined in Chapter 2 of this book and on page 
138 in this chapter. 
In the interview study, we developed a semi-structured interview 
guide. The reason for this was to ensure comparability and congruence 
in the informants’ answers when using terms in the curricula. The reason 
for keeping it somewhat open was to enable each participant to contrib-
ute their understanding of the application of the constructs and concepts 
of samhandling unique to their situation. We identified six informants, 
representing different roles and backgrounds at the Norwegian Military 
Academy, which could provide us with sufficient data. Informants 1–4 
were instructors, while informants 5 and 6 represented the leadership at 
the Academy. The sample can be viewed as strategic. The purpose of the 
study was explained to all of the informants, as well as the research ethics 
of issues related to confidentiality and confirmed consent. The individual 
interviews were conducted at the Academy in the spring and fall of 2017, 
each interview lasting approximately one hour. After the last interview, 
the data was analyzed by all four authors of this chapter. The data mate-
rial collected was considered sufficient and no further interviews were 
regarded necessary. The interviews were analyzed using a thematic meth-
odological approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Results 
The following section presents the results of the thematic study.
Terms used in relevant doctrines
What terms are used to identify different constructs and concepts of sam-
handling in doctrines relevant to officer leadership education planning at 
the Norwegian Military Academy (Research Question 1)? The Norwegian 
Armed Forces uses the following definition of a basic doctrine: “Basic 
doctrines are used for the development and application of military forces 
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in support of national objectives. They are guiding but require judgment 
in use.”1,2 As seen, the definition of a doctrine relevant to identifying 
terms covering constructs and concepts of samhandling in the Norwe-
gian case, exemplify the claim by Torgersen and Steiro in Chapter 2, that 
there is no standard formula for organizations for developing samhan-
dling when analyzing and applying the doctrines in educational planning 
and in concrete action. As each organization conceptualizes samhandling 
individually, to link unforeseen and risk-oriented interaction (the Bow-
Tie Model in Chapter 1) requires identification of the terms, covering 
possibly comparable and contrasting understandings. Terms relevant for 
answering Research Question 1 in this study were identified in the doc-
trines represented in Table 8.1 below.
According to Table 8.1, the Norwegian Military Academy uses a wide 
range of national and international doctrines in the education of officers. 
In the documents, we find different terms for cooperative efforts, such as 
samhandling (interaction), collaboration (cooperation under leadership 
aiming for a common goal), cooperation, and combined arms3. The book 
on the German Art of War: Truppenführung (Condell & Zabecki, 2001) is 
also stated by many as a widely used source as a basis for discussion and 
reflection, but the book is not used as an instruction or guide for directly 
developing officers at the Norwegian Military Academy. 
In our thematic analysis, we examined the two latest Norwegian doc-
trines, FFOD (2007) and FFOD (2014), in more detail, as these are the two 
doctrines all informants have indicated are most often used in education 
at the Norwegian Military Academy. In FFOD (2007) and FFOD (2014), 
the terms covering the constructs and concepts of interaction and coop-
eration are used more or less synonymously. However, the terms appear 
more often than not when describing military-civilian collaboration. 
Joint force is, on the other hand, used to describe collaboration within 
the Armed Forces, indicating that different branches collaborate on joint 
projects. This is especially present in FFOD (2014) in our analysis.
1 https://www.oslomilsamfund.no/forsvaret-forsvarets-doktriner/
2 The joint doctrines are also covered by other definitions, such as Joint Publications and 
Capstone.
3 Norwegian term: Samvirke.
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Table 8.1 Results from survey and interviews: Doctrines relevant for/used in the education at the 
Norwegian Military Academy, 2017.
Name of doctrine Description
Norwegian 
doctrines
FFOD (2000) The first joint doctrine. 
Forsvarets Pedagogiske 
Grunnsyn [The Basic 
Pedagogical View of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces] 
(2006)
The doctrine for a common educational 
foundation.
FFOD (2007) The second joint doctrine, indicating 
the role of the officer. Describes 
cooperation but not samhandling. 
Provides a military-theoretical basis. 
FFOD (2014) Interaction is present as a concept 
(samhandling is mentioned 15 times in 
a document of 208 pages, main text). 
Provides a basis for understanding 
peacekeeping forces and Capstone. 
Basic publications 
for the Norwegian 
Army
UD 1 Educational directive.
Doctrine for land operations 
2004
High probability that this will be 






The oldest doctrine in use at the 
Norwegian Military Academy.
Doctrine of the Netherlands
UK Army Operations 2010,
(Chs. 2, 3 & 8)




Capstone doctrine UNIBAN 
1+2
Stanag APP 6
Stanag AJP 3.2 + ATP-3.2.4 – 
Land operations
Counter ID AJP-3.15
NATO doctrines are used as supporting 
literature, but NATO terminology is 
considered important for educational 
purposes.
AJPs are less used.
Field Manuals
FM324 – Counter-insurgency General doctrine, but largely based on 
experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq.
FM 3–24 US Army/Navy 
Counter-insurgency
General doctrine, based on experiences 
from Afghanistan and Iraq, 2005. 
Central in Norwegian higher military 
education.
FM100–5 Air/Land Battle First maneuver warfare.
FM 100–23 UN Peace Keeping
FM part 10 (British doctrine)
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In FFOD (2007), the term samhandling (interaction) appears only 
occasionally. The FFOD (2007) doctrine is considered by our informants 
to serve educational purposes better than FFOD 2014, because the former 
provides a more solid military-theoretical basis than the latter. However, 
even the FFOD (2007) doctrine provides little guidance on samhandling 
as a way of learning. This means that it is does not explicitly address the 
idea that for interaction to occur, each participant should contribute 
with their unique situational understanding, and that this is an ongo-
ing learning process in terms of relating interaction to unforeseen situa-
tions and risk-oriented educational planning. As claimed earlier in this 
chapter, for participants to engage in qualified and safeguarded inter-
action in risk-oriented situations, participants’ understanding of terms 
used to identify comparable and differing constructs and concepts of 
samhandling in doctrines is crucial. The absence of relating the terms 
identifying samhandling to unforeseen situations in both FFOD (2007) 
and FFOD (2014) may indicate that the Norwegian doctrines do not have 
a clarified view as to the premises of samhandling. Rather, the way the 
terms are used may be understood as a vague attempt to frame the rela-
tionship between different agents on the “same team”, rather than pro-
viding well-defined terms that would enable the same agents to discuss 
what samhandling means in each unique situation. As such, the thematic 
analysis indicates that the terms used to identify constructs and concepts 
covering samhandling in the doctrines used in education planning at the 
Norwegian Military Academy do not focus on the Bow-Tie phases to any 
great extent (see, for instance, Chapter 1). The terms used for different 
kinds of collaboration are not sufficiently open to change, neither prac-
tically nor theoretically, regardless of whether the topic or situation is 
related to an assessment of risk in military operations or threat analyses, 
or whether interactional competence should be used in risk assessment, 
in operations or in the recovery phase. The doctrines signal the function 
of the terms, indicating samhandling as one and the same thing, even 
though different terms are used. Hence, the term samhandling, as used 
in both of the Norwegian doctrines relevant in educational planning at 
the Norwegian Military Academy, does not function as a specific guide 
in competency development for new Army officers. Terms for different 
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kinds of collaboration are, however, frequently used. As these doctrines 
serve as a basis for military officer leadership education, the terms may 
be both somewhat misguiding when not subject to a concrete analysis, 
and they may serve as an ambiguous concept in military training. One 
consequence of this may be, as pointed out by Andersen (2016), that each 
branch of the Armed Forces adapts its own translation of the concept of 
samhandling into its own context, as the branch-specific interpretations 
are more context-sensitive than a rationalistic, joint-doctrine under-
standing that is less clearly defined. This possible consequence is contra-
dictory to the joint doctrine’s aim of aligning the military branches in 
operations.
The term samhandling (interaction) is used six times in the Norwe-
gian doctrine, “Forsvarets Pedagogiske Grunnsyn” (FPG, 2006) [“The 
Basic Pedagogical View of the Norwegian Armed Forces”], and is spread 
over several chapters. It is therefore reasonable to claim that the term 
serves as an important basis for education in the Norwegian Armed 
Forces. Samhandling is considered essential to the main message of FPG. 
The FPG underlines a shift in the educational focus in the Norwegian 
military, from traditional knowledge dissemination to an ongoing and 
common development of knowledge unique to different situations. The 
FPG is based on socio-cultural learning theory exemplified in such top-
ics as communities in practice, experiential learning and Apprentice-
ship Learning (see Chapter 6 for a further elaboration of Apprenticeship 
Learning in a military context). The FPG also focuses on role conscious-
ness, leadership identification and leadership development. Finally, the 
FPG focuses heavily on a professional development of the military pro-
fession (regarding military skills, situational awareness, ethical consid-
erations, attitudes and leadership). Our findings indicate an absence of 
clarified terms used to cover samhandling, as well as an imprecise link 
between interaction and learning, and this may indicate that the FPG has 
not had sufficient influence as a communicative link between doctrines, 
curricula and teaching practice. Another question posed by our inform-
ants is whether the use of collaboration/cooperation in NATO documents 
might be interpreted in the direction of interaction rather than collabora-
tion? If that is the case, the challenge may not be in translation or transfer 
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from NATO documents to Norwegian documents, but rather that the 
Norwegian doctrine authors have not focused on the main message of 
the socio-cultural understanding of samhandling in the FPG adequately. 
This may have resulted in unknown consequences in the education of 
Norwegian Army officers over the past 10 years. 
Defining and understanding the distinction  
between samvirke (collaboration) and  
samhandling (interaction)
How do instructors in charge of officer leadership education planning at 
the Norwegian Military Academy explain how normative understand-
ings of interaction in different doctrines serve to prepare future officers 
for interaction in unforeseen and risk-oriented situations (Research 
Question 2)? In our interview study, we find that the terms are under-
stood differently and that they appear to serve different purposes in edu-
cational planning at the Academy. Reports from two informants in our 
interview study indicate that they have different views on how the terms 
“collaboration” and “interaction” may overlap in daily practice. Inform-
ant 1 elaborates on this issue. He explains that samhandling is achieved 
when collaborating in a department to achieve defined effects. It entails 
practical problem solving where time is essential. Time, and especially 
achieving something at a greater pace than the enemy, is the most impor-
tant thing in warfare. ‘Self-synchronization’, as described in the Defense 
Chief ’s view [FSJ-Lead, 2012], means that the less time you use on col-
laboration management and the more you rely on intuitive action, the 
more time is saved. There are different effects that contribute to this, but 
it requires a lot of training together to understand such collaboration in 
practice; to create a common understanding of the problem and to know 
how colleagues will possibly react. Informant 1 uses the two terms rather 
synonymously in this observation. 
Informant 2, however, is clear about the different meanings that the 
two terms may imply. Tactical collaboration is about combining effects. 
Samhandling is, in his view, a more difficult term to get a hold on. It may 
differ between military units, between the military and civilian sectors, 
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and between representatives from the tactical and political levels, both 
nationally and internationally. Collaboration is, from this perspective, 
more about cooperation before, during and after an operation, and it 
deals with all the resources that are available. Samhandling (interaction), 
on the other hand, is deemed to be a broader term than collaboration and 
is thus more difficult to delineate.
It is not our purpose to criticize the two informants, nor to imply that 
one interpretation of our interview question is more correct than the 
other. Rather, it is in our interest to illustrate that terms can be under-
stood differently within an organization when not specified in the rele-
vant doctrines they use as a foundation in their educational planning. 
In the Norwegian language, the words samvirke (collaboration) and 
samhandle (interaction) have a very close linguistic similarity. While 
Informant 1 explains that cooperation is about acting together to reach a 
common goal and create a unified organism, Informant 2 perceives sam-
handling to be at a higher level than collaboration, and that interaction 
serves a higher ambition than collaboration. In the interview, Inform-
ant 2 also links samhandling to officer socialization, thus making the 
socio-cultural learning aspect more apparent than in the reply given by 
Informant 1. There may be different reasons for this, but one interpreta-
tion is linked to their different backgrounds and roles in the educational 
planning processes at the Academy, where Informant 1 is in charge of 
practical tactical topics and Informant 2 is in charge of topics related to 
strategy development. 
Wadel (see Chapter 13) points to the importance of relational skills 
enabling interaction. He also refers to Anthony Giddens, who describes 
social interaction as: “…the process by which we act and react to those 
around us” (Giddens, 1997:85). Informants 1 and 3 do not necessarily agree 
that samhandling (interaction) is at a higher level than samvirke (collabo-
ration), claiming that the relational aspects are equally strong when using 
both terms. Informants 2 and 4 point to a need for more clarification 
regarding the terms in FFOD (2014). 
Informant 4 claims that FFOD (2014) introduces differing and some-
what contrasting terms to identify constructs and concepts of samhan-
dling. This is a challenge, in his view, because it creates a mental barrier for 
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students in understanding samhandling in practice. Using all three Norwe-
gian doctrines for joint operations in education at the Norwegian Military 
Academy, however, underlines the importance of better defining the terms 
used in identifying constructs and concepts of samhandling in the doc-
trines, as they are seen to be vague and somewhat overlapping (Table 8.2).
Table 8.2 Results from interviews: How Norwegian officers in charge of leadership education 
at the Norwegian Military Academy define the terms samvirke (collaboration) and samhandling 
(interaction).
Informant Term Explanation
#1 Collaboration The study of joint efforts. Theoretically about placing the enemy 
on the horns of a dilemma. Relevant for tactical training more 
than conceptual understanding. 
Interaction Internal processes coordinated to achieve the process itself. 
Requires increased conceptual understanding, preferably at a 
higher level in the military hierarchy.
#2 Collaboration Tactical cooperation, combined effects to create a dilemma for 
the enemy. About military resources within an operation. 
Interaction Challenging concept to define, requires joint analysis. 
Relationship between military and civilian resources, and tactical 
and political levels, nationally and internationally. Rather than 
tactical efforts, it is about cooperation before, under and after an 
operation, applying all resources available. 
#3 Collaboration Concept that encompasses leadership, ability to be led, 
organization, tactics, and synergy across branches to solve 
missions. A practical concept used in daily communication. 
Unity of command.
Interaction Does not use this specifically. It is a synonym for collaboration.
#4 Collaboration Tactical. Coordinating effects. Support mechanism to interaction 
that may be branch-specific.
Interaction Cooperating to achieve a common goal. A level above 
collaboration with a higher ambition. Coordinating actions. Joint 
leadership across branches.
#5 Collaboration Used within a branch or across branches, a practical effort to 
use maximal strength. 
Interaction Relational, e.g. interaction in networks. Easily misunderstood 
as related to technology/Mission Type Orders. Cooperation 
through parallel planning on multiple levels to save time.
#6 Collaboration Leadership and tactics related to doctrines solving military 
problems.
Interaction Leadership form in daily interactions. The current leadership 




During the interviews, we found that two of the informants inter-
preted the nuance between collaboration and interaction as useful, while 
the other two instructors found that the terms covered the same issue. 
Therefore, we also asked the informants representing the leadership at 
the Academy about a clarification of how relevant the terms covering 
collaboration and interaction in FFOD (2007) and FFOD (2014) were in 
educational planning, seen from their perspective. Informant 5 found the 
term samhandling to be crucial in preparing new officers for handling 
crises in unforeseen situations. He expressed a need for clarification of 
the two terms in upcoming doctrines for joint operations. Informant 6 
agreed that it is important to define and contextualize how the difference 
between samvirke (collaboration) and samhandling (interaction) may be 
understood in unique situations. Informant 6 underlined that the present 
educational model at the Norwegian Military Academy demands a com-
mon and clear understanding of samhandling, such as defined in Chapter 
1 and in the introduction to this chapter. In the view of Informant 6, the 
current doctrines are not sufficiently clear about the terms and how they 
may be linked to ongoing learning. He assumed that an upcoming FFOD 
would have to maintain a focus on joint operations and, in particular, 
how new technology, the new security policy situation and new threats 
require a clarified view on how samhandling is shaped by these factors, 
and how a focus on interaction rather than collaboration will contribute 
to a stronger operational force.
We see from Table 8.2 that the four instructors and the two informants 
representing leadership positions at the Academy define the two terms 
differently. Some of the instructors viewed collaboration and interaction 
as interchangeable terms. The higher up in the hierarchy, the more likely 
it is that the person will interpret the term samhandling (interaction) in 
a similar manner to the definition used in this chapter, i.e. more stra-
tegically emphasizing relational aspects, and more strongly related to a 
discussion about how the terms need to be better explained and updated 
accordingly in upcoming doctrine developments. 
Another important finding in the interview study is that the inform-
ants point out what they perceive as crucial differences between Nor-
wegian and US doctrines used in education to prepare officers for the 
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unforeseen. The Norwegian doctrines are described as serving as a 
knowledge base for military theory, linked to military theorists such as 
Clausewitz and to socio-cultural learning theory. The Norwegian doc-
trines are, however, perceived as challenging and difficult to interpret 
for students because of their complexity. The US doctrines used in the 
same education are regarded as more of a template for “normal” training. 
They are easier to use in education, and are regarded as more adaptable 
to action. They are, therefore, perceived as less time consuming to use in 
education. All four instructors do, however, use doctrines to introduce 
central military theoreticians to students. Two examples mentioned are 
Hew Strachan’s (2008) Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography and Michael 
Howard’s (1962) The Use and Abuse of Military History. Both are regarded 
as central in teaching new officers an understanding of the history and 
development of military doctrines, as well as in teaching military ide-
ology and how military leadership might think about current military 
operations. When it comes to preparing students for unforeseen and 
risk-oriented situations, military doctrines are seen as a highly relevant 
teaching tool by all, although they disagree on the quality of the doc-
trines in this regard. 
In the individual interviews, all informants illustrated how they per-
ceive doctrines as a pedagogical (educational or teaching) tool. They 
underlined the status of the doctrine as a speculation about what is 
needed in the future – in an unforeseen scenario, as well as pointing out 
how they are characterized by inertia. The dynamic between understand-
ing a doctrine as a documented tradition as well as a guide for unforeseen 
situations was described as challenging, but necessary. The aim of using 
both general joint doctrines and branch-specific operational doctrines 
is reported to enhance the students’ understanding of the ambivalence 
in the theoretical, cultural and authoritarian aspects of military theory 
(Høiback, 2012). One informant described a doctrine as a tool to provide 
form and color to unknown future directions of the Army. 
The NATO doctrines were not perceived as being as relevant in educa-
tion as the Norwegian and US doctrines. Although underlining that Nor-
wegian doctrines are built on NATO doctrines, and that it is important 
to equip students with the current terminology found in, for example, 
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STANAG APP 6 and AJP 3.2 + ATP 3.2.4, one of the informants pointed 
out that the US is, after all, strongest in international operations. This 
served as an argument for preferring US doctrines to NATO doctrines 
in an educational setting. Another argument was to use UN doctrines, 
such as Capstone doctrine UNIBAN 1+2, in education, as they are rele-
vant to peace-keeping operations, an aspect not found in the NATO doc-
trines for joint military operations. However, when referring to particular 
aspects of the curriculum, such as preparing for international operations 
in places such as Afghanistan, informants perceived doctrines to be too 
generic to serve a meaningful purpose in education.
Overall, doctrines were deemed important in education planning, ensur-
ing that new officers are prepared for unforeseen scenarios. Doctrines were 
understood as a reference point for developing common concepts and a 
common understanding of a why and how in military efforts, but not nec-
essarily as a measuring tool for future operational success. Doctrines were 
seen as one of several parts of a formal curriculum. The current curricu-
lum includes all three of the Norwegian joint operation doctrines, i.e. FFOD 
(2000; 2007; 2014). They serve to explain doctrinal development in Norway, 
and more importantly, concept development related to samhandling.
The relevance of military doctrines in 
educational planning
How does the leadership of the Norwegian Military Academy explain 
how doctrines may serve as relevant tools in educational strategic plan-
ning (Research Question 3)? Both informants representing the leadership 
in our study viewed military doctrines as especially relevant in preparing 
future officers for upcoming deployment. In the same line of argumen-
tation, they also found doctrines as relevant in equipping students with 
an understanding of how future orders are linked to strategies based on 
national and international doctrines. Informant 3 pointed out that doc-
trines could be seen as more relevant for the first group going on a new 
mission. The doctrines were perceived as less important for successive 
groups, merely “taking over” an ongoing mission, the argument being 
that they inherit experience from the earlier deployed groups.
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Although the doctrines are perceived by all six of our informants as a 
useful working tool in educational planning, relevant for teaching stu-
dents how to handle the ambiguity of central concepts in understand-
ing and developing common efforts, the informants representing the 
leadership also called for a better conceptualization of samhandling 
(interaction) in the Norwegian doctrines and a need to change this in 
an upcoming joint doctrine. According to the same informants, this con-
ceptualization should be theory-based, such as in FFOD (2007). 
The study also indicates a need for better tools, to understand which 
similarities and differences in terms are more relevant in analyzing the 
relevant outcome of education. This is crucial when we understand how 
doctrines are used as instruments for guiding the education of future 
officers, facing unforeseen scenarios in upcoming deployment and 
domestic affairs; see, for instance, the Bow-tie Model in Chapter 1.
When understanding samhandling (interaction) in the sense that we 
argue for in this chapter, that each organization (and group) should con-
ceptualize the term individually, in order to understand their own and each 
other’s analysis of an operation in a proficient manner, the lack of a clarified 
definition of interaction in the current doctrines used in educational plan-
ning at the Norwegian Military Academy seems to provide limited guide-
lines in this case. The informants were, however, divided in their judgment 
on this issue. The informants who stressed that interaction was a concept 
encompassing more than the concept of collaboration were also the ones 
suggesting that renewed interpretations of doctrines, rather than inheriting 
others’ experience, were crucial in educating officers for the unforeseen. In 
fact, two of the informants (one from the instructor group and one from the 
leadership group), stressed the need to expose military students to doctrine 
analyses as early as possible, as they found the analysis of differing terms 
used to cover similar constructs and concepts to be part of critical training 
for an officer and for the professional development of the organization as a 
whole. On the other hand, the informants from the instructor group who 
viewed experience to be of just as much importance as complex doctrinal 
analysis in education, argued that military operations have a practical focus. 
They agreed that doctrines were necessary, but preferably at a higher (and 
more ideological or political) level in the military hierarchy. 
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The discussion of theory-based versus experience-based views on the 
use of doctrines in strategic educational planning was, in fact, the issue 
that divided the informants’ perspectives of the relevance of doctrines in 
educational matters the most. We have also found the same tension in 
other studies of the educational relevance of leadership education in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces (Carlsten et al., 2015; Carlsten et al., 2016). 
The hidden military curriculum  
and samhandling
Not everything learned in education is explicitly formulated in a formal 
curriculum. Each educational program usually follows an established cul-
ture, with a set of current values, behavior and thinking that have been 
developed over time in the organization. This is usually called the “Hid-
den Curriculum” (including Jackson, 1968; Giroux, 1988; Margolis, 2001). 
In military leadership education, we recognize this as codes and industry 
culture related to military branches, among other things. Doctrines are 
thus read in the light of the Academy’s own “Hidden Curriculum”, and the 
formal curriculum can be more or less colored by this. In addition, the 
“Hidden Curriculum” works partially independent of the formal curric-
ulum when it comes to impacting students’ learning. For this reason, it is 
necessary for instructors, leadership and students to be aware of nuances 
in key terms in doctrines identifying central constructs and concepts, like 
samhandling (interaction), that are likely to contribute to new officers’ 
competence development in handling complex and risky situations. 
The consequences of such differing perceptions as we have identified, 
at only one military academy in one country, will be even more influen-
tial in military action, at a point where officers from different branches 
and countries, who have completed their education at various defense 
academies and staff colleges, will meet. If different officers in a joint oper-
ation have quite differing understandings of the term “interaction” in the 
doctrines relevant to their missions, the effectiveness of the joint force 
could be severely affected. 
To ensure that the “Hidden Curriculum” does not control competence 
outcomes too strongly, doctrines and the formal curriculum should define 
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and elaborate on these terms thoroughly, and there should be the greatest 
possible match between them. In our study, we have seen that the central 
concept of interaction is unclarified, both in the different doctrines and in 
their interpretation by different informants within the same higher educa-
tion institution. This may pose challenges, both in educational training and 
practical samhandling (interaction). Even though a doctrine should be open 
enough to allow for situational judgment, the terms used to cover important 
constructs and concepts should guide such analysis rather than distract it, 
as we have seen indications of in this study. 
Conclusion
The findings in the current case study indicate that military doctrines are 
regarded as important in leadership training at the Norwegian Military 
Academy, especially when it comes to understanding and guiding inter-
action in unforeseen and risk-oriented situations. The findings indicate 
that doctrines should be strengthened, and play a more significance role 
for leadership education in the future. At the same time, the terms used to 
describe samhandling in military doctrines found relevant in education 
at the Norwegian Military Academy are numerous, vague and somewhat 
overlapping. Collaboration (samvirke) and interaction (samhandling) are 
used interchangeably as terms, without the message being clear about 
what purpose the terms serve, and what the consequences for strategic 
planning may be. 
More generally, our findings demonstrate that if the concept of sam-
handling (interaction) is brought to the forefront in teaching new officers 
to handle unforeseen situations through interaction, it is crucial that the 
terms of interaction and collaboration are better defined, on a continual 
basis, and made concrete at all levels in the military hierarchy, not only in 
the doctrine itself. Informants stress that a doctrine should be safeguarded 
at the top level in the hierarchy, because the military doctrines possess 
certain qualities of looking ahead jointly, that individualized, experience- 
based approaches to strategic education planning cannot cover. 
The term samhandling is not sufficiently related to unforeseen situ-
ations and ongoing learning in the doctrines found relevant in officer 
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leadership education in our case. It is neither sufficiently exemplified, nor 
clearly based on a theoretical foundation. Thus, we see a tendency in our 
study that the understanding of one of the main terms in modern military 
development is given different meanings by different agents in the same 
organization. Although we have suggested that the relevance of sam-
handling (interaction) needs to be open enough to be context-sensitive, 
in order to serve the purpose of handling unforeseen and risk- 
oriented situations, our findings indicate that it might just miss the same 
context-specific features guiding the training for joint operations. The 
vagueness may be replaced by opinion and experience-based views in 
the “Hidden Curriculum,” rather than serve as a basis for developing the 
military profession as a whole, both within and across military branches, 
nationally and internationally. Our ambition for this chapter has been to 
lay a foundation for a more nuanced academic and pedagogical (educa-
tional) discussion that in turn can contribute to further awareness of the 
relevance of the concept of samhandling in curriculum analyses. In the 
future, more samhandling will be expected with the civil education sector 
(cf. Carlsten et al., 2016). We therefore believe that this chapter may be rel-
evant for both the military and civil education sectors in order to create 
awareness and debate. 
From a general perspective, these findings may also be of relevance 
for public strategic emergency-preparedness management, other high-
risk emergency organizations, and in educational programs for different 
professions, in their strategic work aiming to develop samhandling com-
petence and in order to handle risk under unforeseen conditions. At the 
same time, concepts such as samhandling and similar expressions may 
lead users to believe that it covers more than it actually does or covers 
something different, which may have undesirable consequences for the 
actual learning outcome. It is therefore important to raise awareness in 
the organization of the underlying processes and the relational ambition 
level that will be the basis for and the content of the chosen term (see 
also Chapter 2). An advantage is to reach a collective understanding of 
the kind of skills that will be developed and trained. Another gain of 
such an analysis is to provide a basis for clarified learning goals and con-
crete scenario development through exercises and other teaching plans 
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in leadership education, as well as the evaluation of this, both in terms 
of learning outcomes and the education as a whole. This may facilitate a 
balance between the hidden curriculum and formal guidelines and tools 
in order to build competence for samhandling and prepare leaders for 
handling risk and unforeseen conditions.
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in which samhandling between individuals is predicted to be increasingly digital. At 
the same time, teachers currently refrain from using digital tools in order to inter-
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schoolteachers in primary and secondary schools in Norway shows that the respond-
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er extent for administrative purposes than for pedagogical ones. The main obstacle 
is that teachers do not know exactly how digital samhandling should be facilitated  
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general. The conclusion is that the future is unknown, and the unforeseen is partly 
learned through teachers’ professional judgment. Therefore, “new” pedagogy need 
not necessarily consist of more educational models and theories of “what works.” 
Perhaps the “new” pedagogy should be, to a greater extent, based on samhandling 
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“The future school” aims to prepare students for a new world, where 
samhandling1 is crucial for knowledge development (Kunnskapsdepar-
tementet, 2015). In the light of technological development, it is logical 
to assume that samhandling may become increasingly digital in the 
years to come. The problem is that we do not know exactly how this 
should be facilitated educationally and what the consequences may be 
for education in general, although Torgersen and Saeverot (2015) argue 
that the future, or “unforeseen age”, may require a “new” Pedagogy2. 
This may also apply to the concept of samhandling, which in itself is 
quite complex. 
Samhandling has had a vital role in the development of interaction 
and cooperation mechanisms between individuals and organizations 
in Norway. Samhandling is a Norwegian term that we believe has no 
exact equivalent in English. Originally, the term was used to describe a 
seamless interaction between humans and computers. It has developed 
a broader meaning, often understood as an interaction that includes 
various factors, such as participation, rationality, cooperation, inclu-
sion, involvement and trust, to name a few (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009; see 
Chapters 1 and 2). Samhandling involves not only interaction between 
individuals, groups and institutions, but also knowledge-sharing and 
development. In recent years, samhandling in education has become 
increasingly digital. An important objective for samhandling in an 
educational context is to increase the availability of knowledge and 
enable more efficiency of learning. However, the concept of samhan-
dling is complex and may be perceived differently by various parties. 
1 Samhandling is a Norwegian term which corresponds roughly to the English “interaction” 
(Torgersen & Steiro, 2009; see Chapters 1 and 2).
2 ‘Pedagogy’ is perceived here as the Norwegian discipline ‘pedagogikk’, not the Anglo-American 
term ‘education’. Gert Biesta denotes the following: “[…] the German concept of ‘Pädagogik’ 
(and the Norwegian concept of ‘pedagogikk’), […] is an academic discipline in its own right, 
independent of other disciplines” (Biesta, 2011:189). In the Anglo–American tradition, however, 
‘education’ cannot stand on its own, which is why this tradition has introduced such concepts as 
philosophy of education, psychology of education, sociology of education, history of education, 
etc.” (Saeverot & Biesta, 2013:178).
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Consequently, there may be a further need to define what samhandling 
entails in various situations for different participants. Furthermore, 
digital samhandling presents education and society with practical and 
ethical challenges, and it may also involve various risks for individu-
als. This may challenge people’s trust and involvement in samhandling 
processes. Replacing face-to-face samhandling with digital samhan-
dling may also have various implications for the samhandling itself 
and for the students’ ability to learn and develop. Moreover, there is a 
high level of uncertainty as to whether digital samhandling in educa-
tion may lead to various types of threats, for example, risk exposure, 
digital terrorism, and personal bullying (harassment). Other implica-
tions may include unwanted digital surveillance, infiltration, use of 
false identities and hacking, as well as propaganda and indoctrination, 
for example, in the form of political manifestos, warning signs prior 
to acts of terrorism and ideological articles from political and mili-
tary situations. Another type of risk may also occur to a greater extent 
than before; academic learning may be different to what the education 
programs have envisaged concerning the curriculum, as digital sam-
handling during the learning process may lead to knowledge-sharing 
and learning with parties who have other motives and insights than 
the designations of the curriculum. The question is, should this be seen 
as an advantage or disadvantage for learning and development? This, 
in turn, raises the question about the need for control versus freedom, 
when it comes to using digital and social media concerning academic 
learning. Future education should, therefore, prepare students to a 
greater extent for digital samhandling. The problem is that we do not 
know exactly how this should be facilitated educationally and what the 
consequences may be for education in general. In this chapter, we will 
examine conditions that may promote and hinder digital samhandling 
between teachers and students, and discuss whether digital samhan-
dling requires a new form of pedagogy, which, to a greater extent than 
before, takes into account risks and unforeseen events. The risk con-
cept is applied here to both the unwanted consequences of digital use 
and the uncertainty related to the extent in which learning goals are 
achieved with this use.
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The concept of samhandling in education
Samhandling involves a meeting between individuals where learning 
and development are central. A meta-analysis of the concept of samhan-
dling, conducted by Torgersen and Steiro (2009), shows that the core of 
samhandling is concurrent learning and the facilitation of competence 
complementarity, via mutuality. Samhandling is a complex term that is 
often added diverse content in various fields, disciplines, and organiza-
tions. Nevertheless, in many contexts it is expected to be perceived intu-
itively. Such an approach to samhandling may cause misunderstandings 
and quandaries when individuals and organizations that meet have dif-
ferent understandings and views as to what samhandling entails. Torg-
ersen and Steiro (2009) demonstrate how the concept of samhandling 
is used in various disciplines, industries, and institutions, and describe 
samhandling as a communication and development process in which 
participants exchange skills and work towards common goals. Based 
on various definitions of the concept of samhandling, they state that the 
relationship between participants in the process of samhandling is based 
on “[…] trust, involvement, rationality and industry knowledge” [our 
translation] (p. 129). This idea of samhandling seems to be in line with 
interaction processes that take place in education. According to Vygotsky 
(1980), the interaction between teachers (as “significant others”) and stu-
dents may lead to learning and development. Vygotsky (1980) denotes the 
“space” between established knowledge and new insights as the proximal 
development zone; a “learning zone” that through interaction with others 
may become established knowledge. This is consistent with sociocultural 
views of knowledge that Vygotsky is often linked to, where learning takes 
place through social interaction within cultural contexts. Valsiner and 
Van der Veer (2000) perceive the sociocultural perspective as learning 
through social interaction and activity.
In the Official Norwegian Report NOU 2015:8 “School of the Future. 
Renewal of subjects and competencies” [our translation]3 (Kunnskaps-
departementet, 2015), the Norwegian Ministry of Education emphasizes 
that communicating, participating and samhandling in social contexts 
3 NOU 2015:8 Fremtidens skole. Fornyelse av fag og kompetanser (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2015) 
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will be important and necessary areas of competence in schools of the 
future. This report discusses samhandling between school, education, 
and the public and business sectors. The importance of samhandling, 
regarding society’s needs and the development of democracy, both at 
a local, national and global level, is strongly emphasized in the report. 
The report principally points out that students in schools of the future 
must acquire capabilities such as “samhandling skills, metacognition, and 
self-regulated learning” [our italic and translation]. With regard to sam-
handling skills, the report makes clear that students should “[…] be able 
to participate in various areas, express their opinions and have positive 
relationships with others” (p. 29). Metacognition is defined as “[…] being 
able to reflect on one’s own thinking and learning” (p. 25), while self- 
regulated learning is described as follows: “[…] students learn over time to 
take the initiative and control parts of their learning process” (p. 27) [our 
translations]. These learning objectives show that future education will be 
required to enable students to learn how to acquire knowledge through 
samhandling. In order to do so, students should acquire knowledge about 
samhandling4 (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2015:29). Thus, teachers need to 
gain more insight in how to teach samhandling at school. 
For various reasons, digital samhandling in education may be even 
more challenging to conduct and teach than face-to-face samhandling. 
Digital samhandling is a communication form mediated through technol-
ogy. In education, the objective of such a practice is for pupils and teach-
ers to acquire digital literacy as a tool for constructing further insights 
(Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2008, 2015; Uninett-ABC, 2006). The chal-
lenge with these goals is as follows: Digital samhandling is still a relatively 
new and untested phenomenon in education, and there are various fac-
tors – inside and outside of school – which both promote and inhibit the 
use of digital means of samhandling between teachers and students. As a 
result of encountering various obstacles, teachers use samhandling tech-
nology to a greater extent for administrative purposes rather than aca-
demic ones (Egeberg et al., 2012; Furnes, 2015; Hatlevik, Tømte, Skaug, & 
4 Refers to the Norwegian term ‘samhandlingskompetanse’ (samhandling competency, a compre-
hension of samhandling as a literacy that may facilitate people’s ability to participate and express 
their opinions in democratic societies (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2015).
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Ottestad, 2011; Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2008). The Norwegian Minis-
try of Education (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2008) concludes that despite 
the fact that the use of new technology has increased greatly at Norwegian 
institutions, information and communication technology (ICT) has had 
more influence and application in administrative services and functions 
than on the educational content (ibid:32). This means that digital sam-
handling that takes place between teachers and students is primarily of 
an administrative nature (e.g. submission of tasks, registration of absence 
and grades) rather than learning and development in the form of samhan-
dling (e.g. project work and educational forums) (Furnes, 2015).
Learning management systems and 
samhandling in education 
How should digital samhandling platforms be used for educational pur-
poses? To address this question, we will take a closer look at the use of 
Learning Management Systems (LMS) in education, a technology that has 
been implemented in the Norwegian school system. As a part of commu-
nity development in the late 1990s, the Norwegian government promoted 
digital samhandling between educational institutions and students via 
LMS, which are web-based systems that are developed to facilitate knowl-
edge exchange, communication, support for learning activities and the 
management of such activities (Uninett-ABC, 2006). Important goals for 
the implementation of LMS were also to increase digital literacy among 
teachers and students, and make school more accessible to students (and 
their parents or guardians, in addition) (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2008; 
Uninett-ABC, 2006). According to the Norwegian Education Directorate 
(Udir), LMS has had an important role in education as a “catalyst” for dig-
ital literacy in education (Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2006b). Despite these 
goals and visions, LMS did not become the arena for samhandling that one 
had hoped for and expected. On the contrary, this technology has been 
used primarily for administrative purposes rather than educational ones. 
To understand why LMS has not been able to meet expectations as a 
catalyst for digital literacy, it may be useful to examine factors that influ-
ence its use in education. Often, various factors may have implications for 
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human actions (Foucault, 1972). Schools and education are no exceptions, 
as they are influenced by conditions both inside and outside of school. If 
we go to Krüger (2000), in the extension of Popkewitz (1991) and Foucault 
(1999), teaching is viewed as an “ensemble of discursive practices.” Krüger 
(ibid.) states that standards, rules and “styles of reasoning” may influence 
teaching strategies. The use of LMS may be seen in light of these ideas. 
Several factors may affect how this technology is being employed in educa-
tional institutions. For example, i) the interaction between the government 
authorities and educational institutions concerning LMS; ii) teachers’ and 
pupils’ perceptions of LMS; iii) functionality and user-friendliness of vari-
ous brands and types of LMS; iv) how (class) leadership is accomplished on 
LMS; and v) which risk factors digital samhandling in education presents. 
These factors provide possible explanations for the practice of LMS, but 
there may also be other explanations as to why LMS has not become the 
arena for samhandling that the government authorities and the educational 
sector had hoped for. Let us look at each of these factors.
(i) The interaction between the authorities  
and educational institutions 
Policy documents concerning LMS have been published to express the 
Norwegian government’s intentions of implementing this technology 
in the education sector (Uninett-ABC, 2006; Utdanningsdirektoratet, 
2006b). However, the interaction between the government authorities 
and school seems to have been challenging, which has led to the failure 
of LMS technology to gain the role it was intended to have – as a catalyst 
for digital literacy (Håland & Strømme, 2009; Utdanningsdirektoratet, 
2006b). A research study of 96 teachers in elementary schools in Bergen 
(western Norway) in 2015 shows that LMS is perceived to be an admin-
istrative tool rather than an educational one. Several respondents said 
that if LMS had been more intuitive, it may possibly have been used for 
educational uses to a greater extent. As LMS technology is today, and 
with the lack of sufficient time at school to explore it, one does not have 
the opportunity to reveal educational possibilities that may lie in the 
technology. Furthermore, respondents say that since the administrative 
chapter 9
174
functions of LMS are embedded and compulsory to use, LMS is more 
widely-used as an administrative tool than an educational one. If LMS is 
to be used pedagogically, it is up to the teachers themselves to develop it. 
This is something that many teachers experience as challenging and time- 
consuming (Furnes, 2015). Despite the fact that the authorities promote 
LMS as a catalyst for digital literacy in education, a majority of the teach-
ers in the study express that the technology is primarily used for admin-
istrative purposes. 
There seems to be dissent regarding what LMS is. Some describe this 
technology as an “empty shell” which must be filled with educational 
content to become an educational tool (e.g. Coates, James, & Baldwin, 
2005; Haug, 2012). Also, the use of the term “catalyst” by the government 
in relation to LMS has been criticized, as one which primarily empha-
sizes the administrative functions of the technology and not the educa-
tional ones (e.g. Håland & Strømme, 2009). When the authorities and 
the educational sector have not appeared to agree on whether LMS is an 
educational or an administrative tool, this has sent ambiguous signals 
to schools, which may have resulted in teachers using LMS mainly for 
administrative purposes. 
The Norwegian government expresses its intentions to the educational 
sector through policy documents. These documents often contain both 
political visions and guidelines and may be subject to different interpre-
tations out in the field, which results in a variety of practices. Theorists 
who are concerned with the relationship between theory and practice 
in education state that different uses of terms and concepts in these two 
areas may cause communicational challenges and have implications for 
practice and praxis (e.g. Carr & Kemmis, 2003; Krüger, 2001; Kvernbekk, 
2012; Popkewitz, 1991). This is possibly a factor that has had implications 
for how LMS has been used for samhandling in education. How teachers 
interpret the authorities’ intentions may affect the digital samhandling 
that occurs using LMS. In conclusion, if the government wants LMS to 
be primarily used for educational samhandling, they should focus more 
on scientific questions such as “what, how and why”, rather than empha-
sizing administrative features and political visions which contribute to 
undermining LMS’s educational potential.
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(ii) Digital samhandling between teachers  
and students 
Teachers and students have interacted digitally to varying degrees since 
the 1990s. Studies show that LMS technology is mainly used for adminis-
trative purposes (such as submission of tasks, registration of absence and 
grades) and to a lesser degree, for educational purposes (such as peer-learn-
ing, knowledge development and exchange of knowledge) (eg Egeberg 
et al., 2012; Furnes, 2015; Hatlevik et al., 2011; Håland & Strømme, 2009; 
Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2008). A probable reason for this practice is that 
digital samhandling for educational purposes is a relatively new phenome-
non in education, and there is a limited amount of research on the subject. 
Also, due to facing unforeseen events while interacting in new ways, one 
may fail to work on achieving learning goals systematically. New insights 
may not be the products of good planning and systematic learning. Some-
times one has to gain insights ‘along the way’ during the learning process 
(Norwegian: ‘underveislæring’). According to Steiro and Torgersen (2015), 
knowledge may not always be developed prior to samhandling; it must also 
be developed during processes of samhandling, through individuals and 
institutions gaining experience and knowledge from each other. In the 
school context, teachers and students who interact using LMS may become 
participants in “communities of practice,” where they can construct new 
knowledge during samhandling. Lave and Wenger (2003) argue that “com-
munities of practice” may be used for learning when both the road and 
probably the end station are unknown. This approach to knowledge con-
struction aims to prepare individuals for encountering the unknown and 
the unforeseen. Steiro and Torgersen (2015) argue that since we do not 
know the unforeseen, we cannot “tailor” an education in advance, but that 
does not mean that one cannot learn along the way.
(iii) Functionality and user-friendliness  
of different types of LMS 
Various types and brands of LMS have built-in functions for admin-
istrative purposes, while the educational features are often open to 
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development and adaptation. The latter is in line with the idea that 
teachers should have autonomy in regard to teaching methods, which 
is deeply rooted in the teaching profession. However, studies conducted 
on LMS’s functionality and user-friendliness show that different types 
of LMS may vary in features and interfaces, and may be experienced 
as user-friendly to various degrees (e.g. Baltzersen, Tolsby, & Røising, 
2007; Nordseth, 2006). The study mentioned previously which examined 
teachers’ use of LMS in Bergen, concludes that if teachers perceive LMS 
as ‘empty shells,’ time-consuming, unintuitive and/or old-fashioned, the 
technology will primarily be used for administrative purposes, and to 
a limited extent for educational purposes (Furnes, 2015). The paradox 
here is that the opportunities for development and adaptation that the 
designers of LMS have opened up for in the technology, have resulted 
in teachers exercising their autonomy to choose not to use LMS as an 
educational tool.
(iv) How to enable (class) management  
and samhandling with LMS 
Digital samhandling and class management with LMS can be challeng-
ing. According to Torgersen and Steiro (2009), there are often expecta-
tions that communication through digital platforms may be transferred 
directly from the type of samhandling that occurs face-to-face. However, 
since digital samhandling processes take place in areas that do not have 
an instant self-written core or centerpiece, such as a physical encounter, 
digital communication may be more complicated than meeting physi-
cally (ibid:151). Several challenges may apply, since digital samhandling 
places greater demands on participants’ activity and reception. Digital 
samhandling may change the power structures so that teachers’ authority 
may be undermined. Also, digital samhandling requires necessary skills 
for utilizing the technology. Moreover, both teachers and students must 
find their places and fulfill their roles online, as they do face-to-face. The 
question is, how should these roles be managed in the unforeseen future, 
especially when samhandling is becoming increasingly digital? 
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Class management is becoming more and more complex, and even the 
authorities seem to be uncertain of the implications for education. In the 
government report, NOU 2015:8 “School of the Future” (Kunnskapsde-
partementet, 2015) [our translation],5 the term “class management” is only 
mentioned twice, without a sufficient discussion as to how this specif-
ically may be implemented in schools of the future. If teachers experi-
ence difficulties leading classes online with the result that they refrain 
from using LMS for educational purposes, the technology may lose its 
relevance. Torgersen and Steiro (2009:151) believe that leaders on virtual 
samhandling platforms should be active contributors. The reason for this 
has two sides; to draw both attention to and influence the development 
of learning. In a school context, by aiding pupils and using samhandling 
for facilitating learning activities, the teacher is visible and clear on LMS. 
Hatlevik et al. (2011) conclude that when teachers are active on LMS, stu-
dents use it more often. For students to perceive LMS as a relevant and 
dynamic tool, teachers should prioritize activity and samhandling. It is 
important that teachers have appropriate skills in leading classes in vir-
tual environments and that they reflect on the didactics (Didaktik)6 con-
cerning the “what, why and how” in relation to LMS. At the same time, 
students should also be given the opportunity to influence their academic 
progress, in accordance with the Norwegian Curriculum (Utdanningsdi-
rektoratet, 2006a). 
When teachers use LMS primarily for submission of tasks, registration 
of absence and grades, and to a lesser extent for professional develop-
ment, they send a signal as to the technology’s suitability. This practice 
may have negative implications for students’ perceptions of LMS as sam-
handling technology, i.e. using this technology for the construction of 
knowledge through samhandling. 
5 NOU 2015:8 Fremtidens skole. Fornyelse av fag og kompetanser (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2015) 
6 The term “didactics” is not in frequent use in the Anglo-American world. It is though within the 
framework of Nordic and German research traditions concerning the theory of education and 
instruction, i.e. Didaktik (Uljens, 1997, p. vii).
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(v) Which risk factors may digital samhandling  
at school present? 
Digital samhandling in education is a relatively new phenomenon, and 
there is a high level of uncertainty as to whether this type of samhan-
dling can replace or complement traditional samhandling. Moreover, 
digital samhandling can be associated with various risk factors, a fact 
which can provide a possible explanation as to why teachers may refrain 
from encouraging students to interact with each other digitally during 
and after school. We can examine several risk factors here that may apply 
during digital samhandling in education and otherwise in society. Firstly, 
risk factors may be exposure, digital terrorism, and networking regard-
ing learning processes and online interaction. In addition, ‘fake news’, 
‘bots’ (robots) and ‘troll factories’ are used to control public opinion 
and distort conversations online. Other consequences may be unwanted 
digital surveillance, the use of false identities and hacking, as well as 
propaganda and indoctrination, for example in the form of a politi-
cal manifesto (Torgersen & Saeverot, 2012). These factors can, at worst, 
undermine opportunities for digital samhandling that promote trust 
and involvement. Such mechanisms are threats to knowledge as we have 
known it, and they are threats to democracy. Digital samhandling that 
aims to hurt others may be both visible and concealed. It can be visible in 
the form of messages and images, making it relatively easy to document, 
although it is not always easy to identify the individuals behind it. The 
more hidden variant may be excluding people from shared messages and 
events by either not informing them or misinforming them. This type 
of samhandling is more challenging to detect and may affect both chil-
dren and adults. Once discovered, this may cause excluded individuals 
to experience the betrayal of several others in addition to those who have 
actively excluded them. Exclusion may also be unintentional, when peo-
ple fail to master the technology adequately or do not have access to dig-
ital samhandling platforms. This may prevent them from participating in 
the samhandling that occurs, resulting in exclusion. These are factors that 
teachers must take into consideration to avoid exclusion of already-mar-
ginalized student groups. It should be added that self-exclusion may also 
occur, when individuals opt out of membership in digital samhandling 
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platforms or just fail to attend. This type of decision is made, for example, 
when people want to make a point about not wanting to participate, or do 
not want to be associated with various samhandling platforms. Refrain-
ing from samhandling and participation signalizes a point of view. In our 
understanding, where digital samhandling with reciprocity is facilitated, 
it is possible to create social, technical mechanisms that prevent reciproc-
ity, thus hindering samhandling.
Another risk that may occur to a greater extent than before, is linked 
to knowledge and how it is perceived in the digital age. While knowledge 
is known to be constructed by interaction (Dewey, 1916; Vygotsky, 1980), 
it may nowadays be seen as something that can be found online, rather 
than being constructed and developed. This may pose a threat to “knowl-
edge society” in an unforeseen age, where solutions to as yet unknown 
problems will need to be created (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2014–2015, 
2015, 2016–2017; Torgersen, 2015). In education, a risk factor might be that 
students follow knowledge structures found on the Internet and search 
engines, rather than constructing knowledge by themselves and through 
samhandling with others. The knowledge gained through search engines 
may be designed by various parties, promoting their own interests and 
agendas. This type of knowledge may potentially have definitional power 
and shape how the younger generation understands and constructs 
knowledge. Other risk factors are “unintentional learning,” which may 
differ from the curriculum. Digital samhandling might lead to knowledge 
being constructed and/or shared with parties who have different motives 
and insights than the intentions of the school curriculum. The question is 
whether this should be seen as an advantage or a disadvantage for learn-
ing. This, in turn, raises the question of the need for control versus free-
dom when it comes to using digital and social media for samhandling and 
learning. At the same time, it is important that young people learn to be 
critical, so that they may “travel” safely online and construct knowledge 
with others through digital samhandling.
Finally, digital samhandling may eventually replace the need for direct 
samhandling with other people. This risk can be associated with insuf-
ficient, face-to-face social interaction. Our society is built on sociocul-
tural ideas that promote socializing, learning and development through 
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interaction with other people (Dewey, 1916; Dysthe, 2001; Vygotsky, 1980). 
Replacing that with digital samhandling may threaten these ideas. The 
question is whether digital samhandling should be regarded as a real 
threat to direct samhandling, or whether it should be seen as an extension 
and a strengthening of direct samhandling. Either way, this is an impor-
tant topic that should be addressed further in the discussion about digital 
samhandling.
To sum up, digital samhandling may present education with uncer-
tainty and ethical dilemmas regarding students’ safety. This may be a 
potential explanation as to teachers’ hesitation to make use of new tech-
nology. Skagen Ekeli (2002) believes that there is a high level of uncertainty 
as to whether our decisions and activities may harm future generations’ 
interests and living conditions, and he wonders to what extent we can be 
held responsible for risky activities that can harm generations to come. 
If we transfer this idea to the use of samhandling technology in educa-
tion, it may be potentially harmful to children and young people, but 
also to teachers and other parties who interact digitally. This may be due 
to the risk factors mentioned earlier in this chapter, but perhaps also due 
to the lack of samhandling skills and legislation governing digital sam-
handling. Thus, school activities that are intended to promote knowledge 
development and exchange of knowledge may potentially harm future 
generations’ interests and living conditions. This is a risk that should be 
delimited through the use of safer platforms for digital samhandling and 
the development of samhandling literacy at school and in the community.
Does digital samhandling in education require a 
new pedagogy?
When teachers and students use samhandling technology instead of face-
to-face samhandling, it is possible that the terms of samhandling change, 
hence influencing the results. This makes demands on teachers to reflect 
upon how digital samhandling should be organized and how to manage 
their roles as class leaders in a virtual environment. By changing the prem-
ises for interaction, one may affect the interaction and communication 
itself, both regarding opportunities and challenges (e.g. Habermas, 1999; 
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Hellesnes, 1988). Also, new methods of samhandling may cause estab-
lished knowledge to fall short, requiring teachers to investigate whether, 
and if so how, such methods may fit into the future school in “the unfore-
seen age.” Torgersen and Saeverot (2015) argue that the unforeseen age 
requires a new pedagogy. To encourage learning in a new and unknown 
future, one should, according to Torgersen and Saeverot (ibid.), explore 
and challenge traditional knowledge, educational models and learning 
by experience. Kvernbekk (2015) points out that such ideas of learning 
contradict traditional ideas of predictability regarding aspects such as 
achievement, including evidence-based research on “what works” (evi-
dence-based knowledge). Biesta (2007) problematizes the “what works” 
approach to learning, and emphasizes that what works may vary in differ-
ent situations. He argues that teachers’ professional judgment should be 
the basis for their decisions, in combination with evidence-based knowl-
edge, practical experience and common sense (phronesis). As the future 
school seems to be all the more unpredictable, it is quite logical to assume 
that improvisation should also be a form of action in education (Wer-
ler, 2015). At the same time, improvisation, for example through digital 
samhandling, may pose risks for learners, as we do not know the conse-
quences of it. The fear of potential risks with digital samhandling may 
explain why teachers’ refrain from using it. However, if teachers refrain 
from facilitating digital samhandling, this may present a threat to the 
“knowledge society” in the unforeseen age. This is due to society’s need 
for samhandling through various platforms that may enable creativity 
and problem-solving of as yet unknown issues in the future.
The discussion so far about digital samhandling in education in the 
unforeseen age shows that teachers are vital as class leaders, also in virtual 
environments. However, they should participate in developing their roles 
as class leaders in the unforeseen age. This imposes demands on teachers’ 
professionalism, samhandling literacy, adaptability, and judgment. Also, 
educators and educational researchers should develop new approaches to 
learning, that can open up for the construction of new insights rather 
than primarily enabling the mediation of established knowledge. Torg-
ersen and Saeverot (2015) suggest that a new approach to learning can be 
indirect; an approach which opens up to new insights to a greater extent 
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(see also Saeverot, 2013; Saeverot, 2017). Indirect pedagogy enforces more 
student reflection, rather than seeking established knowledge (Saeverot, 
2017). Since digital samhandling is mediated through digital tools, it is 
an indirect form of communication that is also consistent with indirect 
forms of pedagogy.
Conclusion – strategies for better digital 
samhandling in education
So far, we have discussed several factors that may influence the basis of the 
digital samhandling that takes place in education. Firstly, guidance by the 
authorities should be clearer and more informative. Secondly, teachers 
should be professionally acquainted with digital samhandling platforms, 
as well as exploring their educational potential. Gaining digital literacy 
may enable teachers to act as class leaders while using digital samhan-
dling tools. Also, such capabilities may facilitate the creation of better 
learning environments for both students and teachers. Thirdly, digital 
samhandling platforms that are perceived by their users as safe, dynamic 
and flexible, rather than restrictive and rigid, are used to a greater extent 
for educational purposes. 
An important aspect of using digital samhandling tools in education is 
linked to reflection and learning during the teaching process. Despite the 
fact that teachers and students participate in various digital samhandling 
arenas daily, both socially and professionally, many are still relatively 
inexperienced in using such tools for educational purposes. The objec-
tives of this form of samhandling are different in the various contexts, 
and therefore, so are the results. Moreover, both teachers and students 
depend on learning along the way, and this process should take place 
through reflection and continual samhandling – which may in turn ena-
ble the development of digital samhandling literacy and new insights.
As the future is unknown, and the unforeseen is partly learned through 
teachers’ professional judgment and in practice communities with students, 
“new” pedagogy need not necessarily consist of more educational models 
and theories of “what works.” Perhaps the “new” pedagogy should be, to a 
greater extent, based on samhandling literacy and problem-based learning?
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Section II: Organizational 
Samhandling Structures
This research focuses on different aspects of leadership, innovation, 
learning and organization in relevant industries, agencies and emer-
gency management, highlighting different research methods, aspects and 
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Samhandling (which roughly equates with “interaction”), can be seen as 
a deeper form of cooperation and a good way forward, in order to ben-
efit from complementary competency and strive for better services and 
products (see Chapter 2; Steiro & Torgersen, 2013; Torgersen & Steiro, 
2010; Torgersen & Steiro, 2009; Miles & Watkins, 2007). These condi-
tions are not only applicable to complex and flexible multi-national 
organizations, for example, in the oil and gas industry, and military 
logistics organizations associated with international operations, but 
also to national competency-oriented businesses and educational man-
agement. The training of managers in contemporary times has been 
criticized for being too instrumental, narrow and shortsighted; this has 
created significant debate in recent years regarding the training of man-
agers in business schools (see for instance: Nussbaum, 2010; Ghoshal, 
2005; Bennis and O’Toole, 2005; Czarniawska, 2003; Mintzberg, 1989). 
To a large extent, management and control concepts have been rooted in 
economic or psychological theories and models, although society’s com-
plexity and the pace of change will demand a broader and deeper foun-
dation for the development of effective management systems in future 
(Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). Here, thinkers such as Immanuel Kant can 
help us to find the key which underlies relational and social structural 
phenomena that are otherwise overshadowed by the more applied and 
instrumental approaches of the field of management. Torgersen and 
Steiro (2009) argue for incorporating the thinking of Immanuel Kant 
and Jacques Derrida. In this chapter, these thoughts are re-introduced 
and elaborated upon. 
Risk and samhandling
Immanuel Kant (1795/1991) argued for his idea of the Weltbürger (“world 
citizen”), also known as “The Cosmopolitan Ideal”. His fundamental 
philosophy is that all humans are welcome, regardless of time and place, 
and that all humans are world citizens, regardless of nationality and cul-
tural belonging (Kant, 1795/1991). The world citizen is concerned with 
global challenges and solutions, and all humans are obliged to maintain 
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attitudes and values in accordance with these basic assumptions. All 
nations, states, organizations and humans should include others, which 
implies unconditional courtesy unrestricted by borders, boundaries and 
thresholds. This type of thinking demands an awareness of our own tol-
erance thresholds, values and attitudes. The philosophy of the Weltbürger 
calls for an open exchange of knowledge and values;, Immanuel Kant 
was influenced by Adam Smith (1776), who perceived specialization as 
a means for gaining a competitive advantage (Nussbaum, 2011). Adam 
Smith has been dubbed the founding father of market-economic think-
ing; greater specialization calls for experts who are willing and able to 
cooperate and create something new. Better products and/or services are 
essential for samhandling and meeting the unforeseen. Key words asso-
ciated with the Weltbürger are tolerance, trust, equality, respect, coping 
and learning. 
The Weltbürger and hospitality
The Greece philosopher Socrates (470 BCE – 399 BCE) is reported to have 
denied being called a citizen of the Greece state Athens; he would rather 
be called a citizen of the world (Hale, 2014). Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) 
was a German philosopher and physicist, whose primary concern in 
his writings was universal ethical rules, including the universal ethical 
maxim: “always act in such a way that you can also will that the maxim 
of your action should become a universal law”, which became the foun-
dation for “The Cosmopolitan Ideal” (Kant, 1795/1991). Kant’s thinking 
constituted a new democratic understanding of societies and organiza-
tions, as deliberative democracy is about mutual respect for each other’s 
understanding, communication and actions. 
The main element in Kant’s thinking is that all humans are welcome 
in the world, regardless of time and place; he called this the Weltbürger-
recht or “cosmopolitan right. All people are co-citizens, independent of 
nationality and cultural affiliation, and the Weltbürger is concerned with 
global problems and solutions. Kant speaks of rights, although duties 
are perhaps more evident in his thinking. All men are obliged to prac-
tice such attitudes and values in their daily lives and to practice human 
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rights. Originally, Kant stressed that nations and states should be includ-
ing and not excluding, which has direct implications for management. 
Several organizations need to think in terms of flexibility and organize 
themselves to be more flexible, since managers need to interact with a 
variety of different people. We also see that there is a need for managers 
to perform what has been termed “T-management” (Hansen, 2009), i.e. 
managers need to have an overview, while at the same time involving 
themselves and interacting in projects to help them succeed. Hence, the 
way we samhandler (“interact”) becomes of importance. The ideal, effec-
tive leader of the 21st century will have to be able to mobilize people in 
order to undertake tasks in uncertain, rapidly changing environments 
(Hays & Kim, 2008). Furthermore, it should be noted that the 21st cen-
tury leader is “whole”; one who leads with his/her heart, head and soul 
in order to be authentic and touch others, above or below him/her in the 
hierarchy – both those who work for the leader and partners and stake-
holders (Griffin, 2008). Griffin (2008) also uses the word “wholeness”, as 
the whole person takes a holistic view of the world and the people around 
him/her (English, Fenwick & Parsons, 2005). The responsibility for those 
who educate managers is to make sure that “the whole person” is edu-
cated (Boyatzis & McLeod, 2001). 
Another central thinker is Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), a French phi-
losopher and writer particularly known for the term “Deconstruction”, 
which is about splitting-up words and phrases to find out what they really 
mean, in light of the culture and underlying attitudes. Human compre-
hension requires common words and phrases (language), a cultural and 
social context, both of which have formed the basis for the conceptual 
analysis of “hospitality”, and a “threshold of tolerance” (Derrida, 2005a; 
2005b; 2000). Hospitality is unconditional kindness that is not restricted 
by a limit or threshold, and there are no assumptions or prejudices in 
the invitation offered to the other party: “I invite you unconditionally – 
welcome to my home” (figuratively speaking). People should be included, 
regardless of sex, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, nationality, cul-
ture, position or socio-economic status. Pure tolerance is to accept the 
unacceptable, as well as accepting that which goes against common sense 
and may cause discomfort and tolerance problems; this applies to both 
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individuals, organizations and states. Furthermore, such thinking and 
action requires an awareness of one’s own tolerance thresholds, values 
and attitudes. This can be achieved through a joint deconstruction of the 
necessary basic concepts. 
Communication and samhandling
Samhandling depends upon individual characteristics and skills, struc-
tural and cultural components and an awareness that such expertise 
is a necessity. If participants actively contribute with their expertise to 
the community, not least by actively listening to each other, this in turn 
makes them conscious of the necessity. It confirms the importance of 
involvement and awareness in working together, in addition to being 
sensitive to each other, so that interactions can be achieved. We see 
facilitation skills as being important aspects of management, and in a 
well-recognized book on facilitation by Schwartz (1994), concrete exam-
ples are given showing how to interact with openness, “How come I am 
right? How come you are right? Maybe we are both right?”. Schwartz (1994) 
does not refer to Immanuel Kant and Jacques Derrida, but builds heavily 
on the thoughts of Chris Argyris and Donald Schön (1996; 1978). This 
form of communication does not put one above the other person, but it 
opens up for seeing differences as a resource. Quite clearly, the examples 
of Schwartz provide good, sound examples of hospitality and recognition 
of the other person (“I welcome you unconditionally”). This is a central 
fundament for deliberate democracy (Kant, 1795/1991). The Greek phi-
losopher was known to ask questions rather than providing his opinion 
and forcing it on others. Schein (2013) also advocates the importance of 
asking questions rather than telling the truth. We further believe that 
in addition of asking questions and approaching other humans in that 
sense, also is about the view of humans and interaction between humans 
is important, since there are some elements of self-fulfilling prophecies, 
as pinpointed earlier by McGregor (1960) and later reinforced by several 
authors (i.e. Ghoshal, 2005; Birkinshaw 2012; Steiro, 2015). We need to be 
aware of our assumptions and be able to integrate and tolerate opposing 
and conflicting views (Steiro, 2015). 
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Weltbürger and hospitality as a means of 
opening up for different perspectives
The well-recognized Harvard researcher, Theresa Amabile, writes that 
pluralistic thinking and being able to see different perspectives are 
important for creativity (Amabile, 1996; 1989). Creativity is more and 
more important for the survival of organizations and in order to succeed 
with new products or services. Creativity, as we see it, is a key factor in 
both reducing and mitigating risk after an accident or a deliberate attack. 
By being open and offering hospitality, the Weltbürger puts him/herself 
in a position to get to know the unusual, the strange and the contradic-
tive better. Samhandling has been defined as “… an open and mutual 
communication and development between players, in terms of expertise 
that complements each other and develops skills, directly face-to-face, or 
mediated by technology or by hand power, working towards common goals. 
The relationship between players at any given time rests on trust, involve-
ment, rationality and industry knowledge” (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009:130). 
Samhandling is seen as a key in focusing on complementary skills and 
knowledge (Miles & Watkins, 2007). Granovetter (1973) writes about the 
strength in weak ties, which are people or relations that are not very well 
known to us and that we are unfamiliar with. However, getting in contact 
could open up for new ideas, thoughts, questions and even criticism. On 
the other hand, strong ties are family, close friends and colleagues who 
possess very important values for us, but here the information tends to be 
known already. In contrast, the unknown and nonhomogenous tend to 
be unfamiliar to us (Granovetter, 1973). Here, the opportunities for explo-
ration and new possibilities are greater. 
Some preliminary conclusions and  
a brief look ahead
In a more dynamic and complex world, we need some guiding princi-
ples in order to ensure mutual respect and understanding. Communica-
tion and interaction should be deeply rooted in ethical thinking, and we 
need to communicate in a way that does not create unnecessary distance. 
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A stronger focus on communication and interaction between people is 
needed. Hence, we suggest an approach that uses humanistic knowledge 
and training, not only through cases but also looking beyond them, to a 
more holistic approach to the formation of leadership in our society. We 
think that this will help improve project managers and strengthen their 
competence, so that they possess and exercise better leadership skills 
under unpredictable and unforeseen conditions. Key words associated 
with the Weltbürger and hospitality are tolerance, trust, equality, respect, 
coping and learning, with the difference lying in competence. The Welt-
bürger could be the answer to the challenges of a more globalized world; 
in that sense, we think that Immanuel Kant and Jacques Derrida will 
make a vital contribution to the execution of leadership. The concept of 
the Weltbürger and hospitality have important values in and of them-
selves, and are ideas that are universal and timeless, providing an impor-
tant compass for human interaction. A manager with an awareness and 
attitudes in accordance with these values will be better at meeting differ-
ent people and cultures, which is also important in that it distinguishes 
more clearly between people and competence. The “World Citizen Idea” 
and “World Hospitality” require an open exchange of knowledge and val-
ues between citizens, in order to “reach” the way forward to something 
“new” in regard to inclusion, with the differences being seen as contribut-
ing competence. They will assist in the facilitation of experience, knowl-
edge, exchange of values and learning within the organization – the gain 
is in the “difference”, which is consolidated to create a new and stronger 
power (complementary power) to meet the unforeseen. 
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Abstract: This chapter sheds light on interaction (samhandling) between scientists 
and politicians. What happens when the latter gives the former a role in an effort to  
ensure that society is not exposed to an unforeseen calamity? The chapter has two 
objectives – one conceptual and one pertaining to the analysis of public policy in a 
particular context. First, distinctions are drawn between three dimensions of uncer-
tainty about the consequences of action. The aim is to create a clearer understanding 
of what is meant by assertions that policy is made under conditions of uncertainty. 
Secondly, the political implications of uncertainty are charted with particular refer-
ence to the choice of climate policy. The analysis targets the way the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has handled the task of publicizing the 
effect that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases have on the atmosphere. 
The conclusion is that the IPCC’s communication with politicians and the public 
has contributed to, rather than ameliorated, the problem of uncertainty that stands 
in the way of resolute political action.
Keywords: Samhandling, interaction, decision making under uncertainty, scientific 
disagreement, unforeseen.
Citation: Malnes, R. (2018). The Triad of Uncertainty – The Interaction Between Sci-
entists and Politicians. In G.-E. Torgersen (Ed.), Interaction: ‘Samhandling’ Under Risk. 
A Step Ahead of the Unforeseen (pp. 199–212). Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.23865/noasp.36.ch11




Normative questions about what we ought to do bring descriptive ques-
tions about matters of fact in their wake. This is because the consequences 
of our actions depend, to a greater or lesser extent, on what goes on else-
where, outside our control. Uncertainty about such matters is apt to stand 
in the way of resolute action. 
In this chapter, I shall first argue that the problem of uncertainty has sev-
eral aspects. Indeed, it is no single problem, but a triad of what I shall call 
bewilderment, ignorance and scientific inconclusiveness. Secondly, I shall 
discuss the role of science in dealing with bewilderment and ignorance. I 
pay particular attention to research into the cause of climate change. The 
aim of the article is to shed light on the interaction between scientists and 
politicians. What happens when the latter gives the former a role in an 
effort to ensure that society is not exposed to an unforeseen calamity? 
A brief introduction to the issue of climate change and the choice of cli-
mate policy is in order. Political authorities would like to know how human 
activity affects the earth’s climate in order to decide whether anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases should be reduced or allowed to continue at, 
or above, their current level. What is achieved by adopting one or the other 
course of action depends crucially on what goes on in the atmosphere. On 
the one hand, the effect of doing nothing, or not much, to lower emissions 
may be grave. The greenhouse theory says that greenhouse gases have an 
appreciable effect on the climate of the earth. If so, continued emissions 
at the current level are dangerous. On the other hand, reducing emissions 
may be costly, too. This, at any rate, is the opinion of many economists. If 
they are right, there is good reason to dispense with reductions unless they 
will contribute to stabilizing the climate. Let us assume that they are right. 
Let us also assume that the consequences of climate change may turn out 
to be far worse, at least in certain parts of the world, than any economic 
hardship anyone will suffer owing to reductions of emissions. Most of the 
subsequent argument will be unaffected if we drop the latter assumption, 
but it plays a crucial role towards the end of what follows.
An important conclusion is that scientific opinion about climate 
change has influenced parts of political opinion in a way that belies the 
scientists’ best intentions. Their presentation of results from research was 
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meant to counteract the reluctance of political agents – leaders as well as 
people at large – to do something about the dangers of climate change. 
This may well have produced the opposite effect. 
Bewilderment
We – or those of us who are not well versed in atmospheric chemistry – 
do not know what to believe about anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases. We are uncertain in the psychological sense of the word. Uncertainty, 
thus conceived, is a state of mind – a doxastic attitude – and it amounts to 
the absence of wholehearted belief. With regard to the matter at hand, we 
cannot judge that things are definitely thus or so. I shall call it bewilderment.
To arrive at a more precise definition, consider an episode in Shake-
speare’s Othello. Night falls on Venice and Brabantio, a nobleman, is at 
home. So, he believes, is his daughter; indeed, he is certain that she is at 
home. He has a full belief. Then consider Hamlet. In the tragedy that bears 
his name, he has just lost his father, who was King of Denmark, and he 
suspects murder was committed at the behest of the Queen and the late 
King’s brother. But he is by no means sure. After all, the body was found 
lying in a garden where poisonous snakes live. Hamlet has no full belief, 
only a partial one. In general, to have a partial belief in a proposition, P, is 
to attach greater likelihood to P than any contrary proposition – i.e. any 
proposition that entails the denial of P – but some likelihood to at least 
one contrary proposition. As Hamlet sees it, murder is the likelier of two 
explanations that both have some likelihood.
Partial belief can border on full belief. Suppose, for example, that I 
peer out of the window and see people in their shirtsleeves. This gives 
me reason to believe that the weather is warm. As it happens, however, 
the past week has been unseasonably cold and perhaps these people have 
taken off their jackets in protest against the weather, as it were. What I see 
favors the first hypothesis, but does not rule the latter out of court. I have 
a partial belief that is nearly full.
Partial belief can also be distant from full belief. Let’s say that I wonder 
whether my daughter will go right home after school to take our dog out 
for a walk. She said she would, but it is a beautiful day, so perhaps she will 
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succumb to the temptation of hanging out with some friends. Only by a 
small margin does one proposition (“she will go right home”) surpass its 
negation (“she won’t”) in terms of likelihood. My partial belief borders on 
refusal to accord the former a higher probability than the latter. I am, in 
other words, on the verge of suspending judgment.
In view of these distinctions, we may refine the account of bewilder-
ment. To be bewildered about something is to have a partial belief about 
it or, at the limit, no belief at all. The latter amounts to suspension of 
judgment. Short of that, bewilderment comes in degrees. The further we 
are from full belief, the greater our bewilderment. In the second last para-
graph, I invoked a case of mild bewilderment, whereas the last paragraph 
portrayed me as very bewildered. 
Bewilderment is a problem from a practical point of view. It is apt to 
stand in the way of resolute action. One is naturally reluctant to choose 
an alternative that does not match up with a clear-cut consequence. 
Reluctance is apt to vary with the distance from full belief. The more 
unsure one is about what a given alternative leads to, the less keen one 
is to choose it, all things being equal. Reluctance fostered by uncertainty 
presumably reaches its highest level when judgment is suspended.
Ignorance
Suppose someone has a full belief. She may, for example, stand before 
a choice and feel certain about what an alternative has in store for her. 
There is no doubt in her mind. All the same, she can be out of her depth. 
Certainty, to quote Wittgenstein (1972:6e), is “a tone of voice in which 
one declares how things are, but one does not infer from the tone of voice 
that one is justified.” To be certain but not knowledgeable about a certain 
subject at the same time is no feat (not, at any rate, if experience from my 
life is anything to go on).
Being knowledgeable is no state of mind, but an epistemic position. It 
consists in being aware of how things really are. This, too, is a kind of cer-
tainty. Similarly, being unknowledgeable is a kind of uncertainty. Call it 
ignorance. I shall offer a more refined account of it after briefly digressing 
on the topic of truth.
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The term “truth” stands for a relation between a representation and 
some matter of fact. Say the representation is verbal – a written account, 
for example. It is true if, and only if, it depicts things as they are. In par-
ticular, the assertion that X causes Y is a true explanation of Y, provided 
Y really owes its occurrence to X. David Hillel-Ruben (1991:210) makes 
the point cumbrously: “Explanations work, when they do, only in vir-
tue of underlying determinative or dependency structural relations in 
the world.” Jon Elster (2017:24) puts it pithily: “A genuine explanation 
accounts for what happened, as it happened.”
Elster (ibid.:25) adds, “Why would anyone want to come up with a 
purely conjectural account of an event?” This statement, however, is apt to 
invite misunderstanding. Nothing contrasts more starkly with guesswork 
than truth revealed, but mere conjecture and certified truth are extremes. 
Between them is the immensely important category of representations 
that are conjectural but credible. They constitute promising candidates 
for truth. Their importance derives from the fact that we do not search 
for truth the way we search for, say, a word to rhyme with another. One 
can tell whether words rhyme by comparing them to one another, but no 
proposition permits straightforward comparison with reality. Going after 
truth is a more roundabout matter. 
In Colin McGinn’s words, there is “no more to the injunction to seek 
the truth than to respect the evidence”, not because “there is no distinc-
tion between evidence and truth”, but because “our position as cognitive 
agents is confined to that of evaluators of evidence” (McGinn 2003:72). 
This dictum needs some fleshing out. I take it that “evidence” stands for 
information, in particular, perceptual information.1 Not for nothing, 
McGinn speaks of the evaluation, rather than collection, of it. We do not 
just register bits and pieces of evidence; we scrutinize information before 
it can serve as a cue to the truth. Documents, for example, are assessed for 
authenticity. A further and more notable complication is that informa-
tional value can be boosted by means of reasoning. Here is an illustration 
1 “Evidence” sometimes has a more inclusive meaning. It may stand for what I will soon talk about 
under the head of “epistemic considerations”. McGinn’s use of “evidence” seems to be in line with 
mine rather than the more inclusive meaning, but it does not matter if I am wrong on this score. 
The substance of what I am going to say will be unaffected. 
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of how this works. After Beethoven had lost his hearing, he carried note-
books about with him, in which people he met wrote down what they 
said to him. His own contributions to the conversations are mostly unre-
corded, but the written record, together with background knowledge of 
the life and times of the composer, permit credible conjectures. We may 
fill out the blanks by asking what Beethoven is likely to have said that elic-
ited the responses he got. Similarly, to turn to science for an illustration, 
we can figure out the chemical composition of stars by inference, from 
observations of the frequency and pattern of light rays. It is a question 
of abductive inference, which, schematically put, goes like this: (i) there 
is evidence that Y is the case; (ii) the best explanation of Y is that X is the 
case; hence (iii) X is the case. Evidence is one kind of pointer to truth and 
abductive inference is another. There are yet others, notably inductive 
inference. We can call them collectively epistemic considerations. 
Now we are equipped to restate McGinn’s dictum. In practice, there 
is no more to the injunction to seek the truth than to respect epistemic 
considerations, not because there is no distinction between propositions 
that rest on epistemic considerations and propositions that are true, but 
because there is no better way of getting at the truth than respecting epis-
temic considerations. This, in turn, equips me for refining the definition 
of ignorance. To be ignorant about something is to form a belief about 
it without paying sufficient attention to epistemic considerations. Like 
bewilderment, ignorance is a matter of degree, running the whole gamut 
from a mild lack of attention to epistemic considerations to pronounced 
inattentiveness. In other words, the evidence for, and the reasoning 
behind, a certain belief can leave a little or a lot to be desired. 
Consider Brabantio again. He is certain that his daughter is at home. 
Enter Iago and Roderigo, who tell him that the girl has eloped with a 
lover. Brabantio does not believe what they say, but searches the house 
and then realizes that he is wrong: “It is too true an evil, gone she is.” 
(Shakespeare Othello scene 1, act 1) Both before and after the search, 
Brabantio has a full belief. Beforehand, he is certain that his daughter is at 
home; afterwards, he is certain that she is not. Psychologically speaking, 
the two states of mind are akin to one another. Both bespeak confidence. 
But epistemologically speaking, they differ. The original belief is, if not 
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flippant, at least careless. It is replaced by one that rests on a propitious 
way of getting at truth – or, more accurately, a well-suited way of inquir-
ing into someone’s whereabouts. It is not that by going and looking for 
a person at a certain site one is certain to find out whether or not she is 
there, but the procedure is promising to a tee.
Then consider Hamlet for a second time. The basis for the partial belief 
he holds when the play begins is flimsy. What makes him suspect that 
his father was murdered is the hasty marriage between his uncle and his 
mother. (I disregard the nightly appearances of his father’s ghost.) It may 
well have been improper of the two to wed so soon, but it hardly indicates 
that they are murderers. Hamlet is on thin epistemic ice; his case is a para-
digm of ignorance. Later, however, he conducts an ingenious experiment. 
He arranges for a group of travelling actors to stage a tragedy about regi-
cide in the presence of his uncle. The new King reacts with evident horror 
when the players enact the murder scene. This fortifies Hamlet’s suspi-
cions. His doxastic attitude still falls short of a full belief, but now reflects 
attentiveness to epistemic considerations. He is no longer ignorant.
Scientific inclusiveness
It is in the nature of scientific inquiry to help with the problem of igno-
rance. I take this claim to be uncontroversial. Not only will I refrain from 
defending it; I will give it a rhetorical lift by borrowing a couple of felic-
itous phrases from Jonathan Bennett. Ordinary, untutored belief about 
matters of complexity tends to be based on “scanty reasoning about a 
small set of empirical data”, whereas science offers “thorough reasoning 
about a rich set of empirical data” (Bennett 2016:15). 
In contrast, it is not in the nature of science to help with the problem 
of bewilderment. The transition from untutored belief to belief that takes 
its cue from scientific inquiry is as likely to exacerbate as alleviate that 
problem. When we are presented with a rich set of varied evidence and 
become privy to ingenious reasoning, we may not be capable of forming 
a full belief or retaining one we had in advance.
In view of this, I shall define one more conception of uncertainty. 
Suppose that no full belief emanates from scientific inquiry about some 
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matter of fact. Science warrants only partial belief of what takes place or 
no belief at all. Then there exists scientific inconclusiveness. Conversely, 
when science puts doubt to rest, scientific conclusiveness is achieved. In 
the previous paragraph, I suggested that both upshots of enquiry are nor-
mal, which is not to say that they are equally welcome. The purpose of 
science is, after all, to get at truth. Only scientific conclusiveness bespeaks 
success in this respect (but does not, of course, guarantee it). Scientific 
inconclusiveness does away with ignorance, which is fine, but leaves us in 
a state of bewilderment, which is not so fine, as it is apt to hinder resolute 
action.
Combatting and exacerbating bewilderment
In the remainder of the article, I shall turn to research on climate change 
in order to extract some more specific lessons about the role of science 
in dealing with ignorance and bewilderment. Political authorities have 
engaged scientific experts to help with the question of whether or not 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases affect the climate in ways 
that are dangerous. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) is a network of scientists whose task is, among other things, to 
sort this question out. What have these scientists done for us?
To all appearances, the IPCC has helped with the problem of uncer-
tainty-cum-ignorance. Quibbles about the quality of its successive reports 
notwithstanding, they firmly belong to the category of thorough reason-
ing about a rich set of empirical data. It appears, moreover, that the IPCC 
is also intent on helping with the problem of uncertainty-cum-bewilder-
ment. Consider a statement by John Houghton, who has been chairper-
son of Working Group 1 – one of the three constituent working groups: 
… our work was rather like the making of a weather forecast. It is of little help 
for a forecaster to say that the weather will change tomorrow but that he is un-
willing to say in what way. The forecaster also needs to give his best estimate of 
the detail of that change. (Houghton 1990:6)
To be sure, the statement is ambiguous. On the one hand, Houghton urges 
scientists to be precise and not to tell things approximately when exactness 
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is feasible. Saying simply that the weather will change is inadvisable, if not 
irresponsible, if one has reason to believe that incumbent change will take 
this or that particular shape. This is a pertinent but trite admonishment. 
On the other hand, Houghton also admonishes that scientists commit 
themselves to a full belief. He suggests that a weather forecast is useless for 
practical purposes unless the forecaster comes up with a definite predic-
tion. Heeding the first admonishment will not help with the problem of 
bewilderment, but heeding the latter obviously puts an end to it. 
As it turns out, the IPCC goes a long way towards committing itself to 
a full belief about the cause of climate change. In the first report, Working 
Group 1 offers the following summary of its findings:
We are certain of the following: … emissions resulting from human activities are 
substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases … 
These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an 
additional warming of the Earth’s surface. (IPCC 1990: xi)
This is said in the Executive Summary, which directs itself to political 
decision makers and the public at large. However, the commitment to 
full belief is something of an intellectual exaggeration. In the “supporting 
material” provided by Working Group 1, we read that, “Poor quantita-
tive understanding of low frequency climate variability (particularly on 
the 10–100 year time scale) leaves open the possibility that the observed 
warming is largely unrelated to the enhanced greenhouse effect.” (IPCC 
1990:254) There is, accordingly, a discrepancy between what some scien-
tists (at least) believe about the effect of greenhouse gas emissions and 
what those who penned the executive summary communicate to politi-
cians and the public. The formulation I quoted from in the “supporting 
material” is indicative of only partial belief in the greenhouse theory. Two 
hypotheses – an enhanced greenhouse effect and natural variability – 
appear to be good candidates for truth, contrary to what the IPCC states 
in the summary.
In the report of 2007, the summary of the contribution from Work-
ing Group 1 contains many formulations that signal, if not full belief, 
at least nearly full belief in the greenhouse theory. It is said, for exam-
ple, that “[m]ost of the observed increase in global average temperature 
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since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase 
in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” Moreover, it “is very 
unlikely that climate changes of at least the seven centuries prior to 
1950 were due to variability generated within the climate system alone.” 
(IPCC 2007:10 and 12) The IPCC goes as far as alleging that there is a 
chance of 9 in 10 that human activity is the cause of climate change. 
This, however, seems exaggerated in the light of what the scientific pro-
ceedings say. Qualifications and reservations are voiced. They have to 
do with the models that underlie the estimate I just cited. In particu-
lar, the role played by clouds and oceans in the causal chain between 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change remains to be sorted out 
(ibid.:592–593).
It appears, then, that the IPCC tones down scientific inconclusiveness 
about the cause of climate change. The results it reports are inconclusive. 
Epistemic considerations support only partial belief and we are closer 
to suspension of judgment than full belief. Yet, in statements that direct 
themselves to political authorities and the public, a nearly full belief is 
voiced.
Why does the IPCC speak with two tongues? I venture the hypoth-
esis2 that it does not confine its attention to epistemic considerations 
when it passes a judgment on the greenhouse theory before us, its non- 
scientific audience. Considerations of a practical nature enter the pic-
ture. They have to do with what can go wrong if we – or politicians who 
act on our behalf – adopt a climate policy that reflects false belief about 
the cause of climate change. Two errors, in particular, are conceiva-
ble. One is to take costly steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that 
actually have very little or no effect on the climate. Call this the error of 
redundancy: making (significant) sacrifices to no avail. The other error 
is to refrain from reductions in the false belief that anthropogenic emis-
sions are inconsequential, whereas they substantially affect the climate. 
Call this the error of complacency. On the face of it, the two errors are 
equally regrettable. The first consists in wasting resources that society 
2 It is inspired by an argument of Michael Bratman (1999:22–24). His thoughts are on other mat-
ters and I do not know whether my inspired use of them will be to his liking.
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might have put to good use, the second in wasting an opportunity to 
avert adversity. 
We have seen that the findings of the IPCC warrant a partial belief as 
to the effect that climate change will have unless reductions are under-
taken. This belief is close to suspension of judgment. Now, suppose sci-
entists are not reporting the result of their research to us, but to someone 
who is about to place a bet. Suppose their task is to enlighten a gambler 
about the value of two lottery-tickets: one says that cuts will stave off cli-
mate change and the other that they won’t. Suppose, moreover, that sci-
entists know that this gambler is not fully rational, but liable to make an 
unwise decision. Then they may reinterpret their task as a dual one: both 
telling the gambler about the risk of, respectively, redundancy and com-
placency, and helping her to make a rational choice. What, apart from 
doing their best on the first score, might they do to forestall irrationality? 
It is natural to think that the presentation of their findings might be more 
or less suited to the purpose of priming the gambler for a rational choice. 
Will it help, for example, to inflate the estimate of one or the other risk? 
No, because the error of redundancy and the error of complacency are 
equally undesirable. If the gambler bets on the need for cuts when cuts 
are redundant, she loses her money; ditto if she wagers that it is safe to 
abstain from cuts that are actually needed. In view of this, the best scien-
tists can do with a view to promoting rational choice on the part of the 
gambler, is to straightforwardly convey their findings to her. 
The predicament we – all of us, but political authorities in particular – 
are in differs from that of the gambler. From our perspective, there is an 
asymmetry in the costs of error. The alternatives of either cutting or not 
cutting emissions are not on a par when it comes to how badly things may 
go. The consequence of complacency is worse than that of redundancy. 
However adversely cuts in emissions will affect the economy of this or 
that country, the consequences of climate change are far worse, at least in 
certain parts of the world. Failing to make necessary cuts could be disas-
trous. In contrast, the risk of making cuts to no avail is worrying, but not 
nearly as much. So, at any rate, I assumed at the outset. 
In view of this, one would expect that scientists who let practical con-
siderations into their reasoning behave otherwise than they would have 
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done if they had only reckoned on epistemic considerations. If, in par-
ticular, they are concerned about imperfect rationality on our part, it will 
be a concern about complacency. Considering the asymmetry in the costs 
of error, redundancy is, in comparison, a lesser worry. 
In the case of the hypothetical gambler, I simply postulated that the 
hypothetical scientists worry about her lack of rationality. It will not do 
to argue this way when it comes to the way scientists in the IPCC behave 
towards us. There has to be some justification for assuming that they sus-
pect we may not be up to the task of making a wise decision. The justifica-
tion is not hard to find. On the one hand, the cost of cutting greenhouse 
gas emissions will be borne whether or not cuts do any good. On the other 
hand, the cost society will incur if cuts are needed but left undone lies in 
the future. This is a classic setting for myopia. The error of redundancy may 
make an impression that is out of proportion to the real cost of undertaking 
redundant cuts. It is apt to be the other way around with the cost of compla-
cency. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the IPCC ratch-
ets up the estimate of the risk that greenhouse gases cause climate change. 
Suppressing doubt is a kind of manipulation. The IPCC would have 
us believe that the development will definitely go in the wrong direc-
tion unless emissions of greenhouse gases are cut significantly, whereas 
inquiry indicates only that disaster may happen. They encourage a nearly 
full belief, in spite of the fact that the epistemic considerations warrant a 
partial belief that is closer to suspension of judgment.
I do not think such manipulation of belief is necessarily wrong. Sup-
pose people are prone to take uncertainty as an excuse for living danger-
ously. Suppose, moreover, that lecturing people on the folly of this attitude 
will not have much of an effect on their behavior. Neither assumption is 
far-fetched when, as in the case of climate change, it will be costly to deal 
effectively with the danger in question. In such a case, when people are 
dragging their feet, those who are aware of the danger at hand may be 
justified in covering up uncertainty in order to discourage indecisiveness 
in the face of danger. 
In practice, however, there is a problem. Manipulation of belief by 
scientists may easily turn out to be counterproductive. It is apt to push 
scientific debate in a direction that makes people less, rather than more, 
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prepared to do something about the danger. The root of the problem is 
that scientists rarely agree on matters relating to risk. When someone 
expresses greater confidence in their predictions than evidence permits, 
those who disagree will not remain silent. The scientific debate that fol-
lows is likely to be loud and livid, and as the heat turns up inside the 
scientific community, people on the outside may come to believe that dis-
agreement runs deeper than it actually does. Scientific communication 
that is aimed at covering up scientific inconclusiveness will rather con-
tribute to making a major issue out of it.
In the case of climate change, a large part of the public debate revolves 
around the question of whether or not things are certain to end in dis-
aster unless something drastic is done to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions. This has set the stage for bickering and postponement of political 
decisions. Responsibility for this state of affairs lies largely with scientists 
who have used their position as public experts to argue that the green-
house theory is the only viable explanation of climate change. It is not, 
and scientists who subscribe to other theories have raised their voices in 
protest. As a result, scientific inconclusiveness has come to be perceived 
as a major problem and a good reason not to do anything before scientists 
agree – which, of course, is unlikely to happen soon.
Conclusion
Discord among scientists has not gone unnoticed among those who, for 
some reason or other, want to dismiss the dangers of climate change. They 
have been able to defend their position simply by pointing out that there 
is still disagreement among scientists. A telling illustration is a memo 
that came from the Republican Party in the United States, when George 
W. Bush was President. It was meant to back up the President’s resistance 
to greenhouse gas reductions, and it said:
Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled, their 
views about global warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to 
continue to make the lack of scientific conclusiveness a primary issue in the 
debate. (Quoted from Lanchester 2007:5)
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Scientists who try to pass the greenhouse theory as certified truth open 
the door to this kind of argumentation. They play into the hands of those 
who are struggling against reductions of greenhouse gas emissions, allow-
ing them to harp on about the margin of error in the greenhouse theory.
I shall close on a note of political engagement. Uncertainty is pro-
nounced and resilient even in the best parts of science, and scientists 
should not cover it up. They should rather acclimatize people to the idea 
that most of time, even the best estimate is an unsure estimate. The fact 
that we do not know for sure, but only suspect, that greenhouse gas emis-
sions are causing climate change is not a good excuse for inaction. 
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In this chapter, I explore the link between social innovation and collab-
oration among change makers and stakeholders. Social innovation is 
a field on the rise, both practically and theoretically (Cajaiba-Santana, 
2014), and involves new ideas for tackling unmet social needs or solving 
current social problems (Mulgan, Tucker, Rushanara, & Sanders, 2007). 
Even if social innovation has great potential, confronting uncertainties, 
risk and resistance are inevitable when engaging in this type of endeavor. 
Consequently, it may be challenging to mobilize key stakeholders to com-
mit to and engage in relevant actions and collaborative processes (Marcy, 
2015). The problem addressed in this chapter concerns how to identify, 
target and mobilize key stakeholders to collaborate constructively in 
social innovation initiatives. It is viewed from the vantage point of those 
initiating and leading social innovation efforts, and aims to point out 
some factors that must be overcome and others that may foster construc-
tive collaborative processes among change makers and stakeholders. 
Social innovations involve collaboration
Social innovation is a research field on the rise (Cajaiba-Santana, 2014:42), 
with the potential to resolve pressing social, economic and environmen-
tal challenges (Windrum, Schartinger, Rubalcaba, Gallouj, & Toivonen, 
2016). Social innovation can be defined as the development and imple-
mentation of new ideas to meet previously unmet social needs or solve 
current social problems (Mulgan et al., 2007). The European Commission 
(2010, 2013) perceives social innovation as a way to address societal prob-
lems like unemployment, poverty, demographic shifts and climate change 
with innovative solutions of social inclusion and empowerment (Lind-
berg, Forsberg & Karlberg, 2016). As such, these innovations are social, in 
terms of both ends (coming up with innovative solutions to social prob-
lems) and means (developing innovative solutions in a social way). 
Some specific examples of social innovations are the development of 
online education, neighborhood renewal programs, and efforts to enable 
elderly people to stay longer in their homes (Sørensen & Torfing, 2014:3). 
Lindberg et al., (2016) studied how women’s networks may contribute 
social  innovation and collaboration
215
to social innovation. Drake, Ballangrund, Svenkerud & Ulvestad (2017) 
employ action research to mobilize more women professors at a Norwe-
gian higher education institution, contributing to the promotion of social 
innovation in academia (see also Ulvestad, 2017). 
While social innovation as a way to resolve current social inequalities 
and unmet needs of groups of individuals appears promising, there are 
certainly challenges and obstacles that may interfere with and decrease 
the likelihood of such processes and outcomes. One particular challenge 
relates to the fact that most social problems and solutions involve multiple 
stakeholders and a network of people. While change makers and change 
agents initiate and drive innovation processes (McCalman, Paton, & Sie-
bert, 2016), they depend on other people to contribute, engage and collab-
orate in various roles and processes along the way (Cels, de Jong & Nauta, 
2012). Successful social innovation requires stakeholder acceptance and 
collaboration, state Herrera (2015). 
What, then, is collaboration? Some definitions are comprehensive and 
describe all the components that are ideally involved in collaborative pro-
cesses. For example, Torgersen & Steiro (2009:130) define samhandling 
[collaboration] as an “open, equal communication and developmental 
process that occurs between participants with compatible competencies 
and who exchange competence, directly face-to-face, mediated via tech-
nology, or by hand, work towards common goals, and where the relation-
ship between the participants is built on trust, engagement, rationality and 
sectorial knowledge”. At the other end of the spectrum are definitions that 
view collaboration as occurring as soon as there is an action and a response 
to that action. For example, Wadel (2012) leans on Asplund (1987) when 
stating that interaction occurs when a person responds to what another 
person does. Behaviors and outcomes are ‘produced’ as sequences of 
acts interact with each other. This thinking is in line with Schein (2016), 
who claims that leaders can never not communicate, for even the lack of 
response is a response. As such, interaction is evident when more than 
one person is present in any situation and someone takes an initiative to 
communicate and/or engage with someone else in a conversation or other 
actions. In contrast, the term samhandling implies a more cooperative and 
socially constructive mindset, approach and relationship between actors 
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(Gergen, 2015). In the social innovation literature, the terms ‘engagement’ 
and ‘co-creation’ are used alongside collaboration to denote constructive 
collaboration between change makers and stakeholders.
If social innovations are viewed as a value chain, where change agents 
with ideas to address and improve a specific social problem represent the 
start (Young, 2011), there may be numerous stakeholders involved along 
the way towards implementation. Stakeholders are anyone who in some 
way has a stake in the success of the social innovation (Cels et al., 2012:13). 
Razali & Anwar (2011) emphasize that stakeholders can be positive or neg-
ative influencers and define stakeholders as “all those who have a stake in 
the change being considered – those who stand to gain from it and those 
who stand to lose (Macaulay, 1993)”. These influencers can be external and 
internal authority persons, decision makers, employees, professional col-
leagues and clients, those who control material and immaterial resources, 
critical information and the like. Clearly, from the point of view of change 
makers, it will be advantageous to have proactive and collaborative rela-
tionships with ones’ stakeholders (Sørensen & Torfing, 2014:4). 
A first step, then, is to identify and discover key stakeholders. Empiri-
cal research has found that identifying and discovering stakeholders rep-
resents a core problem for practitioners (Alexander & Robertson, 2004). 
This is not surprising, as other research has found more than 100 stake-
holder categories in use (Fassin, 2009). Stakeholders are typically iden-
tified via broad roles, such as distributors, suppliers, customers, owners 
and so forth (Freeman, 1984). Researchers have pointed out, however, 
that this is an insufficient approach (Fiedler & Kirchgeorg, 2007; Wolfe & 
Putler, 2002). The argument is that people do not behave as representatives 
of broad group categories, but as individuals with unique preferences, 
interests, perspectives and needs. Consequently, McVea and Freeman 
(2005:57) suggest that stakeholders should be treated as “individuals 
with names, faces and families”. How this is to be done, is however not 
explained or elaborated on in the article, and has only to a limited degree 
been addressed in other contributions (Drake, 2014).
Social innovations offer meaning and purpose to those who are per-
sonally or professionally engaged in the problem at hand. However, they 
are also risky, uncertain and likely to evoke resistance and even hostility 
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among others. How to overcome such obstacles and engage key stakehold-
ers in constructive collaborative processes, including those who might 
otherwise be motivated to refrain from engagement or actively resist pro-
gress, is a key question. This is particularly so in light of the recent trend 
of “innovating the innovation process” (Darsø, 2012), where stakeholders 
are being involved and engaged at a much earlier stage in the innovation 
process than previously. Frow, Nenonen, Payne & Storbacka (2015:3), for 
example, state that the role of customers has evolved from ‘passive audi-
ences’ to ‘active players’. From this perspective, identifying, onboarding 
and engaging key stakeholders, may represent both an opportunity as well 
as a challenge. 
The problem
On this background, the problem that will be addressed in this chapter 
concerns how to identify and attract key stakeholders to engage in col-
laborative processes in any given social innovation initiative. It is viewed 
from the vantage point of those initiating, coordinating and leading social 
innovation efforts, who will be referred to as change makers or change 
agents. The literature reviewed ranges from contributions around social 
innovations, stakeholder identification, engagement and collaboration. 
The chapter has the following structure: First, I describe in more detail 
why social innovation may be perceived as both risky, uncertain and 
unjust from a stakeholder perspective. Next, I explicate why targeting and 
attracting the right stakeholders are so important for constructive, col-
laborative processes. I propose that attracting stakeholders with power, 
purpose, passion and presence may provide change makers with a broad 
scope of influencers who may move the innovation process forward in a 
socially responsible way. 
Viewing social innovation from a process ontology (Hernes, Hendrup 
& Schäffner, 2015), may add further meaning to such ambitions. It gives 
rise to actions and relationship building between change makers and 
potential or current stakeholders, not only with short-term outcomes in 
mind, but over the long haul as well. These ideas are briefly mentioned in 
the last section of the chapter. 
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What is risky about engaging in social 
innovation?
Since the premise of this book is to explore conditions for effective collab-
oration under situations of uncertainty and risk, it may be fruitful to be 
more explicit about what kinds of risks and uncertainties that may impose 
challenges in terms of attracting stakeholders to social innovation efforts.
Firstly, all innovation processes are of their very nature uncertain, as 
they involve creating something new (Cels et al., 2012). This ‘newness’ 
may involve new ways of doing things, as well as new outcomes1. Clearly, 
engaging in something without knowing what will come out of it, if any-
thing at all, may lead some stakeholders to resist getting involved in the 
first place. 
Uncertainty may be particularly profound at the outset of an inno-
vation process. Viewing innovation processes in terms of stages is quite 
common in the literature (Kezar & Eckel, 2002). Herrera (2015:1469), for 
example, addresses the various stages involved in issue of ‘corporate social 
innovation’. At the initial stage, the core tasks are about active problem 
sensing and idea generation. More specifically, this include exploring 
and identifying the problem, necessary input and resources, processes 
and stakeholders, probable by-products, variations in outcomes and so 
forth. All of these may involve blurry perceptions, multiple interpreta-
tions and unclear goals which in sum creates a high level of uncertainty. 
At later stages, such as the implementation stage, the level of uncertainty 
is substantially reduced and may appear less daunting. It may therefore 
be useful to keep in mind that individual stakeholders may be more or 
less tolerant and anxious about uncertainty (Moxnes, 2012). Those with 
low tolerance of ambiguity, should probably not be targeted at the earliest 
stages of the innovation process. 
1 The differences between change, invention and innovation are often addressed in the literature. 
Sørensen & Torfing (2014:2) explain that all innovations involve change, but not all changes qua-
lify as innovation. Only those changes which disrupt existing practices and the common wisdom 
in a particular area, should be considered innovations. The difference between inventions and 
innovations, is that inventions are ‘new to this world’, but innovations are only new to the local 
situation (Cels et al., 2012:4). Hence, it is not the source of innovation but the local context of 
implementation that determines whether something can be considered an innovation or not 
(Roberts & King, 1996). 
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When it comes to problem identification, a particular kind of uncer-
tainty is pivotal to address, namely, whether there actually is a problem 
that must be dealt with in the first place. “The problem is that people don’t 
notice the problem,” stated Deborah Rhode, in a panel debate on women 
and leadership at a global leadership conference in 20162. When it comes 
to social inequalities or situations where minorities experience unequal 
or insufficient circumstances compared with the majority, it may not be 
easy for those who do not themselves confront the problem, to see that 
there actually is one (Drake et al., 2017). 
Another challenge relates to the fact that in order to restore equality 
between certain groups of individuals, some individuals must be pro-
vided advantages, and not others. In fact, when solutions to social prob-
lems are implemented inside current organizations, the effect may be 
that some employees win at other employees’ expense (Cajaiba-Santana, 
2014:44). Thus, social changes may be seen as an improvement by those 
who support or belong to the favored group and as a regression by others. 
Stakeholders who are affected negatively or who do not receive the same 
advantageous treatment as their co-workers, may build up resistance and 
eventually decide to sabotage the initiative. Others, who are not nega-
tively affected themselves, but foresee such resistance from other power-
ful participants or stakeholders they positively identify with, may refrain 
from supporting the initiative. 
The possibility of such a response may be partly explained by the fact 
that social problems primarily become visible and are accrued at the col-
lective level, while solutions often must be instigated at the individual and 
organizational levels (Phills, Deiglmeier & Miller, 2008). Those having 
to give way to underprivileged group representatives may thus lack the 
motivation to do so. 
Taken together, even if not all of these forces come into play during 
one particular social innovation initiative, resistance and hesitancy by 
potential and actual stakeholders should be expected when embarking on 
a social innovation process (Marcy, 2015). 
2 Global International Leadership Association, 18th Annual Meeting, Nov. 2016, Atlanta USA. The 
author was present at the panel debate and took notes. 
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At the same time, when stakeholders do become engaged in such pro-
jects, there may be plenty of upside. Finding meaning, purpose, taking 
responsibility, and participating in mutual collaboration and co-creation 
of new solutions to unmet needs, underline why individuals may be moti-
vated to engage in social innovations at a personal level. 
Identifying and discovering stakeholders
Before engaging in problem identification and exploring solutions to cur-
rent social problems, stakeholders who may influence or be influenced 
by the initiative should be identified (Wagner, Alves, & Raposo, 2011). As 
already mentioned, the most common approach to stakeholder identi-
fication is the application of a ‘role-perspective’ (Freeman, 1984; Fassin, 
2009). One tries to identify, through either empirical analysis or theo-
retical reasoning, which are the most central roles influencing, or being 
influenced by, an issue or problem in question. This point to the impor-
tance of the power of stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood 1997). Let us 
look a bit more into this notion, followed by the issues of stakeholders’ 
purpose, passion and presence. 
Stakeholders with power
In practical terms, identifying stakeholders may start with those formal 
roles, which have the power to influence or be influenced by an issue in 
question (Power, 2010). In some cases, these may be formal gatekeepers 
who control access to information, decisions or other resources necessary 
to move an idea forward. Young (2011) provides an illustrative example: an 
individual who invents a new form of legal contract cannot simply insti-
tute it on his/her own. Rather, the implementation process is dependent 
on involvement and coordinated efforts among stakeholders who have 
the authority to accept and instigate the application of the legal contract 
in a particular domain or in society in general. 
Investigating leadership constructions within a corporation, Drake 
(2011, 2014) suggests that combining functional role and hierarchical 
level may lead to a more refined and practically applicable classification 
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of stakeholder groups. Those who have similar roles, such as leaders, HR 
staff and labor union representatives, but operate at different hierarchi-
cal levels, may exhibit quite different levels of decision-making power, 
social capital, and strategic concerns (Hooijberg & Denison, 2002; Tsui, 
1987). Thus, it may be useful to ensure representation from stakehold-
ers who function at appropriate authority levels in the organizational 
hierarchy. 
Stakeholders may have access to power in more indirect ways than 
functional roles, for example via ones’ networks, reputation, experience, 
competencies and so forth. Young (2011) emphasizes how power may 
derive via networks, and suggests that both social capital and relational 
abilities are important when identifying which individual stakeholder 
representatives to invite or attract into a social innovation process. Not 
only are people’s first-level connections important (so-called ‘strong ties’), 
but their ‘weak ties’ (the people their contacts are in contact with) are also 
relevant (Granovetter, 1973). If the change agent or change maker her-
self does not have the decision-making or informational power needed to 
move a project forward, it may be sufficient to mobilize the engagement 
of stakeholders in ones’ network who do. 
Networks can be valuable in ways that are more indirect and provide 
necessary legitimacy to an initiative (Cajaiba-Santana, 2014:47). This is 
particularly relevant in public-sector innovations, as legitimacy involves 
securing support for the initiative in one’s authorizing environment (Cels 
et al., 2012). In practice, this may be done by involving stakeholders more 
explicitly in the project as a form of sponsor, ambassador or mentor. 
Empirical research has, for example, demonstrated how successful social 
innovators typically reach out to people with a certain status or power. By 
creating some kind of role for powerful people in their project, they hope 
to generate necessary credibility and legitimacy from other key stake-
holders (ibid.:30). 
Stakeholders with purpose 
What makes someone see something as a problem worth engaging in? As 
Weick (1995:9) points out, problems do not present themselves as givens. 
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They must be perceived or constructed from problematic situations that 
seem worthwhile to look into. When a problem or a problematic situation 
has gained the attention of someone, there may be sufficient motivation 
to engage in collaborative processes to help fix it. If so, one becomes a 
stakeholder through one’s purposeful engagement. 
Oftentimes, however, needs are not so blatantly obvious, and may in 
fact not be recognized by stakeholders at all (Mulgan et al., 2007). In these 
situations, argue Cels et al., (2012), the change maker should not aim to 
create an overall purpose that all stakeholders must share or agree with. 
Instead, one should explore what key stakeholders find meaningful and 
important at an individual level, and address how the problematic situ-
ation relates to these concerns. In other words, one should try to carve 
out a clear purpose, which will resonate with individual stakeholder con-
cerns and values. McCalman et al., (2016) note that as long as all parties 
with a stake in the change see a mutual benefit in moving the project 
forward, it is not necessary that they all share the same perception about 
why this is a good idea. 
Combining information about stakeholder power with exploration of 
stakeholder purpose, may help change agents in deciding where to put in 
sufficient time and energy in terms of onboarding the right mix of stake-
holders. In stakeholder analysis, one tries to map the degree of interest 
as well as the power/influence each stakeholder has regarding a project/
initiative (Kuenkel, Gerlach, & Frieg, 2011). This becomes input for devel-
oping strategies of stakeholder engagement. People with high power and 
high interest in an issue should be managed closely and given a lot of 
attention, as they represent a high potential stakeholder group (Muham-
mad & Mustafa, 2013). Another important stakeholder group are those 
with low interest in an initiative, and at the same time high influence/
power to affect its success. Finding ways to activate a sense of meaning 
related to tackling a specific social problem, may help moving stakehold-
ers from low to high interest stakeholders. 
One way to increase the likelihood that stakeholders will find it pur-
poseful to engage in a particular social initiative, is to appeal to the notion 
of becoming your neighbor’s ally. Young (2011) found that the value of the 
adoption of an innovative idea by a given individual increases according 
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to the number of his ‘neighbors’ who adopt it. In other words, there is 
likely to be a mechanism of contagion involved, where people see the 
value of valuing what the people close to them value. To this end, it may 
be useful to attract potential stakeholders by pointing to the social com-
mitments by their colleagues and acquaintances. 
Another strategy could be to appeal to the potential of developing a 
team spirit among stakeholders who may otherwise not see themselves as 
part of a group or team. While knowledge workers are often sufficiently 
self-leading and operate quite independently in contemporary work-
places (Kristensen, 2011:130), they may nonetheless be highly motivated 
by being part of highly engaged teams that are collaborating on a shared, 
social cause (Kuenkel, 2016).
Stakeholders with passion 
Identifying stakeholders who feel a passion or compassion related to the 
problem at hand, involves recognizing emotional aspects of stakeholder 
engagement. Solem & Pedersen (2016) state that engagement involves the 
investment of (personal) physical, cognitive and emotional energy (Kahn, 
1990, 1992; Rich, Lepine, & Crawford, 2010). Physical energy points to the 
‘hands’ of the individual (their behavior), cognition to the ‘head’, and 
emotions to the ‘heart’ (Ashforth & Humphrey 1995:110). 
The topic of ‘heart’ is, however, not much understood nor researched 
in the field of social innovation, in spite of the fact that passion is deeply 
embedded in the practice of entrepreneurship (Cardon, Wincent, Singh, 
& Drnovsek, 2009), as is compassion in social entrepreneurship (Miller, 
Grimes, McMullen & Vogus, 2012). Dating back to Schumpeter’s (1942) 
early writings, researchers and practitioners have pointed to passion in 
order to explain innovative behaviors that cannot be explained by ration-
ality and reason, such as unconventional risk taking, intensity of focus, 
and believing in a dream in spite of setbacks and resistance. 
Mulgan et al., (2007) write about how personal motivations play a crit-
ical role in social innovations, particularly in the sense that people want 
to solve their own problems or are motivated by the suffering of their 
friends, family or fellow citizens. 
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Gouillart & Hallett (2015), who describe a successful co-creation effort 
that took place at an employment office in the United Kingdom, offer an 
illustrative example. The new leader of the office had envisioned it as a venue 
where employees and outside service providers, along with the constituen-
cies that they served, would develop new community-based approaches to 
the challenge of unemployment. Because the rate of unemployment among 
young Somalis was particularly high in the region, and many of the advis-
ers were eager to support young, at-risk Somalis, they decided to target the 
Somali community. However, the suggestion that this subgroup might get 
special treatment caused some people in the bureaucracy to raise objec-
tions. Staff members, therefore, had to campaign for the right to tailor a 
specific approach to young Somalis. Ultimately, they received permission 
to proceed with a five-step co-creation project, of which a core idea was to 
mobilize and facilitate community members’ engagement with each other. 
The authors write (ibid.), “Passion is the currency of co-creation, and the 
energy that comes with allowing employees to engage with members of a 
specific community can be powerful”.
Passion is not only a positive driving force, as illustrated above, but can 
also be activated by negative emotions and intentions. When someone is 
passionately negative about tackling a social problem, or feel negatively 
about a specific solution that is being developed, they may seek to sabo-
tage or prevent it from coming to fruition (Huxham, 1996). Occasionally, 
such negative forces may cause a preliminary delay to or completely ter-
minate a social initiative. 
However, if handled constructively, negative resistance may come to 
play a productive role in co-creational, collaborative processes (Huddart, 
2010). Nilsen, Dugstad, Eide, Gullslett, & Eide (2016) identify various 
forms of resistance that appeared after the implementation of new tech-
nology in a healthcare setting, such as resistance against participating 
in collaborative processes, resistance connected to the IT infrastructure, 
and resistance arising from ethical concerns. However, the study showed 
that resistance changed character over time and that it was not solely a 
negative phenomenon. When viewing implementation as a co-creation 
process, note the authors, resistance may contribute positively to the 
development and innovation process through the friction it creates. 
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In other words, negative feelings and active resistance may provide 
energy that can strengthen a change effort or help reframe it, if only man-
aged wisely. Tapping into negative energies and voices as early as possible, 
may enable change makers to embrace and/or reframe opposing view-
points that might otherwise come to create obstacles, setbacks or lead to 
a final stop of the innovation process. 
Stakeholders with presence
Being present to engage in social innovations has to do with both a will-
ingness to prioritize and invest one’s time and physical energy into it, as 
well as the ability to be alert and cognitively and emotionally present in 
collaborative processes as they occur. Kahn (1990, 1992) addresses engage-
ment relative to work roles, and as noted above, he suggests that engage-
ment is related to the following three types of energies; physical, cognitive 
and emotional. Full engagement requires mobilizing all three simulta-
neously, such as in the case of experiencing flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1990). However, all three conditions are also important in and of them-
selves. When it comes to presence, the following three questions may 
tap into the concerns that stakeholders may have prior to personally 
engaging or disengaging in a problem situation (slightly adapted from 
Kahn, 1990:703); 
• How meaningful is it for me to bring myself into this? 
• How safe is it to do so?
• How available am I to do so? 
In reference to the latter question, it may be crucial for the change 
maker to determine whether stakeholders in fact intend to and have 
available time to engage in the project, or if they only pay ‘lip service’ 
to it. Muhammad & Mustafa (2013) suggest that one way of ascertain-
ing this information is to study carefully whether there is convergence in 
what stakeholders say and do. For instance, a stakeholder may be verbally 
supportive of the project in numerous project meetings, but does little 
in between projects meetings to aid the project in practical terms. If so, 
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the stakeholder may lack cognitive and/or emotional commitment to the 
project, even if he/she is physically present. 
Being willing to spend time and energy on a social innovation effort 
does not entail being available at all times; it can vary from a one-off 
effort, to infrequent encounters or a more continuous role (Frow et al., 
2015). Being present can indicate physical presence or virtual presence via 
technology. It may also be an option to delegate occasional meetings to 
another person or stakeholder representative. 
Presence can also refer to the qualitative dimensions of a situation, aka 
mindfulness. Fairhurst (2011:132) define presence as the ability to connect 
authentically with the thoughts and feelings of others. When individual 
stakeholders are authentically present and engaging in constructive col-
laboration with others, a collective intelligence may emerge that is far 
beyond what may be otherwise planned for (Kuenkel, 2016; Wheatley & 
Frieze, 2006). 
Summary 
This review has attempted to offer a broad, but by no means exhaustive 
perspective on how to identify and engage stakeholders in any given social 
innovation effort. In sum, stakeholders may be targeted and attracted 
from amongst those who: i) hold functional and/or hierarchical roles 
with the power, authority and networks to influence or be influenced by 
the problem in question, ii) see the purpose of engaging in collaborative 
processes that may propel the initiative forward, iii) feel passion and/or 
compassion related to the issue, and iv) offer their presence to the process; 
physically, cognitively and/or emotionally. 
Stakeholder engagement and collaboration:  
A long-term perspective
My idea in this chapter is to link social innovation with research related 
to stakeholder identification, engagement and collaboration. Social inno-
vation is a promising field with great potential to contribute to positive 
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social changes and/or alleviating current social problems. However, 
social innovations are also challenging, complex and uncertain endeav-
ors. On this background, the overall problem that is addressed involves 
how to identify and engage stakeholders in social innovation initiatives 
and efforts. 
Onboarding the right stakeholders from the outset may be the most 
important of all thresholds. Early identification and ownership tends to 
increase the probability that a change will be seen in an opportunistic 
and therefore, less threatening manner (McCalman et al., 2016). Thereaf-
ter, it may be more a matter of escalating and accumulating commitment 
(Hernes et al., 2015; Kezar & Eckel, 2002; Weick & Quinn, 1999) and pro-
viding the necessary means to allow for collaborative and co-creational 
processes underway (Gouillart & Hallett, 2015). If a strong enough why is 
established in the case of each individual stakeholder, the remainder of 
the innovation process may be more concerned with the ways in which 
stakeholder engagement may follow (Cels et al., 2012). As Wheatley & 
Frieze (2006) assert, “…the world doesn’t change one person at a time. 
It changes as networks of relationships form among people who discover 
they share a common cause and a vision of what’s possible.” 
The roles of change makers are undoubtedly demanding, and are likely 
to change throughout the process. Change makers may assume functions 
as communicators, facilitators, teachers, catalysts, conveners, and more 
(Darsø, 2012; Klev & Levin, 2009; Sørensen & Torfing, 2014:6). Laying 
the grounds for constructive collaborative processes among stakeholders 
may take (more) time and creativity in the initial phases of social inno-
vation initiatives. Some people onboard easily while others need time to 
process arguments, assess risks and uncertainties and become acquainted 
with the other people involved. If a process-ontology is adapted (Hernes 
et al., 2015), there is never wasted time or ‘failure’ incurred – only new 
learning and experiences that can benefit future encounters and lead to 
more advanced collaborative relationships over the long haul (Torgersen 
& Steiro, 2009). 
Social innovations appeal to people’s desire for progress, combined 
with their longing for meaning (Kuenkel, 2016:265). The magic that may 
arise as change makers and stakeholders engage with each other and 
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contribute to help solve the current social problems of our times, may 
serve as a valuable source for continued relationship building and collab-
orative efforts. This may also explain part of the why that keeps change 
makers finding meaning in maneuvering through the resistance, hesitan-
cies and uncertainties that are bound to be a part of any social innova-
tion effort. What it is that motivate change makers to take on the role of 
problem owner, and becoming the driving force vis-à-vis stakeholders, is 
an interesting question that may be the topic of a continued conversation 
about social innovation, stakeholders and collaboration.
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Abstract: The chapter presents a case from a government agency in Norway, where 
two assistant directors share a leadership position and must interact extensively. The 
main purpose is to highlight some benefits and challenges related to shared leader-
ship when it comes to risk prevention and handling unforeseen events. The analysis 
is based on a relational perspective that emphasizes that successful interaction be-
tween people requires complementary skills, conceptualized as relational skills. The 
chapter concludes that the patterns of interaction and relational skills that develop 
during shared leadership can help prevent undesirable events. This is partly because 
shared leadership can provide increased capacity in identifying risks. Common  
experiences in handling risks and unforeseen events may contribute to learning  
that in turn provides the potential for further development of the interactional and 
relational skills in shared leadership. At the same time, shared leadership entails 
some risks that may impact on the prevention and handling of such events. For 
instance, interactional challenges that may arise in a shared leadership may prevent 
leaders from discovering potential hazards.
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This chapter focuses on interaction between formal leaders who practice 
what is referred to in the literature on shared leadership as “joint lead-
ership” (Wilhelmson, 2006; Döös et al., 2013; Döös, 2015). “Joint leader-
ship” means that the leaders have the same leadership position and share 
responsibility and authority. In order for this type of shared leadership 
to function, extensive interaction between the leaders is required. The 
leaders must succeed in leading together; that is, succeed in co-leading. 
To do so, they have to form a common management practice and appear 
as unified. Shared leadership can have several advantages but may also 
entail various challenges, not least with regard to achieving the interac-
tion required for effective co-leading, and may therefore represent a risk. 
At the same time, shared leadership, in various ways, may affect how the 
leaders handle risk.
This forms the basis for addressing possibilities and challenges related 
to collaboration associated with shared leadership, and for asking what 
impact shared leadership can have when it comes to preventing and 
handling risk and unforeseen events. These questions are discussed on 
the basis of empirical material from an ethnographic fieldwork carried 
out in a government agency in Norway over a period of 10 months in 
2013 – 14. In this project, several leaders at different organizational levels 
were followed. This chapter concentrates on two assistant directors who 
shared a leadership position. The directors were followed throughout the 
fieldwork period. The analysis of the assistant directors’ interactions is 
based on observations from internal meetings between them and meet-
ings between them and employees. Some meetings were followed up with 
informal conversations with the assistant directors. Furthermore, five 
formal interviews were conducted with one of the assistant directors and 
two with both directors together. 
One case cannot give a complete picture of shared leadership, but it 
does provide a good basis for exploring the topics in this chapter. The 
case presented intends to give insight into the kind of interaction that 
leaders who share a leadership position have to engage in, the importance 
of this interaction for their leadership practice, and what appear to be 
important prerequisites for achieving successful co-leadership. The main 
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purpose of the chapter is to highlight and discuss some benefits and chal-
lenges related to shared leadership when it comes to risk prevention and 
handling unforeseen events. Risk is understood as something negative 
and potentially dangerous that one wishes to avoid. Unforeseen events 
are unexpected and unusual events that occur which require handling 
beyond the usual, everyday operations.
Perspective and key concepts
The analysis in this chapter is based on a relational perspective, where 
relational concepts are applied to capture central aspects of situations in 
which individuals enter into interaction and relationships with each other 
(Wadel & Wadel, 2007). Social interaction is understood as “the process 
by which we act and react to those around us” (Giddens, 1997:85). Based 
on Mead (1934), we can say that the act of one person represents a gesture 
that depends on being received and responded to by interactive partners, 
in order to become a meaningful act and give grounds for talking about 
interaction. Thus, interaction can be said to refer to the partial acts of 
various persons who are interdependent. These partial acts may be per-
formed simultaneously or sequentially. When looking at interaction, we 
are not only interested in capturing individual acts but also co-activity; in 
other words, acts that individuals perform together. In interaction, indi-
vidual acts can be seen as partial acts that are part of something larger. 
All interaction requires skills, including communication skills. For 
individuals to be able to interact successfully, complementary skills are 
required. Skills that two or more people possess together can be concep-
tualized as relational skills (Schou Andreassen & Wadel, 1987). Each per-
son’s individual skills thus represent partial skills that are incorporated 
into the skills that the interacting people possess together. When it comes 
to shared leadership and risk management, the relational skills that the 
leaders have developed and possess together will be of crucial importance 
for how they react to, and handle, risks and unforeseen events.
While interaction is a value-neutral concept, collaboration is a concept 
with positive connotations. Collaboration consists of interactions that are 
rewarding and lead to personal development, rather than interaction that 
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is suppressive or characterized by competition and conflict. Collabora-
tion means that the participants work together to reach common objec-
tives, such as when the members of a band collaborate to play music that 
sounds as good as possible (Schiefloe, 2011:311). Collaboration is a type 
of interaction characterized by generalized exchange, in which transac-
tions do not depend on immediate returns. Collaborative relationships 
are characterized by trust (Schiefloe, 2011:353) and incorporation; in other 
words, a “give and take” relationship, and acts such as providing support 
and showing concern (Wadel & Wadel, 2007:92). Collaboration requires 
making the effort to establish and maintain relationships, and to build 
and maintain mutual trust, motivation and deference (Wadel & Wadel, 
2007:75). A well-functioning, shared leadership will be characterized by 
collaborative interaction between the leaders.
Shared leadership
A number of concepts have emerged that conceptualize leadership as some-
thing that is divided and shared, and as something individuals perform 
together or jointly. “Shared leadership” is one of these concepts. Shared 
leadership originates from the literature on teamwork (Fitzsimons et al., 
2011), where the concept is used to describe how leadership functions are 
shared among the members of a team (Drecsher et al., 2014). The concept 
has also been applied to situations in which two, or sometimes more, for-
mal leaders share a leadership function, have joint responsibilities and lead 
together (Crevani, 2011). Döös et al. (2013) emphasize that shared leader-
ship entails close and extensive collaboration among the leaders. 
Shared leadership can be the result of a formal decision, as in the case 
described in this chapter. However, shared leadership can also emerge as 
a practice without being based on a formal decision. The literature con-
tains a number of concepts used to describe different categories of shared 
leadership. For instance, “functionally-divided leadership” and “dual 
leadership” are concepts used for leaders at the same hierarchical level, 
who have equivalent responsibilities in the business but who carry out 
different tasks (Döös et al., 2006; Döös et al., 2013; Döös, 2015; Fjellvær, 
2010). We also find that leaders at different organizational levels choose to 
interaction and r isk  management in  shared leadership
237
share leadership responsibility. “Joint leadership” has been used for situa-
tions in which two full-time leaders at the same hierarchical level occupy 
a leadership position together, have shared responsibilities and both for-
mally and practically share tasks, responsibilities, power and authority 
(Wilhelmson, 2006; Döös et al., 2006). This is the form of shared lead-
ership that is most extensive when it comes to leading together, and is 
therefore the focus of this chapter.
In the literature, shared leadership is described as both something new 
that is expanding (Döös & Wilhelmson, 2003; Döös et al., 2006; Döös 
et al., 2013) and as a phenomenon that has existed for a long time (Sally, 
2002). In a survey conducted in Sweden, 41 % of the leaders responded 
that they practice one form or another of shared leadership. Joint lead-
ership is practiced by 5 % of leaders in Sweden (Döös et al., 2006; Döös 
et al., 2013). 
The occurrence and prevalence of shared leadership in our society 
today has been linked to a number of factors: the growth of new organi-
zational forms; knowledge workers that must be led differently than tra-
ditional workers; the need for a way for leaders to handle an ever-more 
demanding, exhausting and unpredictable work situation; and the desire 
to make leadership less lonely (Wood, 2005; Crevani et al., 2007; Döös 
et al., 2013). In the Nordic countries, shared leadership may also be asso-
ciated with a working life and leadership model that is characterized by a 
relatively-flat hierarchy, co-determination and a long tradition of autono-
mous and self-governed work groups (Döös et al., 2006).
The literature on shared leadership generally does not provide the 
sort of detailed descriptions and analyses of the interaction between 
leaders practicing shared leadership that would allow readers to see 
how the leaders perform shared leadership together in practice. Crevani 
et al. (2007:60) is an exception; they use concepts such as “consulting each 
other,” “exchanging information” and “exchanging ideas,” to describe 
shared leadership at a school. Several authors have emphasized that we 
need more knowledge about how leadership and managerial work is exer-
cised in practice (Crevani et al., 2007; Tengblad, 2012). This includes more 
knowledge about how leaders who share leadership responsibility interact 
and lead together (Crevani, 2010; Döös et al., 2013). How do the leaders 
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interact with each other, what does their interaction consist of, what is the 
purpose of their interaction, and what impact does the interaction have 
on how they lead?
Interaction in a shared leadership 
To show the type of interaction that leaders in a shared leadership engage 
in, and to gain insight into how the leaders lead together and manage to 
co-lead, we shall present empirical material from a study of a public agency. 
The agency is one of 40 Norwegian government agencies which supervise 
the compliance of private and public enterprises with laws and regula-
tions. We focus on two assistant directors in a joint leadership who share 
the responsibility for the agency’s supervisory activities. Together, the two 
assistant directors are responsible for six teams, which are involved in 
supervising the industry that the agency is responsible for. Shared respon-
sibility means that the two assistant directors must interact extensively. 
The two assistant directors interact in several different arenas. They 
interact in connection with a number of regular management meetings, 
and in meetings with the teams and co-workers they are responsible for. 
They also regularly meet with each other in connection with their shared 
area of responsibility, which they refer to as “coordination meetings”. 
These meetings act as a kind of “backstage arena” (Goffman, 1959:112), 
where the directors prepare their leadership, mark out a course, and 
ensure a coordinated and professional outward appearance. They also 
hold pre-meetings ahead of external meetings. Face-to-face interaction 
also takes place when they contact each other in their offices or run into 
each other in the hallway, at the coffee machine or in the cafeteria. They 
also communicate frequently by email.
What does the interaction consist of?
At an overarching level, much of the interaction between the two assis-
tant directors relates to keeping an overview of the industry they super-
vise and the supervisory activities that the agency plans and implements. 
More specifically, their interaction relates to the planning of activities 
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and meetings, discussions about the need for enhanced knowledge devel-
opment, the management and distribution of resources, etc. Much of the 
interaction focuses on the allocation of tasks between them, such as who 
is to be listed as responsible for specific projects and who should partici-
pate in the various types of external meetings. Sometimes they choose to 
appear in meetings together, to mark the seriousness of the meeting or to 
be able to support each other in difficult matters.
If we look more closely at what the interaction between the two assis-
tant directors consists of, we find that it is focused on informing and brief-
ing each other about various issues and keeping each other up to date. 
This interaction is due to the fact that the directors have had to divide 
work and responsibilities between them. The interaction is highlighted as 
absolutely necessary for them to fulfil their shared responsibilities. Fur-
thermore, they say that one of the most important things that they do in 
relation to leading together is to discuss an issue, look at what and who it 
affects, and exchange viewpoints. These discussions often include what 
they refer to as reflecting together.
The interaction between the assistant directors is also associated with 
acquiring ideas or input, or concrete suggestions in relation to some-
thing they are working on, or a problem that they must handle. Some 
of the interaction between them consists of thinking aloud together or 
brainstorming. The brainstorming often takes place in the initial phase 
of the work on a case or issue, at a moment when they are very open to 
all kinds of ideas. Some of the interaction between them relates to seeking 
and giving advice about cases they are working on. The assistant directors 
also talk about using each other as sparring partners, for example, when 
preparing a difficult case for presentation to the executive management. 
In some instances, the interaction is about getting feedback on whether 
something one has been working on looks good or can be done a certain 
way, or it is about seeking and securing support from the other person. 
When a case has reached the point where one has a suggestion of how to 
respond and act, they tend to seek both feedback on, and support for, the 
suggestion. 
Another aspect of their interaction is illustrated by the statement that: 
“We use each other to air things.” This is often about needing someone to 
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talk through an experience with or express frustration to. Much of the 
interaction between the assistant directors is about brief checks and clari-
fications. For instance, they may check whether they acted in accordance 
with previous practice. The interaction is also about coming to an agree-
ment and making decisions. One expression that the assistant directors 
use when talking about their discussions and forming the basis for deci-
sion-making is talking things through. “Talking things through” means 
talking together until one has reached a shared understanding or agree-
ment about the issue. The assistant directors emphasize the importance 
of talking things through to reach agreement and present a united front 
when one of them is to meet with co-workers or external parties. 
The interaction that the leaders need to achieve in order to lead 
together, have a common leadership practice and appear as unified even 
though they are two individuals, can be termed “co-leading”. To ensure 
that things have been talked through appears to be central to co-leading. 
Co-leading is most clearly expressed in their interaction when the assis-
tant directors succeed in talking things through, thereby ensuring that 
they have a joint practice and succeed in appearing as unified. This does 
not mean that other forms of interaction do not play an important role 
in co-leading. For example, the exchange of information is an important 
prerequisite for successful co-leading. If the leaders have not exchanged 
information and interpreted information together – and thus have no 
clear sense of what the other person is thinking – co-workers will get the 
impression that there is no joint leadership. This would make it easier for 
the co-workers to play one leader off against the other.
What significance does the interaction have?
The interaction between the assistant directors is important in order for 
them to establish a shared understanding and a common standpoint. The 
assistant directors must establish a shared understanding of how they will 
lead the area they are responsible for and what is important to prioritize. 
They emphasize that their interaction is important to ensure that they are 
coordinated. In other words, the interaction “ensures that they convey the 
same message” and it is “important in order to be able to stand together”. 
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The interaction ensures that they do not develop divergent practices, such 
as which means and sanctions to use in the agency’s supervisory activ-
ity. The interaction also helps to ensure a just and equal treatment of the 
co-workers, and is important for them to be perceived as one leadership. 
Furthermore, the interaction between them is important to ensure that 
they have thought about all aspects of an issue and have considered it from 
every angle. It becomes apparent that they are creative together and that 
new ideas emerge when they talk with each other. The assistant directors 
also emphasize that the interaction helps establish trust between them and 
gives them a sense of confidence in their leadership role. 
Prerequisites for collaborative interaction  
and co-leading
It is possible to identify various aspects that can help explain how the 
two assistant directors succeed in their interaction and co-leading. These 
aspects are not necessarily absolute requirements for success in shared 
leadership, but are factors that help make interaction and joint leadership 
easier, and appear to be important in creating a well-functioning joint 
leadership in practice. 
The assistant directors talk about their interaction using the term “col-
laboration,” emphasizing that they enjoy a close and well-functioning col-
laboration. They explain this by stating that they find it very rewarding 
to work together and that they both benefit from collaborating closely. 
Furthermore, they emphasize that they have good personal chemistry and 
that this helps them to collaborate well. Another important prerequisite 
that they underscore is that they do not have the same skills but have sim-
ilar knowledge about the area they lead. They complement each other in 
that they have different experiences from previous work and have differ-
ent strengths and weaknesses in terms of knowledge about the industry 
that they supervise. The assistant directors point out that it is important 
to experience collaboration as being personally beneficial, and that it 
would otherwise be difficult to maintain. They also believe that if they 
had been very focused on possessing and exercising power, their collab-
oration would have been arduous, and this would have destroyed their 
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partnership. The literature on shared leadership has highlighted similar 
premises as necessary for shared leadership to function (Döös et al., 2013).
In summary, the interaction between the assistant directors can be 
said to be characterized by generalized exchange and incorporation, 
based on mutual trust and respect. It is also clear that the assistant direc-
tors have complementary knowledge and skills related to the field they 
lead, and that they have developed relational skills. These relational skills 
are evident in their close and effortless collaboration, helping each other 
to improve, and succeeding in leading together and appearing as a unit.
Shared leadership and risk
Risk is inherent in all inter-personal interaction. Collaborative interac-
tion is often built on trust. Placing trust in others always entails a risk 
that the trusted persons do not behave as expected (Misztal, 1996). There 
is often a possibility that something unforeseen may occur when interact-
ing with other people that will have an impact on the interaction and the 
trust between the parties involved, and in turn, lead to other interactional 
terms or place new demands on the interaction. 
Shared leadership may entail a risk that the leaders do not succeed in 
achieving the interaction that is necessary for being able to co-lead, and 
there is always a risk that the interaction between the leaders will fail in 
one way or another. These risks are related to various interactional chal-
lenges associated with shared leadership.
The assistant directors in the government agency emphasize several 
challenges in their joint leadership. They stress that it is often difficult to 
find the time to meet and have enough time for required interaction. They 
note that at times it is cumbersome to have to discuss many issues with a 
co-leader. There is also a risk that confusion may arise in relation to their 
informal division of responsibilities and that, as a consequence, some 
cases can fall between the cracks. Furthermore, they believe that con-
fusion can easily arise over who actually decides what, and that remain-
ing unified in cases where they have disagreed can be quite challenging. 
They also see a significant risk of conflict and power struggles related to 
shared leadership in situations where the leaders are not pulling in the 
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same direction, and create confusion by sending different messages. In 
these situations, there is a great risk that co-workers may try to play the 
leaders off against each other. If the leaders develop a close friendship, 
they may find it challenging to address difficulties with each other. 
Many similar challenges are described in the literature on shared 
leadership (Döös et al., 2013). Wilhelmson (2006) mentions the risk that 
leaders in a shared leadership may be too strong together and create 
an imbalance in the organization. A strong bond of trust that develops 
between the leaders may also become dysfunctional, leading to blind-
ness and a lack of vigilance (Tharaldsen, 2011). In the literature, the most 
significant reason for skepticism towards shared leadership relates to 
whether the leaders can make quick and clear decisions together when 
necessary (Crevani et al., 2007; Crevani, 2011; Döös et al., 2013). 
Many of the challenges that can arise in a shared leadership may increase 
in situations that are unpredictable, and include unanticipated events in 
which communication and interaction are often more challenging, lead-
ing to increased levels of stress. Not least, this relates to the challenges of 
making necessary decisions quickly. When an unforeseen event occurs, 
the opportunities for exchanging information and talking things through 
may change, and then the character of the interaction can also change. 
Therefore, the possibility that the leaders convey different messages and 
appear as if they are not in accordance with each other will increase, mak-
ing it more difficult for the leaders to achieve the respectful interaction 
between them that is necessary for maintaining each other’s trust. 
Shared leadership and risk prevention
While shared leadership may entail different risks, it may also help to 
reduce some leadership-related risks. Shared leadership may prevent the 
leaders’ work from becoming too demanding. The leaders can relieve 
each other and step in for each other. The organization becomes less 
dependent on the individual leader and thus, less vulnerable. It can main-
tain activities even if one leader is absent or indisposed. According to 
the experiences of the assistant directors in the Norwegian government 
agency, the fact that they are two people working closely together helps 
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them to make decisions that are more well-founded, in part because they 
have different and complementary knowledge and experiences, and thus 
can see multiple aspects of an issue. It also helps to ensure a better focus 
on issues that are important to keep track of in the sector for which they 
are responsible, thus reducing the risk of overlooking or failing to address 
something that might lead to an undesirable situation. 
Well-functioning interactions between leaders in a shared leadership 
can often contribute to prevent risks and undesirable events. The leaders 
can make each other aware of what they should be alert to. Together, they 
can identify signs, analyze situations, take precautions and think through 
how best to handle potential events. The assistant directors in the govern-
ment agency emphasize that the fact that they are careful to keep each 
other informed, take time to discuss issues together and exchange view-
points means that they generally have looked at and thought through all 
aspects of an issue. That they check issues with each other, look to each 
other for advice and place emphasis on having talked things through 
together, has preventative effects. That the assistant directors develop a 
shared understanding, establish trust and develop confidence as leaders 
through their interaction helps to prevent potential risks, such as the risk 
that co-workers will try to play them off against each other or that enter-
prises will react extremely negatively to a decision made by the agency.
However, it is also the case that the patterns of interaction that develop 
between leaders in a shared leadership may have a negative impact on 
the ability to predict an event or potential crisis, and to handle a crisis, 
because the leaders think too similarly and thus do not see dangers or 
challenge each other’s understanding of the situation.
Shared leadership and handling risks  
and unforeseen events
Leadership generally entails much uncertainty. Studies show that the 
leaders’ everyday life consists of a constant stream of inquiries and new 
challenges (Mintzberg, 2009; Tengblad, 2006; 2012). Shared leadership 
can be a way to handle aspects of the unpredictability that leadership 
entails. A well-functioning, shared leadership may have many advantages 
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when handling undesirable or unpredicted events, and leaders can seek 
advice and support from each other. 
In situations where a serious event occurs, there is often a great need 
for efficient and good communication and interaction. Yet it is precisely 
in these situations that the conditions for interaction are the worst. When 
leaders who do not know each other from previous interactions have to 
handle a challenging situation together, confusion and uncertainty may 
easily arise that make handling the situation more difficult. Knowing 
each other well, having experience in communicating and interacting 
with each other, and having a clear division of responsibility may be cru-
cial in a critical situation or when something unforeseen occurs. The rela-
tional skills the leaders in a shared leadership have developed through 
their interaction may be of great significance when they must handle cri-
ses or unpredicted situations. 
We can assume that the assistant directors in the above case have cre-
ated a basis for handling undesirable and unpredictable events – including 
situations where they do not have the opportunity to talk things through 
with each other in the actual situation – because they know what their 
partner is thinking and know that they have the support of their partner. 
This means that interaction in “normal” situations helps to form the basis 
for the interaction necessary when something unforeseen, unusual or dif-
ficult arises. Through their previous interaction, the leaders know each 
other, have established ways of communicating and interacting and have 
developed relational skills that they can draw on to handle unforeseen 
events. Thus, for example, the leaders will be able to respond quickly to 
each other’s actions and statements, and they will be able to spontane-
ously provide each other with the emotional support that is important 
when handling difficult and challenging situations.
The impact of unforeseen events on  
shared leadership
The interaction and co-leading that characterizes a well-functioning 
shared leadership may also be challenged when something unforeseen 
occurs and quick decisions and actions must be taken. In addition, the 
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conditions for interaction will tend to change in these situations. It may 
be more difficult to find opportunities to talk together, and provide con-
firmation and support for each other. In these situations, it may be that 
established patterns of interaction, shared understandings, agreements 
and practices are insufficient or do not provide adequate guidelines for 
handling the situation. The situation may require that one moves beyond 
the established patterns of interaction. Decisions must often be made 
without first having an opportunity to talk things through. The chal-
lenges related to interaction in a shared leadership will, in other words, 
increase in situations that are unpredictable or involve unforeseen events.
In a challenging and pressed situation, with little time for interaction 
and talking things through and a need for quick decisions, it will be more 
difficult for the leaders to appear unified, and there is a greater risk that 
they will send conflicting messages. A pattern of interaction character-
ized by collaboration, mutual exchanges and incorporation may be chal-
lenged, easily developing into conflict and interaction characterized by 
the exercise of power. 
Handling an undesirable or unforeseen event may also contribute to 
further developing and strengthening the relationship and interaction 
between leaders in a shared leadership, in part because leaders in these 
situations must interact to handle new problems and may learn from 
this (Torgersen, 2015:17). The relational skills of joint leaders may be chal-
lenged when something unforeseen arises. Furthermore, these situations 
may require relational skills beyond those the leaders have developed and 
which apply under normal circumstances, such as making quick deci-
sions together in a pressured and complex situation. The leaders may also 
develop their relational skills in handling the situation and through the 
shared learning that may occur in the situation. Thus, they may form a 
better basis for handling future challenges related to possible risks, and 
unforeseen and undesirable events.
Conclusion – a model
In summary, shared leadership and the patterns of interaction and rela-
tional skills that are developed during such a leadership, provide some 
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opportunities in terms of preventing and handling undesirable events 
that were not foreseen. At the same time, shared leadership entails some 
risks that may impact on the prevention and handling of such events. 
Experiences in handling events may contribute to learning, that in turn 
provides the potential for further development of the interaction and rela-
tional skills in a shared leadership. We can illustrate this as in figure 13.1.
Figure 13.1 Interaction in shared leadership through the Bow-tie phases.
The figure is based on the Bow-tie model and shows the key opportuni-
ties and risks of shared leadership in terms of preventing, interpreting and 
handling an undesirable event. By providing increased capacity in iden-
tifying risks, shared leadership can help prevent undesirable events. On 
the other hand, interactional challenges that may arise in a shared leader-
ship can prevent the leaders from discovering potential hazards. When an 
event occurs, shared leadership can provide opportunities when it comes 
to interpreting what is happening, but can also make it more difficult to 
achieve a common understanding of the situation. When it comes to han-
dling events, earlier interaction between the leaders may give the basis for 
effective handling, but established interaction and thought patterns can 
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also impair the leaders’ ability to handle the event and prevent them from 
seeing alternative approaches. Experiences from the handling of an event 
may contribute to learning that impacts on the leaders’ future interaction, 
related to the prevention and handling of undesirable events.
This chapter has focused on shared leadership and has intended to pro-
vide insight into the interaction that a well-functioning shared leadership 
requires and implies, pointing to the importance of this interaction for a 
good and unified leadership practice. This has formed the basis for dis-
cussing the role that shared leadership can have when it comes to antici-
pating and preventing risks, and dealing with unforeseen and unwanted 
events that may occur in an organization. We have pointed to challenges 
and risks related to shared leadership that could affect how leaders man-
age to prevent or reduce risk, hinder unwanted events and handle such 
incidents when they occur, and we have underlined benefits and strengths 
related to shared leadership in relation to preventing and handling seri-
ous and unwanted events. A main point that we wish to emphasize in this 
chapter is that the relational interactional skills that leaders in a shared 
leadership manage to build up through their co-leading under normal 
circumstances, can form a foundation that makes it possible for them to 
achieve coordinated and collaborative interaction also in an unusual and 
demanding situation, even though the leaders are unable to communicate 
directly with each other in this situation.
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In this chapter, we want to examine how samhandling (interaction) and 
concurrent learning work together. Concurrent learning is a comprehen-
sive concept as we use it. Therefore, in this chapter we carry out an elabo-
ration of the concept and the processes that this term is intended to cover, 
and further demonstrate the impact these processes have on samhandling 
under unpredictable conditions. Relationships play a crucial role in achiev-
ing this interaction and are significant in all of the phases in an unfore-
seen situation, as illustrated in the Bow-tie Model presented in Chapter 1 
(Torgersen, 2018). Samhandling, as we see it, is a deeper form than collab-
oration, based on complementary skills; therefore, relationships and the 
way they are formed and developed, are of such great importance. This 
requires a strong focus on relational aspects. Another important concept 
is concurrent learning, as a means of increasing efficiency in strengthen-
ing relational aspects. Using several examples, we will argue that concur-
rent learning is, in many ways, crucial for samhandling at risk, where the 
conditions along the way are unpredictable – both dangerous/undesirable 
and harmless/desirable situations. Based on these examples and our defi-
nitions, we develop five aggregate approaches that can help to promote 
awareness and implementation of concurrent learning in practice under 
the assumed conditions. Some of the examples are from high-risk indus-
tries. Others are not, but nevertheless have important attributes that can 
help us understand samhandling and learning under uncertainty. Laga-
dec (1993) points out that foundations (patterns of samhandling) need to 
be established before a crisis appears. 
The definition and the construct  
of concurrent learning
Concurrent learning means that participants learn from one another 
in the samhandling process, like footballers who are familiar with each 
other’s strengths and build on these so that mastery is achieved in com-
mon (Eggen & Nyrønning, 1999). Seligman (2003) calls this signature 
strengths. In this context, signature strengths should make each partic-
ipant better. During the process, participants use each other and build 
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on each other for learning. Concurrent learning involves not only being 
familiar with one’s own competence, but also learning so that individuals 
can connect to their own expertise and thus develop this further with 
the others to create something new. This learning process takes time – it 
needs to take time, and the process must be deliberate and organized. 
“A deliberate and continuously functional and interacting learning process among 
actors that occurs simultaneously with the interaction”.
Steiro & Torgersen (2013:335)
This kind of learning is not accidental; it is intentional and purposeful, 
in the sense that stakeholders or participants need to be both aware of 
this process and focus on the relationship between one’s own and others’ 
expertise and diversity. Samhandling and concurrent learning is also a 
functional process, in the sense that learning also occurs through daily 
interaction activities or actions. At the same time, concurrent learning 
and interaction are interdependent and they are therefore, in a way, a 
part of the same process (hence concurrent learning). Samhandling and 
concurrent learning represents a mindset, a way of working and a form 
of learning, which together help to meet or develop the skills needed to 
tackle the challenges of flexible organizations. Arrangements, the devel-
opment of training and management, and the utilization of comple-
mentary expertise and concurrent learning, are all important strategic 
measures for the efficient development of flexible features for organiza-
tions (Steiro & Torgersen, 2013).
The Mann Gulch Disaster revisited 
During a wildfire in California, a quickly-assembled team of firefighters 
came under pressure and were trapped inside the forest fire. The fire took 
place between the 4th and 5th of August, 1949. This is an outdated exam-
ple and the context regarding firefighting and hierarchy should be taken 
into account. However, it has been argued that the example also pro-
vides an important lesson for contemporary management in a dynamic 
society (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). The group shared a meal and a plane 
flight before they were parachuted into the area. Weick (1993) writes that 
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according to their sources, it looks as if there was little dialogue between 
members. After landing, the team leader wanted to make contact with a 
forest ranger that knew the area. He left the group alone, apparently with 
few instructions, nor that it seems that the second leader in command 
made any effort. The team consumed a meal by themselves while the 
leader had a meeting with the forest ranger and was updated on the situ-
ation in the area. Eventually, the team leader returned to the group and 
they moved into the burning area together. Gradually, the wind changed 
direction, putting the fire team at risk. The team leader gave orders for 
the team to drop their equipment, in order to move away from the fire 
more quickly. This created unrest and confusion; it is not unreasonable 
to suggest that this is the first sign that the group was beginning to frag-
ment and presumably questioned the team leader’s authority. Eventually, 
the group was caught between a wide river and the forest fire. When they 
realized they were trapped inside the forest fire, the team leader ordered 
them to start a protective fire and then to lay down inside the burnt-
out area. The proposal must have appeared to be an act of desperation 
to the members of the team because the team leader was the only one 
who followed the plan. This meant that the team disbanded. Two mem-
bers of the group managed to get across the river and escape to a hillside. 
The leader survived. The other members who fled all perished (Weick, 
1993). We have used this example several times in teaching about under-
standing human interaction, group dynamics and trust between people 
(Steiro & Torgersen, 2015). It also serves as an illustration of the chal-
lenges that temporary organizations can experience. A project which we 
can mention is this fire team, which is an example of a dynamic struc-
ture (Mintzberg, 1979; Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). But that does not imply 
that this structure can automatically operate dynamically. There must be 
some conditions in place. The Mann Gulch Disaster is often used today 
as an illustration of the challenges that dynamic organizations, such as 
a rapidly-reduced project, can meet (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). In this 
context, the authors has told the story of the Mann Gulch Disaster for 
learning purposes and challenged officers in training to think through 
what could have been done differently. A key point is that they are often 
section leaders, so the level of abstraction is not too high. They could get 
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into a situation where time is limited and they receive either a new team 
to lead or a new composite layer. We assumed that firefighting compe-
tence and skills were in place. They were also a heterogeneous group and 
assumed that they might take the relationship for granted. The sugges-
tions that students and cadets come up with after hearing the story are 
as follows: the firefighters could have been introduced to each other, pre-
senting their expertise and skills; they could have held a pre-job meeting; 
“what-if” analysis could have been used; the assistant squad leader could 
have been sent to obtain information from the ranger; the team could 
have had a joint briefing with risk assessments; everyone could have eaten 
a meal together. Such organizations are typically very dependent on trust 
(Torgersen & Steiro, 2009; Sørhaug, 1996). Another point is that, in hind-
sight, it would have been possible for this group to create more concur-
rent learning and thus improve samhandling. It also shows that through 
reflection, solutions come quickly. The final point is that the Mann Gulch 
Disaster stresses the importance of establishing samhandling patterns, 
ideally beforehand. Antonsen, Skarholt and Ringstad (2012) claim that 
what is needed in a crisis must be present in some form in a normal oper-
ation. They refer to Lagadec (1993): “The ability to deal with a crisis situa-
tion is largely dependent on the structures that have been developed before 
the chaos arrives.” (Lagadec, 1993:54) In a crisis situation, Weick (1993) 
pinpoints the concept of “bricolage”; that is, the ability to “create order 
out of whatever materials are at hand.” (Weick, 1993:639) This brings us to 
the next paragraph, which is not an example of a crisis organization, but 
perhaps the best example of developing samhandling, at least in Norway. 
Football coach Nils Arne Eggen made it a part of everyday language. But 
as we shall examine, it does not come for free. 
Samhandling in Rosenborg Football Club  
under Nils Arne Eggen’s leadership 
Nils Arne Eggen was very preoccupied with collective issues and his phi-
losophy is best illustrated in the following quotation: “The highest form 
of collaboration is when the player moves away from ‘must do’ to ‘want 
to do the same’. The basis lies in the individual player’s educational skills; 
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that is, the ability to make others good, take responsibility for others’ 
development and performance, and take responsibility for the team’s 
performance. In other words, to use his own skillfulness to make others 
good and the team good.” (Eggen & Nyrønning, 1999:143–144, authors’ 
translation). It is interesting to note that Nils Arne Eggen uses an exam-
ple from jazz, claiming that “…not until common ground is established 
does the creative improvization provide meaning and development.” 
(Eggen & Nyrønning, 1999:125, authors’ translation) Rosenborg Football 
Club (RBK) managed to win the Norwegian National League for 13 years 
in a row. Between 1995–2002, they qualified for the Champions League 
tournament every year. In addition, they qualified for the quarter final 
in season 1996/1997 and won in their group in the 1999/2000 season. Løf-
dali (2014) points out the importance of interaction in RBK during coach 
Nils Arne Eggen’s reign. He writes, “Eggen’s explanation of what made 
RBK’s success possible can be summarized in one word – samhandling 
[interaction]. The players display a distinct image of how football should 
be played, and his unique ability to transmit this to the players.” (Løfdali, 
2014:29, authors’ translation). It is important that those who have a role 
also receive clear instructions regarding what is lying in it (Katzenbach 
& Smith, 1993). Rosenborg’s way of playing was based on coach Nils Arne 
Eggen’s clear picture on how to play and the players ability to reproduce 
and transfer it to new players (By Riise, 2016; By Riise, 2014; Fredriksen & 
Moen, 2013). This would not have been possible if it was not backed up by 
the clear assumptions of Nils Arne Eggen, “You get good by making oth-
ers good,” and “it’s about channeling ego forces” (Hoff-Leirvik, 2009:232). 
The system is important but it is also important that the players actually 
want to interact, rather than having to interact. In this way, they place the 
interests of the community above their own abilities.
RBK focused heavily on training. Typical of this was high intensive 
training and focus on “simultaneous movements” and “creating plural 
situations”. It was important that the intensity level was high, while at 
the same time, it had to be done right. Nils Arne Eggen would shout, 
“Stop!” When the game stopped, the coach demonstrated how it should 
be done (Hoff-Leirvik, 2009). We see that the principle of subsidiarity 
was important educationally for Eggen; i.e. feedback closely linked to 
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action, thus creating learning in action (concurrent learning), not in a 
conference room after the training session but in a spontaneous meeting 
on the field. 
Dynamic interaction in a software firm
Chmiel (2000) has argued that we need to research organizations that are 
typically at the forefront of technology in order to learn and understand 
more about organization. Such organizations may be software-develop-
ing companies, as suggested by Chmiel (2000). Therefore, we have stud-
ied a software-developing firm which applies agile methodologies (Steiro 
& Torgersen, in press). Agile methods were originally developed when 
people realized that the development of software had to be dynamic, 
when the customer wants it and the market appears to be changing. They 
can be seen as a reaction to plan-based or traditional methods, which 
emphasize “a rational, engineering-based approach” (Dybå, 2000). The 
new focus is on methods which sorts under the umbrella of Agile meth-
ods and leanness (Dingsøyr, Dybå & Moe, 2010). Williams and Cock-
burn (2003) state that agile software development is about feedback and 
change, where short feedback-loops are necessary to achieve a desirable 
and predictive outcome. The agile manifesto prioritizes the following:
• Individuals and interactions over processes and tools
• Working software over comprehensive documentation
• Customer collaboration over contract negotiation
• Responding to change over following a plan
(From the “Manifesto for Agile Software Development” authored by 
Beck, Beedle, Bennekum, Cockburn, Cunningham, Fowler et al. 2001)
This makes software development an interesting case for this book. 
Steiro & Torgersen (in press) sees an open and inclusive environment that 
is very mutually attentive. During this study, there was a change of lead-
ership. The initial department leader was strongly inspired by the idea of 
building on processes and interpersonal resources. This was expressed 
both normatively and in practice. It was expected that one should offer 
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his or her competence, aim to go home at four p.m. and only occasion-
ally work overtime, and be ready to perform the following day. Humor, 
a good mood and social activities were also emphasized. This particular 
leader was keen not to focus too much on individual performance or ego 
boosting. The department leader appointed his own successor. The new 
manager was more academically specialized in the field than his prede-
cessor, but shared the same general ideas with regard to organizing and 
would continue to follow the main essence. At the time when the data was 
collected, there was no indication of any major changes. Minor adjust-
ments were found but they did not seem to unsettle the main features. 
“Stand-up” meetings were held inside the manager’s office, where there 
was plenty of space for grids and charts that showed how they were per-
forming and the challenges ahead. The room was bright and airy. Each 
employee was given a minute to explain what had been done, what was 
looking ahead forward and whether there were any challenges. This meant 
that each person was given a minute in the limelight, giving the manager 
a good idea of the current status. Typically, those that shared challenges 
and others came to “the rescue”, either by giving tips and advice or by 
putting their own tasks aside to help. One could use “programming in 
pairs” both for support, learning and to reduce stress (Steiro & Torgersen, 
in press). 
Relational aspects in the Royal Norwegian  
Air Force
The Royal Norwegian Air Force is characterized by having a relatively 
flat hierarchy and is competence-based, meaning that the person who 
has the most expertise leads a mission, not necessarily the person with 
the highest rank (Maaø, 2005). It is further characterized by numerous 
specializations that must interact to solve missions (Maaø, 2005). The 
Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, which is responsible for officer 
training, emphasizes deep reflection as an instrument (Steiro & Firing, 
2009; Moldjord, Arntzen, Firing & Laberg, 2007; Firing, Gudmunds-
dottir & Karlsdóttir, 2004). A heavy emphasis is placed on interpersonal 
relationships and this is given a great deal of attention. Steiro, Moldjord, 
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Firing & Fredriksen (2010) point out that debriefing has a long history in 
the Air Force. Traditionally, it has focused on operational and technical 
aspects. This is well incorporated. By also focusing on the emotional and 
interpersonal, new perspectives are opened up, allowing for increased 
and different kinds of learning (Fredriksen, 2015; Owesen, 2015; Steiro et 
al., 2010; Folland, 2009). Knowing each other’s strengths and weaknesses, 
and adding uncertainty can contribute to concurrent learning (Steiro & 
Torgersen, 2015). A more holistic view of debriefing includes more of the 
emotional and relational aspects, important not only for learning but also 
for becoming better acquainted with each other’s strengths. 
Concurrent learning in an oil rig company
In this study, informants aboard the rig were interviewed regarding what 
makes them avoid accidents, focusing on factors in normal or successful 
operations (Steiro, Thevik & Albrechtsen, 2017; Thevik, 2014). The ration-
ale for the study is that, with regard to safety, too much focus has been 
on accidents and accident investigation and too little focus on normal 
operations, recovery or successful operations (Rosness, Haavik, Steiro & 
Tinmannsvik, 2016). The informants pointed out that good following-up, 
good control and reporting procedures, collaboration between different 
levels in the hierarchy and different jobs, good notification procedures, 
are special factors of significance. That the rig is well organized, everyone 
“pulls in the same direction” and that they think ahead in all operations 
were also mentioned as important factors. A good working environment 
and collaboration on board were often mentioned when explaining fac-
tors that make operations go well. Safety culture, support, job satisfac-
tion, meeting points, low thresholds for input, good evaluation practices, 
learning from mistakes, less pressure, more understanding of operators – 
these were all cited as key aspects of successful operations (Thevik, 2014). 
Several informants pointed to important learning arenas and ways of 
learning, such as pre-job meetings, handover meetings, briefings, log, 
lessons learned, training programs and being able to stop up along the 
way. It appears that the rig is characterized by a culture of acceptance 
if someone needs to stop up and discuss something, or is experiencing 
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uncertainty or risk, so this is done. One manager put it this way, “If we 
all get home from sea, the mission is successful.” Open communications, 
which allow participants to address issues related to the task in hand and 
give the inexperienced and uncertain participants an opportunity to ask 
questions, should be independent of rank (Steiro, et al., 2017). 
Recurrent themes that were highlighted as important to ensure safety 
were well-being on board, the psychosocial environment, being familiar 
with the colleagues and teamwork (Thevik, 2014). Investing in a good 
working environment appears to be important to several of the inform-
ants, and leaders on board are prominent exponents of this. Experienced 
managers on board emphasized the same values. On offshore drilling 
rigs, there may be a difference between suppliers with regard to inclu-
sion and respect for their knowledge (Steiro et al., 2017). An employee 
from a service company compared the difference between this rig and 
foreign rigs, saying “Here, I am not just the guy sitting in the cage. Here, I 
am respected as an engineer and get help.” This quote demonstrates how 
important assumptions about other people are. Respect for others is a 
key concept in this assumption. It appears to be important to follow up 
this dialectic when we discuss samhandling and concurrent learning. An 
organization that opens up and includes different perspectives, by apply-
ing the ideals of the “World Citizen” and “World Hospitality”, gains power 
from exploiting the “difference” and may use complementary skills and 
knowledge more effectively.
Some steps towards increased samhandling 
and concurrent learning - a model
We have been able to extract some generic lessons from the examples 
highlighted in this chapter should not be regarded in any way as blue-
prints. The context in which various organizations operate does not allow 
debriefing to be implemented without taking the organization’s history 
and context into account. This chapter has identified five factors that 
affect samhandling and concurrent learning, especially under unforeseen 
conditions, and that can contribute in preventing undesirable outcomes. 
These are presented in Table 14.1. 
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Table 14.1 Five factors identified as important to samhandling and concurrent learning
Factors Elaboration Examples 














and strengths is 
important. 
Rosenborg Football Club (RBK) demonstrates the 
importance of having a clear and compact philosophy 
(Hoff-Leirvik, 2009). Nils Arne Eggen in RBK formulated 
the principles “it’s about making others good” and 
“channeling ego forces” clearly stated (Hoff-Leirvik, 
2009; Eggen & Nyrønning, 1999). This is of particular 
importance before an incident occurs.
Respect for others’ competence and regarding diversity 
as a strength are important. This is perhaps the most 
important condition – that one is aware of what others 
stand for and how this actually affects interaction with 
others. You see that there is a mutual influence. This is 
of particular importance before an incident occurs. It is 
not very likely that this will occur during a crisis.
2. Space Create space
Use space for 
wondering and 
reflection
It’s about creating space, even though the situation is 
marginal cf. examples from Weick (1993) and Folland 
(2009). This space can be created or time is scarce. 
Doing something rather than nothing seems urgent. The 
space must be used for learning if possible. The space 
can be used for wondering. Has anyone been in a similar 
situation before? What are the lessons learned from 
this job? Is there something we can use to advantage? 
By communicating their own wonder or questions, a 
leader can more easily open up for more questions but 
also different perspectives. The space should be used 
for learning – to bothexploit and develop knowledge and 
skills. What can possibly be achieved? What are the 
obstacles to this space of action?
3.  Give of 
themselves
Provide and offer 
something. which 
makes it easier to 
get something in 
return
It is about giving of themselves. By providing, it is also 
easier to get others to open up more. This then enables 
the others to follow after. Again, the leader seems to be 
a crucial factor. This could be seen as similar to Points 1 
and 2. However, the unforeseen, as illustrated in the Bow-
tie Model in Chapter 1 (Torgersen, 2018), might demand 
new skills and competence that were not planned ahead, 
since the model assumes that we will usually lose control. 
This means that being open about our own uncertainty 
or fear, for example, might create new possibilities. As 
a leader, one cannot depend on demonstrating mastery 
of everything but rather, one should be open and curious 
about others’ competence and skills. 









Gain insight into 
the basis for 
decisions, in order 
to verify and/or 
challenge these
The example from the software firm demonstrates 
this well. Regular stand-up meetings as a way of doing 
business make it less imposing to flag challenges. One 
can also draw parallels to Nils Arne Eggen and RBK, 





Factors Elaboration Examples 
5.  Reflection 







Time out. Stop, 
reflect and share
Debrief to learn 
and improve
Pre-brief and “what if” – analysis. In the Mann Gulch 
Disaster case, the team could have used a pre-briefing 
to prepare. “What if” – analysis could have been 
used to plan in advance. The team leader, as we have 
seen, had some ideas about what could be done in a 
similar situation, but did not address them before it 
was too late. In retrospect, he should have asked what 
they would do if they were trapped, so they would at 
least have been better prepared mentally. Would that 
have helped? It might also have laid open the team 
leader’s competence, and allowed trust to be built and 
developed before entering the operation.
Time-out as a means to stop, reflect and share. Football 
coach Nils Arne Eggen often stopped training and drew 
attention to learning. A central point was the proximity 
in time as a pedagogical principle. Time-out, as we see 
it, is perhaps the most important tool for concurrent 
learning as with debriefing. 
Debriefing is an important way to sum up and to proceed. It 
is important to be concerned not only with the technical 
and tactical dimensions but also to devote attention 
to interpersonal relationships. It is important that the 
organization trains reflection skills. 
Conclusions
Concurrent learning means that participants learn from one another 
in the interaction process. Samhandling and concurrent learning repre-
sent a mindset, a way of working and a form of learning that also help 
to strengthen relational aspects. Groups and organizations that build on 
and apply concurrent learning will accomplish more and do it earlier. 
They will build more trust and thereby create more of the reciprocity 
that is essential for developing and maintaining relationships. Respect 
for others’ expertise and regarding diversity as a strength is central to 
interaction and concurrent learning, in order to fully gain benefits from 
complementary skills and competence. A central premise here is that you 
need to be conscious of what you actually stand for and how this assump-
tion regarding yourself and others influences relations. Such evolving 
relationships are central to all work processes. Groups and organiza-
tions that build on and apply interaction and concurrent learning will 
Table 14.1 (Continued)
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accomplish several things. They are also more likely to be receptive to 
change and able to adjust their course to accommodate change. We also 
assume they have the ability to be more proactive. 
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Organizations rely increasingly on their ability to adapt to and manage 
multifaceted, demanding situations (Brozus, 2016; Roux-Dufort, 2007; 
Weick, 2015), particularly when facing sudden and unexpected risk events 
(Barnett, 2004; Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011; Cunha, Clegg, & Kamoche, 
2006; Fornette, Bourgy, Jollans, Roumes, & Darses, 2016). These types 
of events accentuate the importance of identifying the individual, social, 
and organizational factors and their capacity to promote or reduce pre-
paredness for unforeseen events. 
The crises of our time entail high risk organizations, such as the Armed 
Forces, investing substantial levels of resources in preparation for these 
complex challenges. The future cannot, however, be predicted and the real 
outcomes of this preparation are very uncertain (Cunha et al., 2006). An 
unforeseen event is “a relatively unknown event or situation that occurs 
relatively unexpectedly and with relatively low probability or predictabil-
ity to the individual, group or community that experience and manage 
the event.” (Kaarstad & Torgersen, 2017:1). Unforeseen events cannot be 
controlled (Tsoukas, 2005). Little is also known about how an organiza-
tion can methodically identify relevant factors that influence the outcome 
of an event (Kaarstad & Torgersen, 2017). How individual humans in 
organizations manage the unforeseen will, on the one hand, depend on 
factors that relate to the individual (Larsen, Buss, Wismeijer, & Song, 2017; 
Staw & Ross, 1985). On the other hand, the individual is also affected by 
the dynamics between social and organizational factors, which are strong 
(Davies-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989; Smith, Benight, & Cieslak, 2013).
Interaction between people, groups and organizations is reported to 
be of great significance in demanding and complex situations (Griffith 
& Vaitkus, 1999; Kramar, 2014; Delahaij, Kamphuis, & van den Berg, 
2016). Interaction (samhandling) has therefore been introduced as a fac-
tor that can be a valuable antecedent to adaption to unforeseen events 
(Kaarstad & Torgersen, 2017). The term “interaction” is often used when 
referring to traditional notions of collaboration, coordination, interplay 
and cooperation. Interaction has, however, a different qualitative mean-
ing, emphasizing open and equal communication, development, compe-
tence complementarity, common goals, trust and knowledge. A collective 
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definition of interaction is “an open and equal communication and devel-
opment process between parties whose competencies complement each 
other, who exchange competence directly face-to-face, via technology or 
manually, who work towards a common goal and whose relationship is 
based on trust, involvement, rationality and industry knowledge.” (Torg-
ersen & Steiro, 2009:130). 
Perhaps the key lesson that has emerged from multivariate studies is 
that there is no single dominant determinant that can predict the outcome 
of demanding and unexpected events (Bonanno, Brewin, Kaniasty, & La 
Greca, 2010; Milgram, Orenstein, & Zafrir, 1989). It is therefore important 
to study the interplay of those risk and resource factors that are considered 
to have the potential to predict outcomes, such as self-efficacy (Aizen, 1991; 
Bandura, 1997; Delahaij et al., 2016; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995; Shuffler, 
Pavlas & Salas, 2012), and social support (Procidano & Heller, 1983; Ryan 
& Burrell, 2012; Schwarzer & Luszczynska, 2012). People who are highly 
self-efficacious have a strong belief in their ability to manage challenges 
and threatening situations. Self-efficacy is usually understood as being 
either task-specific or domain-specific (Bandura, 1997; Leganger, Kraft & 
Røysamb, 2000). However, several researchers have developed the notion 
of self-efficacy as a general construct, which refers to a broad and stable 
sense of personal competence to perform across a range of challenging 
situations (Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998; Leganger et al., 2000; Scherbaum, 
Cohen-Charash, & Kern, 2006). Social support, on the other hand, refers 
to the impact that networks of people have on the individual. Perceived 
social support is defined as the extent to which someone believes that their 
support, information, and feedback needs are met (Cobb, 1976; Procidano 
& Heller, 1983). Specific competencies for demanding situations – personal 
experience, age, gender and realistic training, could also be potential pre-
dictors of preparedness for unforeseen events (Gal & Jones, 1995; Holen, 
Sund, & Weisæth, 1983; Solberg, Laberg, Johnsen, & Eid, 2005). However, 
results of the existing research of socio-demographics are less conclusive 
(Leganger et al., 2000; Scholz, Doña, Sud, & Schwarzer, 2002). 
The aim of this study was, therefore, to examine differences in how 
groups and individuals in the Armed Forces view preparedness for unfore-
seen events based on their role and function within the organization. The 
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main objective was to examine the effect of interaction, social support, 
general self-efficacy and competence in demanding situations on per-
ceived preparedness for the unforeseen. We also examine differences in 
these factors due to professional experience, age and gender. 
Organizations and competence 
The effective utilization of people in an organization has, for several 
decades, been an important field of interest (Schein, 1980). Organiza-
tions are understood to be open and complex social systems in which 
the people and the organization itself affect each other and interact with 
the environment (Daft, 2015; Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2014; Kaufmann & 
Kaufmann, 2015). Many academics believe that human resources are of 
strategic importance to an organization’s success (Armstrong, 2011; Kra-
mar, 2014; Noe, Clark, & Klein, 2014). This is based on the view that an 
organization’s people are a unique internal resource and that this resource 
can represent a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Salaman, Storey, & 
Billsberry, 2005; Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001). The competence of the 
employees is a resource that can enhance an organization’s performance 
(Wright, Warner, Moynihan, & Allan, 2005), thus making competence a 
particularly important factor (Delary, 1998).
Knowledge is, in general, important for the sustainable development 
and growth of an organization (Law & Chuah, 2015; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995). The ability of an organization to maintain knowledge and skills 
that are up to date, both at the individual, group and organization level, 
therefore represents a significant challenge (Noe et al., 2014). Continu-
ous learning, interaction and sharing of knowledge between employees 
is required in a knowledge society, in which knowledge and technology 
develop quickly (Armstrong & Taylor, 2017; Von Krogh, Ichijo, Nonaka, 
2000). Knowledge management, resilience, self-leadership, empower-
ment, team building and creating flexible and network-based forms of 
work are examples of measures and concepts that can be implemented 
to meet these challenges (Armstrong & Taylor, 2017; Linkov et al., 2013a). 
Organizations and individuals must not only be skilled at utilizing 
the full potential of existing knowledge, but also be skilled at creating 
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new knowledge and questioning basic premises (Argyris, 1977; Argyris 
& Schön, 1996; March, 1991; 2006). Peter Senge (1990) highlights three 
important elements of this: the ability to develop personal self-efficacy, 
to develop complex understandings of how organizations function and 
to develop learning in groups and teams. Social learning in communities 
of practice is characterized by closeness, trust and active participation 
(Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 2002). Consequently, the understand-
ing of interaction between people, groups and organizations is becom-
ing increasingly important (Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015:59). Much of 
the research into interaction is, however, based on more predictable and 
known preconditions (Torgersen, 2015).
The high degree of unpredictability and complexity associated with 
unforeseen events increases the need to prepare for the full spectrum of 
stressors (Linkov et al., 2013b). An individual’s response to an unforeseen 
event depends on the individual’s appraisal, interpretation, and coping 
behaviors, as in any other stress-response process (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). Individual psychological resources, such as self-efficacy, and social 
resources, such as social support, appear to be beneficial when dealing 
with challenges and adversity (Delahaij et al., 2016; Friborg, Hjemdal, 
Rosenvinge, & Martinussen, 2003). 
Self-efficacy has been linked to performance (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001; 
Eden, 2001; Shuffler et al., 2012), decision making (Hepler & Feltz, 2012), 
training, adjustment to new tasks (Robbins et al., 2004; Saks, 1997), coping 
behavior when facing challenges, environmental demands and collective 
traumatic events (Liang & Su, 2011; Luszczynska, Benight, & Cieslak, 2009; 
Schwarzer, 1999; Solberg et al., 2005). Most of the research on self-efficacy 
has focused on the expectancy to succeed in a particular domain or task in 
a given situation (Leganger et al., 2000). The context of unforeseen events 
is characterized by being less situation-specific (Kaarstad & Torgersen, 
2017; Scherbaum et al., 2006). Hence, it might be adequate to extend the 
operationalization of task-specific self-efficacy to explain a broader range 
of competence beliefs (Luszczynska, Scholz, & Schwarzer, 2005; Schwarzer 
& Jerusalem, 1995). Perceived general self-efficacy can therefore be consid-
ered to be competence-based, prospective and action-related in less specific 
contexts (Luszczynska, Gibbons, Piko, & Tekozel, 2004; Luszczynska et al., 
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2005). On the other hand, the ability to deal with difficult situations based 
on personal experience, realistic training and individual task-focused cop-
ing capacities may be operationalized as domain-specific self-efficacy. 
In addition, personnel who must deal with uncertainty and demanding 
situations often seek support from their supervisors and colleagues. So, 
when there’s a threat to which one must respond, information or help is 
needed to adequately deal with the threat, and aid is perceived to be avail-
able within one’s support network (Procidano & Heller, 1983). Previous 
research has shown that military units and garrison social environments 
and leadership foster social support, and that this social support helps 
individuals to cope with stressors, manage high job demands and adverse 
conditions (Bliese & Britt, 2001; Cohen, 2004; Delahaij et al., 2016; Stetz, 
Stetz, & Bliese, 2006). It has also been found that there is a positive rela-
tionship between social support and readiness, performance and personal 
well-being (Armistead-Jehle, Johnson, Wade, & Ecklund, 2011; Griffith, 
1989; 2002; Ryan & Burrell, 2012). Both social support and self-efficacy 
are resources that have been studied for many years in military organiza-
tions (Andres, Moelker, & Soeters, 2012; Bartone, Snook, & Tremble, 2002; 
Delahaij, Theunissen, & Six, 2014; Weins & Boss, 2006). They have, how-
ever, not often been studied concurrently. Nevertheless, several scholars 
argue that these factors may have a buffering effect (Delahaij et al., 2016). 
The above outcomes show that more research is needed into factors 
associated with preparedness for the unforeseen. Preparing and learning 
from highly infrequent and unknown events represents a contradiction 
(Barnett, 2004; Lampel, Shamsie & Shapira, 2009). How can you train 
and prepare for something when you do not know what it is? Existing 
research indicates that there is a lack of a conceptual framework (Bundy, 
Pfarrar, Short, & Coombs, 2016; Lampel et al., 2009), that a semantic esca-
lation exists (Roux-Dufort, 2007), that there is an educational challenge 
when dealing with the unknown (Barnett, 2004; Torgersen & Saeverot, 
2016), and that there is a need to rework the senses and grasp ambigu-
ity (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005; Weick, 2015). Furthermore, most 
organizations learn from repeated successes rather than from exceptional 
events or failure (Starbuck, 2009). Rare events may, however, trigger 
learning through exposing weakness and revealing unrealized behavioral 
competence for the unforeseen
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potential (Christiansson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009). Unforeseen 
events therefore represent a challenge that requires numerous levels of 
competence to be mobilized for the challenge to be met (Argyris & Schön, 
1996; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008).
The enmeshment of individual, social and organizational factors high-
lights the need to explore and understand the consequences of their inter-
action. To our knowledge, few or no empirical studies have been carried 
out on this topic. Investigations that examine the joint role of interaction, 
general self-efficacy, perceived competence in demanding situations, and 
social support are important, as combinations of these factors may have 
a protecting and effect on preparedness for the unforeseen. Based on this 
reasoning, the main research question was: Do individual differences in 
general self-efficacy, belief in military skills and abilities, social support, 
personal experience and interaction predict the evaluation of prepared-
ness for the unforeseen? In addressing this, we assume that interaction 
plays a key role in preparing for the unforeseen, with the potential to 
enhance an organization’s capacity to optimize their performance.
Figure 15.1 The Predictive Model of Preparedness for the Unforeseen, showing selected 
indicators at each competence level.
The Predictive Model shown in Figure 15.1 integrates our main 
research question of how interaction directly affects preparedness for the 
unforeseen. This is substantiated by the social resources of social support 
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affecting interaction, the individual resources of general self-efficacy 
affecting competence for demanding situations and social support, and 




The study data was collected using a self-completion questionnaire, 
answered by male and female employees of the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
Personnel from all branches of the military, including commissioned and 
non-commissioned officers, military academy students and conscripts 
participated in the study. The study results are based on a survey carried 
out over a three-month period during winter 2016/2017. The question-
naire was distributed to 16 units, departments and military academies 
throughout Norway. Study participants held a range of competence lev-
els, were responsible for a range of functions and were based in a range of 
units. A total of 624 personnel participated in the study and the response 
rate was 77%. The sample consisted of 525 male (85%) and 92 female (15%) 
respondents, with a mean age of 25.7 years (standard deviation (SD) = 
8.2). Average military experience was 5.5 years (SD = 6.9). Most of the 
questionnaires were completed in plenum with the researcher present. 
Some questionnaires were supervised by a dedicated department con-
tact. All participants were, however, given the same introduction to the 
survey. The study was advised by the Norwegian Centre for Research 
Data (NSD).
Measures
General self-efficacy (GSE) was measured using a Norwegian translation 
of the General Perceived Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE) (Leganger et al., 2000; 
Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). The scale is uni-dimensional and consists 
of 10 items. It taps information about the respondents’ perceived capabil-
ity to handle new and difficult tasks in a variety of domains (Scherbaum, 
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et al., 2006). Sample items include: “I am confident that I could deal effi-
ciently with unexpected events,” and “If I am in trouble, I can usually 
think of a solution.” Respondents responded using a 4-point scale, from 
1 = “not true at all” to 4 = “completely true”. The scale is reported to have 
satisfactory psychometric characteristics, high levels of internal consist-
ency (α = .76–.91), and cross-cultural and criteria validity (Scholz et al., 
2002). The scale had a Cronbach’s alpha (internal consistency) of α = .83 
in the current study.
Competence in demanding situations (CDS) was measured using 17 
items from the Military Skills and Ability Scale (Moldjord, Laberg & 
Rundmo, 2015). Studies have used this scale to measure individual cop-
ing capacity, cooperation in demanding situations, and general knowl-
edge and skills when handling difficult and stressful situations (Moldjord 
et al., 2015; Solberg et al., 2005). This scale could be argued to measure 
domain-specific self-efficacy. Items include: “My ability to act whilst feel-
ing threatened is …”, “My ability to cooperate in difficult situations is 
…”, and “My skills at the individual level are …”. A Likert type scale, 
ranging from 1 (very good) to 5 (very weak) and 6 (do not know), was used 
to record responses. Previous studies have revealed satisfactory internal 
consistency with Cronbach’s alpha above .70 (Moldjord et al., 2015, Sol-
berg, 2007). The internal consistency of the scale was α = .85, and for each 
dimension, the results being α = .84 for individual coping capacity, α = .63 
for cooperation in demanding situations, and α = .81 for general knowl-
edge and skills.
Social support (SS) was measured using a Norwegian translation of the 
Perceived Social Support (PSS) Scale by Procidano and Heller (1983). It 
was designed to assess the functions of social networks in which an indi-
vidual perceives that his/her needs for support, information, and feed-
back are fulfilled by colleagues and leader, especially emotional support. 
The scale is comprised of two 10 item self-reported measures. Examples 
are: “I rely on my colleagues for emotional support”, “My colleagues give 
me the moral support I need”, and “My leader is sensitive to my personal 
needs”. Respondents used a 5-point scale, from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 
5 = “strongly agree”. The scale is reported to have demonstrated 
good internal consistency (α = 83.–.90) (Eskin, 1993). The scale had a 
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Cronbach’s alpha of α = .84, and for the dimension social support col-
leagues α = .78 and social support leader α = .78. 
Interaction (I) and preparedness for the unforeseen was measured by 
UN-ORG (UNforeseen Organization questionnaire). The scale consists 
of 98 items, where the component Interaction is represented by 7 items. 
It was developed within the Strategic Institute Initiative at IFE (Institute 
for Energy Technology), IO EPO (Integrated Operations in Emergency 
Preparedness Organization). The purpose of the questionnaire is to allow 
employees in an organization to assess to what extent their organization 
has emergency preparedness that can handle the unforeseen (Kaarstad 
& Torgersen, 2017). The entire UN-ORG scale was not analyzed in this 
study. Items in the Interaction component include: “My organization has 
developed good faith in the employees”, “My organization has the abil-
ity to exchange and complement the staff’s competence during training”, 
and “My organization creates a mutual sense of understanding inter-
nally within the organization during an exercise or event”. An analysis 
of Cronbach’s alpha of the UN-ORG scale has resulted in a value of .90, 
which indicates a rather high degree of internal consistency between the 
items (Kaarstad & Torgersen, 2017). The scale for Interaction had a Cron-
bach’s alpha of α = .78. 
Statistical analysis
The data was optically read and transferred to SPSS (version 24.0) 
and LISREL 8.72 for statistical analyses. The inter-correlations of all 
independent variables were calculated to test the significance of the 
correlation coefficients. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was per-
formed to evaluate the fit of the internal and dimensional structure of 
general perceived self-efficacy (GSE), competence for demanding sit-
uations (CDS), perceived social support (PSS) and interaction (I) and 
to test whether measured items reflect the latent constructs they were 
designed to measure (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). 
The fit between the model and data was assessed using the χ2/df (df-ra-
tio) and root-mean-square-error of approximation (RMSEA), with a 
90% confidence interval (CI) (Boosma, 2000). RMSEA values up to .08 
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correspond to an “acceptable” fit (McDonald & Ho, 2002). Adaptability 
was tested using comparative fit index (CFI), critical N (CN), standard-
ized-root-mean-squared residual (SRMR) and goodness-of-fit index 
(GFI). Traditionally, most authors who use an index scaled up to unity 
for “perfect” fit regard these fit indices as acceptable if they are greater 
than .90 (Jackson, Gillaspy & Purc-Stephenson, 2009; McDonald & 
Ho, 2002), and SRMR less than .06 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Cronbach’s 
alpha was also calculated to examine scale reliability and the internal 
consistency of the indices (Cortina, 1993). Average corrected item-to-
tal correlation and factor-loading range were determined to provide 
important information on the scales’ factorial structures (Boomsa, 
2000).
A multivariate analysis of variance and covariance (MANOVA/ 
MANCOVA) was conducted to examine differences in general self- 
efficacy, competence for demanding situations, social support and inter-
action, due to demographic variables such as gender, age and years of pro-
fessional experience (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012; Warne, 2014). From this, 
we can obtain a multivariate F value and adjust for differences in one or 
more covariates (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016).
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was carried out to iden-
tify factors that can explain individual variations in preparedness for 
the unforeseen. Predictive values were reported with R² values. The five 
proposed predictors were entered block-wise in the following order: (a) 
demographic variables (gender, age, years of experience), (b) general 
self-efficacy (GSE) and competence for demanding situations (CDS), (c) 
social support (SS), (d) training and exercise, and (e) interaction (I). Gen-
der, age and professional experience may also be related to preparedness 
for the unforeseen. They were therefore entered first, to rule out alter-
native explanations for the observed findings. The other predictors were 
grouped into blocks and entered on the basis of competence level: indi-
vidual, social and organizational. 
A structural equation model (SEM) was finally used to assess whether 
the specified model “fits” the data (Yuan, 2005). Single dependent meas-
ures rarely capture the phenomenon being studied completely. The SEM 
approach, however, estimates the variables in the study simultaneously 
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rather than assuming independent equations (Boomsma, 2000; Jöreskog 
& Sörbom, 2004).
Results
Reliability, fit indices and parameter  
estimates of measures 
The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) results are given in Table 15.1. They 
show that the internal structure of general self-efficacy, competence for 
demanding situations, social support and interaction were consistent with 
respondent data (Leach et al., 2008). This fit indicates support for the meas-
urement model. The parameter estimates in Table 15.1 of Average Cor-
rected Item-Total Correlation and Factor Loading Range were reasonable 
and in support of the predicted model. The results also confirm that each 
component was well defined by its items. However, when determining the 
number of factors that best describe the underlying relationship among the 
variables, some items were taken out. The cut-off value was set at .40. First, 
three items from the Military Skills and Ability Scale were left out, due to 
fit and low rotated factor loadings. Second, two items from the Perceived 
Social Support (PSS) Scale were removed on each of the dimensions, due 
to low factor loadings and factor structure (Costello & Osbourne, 2005).
The reliability and internal consistency of the psychological and social 
variables are also shown in Table 15.1. The reliability and internal con-
sistency of all scales are shown to be satisfactory. One dimension of the 
competence in demanding situation scale showed α= .63. This value is 
considered to be satisfactory, based on the small number of items (four) 
in the scale (Cortina, 1993; Panayides, 2013). 
A series of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were 
computed (Table 15.2) to assess the relationship between study variables. 
Overall, most of the dependent variables were positively correlated with 
each other in the moderate and weak range (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 
2016). The two demographic variables, age and years of experience, were 
strongly correlated, r = .75, p <.01. However, no symptoms of multicollin-
earity or very high inter-correlations among the variables were detected 
(Broomsa, 2000). 
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Differences in psychological variables and social 
variables due to demographic variables
A multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) examined the eight 
latent variables being dependent variables, years of professional experi-
ence being an independent variable, and age and gender as covariates. 
Years of experience was recoded into three groups: novice, intermediate 
and experienced. Table 15.3 shows a statistically significant overall dif-
ference in years of experience on general self-efficacy, competence for 
demanding situations, interaction and preparedness for the unforeseen. 
Wilks’ Lambda = .95, F (16,1134) = 2.04, p < .01, η2 = .03. The multivariate 
effect was significant on the individual factors of general perceived self-ef-
ficacy F (4,574) = 9.65, p < .001, η2 = .06, and on all the three components of 
competence for demanding situations (CDS); individual coping capacity 
F (4,574) = 22.34, p < .001, η2 = .14, cooperation F (4,574) = 3.88, p < .01, η2 
= .03, knowledge and skills F (4,574) = 13.29, p < .001, η2 = .09. There was, 
however, no significant effect between years of experience and social sup-
port colleagues F (4,574) = 0.90, p > .05, η2 = .01, and social support leader 
F (4,574) = 1.12, p < .05, η2 = .01. On the other hand, the effect of years of 
experience on interaction F (4,574) = 4.46, p < .01, η2 = .03, showed signif-
icant differences. Years of experience finally demonstrated a significant 
effect on preparedness for the unforeseen F (4,574) = 2.86, p < .05, η2 = .02. 
Only the covariate gender significantly influenced the combined depend-
ent variables, Wilks’ Lambda = .91, F (8,567) = 7.45, p < .001, η2 = .10.
However, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), including the 
three demographic variables, demonstrated significant interaction effects 
between gender and age, Wilks’` Lambda = .95, F (16,1116) = 2.06, p < .01, 
η2 = .03, gender and years of experience, Wilks’ Lambda = .94, F (16,1116) = 
2.20, p < .01, η2 = .03, and age and years of experience, Wilks’ Lambda = 
.91, F (24,1619) = 2.30, p < .01, η2 = .03, and between gender, age and years 
of experience, Wilks’ Lambda = .95, F (8,558) = 3.67, p < .01, η2 = .05.
Univariate testing (ANOVA) and post hoc tests were conducted as fol-
low-up tests. ANOVA results in Table 15.3 indicated significant differences 
in the effect of years of experience on competence – individual coping 
capacity, F (2,574) = 4.85, p < .01, η2 = .02, interaction F (2,574) = 5.80, 
p < .01, η2 = .02., and preparedness for the unforeseen, F (2,574) = 5.64, 
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p < .01, η2 = .02. Tukey HSD and Bonferroni post hoc results for general 
self-efficacy and all dimensions of competence for demanding situations 
indicated that novice individuals significantly differ from intermediate 
skilled and experienced personnel. Results for interaction showed that 
novices differ from intermediates, and that experienced people differ 
from both novices and intermediates on preparedness for the unforeseen. 
Finally, Table 15.3 presents the group means of the dependent variables by 
years of experience. A comparison of the three levels of experience indi-
cated that years of experience increased the level of general self-efficacy 
and competence for demanding situations. A similar analysis of social 
support colleagues, social support leader, interaction, and preparedness 
for the unforeseen suggested that years of experience decreased the levels 
or made them more inconsistent.
Predictors of evaluation of preparedness  
for the unforeseen 
A multiple hierarchical regression analysis was carried out to examine 
whether preparedness for the unforeseen is predicted by general self- 
efficacy, dimensions in competence for demanding situations, social sup-
port, training and exercise, and interaction. Gender, age and professional 
experience were entered as demographic variables. Table 15.4 shows that 
the predictor variables in Block 5 (Block 1: Demographic variables, Block 
2: Individual resources, Block 3: Social support, Block 4: Exercise and 
training, Block 5: Interaction) explain a significant amount (43% – respec-
tively .00, .03, .09, .02, .29) of the variance in preparedness for the unfore-
seen, R² = .43, F (11, 564) = 38.77, p < .001. Interaction (ß = .61, p < .001) was 
the component which significantly added most variance to preparedness 
for the unforeseen.
Experience with emergency exercises (ß = .13, p < .001), social support 
colleagues (ß = -.14, p < .001), and social support leader (ß = .12, p < .01) 
did significantly predict the variance in preparedness for the unforeseen. 
The analysis shows that neither gender (ß = .00, ns), age (ß = .01, ns), years 
of experience (ß = -.02, ns), general self-efficacy (ß = .07, ns), competence 
– individual coping capacity (ß = -.04, ns), competence – cooperation 
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(ß = -.02, ns) nor competence – knowledge and skills (ß = .03, ns), dis-
played any significant relationship to preparedness for the unforeseen. 
We expected interaction to be positively related to preparedness for 
the unforeseen, controlled for gender, age and experience. The regression 
analysis supports this expectation. Gender, age and years of experience, 
general self-efficacy and competence in demanding situations did not, 
however, explain the variance shown in preparedness for the unforeseen. 
We therefore turned to SEM to examine the relations of relevant variables 
in the context of our predictive model. 
Structural Equation Model (SEM) for predicting 
preparedness for the unforeseen
Structural equation modelling is presented in Figure 15.2. Gender, 
age and experience were left out, in view of the fact that they did not 
obtain any significant effect. The results of the structural equation model 
(χ2 (24) = 107.16, p < .001; RMSEA= .076, 90% CI [.062, .091]; CFI = .95; 
Critical N= 235.07; SRMR= .055; GFI = .96.) indicate a good fit with the 
data (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
The total explained variance percentage of preparedness for the 
unforeseen was 41%, and Figure 15.1 shows two positive and significant 
paths. General self-efficacy positively affected both social support (ß = 
.35, p < .001) and competence in demanding situations (ß = .59, p < .001). 
The percentage of explained variance for social support was 17%, and it 
was 35% for competence in demanding situations. Social support was 
positively associated with interaction (ß = .54, p < .001) and the explained 
variance was 29%. The other pathway, competence in demanding situa-
tions, contributed to emergency exercises (ß = .15, p < .001). The explained 
variance was at the ratio of 2%. Furthermore, interaction demonstrated 
a positive and significant effect on preparedness for the unforeseen (ß = 
.61, p < .001). Emergency exercises were also positively and significantly 
connected to preparedness for the unforeseen (ß = .17, p < .001). 
The explained variance in preparedness for the unforeseen therefore 
essentially depends on interaction. We also found support for the pre-
dicted relationships between general self-efficacy, social support and 
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competence in demanding situations. Likewise, for social support and 
interaction, and between competence in demanding situations and par-
ticipation in emergency exercises. This indicates that social resource fac-
tors have a direct and resilient effect on preparedness for the unforeseen, 
and that individual factors play an indirect role. The results of the indi-
rect, direct and total effects are shown in Figure 15.2, and suggest that an 
integrative approach to preparedness for the unforeseen is a valid one.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to identify the individual, social and 
organizational factors that are associated with preparedness for unfore-
seen events. The study examined the effect of interaction, social support, 
general self-efficacy and competence in demanding situations on prepar-
edness for the unforeseen. It also examined differences in these factors 
due to professional experience, age and gender. The results are based 
on responses from individuals with different roles and functions in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces. We expected, based on previous research, that 
interaction would play a key role in preparing for the unforeseen (Delahaij 
et al., 2016; Kaarstad & Torgersen, 2017; Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2015; 
Kramar, 2014). This expectation was confirmed by the results. SEM analy-
ses showed that interaction was the most important predictor of prepared-
ness for the unforeseen, and that social support was a significant predictor 
of interaction. General self-efficacy and competence in demanding situ-
ations and social support also showed a significant positive relationship. 
Experience with emergency exercises, though low in effect, also contrib-
uted to the explained variance in preparedness for unforeseen events. 
In summary, our findings suggest that there is no single dominant 
determinant that predicts outcomes of demanding and unexpected events 
(Bonanno et al., 2010). The results, however, indicate that it is possible to pre-
pare for unforeseen events by implementing improvement measures, par-
ticularly measures aimed at the improvement of social factors. The results 
therefore represent a positive contribution to preparedness knowledge. 
The authors are not aware of any previous studies that have concur-
rently examined the factors investigated in this study. This study uncovers 
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relations and factors which might explain preparedness for the unfore-
seen and therefore clarifies and supplements existing research.
Implications
The results may have implications for predicting and enhancing prepar-
edness for unforeseen events. They show, for example, that interaction 
between people, groups and organizations is the most significant ante-
cedent of adaption to disruptive incidents. The results also suggest that 
interaction is an essential factor in explaining preparedness for an event 
that occurs unexpectedly, is unknown, and has a low probability of occur-
rence. Individuals and social processes are considered to play an impor-
tant and active role in preparedness, particularly when organizations and 
people are confronted with an unfamiliar event that is unexpected and 
confusing and that must be interpreted in the context of the strategic 
environment (Weick, 1995; 2015; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). This indicates 
that interaction can be used to predict future military performance at the 
individual, group and organization level, where interaction is viewed as a 
generic core competence that is found at several levels in an organization. 
This is particularly appropriate where the sum of the competencies at 
these levels determines the Armed Forces response time, combat power 
and sustainability when facing unforeseen events (Mathieu et al, 2008).
Weick (2015) argues that organizations faced with ambiguous infor-
mation tend to look for assurance in what they already know. All 
organizational capabilities are relatively rigid when facing unfamiliar 
problems, despite the prevalence of the concept of change (Ritala, Heiman, 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2016). There is, furthermore, no large body of 
theory and research on organizational effectiveness and organizational 
learning in abnormal events, such as crises and unforeseen events (Lampel 
et al., 2009; Roux-Dufort, 2007). Recent incidents of terror and crises 
have, however, demanded that high risk organizations such as the Armed 
Forces invest substantial resources in preparing for these very complex 
challenges. The future cannot be foreseen. Such investments are therefore 
associated with great uncertainty (Cunha et al., 2006). The Armed Forces 
may, even so, see the findings of this study as a basis for developing and 
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adjusting their recruitment and selection process, and their educational, 
exercise and training programs, and as a basis for focusing on ways to 
enhance interaction and the organization’s resulting performance. 
The results also show how the interplay of risk and resource factors, 
including factors such as general self-efficacy, social support, compe-
tence in demanding situations and experience with emergency exercises, 
directly and indirectly contributed to explaining interaction and pre-
paredness for unforeseen events (Delahaij et al., 2016; Ryan & Burrell, 
2012; Solberg et al., 2005). It was, nonetheless, surprising that personal 
and military experience had little value as a predictor of preparedness 
for the unforeseen. This question the traditional military assumption 
that there is a close relationship between experience (number of years of 
professional service) and increased coping capacity (Solberg et al., 2005). 
Self-evaluation of general self-efficacy and competence in demanding sit-
uations did, however, prove to be indirectly associated with preparedness 
for unforeseen events. This indicates that officers and soldiers primar-
ily base their evaluation of preparedness for unforeseen events on their 
evaluation of social factors, such as social support and interaction. Estab-
lishing suitable settings for social learning and communities of practice, 
where personnel can feel confident about meeting and sharing experience 
and knowledge, may be required to facilitate preparedness (Wenger et al., 
2002). Leadership that shows a willingness and ability to organize such 
venues is also essential (Moldjord et al., 2015).
Perceived personal efficacy and competence in demanding situations 
indicates coping skills that might be generalized across different stress-
ors and situations (Scherbaum et al., 2006; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). 
General self-efficacy and competence in handling demanding situations 
should therefore enhance preparedness, even in situations involving a 
high degree of unpredictability. It seems reasonable, given the uncer-
tainty associated with unforeseen events, that a belief in one’s personal 
resources, skills and abilities represents a readiness indicator and a sense 
of having faith in oneself. 
Those who believe in their own ability to handle difficult situations, 
increase their ability to seek social support, which in turn explains their 
ability to interact socially. This represents an interplay between essential 
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factors in the ability to handle unforeseen events. From a competence per-
spective, this shows the relevance of focusing on the interaction between 
different competencies. How unforeseen events manifest in each organ-
ization may depend on personnel differences and social factors within 
the framework of an organization’s structure and culture (Cunha et al., 
2006). However, the complex nature of unforeseen events requires knowl-
edge, skills and abilities beyond those of single individuals (Shuffler et al., 
2012). The results of this study show that social dimension factors directly 
explain the ability to handle unforeseen events, while individual factors 
indicate an indirect effect. Future research should, therefore, further 
investigate these relationships.
Strengths and limitations
This study has significant strengths and limitations. The sample size 
(N=624) should be sufficient to detect large effects (Cohen, 1992). The 
respondents represent a varied sample of Armed Forces personnel, within 
a range of units, functions and roles and with a range of experience, ages 
and genders. However, the use of self-reported data is susceptible to com-
mon method bias and social desirability (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Pod-
sakoff, 2003). This may introduce a degree of uncertainty into the results 
and limits generalizability, especially to other populations. 
The assessment of general self-efficacy, competence in demanding sit-
uations, social support and ability to interact could reflect general and 
biased intentions, rather than real perceived capacity, when confronted 
with an unforeseen event. Global measures, like general self-efficacy, 
often have weak predictive power on specific behaviors due to their high 
generality. Thus, self-efficacy measured at a more task and domain- 
specific level might have revealed other results. Competence in demand-
ing situations, though, can be reckoned as a kind of domain-specific 
self-efficacy. However, certain types of performance may well be related 
to multiple aspects and levels of self-efficacy (Leganger et al., 2000). The 
fact that the respondents are selected, trained and experienced should, 
nonetheless, contribute to a realistic evaluation of preparedness for unex-
pected, complex and demanding situations. 
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This study examined the effect of personal, social and organizational 
factors on preparedness for the unforeseen and the relationships between 
these factors. These determinants might influence each other bidirec-
tionally. A future study may conduct a longitudinal survey to examine 
the interactive relationship among these competence levels and determi-
nants. Another possible methodological approach could be a qualitative 
study to explore these phenomena and relations. Such explorations could 
uncover how organization members classify, prioritize and understand 
unforeseen events before responding to them.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study incorporates central concepts of individual and 
social resources that could permit the prediction and understanding of 
resilient behaviors in complex and demanding situations. This study also 
shows that interaction combined with general self-efficacy and social sup-
port can account for a considerable proportion of the variance in prepar-
edness for the unforeseen. Interaction was the most important predictor 
of preparedness for the unforeseen. The results indicate that it is possible 
to prepare for unforeseen events by implementing measures that improve 
social factors, in particular. Organizations can apply these findings by 
developing a work environment where managers and colleagues provide 
moral and emotional support and listen to each other. We also suggest 
building trust between employees and nurturing good forms of com-
munication. Furthermore, we believe it is important to create a common 
understanding of the situation and to have well-functioning routines 
with partners. Finally, a focus on exchange and the complementation of 
employee skills and knowledge may be of benefit to organizations. The 
results therefore make a positive contribution to preparedness knowl-
edge. There are, however, many issues that remain unresolved. There is 
plenty of evidence of significant relations between these concepts, but the 
exact form of these relations is still uncertain. 
In a world of rapidly-changing activities and unpredictable events, it is 
neither possible nor sufficient for individuals, groups and organizations to 
prepare for every potential incident. Organizations, rather than insisting 
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on the prediction of unexpected events, should therefore investigate how 
resilience to deal with unanticipated events can be developed. A change in 
focus and mind-set should highlight the relevance of interaction as a basic 
and generic core competence. In line with previous research, the results for 
gender, age and experience were inconclusive. The results showed signifi-
cant differences between men and women, different age groups and levels 
of experience, due to the outlined individual factors: general self-efficacy 
and competence in demanding situations. On the contrary, this was not 
the case for the indicated social and organizational factors: social support, 
interaction and preparedness for the unforeseen. The existing findings 
should therefore encourage more research, that may help to clarify why and 
when gender, age and experience differences emerge. Future research could 
also include the investigation of other promising and relevant elements such 
as trust, decision making, improvisation, organizational learning, struc-
turing and dynamic adaptive capabilities. This study may be particularly 
relevant to those involved in acquiring, mobilizing and developing com-
petence at different levels in educational, crisis and military organizations.
References
Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behavior. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 50, 179–211.
Andres, M., Moelker, R., & Soeters, J. (2012). A longitudinal study of partners of 
deployed personnel from the Netherlands’ Armed Forces. Military Psychology, 24, 
270–288.
Argyris. C & Schön. D. (1996). Organizational Learning II: Theory, Method and 
Practice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Argyris. C. (1977). Double-loop learning in Organizations. Harvard Business Review, 
55(5), 115–125.
Armistead‐Jehle, P., Johnston, S. L., Wade, N. G., & Ecklund, C. J. (2011). 
Posttraumatic stress in US Marines: The role of unit cohesion and combat 
exposure. Journal of Counseling & Development, 89(1), 81–88.
Armstrong, M. (2011). Armstrong’s Handbook of Strategic Human Resource 
Management. London: Kogan Page Ltd.
Armstrong, M., & Taylor, S. (2017). Armstrong’s Handbook of Human Resource 
Management Practice. London: Kogan Page Ltd.
Bandura, A. (1997). The Exercise of Control. New York: Freeman.
chapter 15
288
Barnett, R. (2004). Learning for an unknown future. Higher Education Research & 
Development 23(3), 247–260.
Barney, J. (1991). Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17, 99–120. 
Bartone, P. T., Snook, S. A., & Tremble, T. R., Jr. (2002). Cognitive and personality 
predictors of leader performance in West Point cadets. Military Psychology, 14, 
321–338. 
Bechky, B.A., & Okhuysen, G.A. (2011). Expecting the unexpected? Swat officers and 
film crews handle surprises. Academy of Management Journal, 54(2), 239–261. 
Bliese, P.D., & Britt, T.W. (2001). Social Support, group consensus and stressor-
strain relationship: Social context matters. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, 
425–436.
Boomsma, A. (2000). Reporting Analyses of Covariance Structures, Structural 
Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 7(3), 461–483. 
Bonanno, G. A., Brewin, C. R., Kaniasty, K., & La Greca, A. M. (2010). Weighing the 
Costs of Disaster: Consequences, Risks, and Resilience in Individuals, Families, 
and Communities. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, Vol. 11(1), 1–49.
Brozus, L. (Ed.). (2016). Unexpected, unforeseen, unplanned: scenarios of 
international foreign and security policy. SWP Research Paper 1. Berlin.
Bundy, J., Pfarrer, M. D., Short, C. E., & Coombs, W. T. (2017). Crises and crisis 
management: Integration, interpretation, and research development. Journal of 
Management, 43(6), 1661–1692. DOI: 10.1177/0149206316680030
Chen, G., Gully, & S. M., & Eden, D. (2001). Validation of a new General Self-
Efficacy Scale. Organizational Research Methods, 4, 62–83.
Christianson, M. K., Farkas, M. T., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Weick, K. E. (2009). Learning 
through rare events: Significant interruptions at the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
Museum. Organization Science, 20(5), 846–860.
Cobb, J. (1976). Social Support as a Moderator of Life Stress. Psychosomatic Medicine, 
38, 300–314.
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112(1), 155.
Cohen, S. (2004). Social Relationships and Health. American Psychologist, 59(8), 
676–684. 
Cortina, J. M. (1993). What is coefficient alpha? An examination of theory and 
applications. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(1), 198–104. 
Costello, A. B., & Osborne, J. W. (2005). Best practices in exploratory factor analysis: 
Four recommendations for getting the most from your analysis. Practical 
assessment, Research & Evaluation, 10(7), 1–9.
Cunha, M.P., Clegg, S.R., & Kamoche, K. (2005). Surprises in Management and 
Organization: Concept, Sources and a Typology. British Journal of Management, 
17, 317–329. 
competence for the unforeseen
289
Daft, R. L. (2015). Organization Theory and Design. Boston, MA: Cengage learning.
Davies-Blake, A., & Pfeffer, J. (1989). Just a Mirage: The Search for Dispositional Effects 
in Organizational Research. Academy of Management Review, 14(3), 385–400. 
Delahaij, R., Theunissen, N. C., & Six, C. (2014). The influence of autonomy support 
on self-regulatory processes and attrition in the Royal Dutch Navy. Learning and 
Individual Differences, 30, 177–181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif .2013.11.003 
Delahaij, R., Kamphuis, W., & van den Berg, C. E. (2016). Keeping engaged during 
deployment: The interplay between self-efficacy, family support, and threat 
exposure. Military Psychology, 28, 78–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/mil0000098
Delery, J. E. (1998). Issues of fit in strategic human resource management: 
Implications for research. Human Resource Management Review, 8, 289–310.
Eden, D. (2001). Means efficacy: External sources of general and specific efficacy. In 
M. Erez & U. Kleinbeck (Eds.), Work Motivation in the Context of a Globalizing 
Economy (pp. 73–85). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Eskin, M. (1993). Reliability of the Turkish version of the perceived social support 
from friends and family scales, scale for interpersonal behavior, and suicide 
probability scale. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55, 660–667.
Fornette, M-P., Bourgy, M., Jollans, J-Y., Roumes, C., & Darses, F. (2016). Enhancing 
Management of Complex and Unforeseen Situations Among Pilots: New Trends 
in Cognitive-Adaption Training. In M. A. Vidulich, P. S. Tsang, J. M. Flach (Eds.) 
Advances in Aviation Psychology. Vol. 1, 229–247. London; New York: Routledge 
Publications. 
Friborg, O., Hjemdal, O., Rosenvinge, J. H., & Martinussen, M. (2003). A new rating 
scale for adult resilience: What are the central protective resources behind healthy 
adjustment? International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research, 12(2), 65–76. 
Gal, R., & Jones, F. D. (1995). A psychological model of combat stress. In F. D. Jones, 
L. R. Sparacino, J. M. Rothberg, & J. W. Stokes (Eds.), War Psychiatry, 133–148. 
Washington, DC: Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Borden Institute, Office of 
Surgeon General. 
Griffith, J., & Vaitkus, M. (1999). Relating Cohesion to Stress, Strain, Disintegration, 
and Performance: An Organizing Framework. Military Psychology, 11(1), 27–55.
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2006). SEM: 
Confirmatory factor analysis. Multivariate data analysis. p. 770–842. New Jersey: 
Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Hepler, T. J., & Feltz, D. L. (2012). Take the first heuristic, self-efficacy, and decision-
making in sport. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 18(2), 154.
Holen, A., Sund, A., & Weisæth, L. (1983). Alexander Kielland ulykken 27. mars 1980 
[The Alexander Kielland Disaster, March 27, 1980]. Doctoral Dissertation, Kontor 
for Katastrofepsykiatri, Universitetets Forlag, Oslo, Norway. 
chapter 15
290
Hu, L. & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation 
Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal 6(1), 1–55.
Jackson, D. L., Gillaspy Jr, J. A., & Purc-Stephenson, R. (2009). Reporting practices 
in confirmatory factor analysis: an overview and some recommendations. 
Psychological Methods, 14(1), 6.
Jacobsen, D. I., & Thorsvik, J. (2013). Hvordan organisasjoner fungerer [How 
organizations work]. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
Judge, T. A., Erez, A., & Bono, J. E. (1998). The power of being positive: The relation 
between positive self-concept and job performance. Human Performance, 11, 
167–187.
Jöreskog, K. G., & Sörbom, D. (2004). LISREL (Version 8.71). Lincolnwood, Illinois: 
Scientific Software International.
Kaarstad, M., & Torgersen, G. E. (2017). Is it Possible to Assess an Organization’s 
Preparedness for the Unforeseen? Development and Evaluation of a 
Methodology. Arts Social Science Journal 8, 254.
Kaufmann, G., & Kaufmann, A. (2015). Psykologi i organisasjon og ledelse [Psychology 
in Organization and Leadership]. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
Kramar, R. (2014). Beyond strategic human resource management: is sustainable 
human resource management the next approach? The International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 25(8), 1069–1089. DOI: 10.1080/09585192. 
2013.816863
Lampel, J., Shamsie, J., Shapira, Z. (2009). Experiencing the Improbable: Rare Events 
and Organizational Learning. Organization Science 20(5), 835–845. 
Larsen, R. J., Buss, D. M., Wismeijer, A., & Song, J. (2017). Personality Psychology: 
Domains of Knowledge About Human Nature. Series: UK Higher Education 
Psychology. London: McGraw-Hill Education – Europe.
Law, K. M. Y., & Chuah, K. B. (2015). PAL Driven Organizational Learning: Theory 
and Practices, a Light on Learning Journey of Organizations. Switzerland: Springer 
International Publishing.
Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress Appraisal and Coping. New York: Springer.
Leach, C. W., Van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L., Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, B.,  
Ouwerkerk, J. W., & Spears, R. (2008). Group-level self-definition and self-
investment: a hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(1), 144.
Leganger, A., Kraft, P., & Røysamb, E. (2000). Perceived self-efficacy in health 
behavior research: Conceptualization, measurement and correlates. Psychology 
and Health, 15, 51–69. 
Liang, B., & Su, C. (2011). A study on relationships among general self-efficacy, 
coping styles and mental health of freshmen from Sichuan earthquake-stricken 
areas. Chinese Journal of Clinical Psychology, 19(5), 669–671. 
competence for the unforeseen
291
Linkov, I., Eisenberg, D. A., Bates, M. E., Chang, D., Convertino, M., Allen, J. H., & 
Seager, T. P. (2013a). Measurable resilience for actionable policy. Environmental 
Science and Technology, 47 (18), 10108–10110.
Linkov, I., Eisenberg, D. A, Plourde, K., Seager, T. P, Allen, J., & Kott, A. (2013b). 
Resilience metrics for cyber systems. Environment Systems & Decisions, 33(4), 
471–476. doi: 10.1007/s10669-013-9485-y
Luszczynska, A., Gibbons, F.X., Piko, B., & Tekozel, M. (2004). Self-regulatory 
cognitions, social comparisons, perceived peer behaviors as predictors of 
nutrition and physical activity: A comparison among adolescents in Hungary, 
Poland, Turkey and USA. Psychology and Health, 19, 577–593.
Luszczynska, A., Scholz, U., Schwarzer, R. (2005). The General Self-Efficacy Scale: 
Multicultural Validation Studies. The Journal of Psychology, 139(5), 439–457.
Luszczynska, A., Benight, C. C., & Cieslak, R. (2009). Self-efficacy and health-related 
outcomes of collective trauma: A systematic review. European Psychologist, 14(1), 
51–62. doi:10.1027/1016-9040.14.1.51 
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. 
Organization Science 2, 71–87.
March, J. G. (2006). Rationality, Foolishness, and Adaptive Intelligence. Strategic 
Management Journal, 27, 201–214.
Mathieu, J., Maynard, M. T., Rapp, T., & Gilson, L. (2008). Team effectiveness 1997–
2007: A review of recent advancements and a glimpse into the future. Journal of 
Management, 34(3), 410–476.
McDonald, R. P., & Ho, R-M. H., (2002). Principles and Practice in Reporting 
Structural Equation Analyses. Psychological Methods, 7(1), 64–82. 
Mehmetoglu, M., & Jakobsen, T. G. (2016). Applied Statistics Using Stata: A Guide for 
the Social Sciences. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
Milgram, N. A., Orenstein, R., & Zafrir, E. (1989). Stressors, personal resources, and 
social supports in military performance during wartime. Military Psychology, 
1(4), 185–199.
Moldjord, C., Laberg, J., & Rundmo, T. (2015). Stressors, social support and military 
performance in a modern war scenario. Journal of Military Studies, 6(1). 
Noe, R. A., Clark, A. D. M. & Klein, H. J. (2014). Learning in the Twenty-
First-Century Workplace. Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and 
Organizational Behavior, 1, 245–275. 
Nonaka, I., Takeuchi, H. (1995). The Knowledge Creating Company. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Panayides, P. (2013). Coefficient Alpha. Interpret with Caution. Europe’s Journal of 
Psychology, 9(4). doi:10.5964/ejop.v9i4.653
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common Method 
Biases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and 
Recommended Remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879–903. 
chapter 15
292
Procidano, M.E., & Heller, K. (1983). Measures of Perceived Social Support from 
Friends and from Family: Three Validation Studies. American Journal of 
Community Psychology, 11(1), 1–24.
Ritala, P., Heiman, B., & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, P. (2016). The need for speed—
unfamiliar problems, capability rigidity, and ad hoc processes in organizations. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 25(5), 757–777.
Robbins, S. B., Lauver, K., Le, H., Davis, D., Langley, R., & Carlstrom, A. (2004). Do 
psychosocial and study skill factors predict college outcomes? A meta-analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 130(2), 261–288.
Roux-Dufort, C. (2007). Is Crisis Management (Only) a Management of Exceptions? 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 15(2), 105–114.
Ryan, D. M. & Burrell, L. (2012). What They Deserve. Quality of Life in U.S. Military. 
In J. H. Laurence, & M. D. Matthews (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Military 
Psychology (381–399). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Saks, A. M. (1997). Transfer of Training and Self‐efficacy: What is the Dilemma? 
Applied Psychology, 46(4), 365–370.
Salman, G., Storey, J., & Billsberry, J. (Eds.). (2005). Strategic Human Resource 
Management. London: SAGE Publications.
Schein, E. H. (1980). Organization Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall.
Scherbaum, C. A., Cohen-Charash, Y., & Kern, M. J. (2006). Measuring General 
Self-Efficacy: A Comparison of Three Measures Using Item Response Theory. 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. 66 (6), 1047–1063. 
Scholz, U., Doña, B. G., Sud, S., & Schwarzer, R. (2002). Is general self-efficacy a 
universal construct? Psychometric findings from 25 countries. European Journal 
of Psychological Assessment, 18(3), 242.
Schwarzer, R., & Jerusalem, M. (1995). Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale. In J. Weinman, 
S. Wright, & M. Johnston (Eds), Measures in Health Psychology: A User’s Portfolio. 
Causal and Control Beliefs. (pp. 35–37). Windsor, UK: NFER-NELSON.
Schwarzer, R. (1999). Self-regulatory processes in the adoption and maintenance 
of health behaviors: The role of optimism, goals and threats. Journal of Health 
Psychology, 4, 115–127.
Schwarzer, R., & Luszczynska, A. (2012). Stressful life events. In A. M. Nezu, C. M. 
Nezu, P. A. Geller, & I. B. Weiner (Eds.), Handbook of Psychology, Vol. 9: Health 
Psychology (2nd ed., pp. 29–56). Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Senge, P. M. (1990). The Fifth Discipline. The Art & Science of the Learning 
Organization. New York: Doubleday Currency.
Shuffler, M. L., Pavlas, D., & Salas, E. (2012). Teams in the Military: A Review and 
Emerging Challenge. In J. H. Laurence, & M. D. Matthews (Eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Military Psychology, (pp. 282–311). New York: Oxford University Press.
competence for the unforeseen
293
Smith, A. J., Benight, C. C., & Cieslak, R. (2013). Social Support and Postdeployment 
Coping Self-Efficacy as Predictors of Distress Among Combat Veterans. Military 
Psychology, 25(5), 452–461. 0899-5605/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/mil0000013
Solberg, O. A., Laberg, J. C., Johnsen, B. H., & Eid, J. (2005). Predictors of self-
efficacy in a Norwegian battalion prior to deployment in an international 
operation. Military Psychology, 17(4), 299–314. doi:10.1207/s15327876mp1704_4
Solberg, O.A. (2007). Peacekeeping Warriors. A longitudinal study of Norwegian 
peacekeepers in Kosovo. PhD. Dissertation. University of Bergen, Norway. 
Starbuck, W. H. (2009). Perspective—Cognitive reactions to rare events: Perceptions, 
uncertainty, and learning. Organization Science, 20(5), 925–937.
Staw, B. M., & Ross, J. (1985). Stability in the Midst of Change: A Dispositional 
Approach to Job Attitudes. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70(3), 469–480. 
Stetz, T. A., Stetz, M. C., & Bliese, P. D. (2006). The importance of self-efficacy in the 
moderating effects of social support in stressor-strain relationship. Work & Stress, 
20, 49–59. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/02678370600624039 
Tabachnick, B. G. & Fidell, L. S. (2012). Using Multivariate Statistics (6th ed.). 
Boston, Massachusetts: Pearson.
Tsoukas, H. (2005). Complex Knowledge Studies in Organizational Epistemology. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Torgersen, G.-E., & Steiro, T. J. (2009). Ledelse, interaction og opplæring i fleksible 
organisasjoner. [Leadership, collaboration and training in flexible organizations]. 
Stjørdal: Læringsforlaget.
Torgersen, G.-E. (Ed.). (2015). Pedagogy for the Unforeseen. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
Von Krogh, G., Ichijo, & K., Nonaka, I. (2000). Enabling Knowledge Creation by How 
to Unlock the Mystery of Tacit Knowledge and Release the Power of Innovation. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Warne, R. T. (2014). A Primer on Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) for 
Behavioral Scientists. Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, 19(17), 1–10.
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations (Vol. 3). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc.
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the process of 
sensemaking. Organization Science, 16(4), 409–421.
Weick, K. E. (2015). Ambiguity as Grasp: The Reworking of Sense. Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 23(2), 117–123. 
Weick K. E., Sutcliffe K. M. (2015). Managing the Unexpected: Sustained Performance 
in a Complex World. New York: Wiley.
Weins, T. W., & Boss, P. (2006). Maintaining family resiliency before, during and 
after military separation. In C. A. Castro, A. B. Adler, & T. W. Britt (Eds.), 
Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat, pp. 13–38. 
Bridgeport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International. 
chapter 15
294
Wenger, E. C., McDermott, R., & Snyder, W. C. (2002). Cultivating Communities of 
Practice: A Guide to Managing Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
Wright, P. M., Dunford, B. B., & Snell, S. A. (2001). Human resources and the 
resource-based view of the firm. Journal of Management, 27, 701–721.
Wright, P. M., Gardner, T. M., Moynihan, L. M., & Allen, M. R. (2004). The 
relationship between HR practices and firm performance: Examining causal 
order. Personnel Psychology, 58, 409–446. 
Yuan, K. H. (2005). Fit indices versus test statistics. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 
40(1), 115–148.
competence for the unforeseen
295
Appendixes 
Table 15.1 Confirmatory factor analysis including maximum likelihood estimation, Cronbach’s alpha, 
Average Corrected Item-Total Correlation and Factor Loading Range for dependent variables
Variables a C-ITC FLR χ2/df RMSEA CFI CN SRMR GFI
General self-
efficacy




.847 .50 340.27/74 0.077 0.95 188.66 0.062 0.93




  Competence – 
cooperation
.629 .56 .26,.74




Social support .841 .46 550.04/103 0.084 0.95 163.21 0.046 0.90
  Social support 
colleagues 
.775 .51 .56,.77
  Social support 
leader
.780 .51 .47,.82
Interaction .767 .51 .51,.73    28.05/8 0.064 0.98 425.55 0.035 0.98
Note. N = 603, α = Cronbach’s alpha, C-ITC = Corrected Item-Total Correlation, FLR = Factor Loading Range, 
RMSEA= Root-mean-square error of approximation, CFI = Comparative fit index, CN = Critical N, SRMR = 
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Table 15.3 Group means and differences in general self-efficacy, competence in demanding situations, 
social support, interaction and preparedness for the unforeseen due to years of experience





Years of experience Novice Intermediate Experienced
General self-efficacy 3.18 (.39) 3.24 (.33) 3.34 (.35)   9.65*** 0.81
Competence – individual 
coping capacity
3.47 (.71) 3.60 (.59) 3.91 (.51) 22.34*** 4.85**
Competence – 
cooperation
3.52 (.76) 3.62 (.59) 3.77 (.48)  3.88** 2.42
Competence – 
knowledge and skills
3.61 (.83) 3.75 (.54) 3.98 (.64) 13.29*** 1.68
Social support 
colleagues 
3.76 (.52) 3.78 (.46) 3.71 (.49)  0.90 0.61
Social support leader 3.32 (.61) 3.28 (.53) 3.39 (.59)   1.12 0.93
Interaction 3.80 (.54) 3.60 (.54) 3.69 (.51)  4.46** 5.80**
Preparedness for the 
unforeseen
6.28 (1.80) 5.72 (1.80) 6.22 (2.10)  2.86* 5.64**
Note. N = 579, Novice; N = 182, Intermediate; N = 236, Experienced; N = 162, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01,  
*** = p < .001, Wilks’ Lambda = .95, F (16,1134) = 2.04, p < .01, η2  = .03. Standard deviations (SD) appear in 
parentheses besides unadjusted means. Listwise deletion.
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Table 15.4 Prediction of preparedness for the unforeseen
 b b b b b
Predictor Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5
Block 1: Demographic variables
Gender  .01 -.01 -.02 -.01  .00
Age  .01 -.02 -.03 -.06  .01
Years of experience   .02 -.04 -.03 -.04 -.02
Block 2: Individual resources
General self-efficacy     .14**  .07  .06  .07
Competence – coping capacity -.03 -.02 -.02 -.04
Competence – cooperation    .09*  .02  .03 -.02
Competence – knowledge and skills  .05  .06  .04  .02
Block 3: Social support
Social support colleagues -.06 -.04 -.14***
Social support leader       .35***    .33***  .12**
Block 4: Exercise and training
Emergency exercise    .14**  .13***
Block 5: Interaction
Interaction      .61***
R2   .00  .03  .13  .14  .43
R2 change /ΔR2   .00  .03  .09  .02  .29
F change   .09  4.76**  30.30***  11.80** 83.60***
Note. N= 576, *=p < .05, **=p < .01, ***=p < .001.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Military Samhandling – Formal and 
Informal Behaviour in Norway’s 
Armed Forces
Tormod Heier
Norwegian Defence University College
Abstract: The chapter describes and discusses interaction within the Norwegian 
Armed Forces. Military interaction is understood as the dynamic and sometimes un-
predictable action undertaken when two or more services interact. The chapter ex-
plores why interaction between military services, such as land, sea and air forces, is 
difficult – and, in some circumstances, completely absent. How can inadequate inter-
action between the military branches be explained? As Europe’s armed forces become 
increasingly complex and sophisticated, two perspectives from organisational theory 
are applied. First, an instrumental perspective is used to comprehend the problem. 
Particular attention is paid to the tension between hierarchical authority and the divi-
sion of labour. Thereafter, a cultural perspective is used to comprehend inter-service 
rivalry. Here, attention is paid to informal rules and regulations, or habitual ‘rules of 
thumb’ that have become institutionalised over time. These ‘the behavioural patterns’ 
affect the way military services perceive themselves in contrast to others. The main 
finding is that Norway’s Armed Forces suffer from ‘limited rationality’. This is because 
Norway’s military units operate within a fragmented command structure that consists 
of many different sub-organisations; individually, in times of peace in Norway, they 
pursue their own myopic agendas rather than a comprehensive national objective. In 
this process, the branches are also forced to compromise with each other to reach their 
individual objectives. A form of limited rationality therefore arises because the Army, 
Navy and Air Force act rationally. This is, however, not on the basis of what serves 
Norwegian security best, but on the basis of what is rational for their specific branch. 
Keywords: Samhandling, interaction, subcultures, military, organisational learning, 
leadership, unforeseen. 
Citation: Heier, T. (2018). Military Samhandling – Formal and Informal Behaviour in 
Norway’s Armed Forces. In G.-E. Torgersen (Ed.), Interaction: ‘Samhandling’ Under 
Risk. A Step Ahead of the Unforeseen (pp. 301–318). Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.23865/noasp.36.ch16




The purpose of this chapter is to describe and discuss interaction within 
the Norwegian Armed Forces. More specifically, the chapter explores why 
interaction between military services, such as land, sea and air forces, is 
difficult and why it occasionally may be almost absent. Defined in its sim-
plest terms, military interaction is understood as the dynamic and some-
times unpredictable action undertaken when two or more services, as 
social groups, have an effect upon one another. In a military-sociological 
context, this applies particularly during negotiations and compromises 
carried out by Army, Navy and Air Force officers, who operate within the 
same chain-of-command. 
Problems in military interaction are important for several reasons. 
Firstly, close interaction between the services is critical to all European 
NATO members, in order to exploit increasingly-scarce defence resources 
more effectively. Inter-service rivalry may easily erode broader ambitions 
of sustaining credible national forces and developing military expertise 
on ‘joint operations’ above the tactical level. Secondly, Norway’s Armed 
Forces are also important public agencies that annually receive substan-
tial funding from the tax payers’ money. It is therefore important to 
gain more knowledge on how scarce resources are spent. Are the Armed 
Forces interacting cohesively and rationally in order to optimise the 
national security effort? Or are the individual services more influenced 
by the ‘appropriate behaviour’ which dominates within their own branch 
(Christensen, 2017:62–64), thereby deviating from political expectations 
of a broad and complementary national security strategy? Thirdly, mil-
itary organisations are also the state’s most dramatic and controversial 
political instruments. How different sub-cultures and sub-groups inter-
act within the Armed Forces should therefore be of interest to increase the 
civic community’s knowledge and control over military organisations. 
Scrutinising inter-service rivalry leads to better transparency within a 
state activity that is often characterised by secrecy and inaccessibility. 
Analysed through the lens of organisational theory, this chapter argues 
that interaction between the Norwegian Army, Air Force and Navy is 
hampered by increasingly-powerful service branches. Such fragmentation 
within military organisations is by no means a new phenomenon (Builder, 
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1989; March & Olsen, 1989; Davis, 2012; Heier, 2017, 85–105). It neverthe-
less impedes a more effective and rational use of scarce defence resources. 
Governmental programmes aiming to create synergy between increasingly 
sophisticated, but also increasingly small and vulnerable national forces, 
face difficulties. Lack of interaction is often exacerbated by numerous insti-
tutionalised rules and procedures; informal norms and values that are 
deeply entrenched, like a special form of DNA, within the respective air, 
sea and land forces. Ethoses such as loyalty, obedience, discipline and con-
formity seem to prevail within certain units, particularly in the Army. Land 
forces often tend to become socialised by means of training and exercise pro-
grammes, which are heavily influenced by close combat with enemy forces 
in hostile terrain (Weissman & Ahlstrøm, 2017:6, 13; Rones, 2017: 138–143). 
In contrast, Air Force units more often consist of highly-educated techni-
cians who operate far from enemy lines, and pilots often have the privilege 
to engage opposing forces from high altitudes and at long distances. This 
may promote more of a “civilian” ethos, characterised by frank discussions, 
less hierarchy, less discipline, and more diversity in personalities and styles 
of leadership (Kvale, 20013; Syversen, 2003; Maaø, 2014). The Norwegian 
Armed Forces, therefore, are first and foremost institutionalised organisa-
tions (Selznick, 1957/1997:20) – and a fragmented political instrument which 
utilises both formal and informal interaction to reach their goals.
Although this chapter focuses on interaction in a narrow military 
sense, the broader phenomenon of organisational interaction may also be 
relevant to other types of organisations. Referring to the Bow-Tie Model 
in Chapter 1 (Torgersen, 2018), fragmentation severely inhibits any organ-
isation’s effective prevention, management or stabilisation of unforeseen 
incidents. Examples are numerous and may, in a Norwegian context, 
include the rivalry between the Police Force and the Armed Forces dur-
ing exercises (Røksund et al., 2016:9), or the absence of adequate civil-mil-
itary security arrangements following the terrorist attack in Oslo in 2011 
(Riksrevisjonen, 2017:14). 
This chapter takes the formal organisation of the Armed Forces as a 
starting point. Being one of the most modern forces in NATO, the mili-
tary chain-of-command can – in a theoretical and stereotypical form – be 
defined as a rational, unified and efficient combat organisation. Challenges 
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to rationality will be discussed below. The combat organisation, however, 
may be described as a neatly-balanced network of multiple components, in 
what is often characterised as a ‘system of systems’ (Heier, 2017:14–16). Dif-
ferent units from the Army, Air Force and Navy, enhanced by numerous 
leadership, support and combat support systems, must interact as a cohe-
sive team to create mutually-reinforcing effects. On short notice, the var-
ious units – from all over the country – are expected to rapidly assemble 
and interact as small ‘cogs’ in a ‘well-oiled machine’. The ‘machine’ is there-
after expected to perform rapidly and effectively, at home and abroad – 
along the Russian border and in the Barents Sea, in the deserts of Syria and 
Iraq, as well as above Libyan air space or in the Indian Ocean. 
Towards a problem statement
The ‘cogs’, however, do not necessarily fit neatly together. Originating 
from different branches, units and levels in the chain-of-command, 
smooth interaction is hampered by different identities. Shaped by infor-
mal norms, values and expectations, the myriad of Army, Navy and Air 
Force ways of understanding themselves are rooted in numerous fields of 
expertise, often in contrast to other services. 
Working on a daily basis inside small and vulnerable ‘centres of excel-
lence’, they are also geographically dispersed throughout a Norwegian 
territory that stretches over a distance equivalent to Oslo to Rome. More 
often than not, these ‘cogs’ have never met before they are suddenly 
forced to interact, sometimes under extreme physical and psychological 
conditions. 
Which mechanisms can help us to comprehend how Norwegian ‘cogs’ 
interact within the military machinery? As the various ‘cogs’ are put to the 
test, how can the organisational conditions be described? Are Norwegian 
troops part of a disciplined and smoothly-operating combat organisa-
tion, efficiently performing missions in accordance with political inten-
tions? Or are Norway’s Armed Forces part of a fragmented instrument; 
an organisation where informal habits, customs and procedures prevail, 
as unexpected incidents occur? Can Army, Air Force and Navy units, 
at the tactical level, make rational and comprehensive decisions for the 
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common good? Can they make choices unaffected by myopic interests 
from individual ‘cogs’? Or is the Norwegian machine characterised by 
unsynchronised interaction, because land, sea and air forces are also tradition- 
bearers, and therefore influenced by their own goals and interests?
Answers to these questions depend upon the perspectives used; these 
will be described below. A good starting point may be the broader par-
adox of centralisation versus decentralisation. On the one hand, consid-
erable effort has been put into controlling and managing scarce military 
resources more effectively. Centralising the Military High Command, by 
integrating it into the Ministry of Defence in 2003, is one such example 
(Bogen & Håkenstad, 2015:126–128). In order to become a more cohesive 
civil-military entity, the purpose was to ‘…take the military command-
ers by the ears…’, fostering better interaction (Bjerga, 2014:473). On 
the other hand, a military decentralisation also occurred which made 
rational interaction more difficult. Six years after the first example, the 
Army, Navy and Air Force service staff branches were separated from 
the civil-military entity in Oslo, and re-located to respective ‘centres of 
excellence’. The Army was sent to Bardufoss in northern Norway, the 
Navy was sent to Bergen in western Norway, while the Air Force was 
sent to Rygge in south-eastern Norway. In so doing, around 60 % of Nor-
wegian personnel were allowed to pursue a life-long career within their 
own service branch. As a result, joint interaction and operational synergy 
between services may be more challenging to realise. 
For example, the three service branches possess an estimated 200 
different information and communication systems, which can hardly 
communicate with each other. It is, therefore, difficult to achieve gen-
uine interaction between services that are becoming increasingly more 
autonomous and service-oriented, as opposed to joint-operation oriented 
(Pedersen, 2015; Bentzerød, 2015). Despite reforms aiming to reinvigor-
ate the formal chain-of-command, ‘inadequate interoperability between 
tactical commanders, and …between combat systems under the tactical 
commanders’, make common objectives hard to reach (Pedersen, 2015).
Building on this paradox, this chapter’s fundamental question is: How 
can inadequate interaction between the military branches be explained? 
As European forces become increasingly technologically-advanced and 
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sophisticated ‘systems of systems’, two perspectives from organisational 
theory may be applied. Firstly, using an instrumental perspective, inter-
action within formal military organisations can be explained, giving 
particular attention to the tension between hierarchical authority and 
the division of labour. Secondly, a cultural perspective may be adopted 
to address the same question. The instrumental perspective is comple-
mented by the effects of informal rules and regulations; habitual ‘rules 
of thumb’ that have become institutionalised over time, which affect the 
way military services perceive themselves in contrast to others. 
The instrumental perspective
How military organisations interact can be interpreted through the lens 
of instrumentalism. The definition of ‘organisation’ is understood as a 
formalised collective of personnel, who work systematically towards a 
common goal on a daily basis (Scott & Davis, 2007:36–40). In theory, the 
assumptions put forward by Richard Scott and Gerald F. Davis could be 
used to describe Norway’s Armed Forces, stereotypically, as a ‘rational 
actor’ (ibid.:35). In theory, interaction between branches occurs accord-
ing to defined roles, responsibilities, and areas of authority. Established 
formalities, procedures and rules are key characteristics of an instru-
ment-like organisation. This contrasts with the more informal, incre-
mental ‘institution’ described by Philip Selznick, which will be explored 
from the cultural perspective below (Selznick, 1957/1997:18–29).
Using the instrumental perspective, formally-written directives depend 
less upon the individual officer’s leadership, or the general’s subjective 
preferences and personal charisma. On the contrary, directives rest to a 
greater extent on rational considerations and existing routines. These are 
rigorously operationalised, transcending the military service’s narrow 
interests. From the Defence Staff in Oslo to the tactical Branch Heads in 
Bardufoss, Bergen, and Rygge, strategic directives and national concerns 
are submitted down the chain-of-command. In return, daily, weekly and 
monthly reports are issued upwards, to build a common ‘situation aware-
ness’ and hence, a better foundation for new strategic guidance. This is a 
theoretical description of interaction. How can it be explained in real life? 
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The logic of official interaction 
In Norway, military interaction takes place through intersecting chan-
nels of management, vertically and horizontally. A vertical interaction 
occurs across military-strategic, operational and tactical levels of com-
mand. Here, political intentions are gradually operationalised into more 
succinct and specific military terms. Firstly, intentions are operation-
alised into directives at the military-strategic level, within the Defence 
Staff. Secondly, this occurs again at the intermediate operational level, 
within Joint Operative Headquarters. Finally, this is carried out at a tacti-
cal executive level, with specific missions designed for the various air, sea 
and land forces (Forsvaret, 2014). From this somewhat simplified context, 
interaction can be explained as a rigid activity of exercising command 
and control authority. ‘Unity of command’ is communicated by means 
of formal roles, clearly-defined responsibilities and delegated authority. 
Orders, standard operational procedures and established drills are exe-
cuted by loyal and obedient staff officers, providing effective interaction 
across levels of command. 
However, parallel to vertical interaction, a significant degree of hori-
zontal interaction also occurs. Individually, the Army, Navy and Air 
Force delegate authority further down their own chains-of-command, 
to develop branch-specific operative concepts, doctrines and educational 
systems. Individually, the branches enhance their specific roles and 
responsibilities within the broader framework of national defence. Long-
term investments are decided, particularly within dedicated weapon, 
support and logistical systems that give their doctrines more operative 
‘punch’. Specialised educational programmes and career plans are also 
developed, to underpin investments and doctrines with expertise, for 
example, through dedicated officer-candidate schools, military acad-
emies and staff courses abroad. In a broader and increasingly complex 
‘system of systems’, therefore, much of the horizontal interaction is dele-
gated to branch-specific vocational education programmes. 
The combination of horizontal and vertical activities is instrumental 
in comprehending how interaction and synergy emerge between different 
services. This is, however, not without complications. Which mechanisms 
may create inter-service rivalry and hence undermine military interaction?
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Cross-pressure and limited rationality 
Based upon horizontal and vertical interaction, military organisations 
are likely to be characterised by a diverse set of goals and interests. Com-
prehending the Armed Forces as a unified, cohesive and rational actor 
is, as such, a myth (Nordheim-Martinsen, 2015). On the contrary, even 
disciplined and strictly hierarchical organisations are subject to signif-
icant cross-pressure. This is because each branch is empowered to act 
rationally between overarching goals and interests. But the same goals 
and interests are not necessarily compatible throughout the chain-of-
command. What is regarded as rational for Army headquarters situated 
in the far north is not necessarily rational to Air Force staff officers sit-
uated at Rygge, outside the densely populated Oslo-region. An example 
may be the Air Force’s recommendation to tie up large amounts of future 
defence spending to new investments in F-35 combat aircraft. On the one 
hand, this may improve the deterrent capability of the Armed Forces, 
thereby enhancing Norwegian security. On the other hand, it may also 
lead to a gradual disintegration of the Army and Navy, because fewer 
resources are left to sustain and develop critical ‘centres of excellences’ 
within these two branches (Bogen & Håkenstad, 2015, pp. 272–5; Johan-
nesen, 2016; Norheim, 2016, pp. 11–12). Another example is the re-location 
of scarce helicopter resources from northern Norway to southern Nor-
way. To better protect the most densely-populated regions of the country 
from a potential terrorist threat, this could be seen as a rational move, as 
seen through the lens of the Air Force and their cooperation with Spe-
cial Forces and the Police Force. From an Army perspective, however, 
this may lead to a critical shortage of tactical helicopter support in their 
primary area of responsibility, along the border with Russia (FMR, 2015; 
Bergstad, 2015).
At the crossroads between horizontal and vertical interaction, it may 
therefore be claimed that the armed forces, like most other organisations, 
are exposed to different forms of limited rationality. This corresponds 
with international research conducted by Richard Cyert and James G. 
March (1963), James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1983), and James D. 
Thompson (2008), among others. The problem of interaction in ostensibly 
rational organisations is often due to the fact that organisational diversity 
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is spread (by the different military branches) over a wide geographical 
area. Isolated within their own regions or at the main bases at Bardufoss, 
Bergen or Rygge, individual services can more successfully negotiate and 
intensify their own specialist preferences. In this light, the Defence Staff 
at the military-strategic level in Oslo can be interpreted as an arena for 
negotiation and compromise between the services, which again inhibits 
full rationality (Thompson, 2008:134–139). 
The scaling down of Defence Staff in Oslo and the subsequent re-location 
of service headquarters to the north, west and south-east of Norway in 
2009, serve as examples. On the one hand, the Defence Staff in Oslo lost crit-
ical manpower and the expertise needed to coordinate horizontal activity 
between numerous units throughout the country (Thornes, 2014:76–77). 
On the other hand, the same re-location also strengthened the branch 
specific ‘centres of excellence’ connected to each individual service, which 
formerly suffered from scarce resources. 
The cultural perspective
Interaction can also be comprehended from a cultural perspective. This is 
quite a different perspective compared to the instrumental interpretation 
presented above. Even though ‘limited rationality’ still prevails, it takes a 
more extreme form. The cultural concept is understood as ‘… a possession – 
a fairly stable set of taken-for-granted assumptions, shared beliefs, mean-
ings, and values that form a kind of backdrop for action.’ (Smircich, 
1985:58) The main emphasis is not placed on the organisation’s formal 
division of labour, established routines or top-down leadership. Instead, it 
rests more on an institutional understanding of the concept, as presented 
by Philip Selznick: the informal management, which develops from below 
in an upward direction over time, because there also exists ‘…an internal 
social sphere which must be safeguarded.’ (Selznick, 1957/1997:20).
Adjacent to the formal horizontal and vertical processes described in 
the instrumental perspective, informal norms and values tend to become 
more influential. Within increasingly-specialised services, the ‘centres of 
excellence’ in the land, sea and air force units start to ‘live a life of their 
own’ in Bardufoss, Bergen and Rygge. This interpretation may not only 
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promote a rational division of labour, as explained in the instrumental 
perspective. As James D. Thompson has suggested, a rational and logi-
cal division of labour may also stimulate the development of subcultures. 
This is particularly so when power and authority are delegated to subor-
dinate units, which have little contact with one another on a day-to-day 
basis (Thompson, 2008:140–143). As a consequence, inter-service rivalry 
is more likely to occur, because stronger and more long-term incentives 
for interaction are dwindling. 
Rather than cultivating ideas for increased inter-service ‘jointness’, 
branch-specific guidelines and moral ‘compasses’ emerge within land, 
sea and air-based units. This is operationalised into land, sea and air 
defence doctrines, career plans and educational directives. Informal atti-
tudes, like ‘this is how it’s done here’, become more influential, also within 
the formal chain-of-command. Key questions, like ‘How should strategic 
directives be executed?’, or “What kind of military expertise should be pri-
oritised?’, become more greatly influenced by symbols, artefacts, rituals, 
parades and social events (Heier, 2014:227–230; Heier, 2017:95–96). These 
mechanisms are systematically developed and organised by the military 
services themselves. Over time, it shapes the way officers think, act and 
behave, both in relation to themselves and, not least, in relation to officers 
from other services. The culture developed within the services thereby 
becomes a kind of ‘professional baggage’ that shapes officers’ identities. 
As the same officers operate within the vertical and horizontal chains-
of-command, as described in the instrumental perspective, they carry 
this ‘baggage’ with them more or less unconsciously, as procedures and 
practises are performed in conjunction with officers from other services. 
An important presupposition is that Norway’s military branches nor-
mally exist at a safe distance from each other – geographically, mentally 
and in terms of expertise. The political and social control exercised by 
the Defence Staff in Oslo is therefore weakened. At the same time, the 
branches’ image of their own basis for existence is strengthened. In the 
contrast between ’Us’ and ’Them’, investments in branch-specific mate-
rials, such as command and control systems, is given a real ‘meaning’. 
Therefore, what is seen as ‘appropriate behaviour’ in one’s own military 
branch will contradict overriding directives that favour ‘unity of purpose’, 
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interoperability and ultimately, a cohesive method of addressing com-
mon challenges. These so-called ‘birth marks’ are often created far back 
in time. They often lead to a ‘path addiction’, whereby the struggle for 
your own interests follows a route that has been marked by colleagues 
and superiors before you. They have ‘a normative and institutional basis, 
which can differ entirely, depending on which development path [the 
military branch in question] has had, and what are established as pre-
dominantly informal values and norms.’ (Christensen et al., 2009:54).
‘The logic of appropriateness’ (March, 1994), or ‘what is appropri-
ate behaviour in a military unit’, is an equally important factor affect-
ing interaction further down in the organisation. This may, for example, 
be related to questions about which communications systems should be 
installed on the Navy’s frigates to interact more effectively with ground or 
air force units. Or which missiles the fighter jets should acquire to sup-
port the Army or Navy. Or which career path army officers should pursue 
in order to create leaders with a broader and more holistic perspective 
on ‘jointness’ and national defence. Army Headquarters strives towards 
“…a transparent ownership of Army personnel”, even at operational level, 
where joint efforts between the services are made (Hæren, 2016). This may 
be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gives the Army important 
ambassadors to influence crucial decision-making processes, as scarce 
resources are the various branches. On the other hand, it may also con-
tribute to friction and rivalry with a joint service, which is strained by 
incompatible goals and priorities (Johansen, 2015; Builder, 1989:67–92). 
The introduction of joint information and communication systems 
between services serves as an example. Instead of providing the Com-
mander of the Cyber Defence Unit with sufficient authority to implement a 
unified system, the Army, Navy and Air Force Headquarters are authorised 
to place orders for equipment serving their particular needs, each individ-
ually, through the Armed Forces Material Administration (Pedersen, 2015). 
Cross-pressure and limited rationality
The individual, service-oriented acquisition of communication systems 
that other services cannot use, cannot be explained as a breach of loyalty 
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in the chain-of-command between the tactical services and the strate-
gic Defence Staff in Oslo. Instead, it arises because the Chief of Defence 
has delegated responsibility to officers that are socialised into patterns 
that frame thoughts and actions (March & Olsen, 1989:27, 54–5). If the 
Army, Navy or Air Force do not recognise the strategic directives from 
the Defence Staff in Oslo, efforts to enhance holistic investments across 
the Armed Forces will fall short. The extent to which the services iden-
tify with the decisions made, and whether they comply with the Armed 
Forces’ overall goals and interests, must also be taken into consideration. 
Therefore, subcultures specific to the military branches are capable of 
creating tension, which again makes interaction difficult. How can this 
be explained in more specific terms?
During the 2000s, the individual services’ expertise and ‘centres of 
excellence’ have been subject to an ‘economically-driven re-organisation 
of defence’ (Måseidvåg, 2011). Consequently, protecting one’s own tactical 
forces from closures and redundancies has become increasingly preva-
lent. This strengthens the explanatory power of the cultural perspective, 
in part because increasingly more service-oriented expertise in the Army, 
Navy and Air Force risk acting on the basis of ‘self-preservation’ and local 
esprit de corps rather than on the basis of overarching, strategic military 
considerations. 
As pointed out in the Dekanstudien (Deans Study), conducted by the 
Norwegian Defence University Colleges in 2016, ‘…branch-specialised 
institutions of learning have developed…in isolation from each other’. It 
has been argued that this has impeded the emergence of ‘common per-
spectives, common solutions [and] professional synergies’ (Bjerga et al., 
2016:2). Preserving branch-specific interests was also evident within the 
Air Force Academy prior to the re-organisation of the six university col-
leges in the Armed Forces in 2016. External consultants were hired by the 
Air Force to clarify branch-specific requirements. They found that ‘Here, 
it is important to create a strategy in order to safeguard particular char-
acteristics.’ (NIFU, 2016:21).
The combination of scarce resources and strong, branch-oriented cul-
tures seems to put military leaders under cross-pressure, caught between 
promoting critical expertise on behalf of the branch, and promoting a 
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broader national defence culture of ‘unity of effort’ throughout the chain-
of-command. On the one hand, Commanders of the Army, Navy and 
the Air Force experience expectations within their own services. Such 
expectations are created by personnel whose primary point of reference 
is firmly anchored in their own military branch. This cultural ‘baggage’ 
is often also tied to ‘paths’ marched by former colleagues in the gener-
ations before them. On the other hand, pressure for unity and loyalty 
is also created in an outward direction, from the political establishment 
and the society in which the Armed Forces exist to serve. Politicians 
and the Chief of Defence expect loyalty from Commanders of the Army, 
Navy and the Air Force, even if it leads to the total disintegration of a 
Commander’s own force. According to former Chief of Defence (2005–
2009), Sverre Diesen, this tension turns the Commander’s position into 
one of the most demanding jobs in the Armed Forces. They are expected 
to promote branch-specific interests when interacting with the Defence 
Minister and the Chief of Defence, and at the same time, are expected to 
assume an advisory role on holistic and comprehensive solutions, as the 
Defence Chief ’s closest colleagues (Diesen, 2011:241). 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe and discuss interaction 
within the Norwegian Armed Forces. By trying to gain more knowledge 
on why inter-service interaction is difficult, the chapter aims to answer 
the following question: How can inadequate interaction between the 
military branches be explained? In these concluding remarks, plausible 
answers of both a general and specific nature are presented. Thereafter, 
two implications for the future are derived. 
Generally, a common denominator valid for both perspectives seems 
to be that Norway’s Armed Forces suffer from ‘limited rationality’. This 
logic resembles the Bow-Tie Model in Chapter 1 (Torgersen, 2018), which 
claims that interaction between the three phases, Prevention, Loss of Con-
trol and Stabilisation, are sources of concern. In this context, this is partly 
due to the fact that a military ‘system of systems’ consists of many differ-
ent ‘cogs’, or organisations, which individually pursue their own goals. In 
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this process, they are also forced to compromise with other branches to 
reach their own objectives. A form of limited rationality therefore arises 
because the Army, the Navy and the Air Force act rationally, not on the 
basis of what serves Norwegian security best, but on the basis of what is 
rational for their specific branch. 
Generally, it also seems as if ‘limited rationality’ arises because inter- 
service compromises and solutions are influenced by informal norms 
thriving inside the Army, Navy and Air Force. These are subtle cultures 
which remain entrenched within the services and may indicate that inter-
action is characterised by both organisational and institutional traits.
The more specific answer to the question is therefore as follows: Inade-
quate interaction within the Norwegian Armed Forces can be explained 
as a sort of cross-pressure. On the one hand, generating from formal 
authority exercised through the official chain-of-command and on the 
other, by informal authority exercised through the service branches’ defi-
nition of ‘appropriate behaviour’. The ineffective use of scarce defence 
resources within Norwegian forces is therefore consistent with Peter 
Selznick’s perspective, claiming that most organisations are institutional 
organisations (Selznick, 1957/1997).
What bearing does this have on the future? Formulated as a hypoth-
esis for further research, it may be claimed that Norway’s Armed Forces 
will continue to be a fragmented and heterogeneous organisation. More 
public spending will not necessarily lead to improved defence. As the 
Armed Forces gradually become more specialised, the informal author-
ity deriving from the individual service’s ‘appropriate behaviour’ will 
increase. Thus, the continued deployment of small tactical capabilities to 
international operations, so-called ‘niche capabilities’, is likely to accel-
erate this trend; branch specific engagements abroad will, despite a joint 
operational framework, promote more autonomy within the Army, Navy 
and Air Force. 
However, fragmentation and inter-service rivalry may not necessar-
ily mean that defence resources are wasted. Lack of interaction may also 
increase defence output, even though it may be more difficult to meas-
ure in quantitative terms. A positive side of fragmentation may be that 
cohesion within the individual branches is strengthened. This aspect 
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is crucial, as Norwegian forces occasionally enter some of the world’s 
most challenging combat theatres, such as those in Syria, Iraq, Afghan-
istan and Mali. As fragmentation and inter-service rivalry also foster a 
stronger esprit de corps and identity within individual ‘centres of excel-
lence’, scarce resources may also help to create a highly-valued output. 
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We begin this chapter with a short introduction to the importance of 
trust in the military. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the impor-
tance of trust in military samhandling (interaction, cooperation). We 
then continue to discuss trust in military leadership, and leadership and 
situational awareness. After this, we continue to discuss leadership as a 
social interaction process that builds trust. We then introduce samhan-
dling, discussing this in a military context. After that, we discuss what 
military leadership is and explain military leadership structures. We 
then introduce a basic trust-based model of samhandling and discuss the 
model and its elements in terms of internal and external frame factors. 
Finally, we conclude that trust is still quite an open concept, and that 
trust is essential for the effective accomplishment of military missions. 
Our model is an attempt to pinpoint the understanding of the impor-
tance of trust in a military planning and leadership context. 
The importance of trust has long been recognized (see for instance 
Stouffer, Adams, Sartori & Thompson, 2008). Trust also serves as one 
of the main prerequisites for effective collaboration (Kouzes & Posner, 
2003). The Norwegian Armed Forces’ (NAF) core business is the plan-
ning and execution of military operations (Forsvarsstaben, 2014). One of 
the main tasks of the NAF is to plan for the unexpected, and ultimately 
for war. The nature of warfare itself is distinguished by uncertainty and 
randomness (Clausewitz, 1832/1976). Warfare consists of many complex 
factors. The unforeseen is by no means a closed concept, it is rather a 
relatively open expression (Kvernbekk, Torgersen, & Moe, 2015). In the 
military context, the essence lies in forestalling the unforeseen in the best 
possible way, through gathering intelligence, planning, structured train-
ing and learning. Samhandling is needed to make this happen.
The core of the concept of samhandling is closely related to leadership. 
In a military sense, we can say that it is about gaining experience and 
learning from each other during the process (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). 
For the NAF, samhandling is about the ability to lead planning of military 
operations as effectively as possible. There is broad agreement that trust is 
an important factor of interaction between different participants within 
an organization (see for instance Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011). Trust 
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can be considered as the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another group member (be it a leader, subordinate or colleague), based 
on a sense of security towards another group member (Sweeney, Lester, 
& Matthews, 2011).1
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the importance of trust in mil-
itary samhandling. Specifically, we discuss the importance of trust when 
planning, leading and executing military operations, which by their 
nature occur under complex conditions.
Trust and leadership
Trust in military leadership
In the research literature, there is an ongoing and not-unexpected dis-
cussion about how the concept of trust should be defined and under-
stood (Sonnenberg, 2015). Trust is a tool that helps individuals to deal 
with uncertainty and in a better way expect different outcomes (Luh-
mann, 2000). Kramer and Tyler (1996) highlight the idea that trust helps 
us dare to work with others to solve common tasks. Piotr Sztompka (1999) 
defines trust as: “a bet about the future contingent actions of others.” (p. 
25). This definition seems fitting for our purpose. It assimilates very well 
the unforeseen, and we find elements of samhandling implicit in the defi-
nition. So far, there is no complete definition of trust in a military sense 
(Brandebo, 2015). Trust is not new regarding samhandling. According to 
the renowned scientist Elinor Ostrom, trust and interaction are as old as 
humanity itself (Høyer, Kasa, & Tranøy, 2016). Trust and samhandling are 
therefore fundamental to our existence. 
1 Trust is necessary and essential for a leader to be able to exercise influence in combat. Soldiers 
who trust their leaders allow them a greater degree of influence regarding the soldiers’ readiness 
to follow directives and motivation to perform duties to complete missions (Sweeney. Lester, 
& Matthews, 2011). Trust is a psychological mechanism that gives the personnel a feeling of 
security, even in dangerous situations, and the necessary willingness to accomplish what it takes 
to solve the mission. The leader must earn the trust of his/her group members through actions 
and communication. If the soldiers trust their leader, they will provide him/her with clear and 
timely information. They will not hesitate to give their own personal opinions, which can be very 
useful. In addition, they get used to voicing possible problems and possible solutions to their 
leader (Sweeney, Lester & Matthews, 2011).
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In recent years, the concept of trust has come under pressure. We see 
this for example in relation to the implementation of New Public Manage-
ment (NPM), also in military governance. The basic idea of NPM is that 
the public sector can be made more efficient through the use of organiza-
tional structures from both the public and private business sectors (Busch, 
Johnson, & Vanebo, 2002). According to Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg 
(2014), NPM arose out of a concern with government failures, a belief in 
the efficacy and efficiency of markets, a belief in economic rationality, 
and a push away from large, centralized government agencies towards 
devolution and privatization. NPM refers to a broad trend of institutional 
developments, implying that principles of governance inspired by private 
organizations should replace the hierarchical structures of old bureaucra-
cies in the public sector (see e.g. Almklov & Antonsen, 2014; Christensen 
& Lægreid, 2001, 2007; Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006; 
Hood, 1991). NPM as a “control doctrine” has its roots in liberal politi-
cians’ underlying mistrust of staff and decision-making in the public sec-
tor (Busch, Johnson, & Vanebo, 2002). NPM is not a topic as such in this 
chapter, but it is worth mentioning because NPM in military governance 
challenges our message that trust is crucial for leadership in the military.
Leadership and situational awareness
Martinsen (2005) states that leadership matters. We argue that this also 
applies in today’s network-based NAF, where one might think that the 
picture of any situation is very well distributed and understood, so that 
no particular intervention is needed from one side or the other. The con-
cept of situational awareness (SA) is used to describe the condition in 
which a person, group or organization has both an overview and under-
standing of a situation. Endsley (1988) has defined SA as “the percep-
tion of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, 
the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status 
in the near future” (Endsley, 1988:97). This is fundamentally problem-
atic, because no humans perceive things alike. A realistic SA, therefore 
requires leaders who work with the community and activate all the 
resources of a team (Forsvarsstaben, 2012). We shall see later that SA is 
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closely related to the concept of sensemaking in military leadership and 
planning processes.
The key trends during the last 100 years of research on leaders and 
the importance of leadership show that leaders’ personality traits, intel-
ligence and leadership behavior can have a good to very good effect on 
efficiency and profitability. Charismatic and transformation-oriented 
leadership also has a good effect. The quality of the relationship between 
leaders and co-workers also has an impact on efficiency and profitability 
(Martinsen, 2005). Good and effective leadership is mainly about creating 
good results through others. The results created together in the NAF con-
tribute to an increased operational capability. It is therefore sensible that 
the political leadership of the NAF has selected leadership, competence 
and a culture of continuous improvement as the most important areas for 
further development (Forsvarsstaben, 2014).
Leadership as a social interaction process,  
building trust
Yukl (2012) defines leadership as a social interaction process. Leadership 
is about relationships and jointly developing a good environment in the 
group. Good relationships affect work performance and achievement in 
a positive way. Decentralization gives the leader a particular responsibil-
ity to develop leadership into a collective process. To describe leadership 
as a collective process is a necessary consequence of the leadership phi-
losophy behind mission command. “Mission command” (Ben-Shalom & 
Shamir, 2011) is referred to as oppdragsbasert ledelse (OBL) in Norwegian 
(Forsvarsstaben, 2007; 2014).
The leader will always have an overall responsibility to make sure the 
team functions and develops and that results are being achieved. Taking 
part in this responsibility contributes to trust and to an overall under-
standing, which in turn helps the hierarchy to function when needed. 
(Forsvarsstaben, 2012). In addition, military leadership requires – if it 
is to be good and efficient, that the leader exhibits balanced leadership 
behavior. This leadership behavior can be categorized by three primary 
target areas: 1. mission focus, efficiency and performance; 2. teamwork, 
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activation of human resources; and 3. development, innovation and 
adaptability (ibid.). In Norway, military leadership is about balancing 
these areas in a natural and credible manner. Embedded within this, 
trust is a subliminal force that enables social interaction between people.
Military leadership is about the leader’s characteristics and behav-
ior, and the interaction between leaders and subordinates. Besides this, 
several external factors, that is, system variables such as organizational 
structure, situation, context, and coincidences, may affect leadership 
(Forsvarsstaben, 2012.) This means that leaders, in cooperation with sub-
ordinates, in at targeted manner structures, organize, influence and legit-
imize the business. Therefore, we may suspect that trust in samhandling 
has a significant function, in that it contributes significantly to the effec-
tive accomplishment of military missions.
Samhandling in a military context
The concept of samhandling is, as we have seen, a relatively open expres-
sion. The concept is used in many contexts by agencies, companies, 
researchers and textbook authors (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). The term 
is also closely related to leadership and trust. We will look at some of 
them and then put the concept into a military context. At the same time, 
the concept of samhandling is utilized at both organizational, group and 
individual level in connection with strategic management, competency 
management, education and training, where the technology structures 
are also included. Torgersen postulates that the concept of samhandling 
has an effect on all sectors and levels (personal communication, Sep-
tember 29, 2016). Over time, the word has also gained importance as an 
action, or interaction, in the interface between people, organizations, 
groups, departments, etc. This makes it particularly interesting in rela-
tion to the NAF, where the planning and execution of operations are 
strongly influenced by samhandling ability both within units, between 
units and between organizational elements and -levels.
The concept of samhandling is applied in the Norwegian Armed Forces 
Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD) from 2014 (Forsvarsstaben, 2014). In 
FFOD, samhandling deals with both processes between people, between 
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the structural elements and levels of the organization, including the con-
version of political ambitions into military operations. Among other 
things, this document states that “The samhandling between levels is 
dynamic and goes both ways, as well as samhandling with sibling enti-
ties, such as civilian agencies or allied headquarters and forces.” (author’s 
translation). The term is also used in conjunction with inter-operability, 
i.e., the ability to operate together. The latter is significant in relation to 
effective accomplishment of missions and is related to trust, in that trust 
contributes to better and/or more efficient samhandling.
In military literature outside of Norway, we find a similar, if not iden-
tical meaning for the term. In English, often-used terms are cooperation, 
collaboration, coordination or most commonly, interaction. “Leaders 
could influence the efforts of subordinates by clarifying their roles and 
developing their abilities, organizing the structure of work, encouraging 
cooperation and teamwork,” (Horn & Walker, 2008:494), is one such 
example in a military context. Another is; “Leaders must be able to lead, 
but they must also be ready to liaise, persuade and cooperate, whoever the 
protagonist or strange the environment.” (Jans, Mugford, Cullens, & Fraz-
er-Jans, 2013: preface). And, “The performance of an organization depends 
in part on the level of cooperation and coordination among interdepend-
ent leaders.” (Yukl, 2015:466). This shows that the English equivalents of 
the term samhandling have embedded both key elements of group and 
team theory, as well as elements of general leadership theory. We can also 
clearly see implicit elements of interaction and trust.
The absolutely-essential element in military planning processes – that 
is, their outcome, is effective accomplishment of missions. The object, or 
the desired final end-state of the operation, always has the main focus. 
To achieve this, the process is dependent upon several factors. Trust is 
possibly the most important because it is essential for effective decen-
tralization, dealing with unplanned events, making the most of skills 
and expertise, and targeted initiatives and drives (Forsvarsstaben, 2012). 
Effective planning and control of military operations requires, among 
other things, good leadership (Forsvarsstaben, 2014) and the estab-
lishment of SA (ibid.). Since trust is presumably essential for efficiency, 
the leader’s role and his or her ability to convey the intent and desired 
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end-state becomes important to both trust and SA. Establishing SA, often 
a common one, is a challenging task. The leader produces and delivers 
(read: communicates), on the spot, a translation of his/her perception 
that is consumed by “users”. In our case, primarily staff and/or subordi-
nate commanders. Shared mental models are important when it comes to 
establishing a common SA (Endsley, 1995). However, different conditions 
can complicate communication, including the ability and willingness to 
transform the leader’s intention into practical action (Forsvarsstaben, 
2014). This therefore requires trust and samhandling.
We argue that the quality of samhandling is dependent on both the 
commander’s ability to exercise discretion and framework factors in the 
communication situation. One factor may be the leader’s relationship 
with those that he or she interacts with. Saltnes Urdal (2015) argues that 
when services are provided in collaboration with the users’ requirements 
and participation in the situation, the users (for instance, the staff) will 
help to create the service and act as co-producers. Samhandling in the 
communication process is, as such, a mediator in relation to avoiding 
misunderstandings.
Military leadership
Leadership in the NAF does not occur in a vacuum; it happens together 
with other people (Forsvarsstaben, 2012). Leadership is a relational 
concept that presupposes a mutual collaboration between leaders and 
employees. Therefore, leaders in many ways are also team players (Glasø, 
2008). All military planning and leadership processes involve samhan-
dling between two or more people. Samhandling takes place not only 
between individuals, but also with leaders who take overall responsi-
bility and cooperate across organizational boundaries (Forsvarsdepar-
tementet, 2014). Knowledge and trust in each other is important. Trust 
is described as the main cornerstone of the NAF leadership philosophy: 
Mission command, or oppdragsbasert ledelse (OBL) in Norwegian (Fors-
varsstaben, 2012). OBL highlights leadership through common attitudes 
and a common approach, rather than management through strict rules 
and over-control.
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Trust is essential for this process to take place effectively. This applies 
at all levels. Effective processes require, among other things, cooperation 
across the whole range, i.e. between individuals, between groups and 
organizational elements, and between organizations and organizational 
elements. The latter is usually called “organizational samhandling” and 
trust is highlighted as a key prerequisite for its success (see Gottschalk 
& Solli-Saether, 2008). The leader of the current level can be considered 
as a “team leader”. The leader is responsible for identifying and defining 
the assignments, deciding what should and should not be done in a team 
process (Hjertø, 2009).
According to Parrington and Findlay (2013), one of the leader’s most 
important tasks is to build and maintain trust. The importance of the mil-
itary commander in leading planning processes has been written about 
extensively in military doctrines and military leadership literature. It is 
clear that the leader alone cannot achieve this. Samhandling is required. 
The term samhandling has, until very recently, been used relatively infre-
quently in a military sense in Norway. In the Norwegian Armed Forces 
Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD) from 2014 (Forsvarsstaben, 2014), 
the concept is utilized to a certain extent. This doctrine is a normative 
document that discloses principles in connection with the planning and 
implementation of joint operations, in addition to other things. FFOD is 
also a learning tool that is intended for the NAF schools and educational 
system (ibid). In the doctrine, the importance of samhandling between 
different subsystems, between people, and between departments and sys-
tems is emphasized.
These doctrinal, or normative documents very often describe ideals. 
When it comes to practice, our experience is that the reality is much more 
complex. In fact, the doctrinal reality often becomes too hard to practice, 
and may in many cases be abandoned.
Military leadership structures
To better understand samhandling, trust and efficiency, it is important to 
look closely at how military forces (read: units) are organized, and which 
leadership structures we find. The organization and the formal structures 
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form a framework for how samhandling and trust can be created and 
acted upon. The NAF is a highly hierarchical organization, and the organ-
izational form is the result of centuries of development. The organization 
(structure) itself is, however, not enough to create interaction or trust.
The organizational structure should be an instrument for solving prob-
lems, creating transparency, predictability, and effective communication 
within the organization (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). The current organi-
zation of military units is a result of the tasks that must be solved most 
effectively. Military forces are hierarchically organized in groups and 
units of varying sizes. There is a formal leader in each group/unit and at 
every level. This means that there are many leaders. We like to think that 
leaders are often people who would like to get something done, meaning 
that they have an inner drive. This can function as both a support and as 
a hindrance for samhandling and output, the effective accomplishment 
of missions. The leader has formal authority or power through his or her 
position and rank. That does not mean that the leader’s power is always 
legitimate. Power is founded on various “power bases”: respectively, 
reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, reference power and 
expert power (Vecchio, 2009). The leader is, nevertheless, a central figure.
The organizational form of military organizations is a line and staff 
organization, which can be traced back to the organization of the Prus-
sian army at the end of the 18th century (Nytrø, 2006). As mentioned 
before, the organizational form is chosen based on the desire to have the 
most effective accomplishment of the assigned missions. The organiza-
tional form still has its challenges. The line organization executes the 
mission, and the staff are intended to provide a supportive function, in 
principle. Unfortunately, it is never as easy as this. This is presumably 
valid for many organizations. There are several assumptions that must 
be present for samhandling to function effectively. Trust is one of them, 
perhaps the most important. The leader must trust that the staff possesses 
the competence he or she alone does not have. The staff must have faith 
in their leader to trust the knowledge of the specialists and what they do, 
and that he or she gives them the necessary leeway, direction and support.
Effective samhandling can only take place if the line organization and 
the staff trust each other. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. This 
samhandling and trust in  mil itary leadership  structures
329
may ultimately result in unnecessary casualties. On the other hand, too 
much trust can also lead to challenges. A survey conducted by the Office 
of the Auditor General in Norway (Riksrevisjonen, 2011) has shown that 
the existing culture of the NAF is based on trust. This culture of trust has, 
in some cases, lead to inadequate internal control procedures because of 
the mutual trust between the staff members. Certain procurements were 
carried out contrary to the current regulations (Boe & Kvalvik, 2015). 
To mediate this, military forces have introduced a command and con-
trol (C2) system consisting of personnel, materials, methods and proce-
dures (Forsvarsstaben, 2014). C2 is central to integrate, synchronize and 
control military operations across units, both horizontally and vertically 
(Andersen & Ødegaard, 2016). Hence, it can be viewed as a typical control 
system. We might ask ourselves whether C2 contributes to more and/or 
better trust. We assume that the system should at least be able to facili-
tate increased and/or better samhandling. Military leadership structures 
are not in themselves enough to either promote or maintain samhandling 
or trust. The processes in planning operations must be lead, and leader-
ship, as we have seen, has a clear interactionist perspective (Wadel, 2012). 
Wadel also highlights the relational perspective of leadership. 
We have seen that trust is at the core of any relationship. We can there-
fore argue, with good reason, that trust is also the core of leadership, since 
leadership is just about relationships. According to constructivist theory, 
language creates meaning (Bruner, 1990; Skagen, 2013). Opinion formation 
also takes place in the leadership process. We can refer to this as a collective 
relational reality orientation. Consequently, our questions are: How often 
do we talk about trust in our own practice? Or, in other words, how often 
do we use the word “trust”? Can it be that the more often we talk about 
trust, the greater the importance of the concept? Do we see here the seeds 
of a new and improved practice in the planning of military operations?
Therefore, trust can only be considered if one understands how such 
collective relational realities function. C. Grenness (personal communi-
cation, September 27, 2007) points out that for the leadership process to be 
more efficient, we must learn to communicate about the relational reality 
(e.g. implicit norms, culture), and begin with simple, dynamic conversa-
tions. What do we think and feel about trust in our own organization? This 
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has implications for dealing with the unexpected. By talking about trust 
and thereby creating a collective relational reality, it will open up for a col-
lective formation of opinion. This can enable us to relate more effectively to 
the basic issues and problems, so that they can be addressed and resolved.
A basic trust-based model of samhandling
Trust is thus the core of all relations, also in a military context. We find it 
therefore natural to put trust into a basic model, using a relational model 
for learning methods (Figure 17.1) as a starting point. There are many fac-
tors that affect trust, specifically samhandling and relationships within 
and between the individual elements in the model (numbered 1–6). The 
model is primarily designed for joint military operations.
Trust in samhandling is essential for any effective mission accomplish-
ment. This may seem obvious, but it is dependent on many elements. 
The model in Figure 17.1 is an attempt to simplify a very complex reality 
and should be understood as such. The model is a draft of such a context 
and may provide a starting point for analysis and reflection, as a basis for 
improved practices. It has its origin in a slightly processed version of the 
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relational didactic model (Pettersen, 2005). Samhandling – and probably 
the most important factor trust is obvious in this context. Perhaps the 
model can also help to see planning and leadership processes from a fresh 
perspective.
Pettersen (2005) points out that models for learning methods, in prin-
ciple, have been developed from a teaching perspective where learning is 
central. For our purposes, such an approach is nevertheless applicable. In 
the attempt to clarify interaction and the relationship between the differ-
ent elements, we must consider all efforts involved in analyzing, planning 
and carrying out military operations. Specifically, this means that when 
we reflect on, analyze and act in relation to one element, we must also 
consider the other elements, because choices and/or decisions related to 
one element will have consequences for the others.
In military terms, this means that the planning and execution of mil-
itary operations is essential if one wants to forestall the unforeseen in 
the best way possible, as stated in the introduction. This occurs through 
intelligence, planning, structured training and learning during the pro-
cess. Samhandling is therefore necessary to make this happen. It therefore 
seems appropriate to have a relational learning perspective on military 
planning and leadership processes. 
Figure 17.1 is an attempt to simplify the complex processes that may 
occur in planning and executing military operations. Trust is at the core 
of the model and may be considered as the prerequisite for effective sam-
handling. The entire planning process for joint operations is not the inten-
tion of this part of the chapter. This is described in NATO’s planning 
doctrine, AJP-5 (NATO, 2013).
Planning and leading military operations are influenced firstly by a 
set of external frame factors, such as the current policy, military stra-
tegic ambitions, laws, agreements, conventions and available forces. The 
external frame factors affect all the elements, especially the Command-
ing Officer’s (CO, no. 1 in the above figure) opportunities to achieve the 
purpose or desired outcome of the operation. 
There are also internal frame factors in the model. These are matters 
within the participants’ control and maneuverability. They are conditions 
that the organization and the participants as a collective have designed 
chapter 17
332
and determined (ibid.). This may involve specific plans and models for the 
planning and execution of an operation. The operational design can be 
said to be such an inner frame factor. This will be explained later.
The central theme of the model is mutual relations, including sam-
handling and trust as its core elements. Without samhandling and trust 
within and between the elements, the mission will not be accomplished 
effectively. The desired outcome then becomes difficult to achieve. 
The planning and leadership process is also affected by these interde-
pendent elements: 
(1) The Commanding Officer (CO) is responsible for the military force’s 
overall operations, a responsibility which he or she cannot delegate 
to others. The CO will primarily act through his or her staff and 
the line organization (Forsvarsstaben, 2014). The CO influences 
the staff through their leadership style and understanding of the 
situation, i.e. mission, frame factors and the time factor (Nord & 
Andersen, 2016). The CO always has the primary responsibility for 
achieving the purpose or desired end-state of the operation2. This is 
the reason the arrow is pointed towards the end-state in the model. 
In addition, there is an area that lies between the leader and the 
desired end-state –the operational design. The operational design is a tool 
for internal communication and is a separate attachment to the opera-
tional plan. This deals with two things: The operational framework and 
the leader’s intention (Ljøterud, 2016). Operational design is intended to 
give the leader the leeway he or she needs to transform the decisions into 
activities that can accomplish the mission most effectively. This requires 
a high degree of SA, samhandling and trust. We can certainly say that this 
is an inner framing factor.
(2) The superior level. In modern Norwegian society, the military forces 
are politically governed. This means that military leaders do not 
2 We should not forget the CO’s chief of staff (COS). He or she is often the key to the optimal 
accomplishment of the internal processes within the staff (Ljøterud, 2016).
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have the same leeway that they would have in a military dictator-
ship, for instance. The superior level is, therefore, a particularly 
important element in planning and accomplishing military oper-
ations. The superior level can interact with the CO, which is most 
common, or directly with the staff and subordinate levels. The lat-
ter has become more widespread because of the implementation of 
new information technology, which makes it easier to monitor any 
situation.
(3) The staff will always work on behalf of the leader and pave the way 
for those who fight the battles, that is, subordinate units and lead-
ers. They have a mutual influence on each other. The staff also helps 
the CO to focus on the big picture and to think ahead.
(4) The subordinate commanders and units are both the CO’s and the 
staff’s advisors, in addition to being those who carry out the mis-
sion. This element is therefore extremely important for an effec-
tive accomplishment of missions. Here one will often find a lot of 
expertise concerning the conduct of joint operations. They interact 
closely with the CO and the staff.
(5) The purpose or desired end-state (of the operation) – is the overrid-
ing focus. The solution or intended achievement of the operation 
always takes first priority. That is why there is an arrow between 
the leader (CO) and this element. It might be argued that the pur-
pose or desired end-state for any military operation is not a sepa-
rate element. This means that it consists of individuals who interact 
directly with the other elements in the model. We would argue that 
this is not quite the case. The reason for this is that planning and 
leadership of military (joint or joint/combined) operations require 
integration and coordination. This is closely related to the what of 
didactics. That is what we are trying to do and intend to achieve. 
In the military sense, this relationship becomes clear in that we 
primarily need to find out what the military force is supposed to 
achieve before we launch the operation. This requires samhandling, 
which in turn requires a dynamic process where the formulation 
of purpose(s) is constantly subject to change. These dynamics will 
consequently have implications for the other elements in the model.
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(6) Last, but not least – Civilian expertise. All military operations affect 
civil society in various ways. The use of civilian expertise in plan-
ning military operations is, therefore, a central element that can 
help to provide detailed knowledge of the operation area, including 
topography, infrastructure and the civil population (Ljøterud, 2016). 
Integration of civilian expertise may therefore contribute to better 
samhandling and mutual trust between the civilian society and the 
military organization. This will, in turn, affect the desired outcome.
Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss the importance of trust in 
military samhandling. The most common notion of trust seems to be of 
a psychological nature (Brandebo, 2015). This means that trust has a per-
ceived vulnerability or risk. Individual perceptions of others’ motives, 
intentions and actions are important. Trust in samhandling becomes par-
ticularly clear in a military context, in which vulnerability, risk, unpre-
dictability and uncertainty affect the situation. Therefore, it is crucial 
that both military leaders and subordinates trust each other. That means, 
among other things, that they both need to act dutifully and not expose 
each other to unnecessary risk.
Trust is still a relatively open concept, perhaps especially so in the mil-
itary sense. With a high degree of certainty, we can say that trust is the 
core of military relations and is crucial for effective samhandling. Trust 
is, therefore, of the utmost importance for the effective accomplishment 
of military missions and for maintaining a durable contract between the 
NAF and a democratic Norwegian society. Anything else is fictitious and 
can have potentially devastating consequences.
We can conclude that trust in and between military leaders is not only 
essential for the effective accomplishment of missions; trust is also cru-
cial in terms of mental and physical well-being (Brandebo, 2015). To quote 
Brandebo further: “Trust in leaders has been highlighted as a core variable 
and a prominent mechanism for subordinates’ well-being, job satisfaction 
and motivation, amongst other things.” (Brandebo, 2015:128–129). This 
quotation clearly emphasizes the importance of trust.
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The model presented in this chapter will hopefully contribute to an 
enhanced understanding of the importance of trust in a military plan-
ning and leadership process. Planning and executing military operations 
is a complex process. Trust is at the core of the model and may be consid-
ered as a prerequisite for effective samhandling. Trust serves as the “glue”, 
helping to streamline and more effectively accomplish any given mission. 
By identifying both the external and internal frame factors, as well as 
the individual elements of the proposed model, it is possible to develop 
and implement specific strategies and educational programs in different 
areas of the NAF. In addition, we also think that our model may be useful 
for other types of organizations similar to the NAF, known as high-risk 
organizations (Picano & Roland, 2012). Trust is also a very important fac-
tor for samhandling for them. It is possible for these organizations to use 
the model, adapting it to their specific, organizational needs. 
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collaboration exercises and the planning phase of these potential learning situa-
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The fear of being “the fool”, or showing that you do not know something, 
shuts down investigative, exploratory practices. This is not ideal but it 
is highly understandable. The thinking in this chapter needs to be tested 
empirically, measuring it on the premises of increased collaboration and the 
perceived degrees of the unforeseen in exercises. Innovative collaboration 
training is not carried out, probably because the people involved do not have 
time to do it. The objective of this chapter is to improve collaborative prac-
tices and exercises, taking the unforeseen into account. Collaborative prac-
tices in this text are referred to using the Norwegian term samvirke, which 
I perceive as leaning slightly closer to inter-organizational interaction than 
either of the Norwegian words samhandling or samarbeid. Chapter 1 (Torg-
ersen, 2018) in this book provides a thorough discussion of these nuances.
This chapter reflects on the process of making collaboration exercises 
and the planning phase of these potential learning situations. The chap-
ter dwells not on the exercise itself, but on the planning and preparatory 
phases of such tasks. Two pedagogical or didactic1 perspectives will be 
explored in order to improve planning work itself and possibly training 
for the unforeseen. In this work, I argue that the use of social technology 
together with didactic thinking, may enhance the extent and quality of 
collaboration training. This chapter reflects a semantic theoretical con-
struction (Kvernbekk, 2002), merging two practical and theoretical per-
spectives: Innovation pedagogy (Darsø, 2011) and the didactic planning 
tool or diamond (Bjørndal & Lieberg, 1978). These theories are not merely 
used to describe practices (Kvernbekk, 2005) but also to create new and 
different, innovative emergency-planning practices.
Exercises are related to the “unforeseen” and the Bow-tie Model (see 
Chapter 1) in two ways. Firstly, they relate to the third phase – stabili-
zation. The topics practiced in exercises will often relate to the practices 
following the handling of something unforeseen. Secondly, this text 
explains how exercise planners can train themselves, addressing new 
training topics which relate to risks we do not know. It is about systematic, 
1 E.g. Theories of learning and teaching practice(-s), or in an anglo-saxon tradition; education or 
curriculum studies. 
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experience-based probing into the unforeseen in training planning. I will 
point to procedures and roles that can enrich planning processes to create 
ideas for practicing the unforeseen. 
The educational concept of the unforeseen in a didactic framework can 
influence the choice of content, methods and evaluation. Furthermore, it 
is related to phenomena such as knowledge, learning, outcomes, judge-
ment, and collaboration (Torgersen & Saeverot, 2015:20). The unforeseen 
can be contrasted with the predictable or the foreseen. The epistemolog-
ical source of the unforeseen lies in the realms of our incompleteness of 
thinking (human error) and in the ontology of an unpredictable world 
in which we feel we have no control (Kvernbekk, Torgersen, & Moe, 
2015). From this viewpoint, the need to address the unknown in edu-
cational practices within the field of emergency preparedness is urgent. 
If the unforeseen is rarely addressed in training/learning situations, 
the exercise can become ritualized and follow predetermined scripts, 
known to all and an objective in itself.
During fieldwork on naval exercises (Kristiansen, Löve-Sörensen, Carl-
ström & Magnussen, 2017), I have noticed that what is going to happen and 
the topic are decided first. People jump to conclusions about exercise goals 
and content. This represents a possible early closure of the possible topics 
trained. From that point onwards, planning is reduced to task distribution, 
and basic project management for producing tasks and Gantt diagrams. 
This is also important, but may cause one to lock-on-target too early, 
reducing the possibility to prepare for the unforeseen. Depending on the 
scale of the exercise, the planning partners may develop their own training 
objectives to ensure learning in their home organization. Another point is 
that while the objectives may be loosely linked to the exercise, the training 
“lives a life of its own”, and the evaluation ends up as something different. 
Overall, I analyze these challenges from an organizational didactic per-
spective. Organizational didactics are defined as “… a discipline focusing 
on the interaction between training and organizational structure, busi-
ness and management/leadership.” (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009:65) Didactic 
tools offer planners (teachers) help in their reflective thinking on different 
aspects of organized learning activities. They highlight the interconnect-
edness between different educational or planning variables.
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Personalities and collaboration theory
Personality tests such as Myers and Briggs type indicator (MBTI) (Myers, 
1998) or the Jungian Type index (Ringstad & Ødegård, 2012) refer to 
judging personality types according to one of four dimensions. People 
possessing traits such as “J” (Judging types) can become stressed by too 
much flexibility, emphasis on re-evaluating tasks, and dealing with sur-
prises. They prefer order and structure, producing significantly fewer 
possibilities in creative tasks. These personality types can often be found 
in the environment of emergency preparedness and in planning groups, 
and among managers in general. Thinking and judging (TJ) are typical 
traits found within groups of military and police leaders (Storr, 2009:174), 
where organizations are hierarchical, predictable and structured.
Collaboration (samvirke) within and between different public bodies 
developed as a popular work methodology among different public entities 
in the late 1980s, as a counterweight to an era with a competitive climate. 
Recent research underlines that collaboration is both more useful and 
effective than individual initiatives (Berlin & Carlström, 2013; Jamal & 
Getz, 1995). The concept of collaboration in organizational thinking is 
often related to improvement and integration. 
However, even if collaboration is perceived as useful, it needs to be 
stressed that from an emergency-management perspective, most inci-
dents are solved within the boundaries of “blue light” organizations. 
This is the way it should be. It is in situations where the mission is not 
solved by one participant alone, or where resources of time and personnel 
are sparse and limited, that the need for collaboration emerges at both 
a ground and strategic level (Andersson, Carlstrom, Ahgren, & Berlin, 
2014). Hurricane “Dagmar” is a relevant example. 
Theoretically, a horizontal collaboration is a process in which differ-
ent participants work together, devoid of all pretense, to solve a common 
problem (Berlin & Carlström, 2008; Jamal & Getz, 1995; Martin, Nolte, 
& Vitolo, 2016). Collaboration is divided into four subdivisions: vertical, 
horizontal, formal and informal (Berlin & Carlström, 2009).
A vertical perspective addresses different relationships in a top-down 
or bottom-up perspective. In short, it is about various hierarchical levels 
and the collaboration between superiors and subordinates. Such levels 
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differ in extent and numbers. Long, vertical command chains can be a 
challenge in emergencies that demand clear and rapid decisions. 
Horizontal collaboration describes an idealistic relationship between 
equal partners. To become equal, the collaborating partners must agree 
upon a joint, equal sharing of responsibilities and resources. A horizontal 
collaboration model is unlikely to be affected by the need for speed and 
certain decisions in an emergency. 
Formal collaboration refers to rules, legislation, treaties and agree-
ments that divide tasks between the participating parties. Such rules or 
guidelines frame individual tasks and responsibilities. Leaders or govern-
ment authorities often develop such guidelines. On the one hand, such 
guidelines contribute to clarity and predictability. On the other hand, 
too many details in such guidelines can create organizational barriers 
in emergencies. Problems emerge when situations follow new pathways 
or develop in terms of urgency and complexity. Something outside of 
the well-known routines is needed from both organizations and lead-
ers. These situations demand experience and “gut feelings” (Kahneman 
& Klein 2010), enabling those involved to rise to the manifest challenge. 
This represents a shift in command and control thinking, from befehl-
staktik towards auftragstaktik (Stewart, 2009)2. 
Informal collaboration can be found in written and unwritten routines 
and agreements. In emergencies, some groups collaborate with more ease, 
due to mutual situational awareness, trust, or a common background. 
Collaboration does not occur because of the event per se. Collabora-
tion demands voluntarism. The participant needs to see the usefulness of 
collaboration and be willing to work across organizational and profes-
sional boundaries to achieve a common objective (Andersson et al., 2014). 
Even though there is a contemporary emphasis on emergency training 
and exercises, research has found that collaboration is more than a rhe-
torical expression. It is something of practical value in relation to man-
agerial challenges, asymmetry, uncertainty, and lack of trust (Berlin & 
Carlström, 2011). To achieve a higher degree of collaboration in actual 
2 This relates to whether military orders should be performed blindly, or adapted to the situations, 
encouraging the soldiers to be flexible when they are solving their orders.
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emergencies, exercises need to have an increased focus on learning and 
evaluation. 
Training for the unforeseen places creativity and new practices up 
front in training priorities. Common ground needs to be established, 
where different organizations and practitioners can meet to learn from 
and alongside each other. Better relations, communications and the abil-
ity to collaborate can be developed through getting to know each other’s 
organizations, strengths and challenges (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). 
Furthermore, if the unforeseen is taken into consideration, collaboration 
practices will be challenged by bridging the gap.
Tools for didactic planning
The Diamond Model
Bjørndal and Lieberg (1978) present a model or didactic tool to help teachers 
improve their planning processes. The model (Fig. 18.1) accentuates the rela-
tionships between the purpose of training (education), objectives, learning 







Figure 18.1 The Didactic Diamond Model. 
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If training for the unforeseen is the purpose, then this affects the didactic 
model by reducing the emphasis on goals or objectives. This line of think-
ing also has an effect on evaluation, challenging the ways of doing things 
and changing what is both appreciated and valued. If synchronous col-
laboration training represents an overriding exercise objective, planners 
need to reflect on the circumstances under which this will occur, and 
then plan taking into account the interconnectedness of didactic factors, 
i.e. content, methods, framework conditions, evaluation and learning 
prerequisites. If the case or scenario is too quickly decided upon when 
creating emergency exercises, it reduces the likelihood of investigating 
other possibilities and new ways to do collaboration training, with some-
thing new or even unforeseen as a factor. To develop this, I will turn to 
innovative pedagogical practices.
Innovation pedagogy
Innovative competence is one of the future core competencies (Darsø, 
2011:10–11), and innovation pedagogy is about creating social and 
educational frameworks and structures that enhance innovative col-
laboration. Innovation competence is about the ability to create inno-
vation by navigating effectively in collaboration with others in complex 
environments.
According to Darsø (2011:62), a creative innovation process contains 
five steps. The first step is (i) wondering about something – a phenom-
enon, problem, or disturbance. This triggers (ii) information seeking 
and gathering. Something that has gone unnoticed suddenly becomes 
intriguing and interesting. This is tiring and is followed by a (iii) men-
tal incubation period, in which ideas and thoughts can hibernate and 
develop. The next phase contains (iv) illumination and eureka experi-
ences, when the problem suddenly finds its solution. The last phase is 
about (v) verification of ideas and testing of solutions, with consideration 
to what started the project in the first place. “Prejects”, in which multi-





“Prejects” involve human influences on the innovation processes. 
Human interaction is a decisive element with regard to a project’s success 
or failure. The Innovation Diamond model (Figure 18.2) is a conceptual 
framework for the perception and articulation of barriers to, and oppor-
tunities for, innovations. The Diamond consists of four parameters that 
give direction to the mind and show how to facilitate innovation. The 
Diamond model highlights two dynamic fields of innovation: knowledge 
and communication.
Figure 18.2 The Innovation Diamond. 
The knowledge that is necessary to create innovation is complex and 
contains sources needed to develop ideas. Such knowledge is interlinked 
with what is known and what is unknown. Knowledge in innovation is 
a mix of evidence-based research, hearsay, intuition, traditions and per-
sonal convictions. Non-knowledge represents the opposite parameter of 
knowledge. In an innovation “preject”, we need to explore what we know 
and somehow transform it into new practices with added value. Such 
processes make us touch upon what we do not know, or what we do not 
know that we do not know. People can avoid the field of not-knowing 
and seek a safe haven in old knowledge and wisdom. “Not-knowing” is 
a social role related to the fool, the clown, and the child, asking funda-
mental questions and doubting causality. In emergency preparation, this 
relates to the unforeseen. A “preject” needs to accentuate both what the 
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Communication in innovation pedagogy is about relations and concepts. 
Relations, according to Ritchie (Darsø, 2011:70), concern the interaction 
between us and how we relate to each other. We can be open or closed, 
and we can have either short or long-term relationships. Concepts can be 
described as models of guidelines or regulations. They can also be fully 
formed ideas. Communication is of vital importance to keep the flow of 
what the group knows and does not know moving towards the develop-
ment of concepts. A challenge is the “muddling in the middle”; a group 
meets and dwells upon a problem for hours at a time, without clarity, con-
cepts, or decisions. A creative process drifts around and in between know-
ing and not-knowing, between concepts and relations. This framework 
demands four different leadership roles, according to Darsø (2011:72).
Leadership in innovative didactics
The four leader or team roles are the Science Detective (knowing), the 
Gardener (relationships), the Clown (not-knowing) and the Concept 
Developer (concept). The didactic framework of Bjørndal and Lieberg 
(1978), without objectives, which in emergency training planning are 
unknown, provides the five focal points to the “preject”. These are: con-
tent, methods, framework conditions, student learning prerequisites and 
evaluation. These represent five tasks which the innovative pedagogue 
needs to explore, finally choosing a path of action in the form of a project 
that aims to train for meeting the unforeseen. The leader roles proposed 
by Darsø (2011), (i.e. Science Detective, Clown, Gardener and Concept 
Developer), are not equivalent to situational leadership, where the role 
shifts within the individual leader, providing shifting impressions. It is 
the task of the innovative team not to jump to conclusions but to stay in 
the open “landscape” and the “preject” phase. 
Team leadership designated by the process owners will, in this case, 
stall decisions and provide the planning team members with different 
leadership tasks. The “preject” needs to address possible practice top-
ics, such as analogue, parallel, and synchronous collaboration. Explo-
ration of what they know or do not know regarding these topics relates 
to learning prerequisites, evaluation, methods and content. It is even 
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more important to discuss the interrelationship between these concepts. 
According to Lave (1991), learning in practice can be seen as a trajectory 
and she advocate the idea that practical learning provides an in-built 
progression. Applied to the field of emergency, people have trained and 
learned in structures formed by work practices and economic logic. 
This highlights the importance of taking learning prerequisites into the 
planning of what to train. The innovative planning team need to ask 
themselves, “At what level of expertise do the individuals and the organ-
ization need to be trained?”
The Gardener provides the group with ice-breakers, nurturing and 
caring for the group’s well-being during the process. The Gardener needs 
to ensure that everyone is heard and signifies that everyone’s contribution 
is important. This may include providing a structure of opening and clos-
ing meetings, where all participants single out three points related to the 
task at hand and say something about their expectations for this work. 
This phase can open up the topic of concepts, what the expectations are, 
and what knowledge exists within the planning group. The role of the 
Gardener is particularly important for ensuring that everyone has his or 
her say.
What do we know? This is the question the Science Detective needs 
to ask, followed by the Clowns, who highlight what do we not know. The 
Concept Developer can harvest ideas, from the topic selection of the 
Didactic Diamond of Bjørndal and Lieberg (1978). To schedule a second 
meeting in the “preject” period can be beneficial in providing a cognitive 
incubation period, furthering ideas and alternating team leadership roles.
The sixth task of innovation didactics – making 
wise decisions
The “preject” is a process where the actions taken are about unlocking 
project scripts and creating more learning opportunities. In the tran-
sition from a pedagogical “preject” phase to the project phase, some 
deliberations need to be taken into account. Synthesising is about incor-
porating all the leads and variations from the “preject” into project work. 
In a transition from “prejects” to projects, Posner and Kouzes (1988:485), 
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give five points of advice to leaders who wish to accomplish extraordinary 
projects. The first two points were covered in the “preject” phase: 
1) Challenging the Process
a. Search for opportunities
b. Experiment and take risks
2) Inspiring a Shared Vision
a. Envision the future
b. Enlist the support of others
3) Enabling Others to Act
a. Foster collaboration
b. Strengthen others
4) Modeling the Way
a. Set the example
b. Plan small wins
5) Encouraging the Heart
a. Recognize contributions
b. Celebrate accomplishments
Keeping the advice of Posner and Kouzes (1988) in mind, listening to dif-
ferent forms of dialogue is important. Scharmer (2009:296) sketches out 
a U model, where the presencing stage represents the change of will by 
a “collective presence” at spiritual level; this happens occasionally if the 
group follows “the rules of dialogue”. This deep-phase of the U theory is 
under debate (Zidulka, 2015) and has been left out of the proposed prac-
tice. “Prejects” are not necessarily about this deep change of will but are 
about the opening of the mind and the rules of dialogue. The theory pro-
poses four depths and four ways to interact: listening, debate, dialogue, 
and presence. Dialogue about inquiry and thinking together is best suited 
to level 3, and is of relevance to the innovative emergency planning team.
Closure of “preject” and the reopening of project
You are now in a position to create more-informed training for the 
unforeseen, using this didactic model for the unforeseen, which can help 
you to choose the factors that can enhance pedagogical deliberations 
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and provide more innovation. Keeping it open and without objectives, 
considered to be a pitfall of project planning and strategic competence 
management, “prejects” can resolve some problems by offering social 
tools stemming from innovation pedagogy. Patience is a key virtue in 
didactics for the unforeseen.
Conclusion - a new model
I have used theories to illustrate the content of this chapter, not as a 
description of practice per se (Kvernbekk, 2005), but to promote a differ-
ent, new and innovative practice. The problems of early closure of topics 
and goal-driven project models are addressed by introducing a “preject” 
phase in didactic thinking, i.e. merging two didactic models. The Didac-
tics for the Unforeseen Model (Figure 18.3) combines the two Diamonds 











Figure 18.3 The Unforeseen Didactic Model, integrating didactic planning tools with innovation 
pedagogy.
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The purpose of implementing a “preject” phase into planning is to 
address fundamental questions of “what, how and why” when holding 
collaboration exercises. Participants take into account that they are train-
ing for the unforeseen and they are not framed by learning goals. The 
purpose is to train for unforeseen events (see Chapter 1). If committed 
to innovative didactic thinking, the group needs to distribute the roles 
of the Concept Developer, Gardener, Clown and Science Detective. This 
distribution will ensure that the group has a thorough discussion on 
how the learning prerequisites, content, methods, framework conditions 
and evaluation are connected and interdependent. By manipulating the 
“what, how and why”, the group can plan and construct exercises along 
the continuums of the unforeseen. 
The model consists of a blurred surrounding field, where training for 
the unforeseen represents purpose and the “unknown”. Through the 
“preject” phase, where the roles of the innovation diamond are put into 
play, different leadership roles emerge: The Clown, the Science Detec-
tive, the Concept Developer, and the Gardener. The team will then anal-
ogously, in parallel, or synchronously discuss the different elements of 
didactic thinking (without goals). To provide a cognitive-incubation 
period, this “preject” phase is held twice (I propose a one week inter-
val between the two). Using this method, new thinking about emer-
gency collaboration training can emerge, developing better practices. 
After the second meeting, planners can execute what they have figured 
out, using ordinary project planning tools and exercise training hab-
its. However, taking the unforeseen into account, the exercise will not 
play out as it was planned or scripted. This is also learning from the 
unforeseen.
As mentioned earlier, the limitation of this research is the lack of empir-
ical data, so that it merely ends as a set of suggestions for busy exercise 
planners, who are impatient and have demanding workloads. Planners 
also need to deliberate upon the importance of “standard” or traditional 
exercises in combination with collaboration, seeing the whole picture and 
the exercise as a program. On the other hand, it is of vital importance to 
train in the realms of the unforeseen, entering the uncharted learning 
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Section III: Operational 
Samhandling Structures
This research focuses on finding and concretizing challenges in connec-
tion with the concept of samhandling in operational and practical rela-
tionships, in different industries and sectors within society, including the 
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In Scandinavian countries, the concepts of “collaboration”, “coopera-
tion” and “coordination” are problematic, due to varying and overlapping 
meaning. The concept of “collaboration” in Swedish contexts, where the 
data of this study has been collected, is predominant in crisis and crisis 
exercises contexts. It is often defined as an overall concept of the interac-
tion between coordination and cooperation (Jacobsson, 2008). This defi-
nition is, however, challenged. Axelsson & Bihari-Axelsson (2006) view 
“integration” as an overall concept to collaboration, cooperation and 
coordination. Collaboration is, according to Axelsson & Bihari-Axelsson 
(2006), a form of integration with a high degree of voluntary agreements 
and mutual adjustments between those involved. It is based on a will-
ingness to work together. Cooperation is defined as a form of integration 
based on management control, but combined with voluntary agreements 
and mutual adjustments. Axelsson & Bihari-Axelsson (2006) define coor-
dination as a form of integration achieved through the existence of a 
common management control. Decisions on integration are made at the 
top of the hierarchical structure and are implemented through bureau-
cratic mechanisms of supervision and control (see Pugh & Hickson, 1976). 
In Denmark, the concept of cooperation is predominant, widely used in a 
broad sense of meaning, and in Norway, a third concept, samhandling, is 
having an increasing impact. 
In line with the theme of this anthology, the most common concept in 
crisis and crisis exercise contexts in Sweden, collaboration, is regarded 
as an equivalent to the Norwegian concept samhandling, used in the fol-
lowing work. In Torgersen & Steiro (2009), samhandling is an open and 
mutual communication and development process between participants. 
The participants exchange and compensate their skills, face-to-face or by 
means of communication technology, working towards common targets 
and based on trust, reciprocity, rationality and professional knowledge 
(p.130). The concept of samhandling will be used in the following text 
(compare to Axelsson & Bihari-Axelsson, 2006).
The goal of samhandling has proven to be difficult in crisis work. Cross-
ing borders is hindered by organization-specific legislation, routines and 
agendas tailored to and repeated within each organization acting on an 
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accident scene (Carlström & Berlin, 2009). In contrast to this, samhan-
dling is highly valued and expected from all participants during crisis 
work. The concept is frequently used as a prefix to professions, organi-
zational models and techniques used during crisis work. One example 
illustrating this is from a Swedish program of rescue services, where the 
concepts samhandling commander, samhandling exercises, samhandling 
team, samhandling contract, samhandling education and limitless sam-
handling is used frequently. The repetitive use of the concept shows that 
samhandling is something good and positive (Sydöstra Skånes Räddning-
stjänstförbund, 2008:3–19). 
It is also common that the concept of samhandling is used in stake-
holder documents outlining reforms and rules. Difficulties in regulating 
responsibilities and rights are related to the need to practice samhandling 
preferably in a conflict-free and harmonious way. The necessity for nego-
tiation, argument or even opposition during certain circumstances is 
seldom proposed. Instead, samhandling is suggested as a solution to the 
challenge of distributing management control in-between organizations 
with overlapping tasks (Rothstein, 2008). 
In this paper, I describe the idea of samhandling as an idealized way 
to manage crisis work, how samhandling is practiced and how it could be 
developed in order to make the concept more appropriate. The context 
is samhandling exercises and an example from an exercise at Øresund 
Bridge, “Koriander”, is used to problematize the goal of samhandling in a 
non-specific and general manner. 
Samhandling in exercises
Samhandling is considered as a key solution when asymmetry of power 
or rivalry occurs. When samhandling is practiced, it appears to produce a 
win-win effect. This idea of samhandling, as a simple way to manage com-
plex inter-organizational actions during a crisis, is common (Berlin & 
Carlström, 2008a). Danermark (2000) emphasizes that in a situation 
where samhandling really works, it can be “heavenly” and improve the 
quality of actions, but when it becomes an idealized mirage based on false 
expectations, it can, in contrast, be “hell”. Samhandling can, according to 
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Danermark (2000), be used in order to compensate for vague leadership 
and a lack of structure and resources. 
An expectation from partners of seamless samhandling can be a spe-
cial challenge to operative crisis organizations, such as the police, fire 
department and rescue services. High-reliability organizations (HROs) 
have a mechanistic tradition in common, i.e. an assumption of linear-
ity, predictability and routine-based work. Mechanistic exercises are 
often professional drills, i.e. exercises based on simple repetitive actions 
to imprint conform behaviors. In contrast to mechanistic behavior, an 
organic behavior is characterized by flexibility and seamlessness (Berlin 
& Carlström, 2011; Scholtens, 2008). 
“Koriander”
In the following example from an international exercise, Swedish and 
Danish rescue services were expected to practice samhandling during an 
accident on the Øresund Bridge, which connects the two countries.
The exercise, as reported by Berlin & Carlstrom (2013), was named 
“Koriander” and was a full-scale exercise designed to simulate a real 
event. A total of 500 participants from 17 different organizations took 
part in the exercise. 
Police, rescue and ambulance services contributed with most of the 
personnel for the exercise. The overall goal of the exercise was to ensure 
preparedness and effectively solve incidents that can occur on the bridge. 
The purpose was to practice samhandling at the command level, in order 
to organize and optimize the use of existing resources in a response area 
(Øresund Bridge, 2012).
The bridge has two decks, with a highway on the upper deck and a rail-
way on the lower deck. The setting for the exercise was located in a nar-
row area beneath the upper part of the bridge. The scenario was a railway 
accident, involving a passenger train and a freight train on the Øresund 
Bridge. In connection with the accident, an overhead contact wire fell 
down on the train. After incoming calls to 911 (the emergency hotline) 
in Sweden and Denmark, the police, ambulance and rescue services were 
alerted in both countries. According to the scenario, four people were 
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dead, 15 were seriously injured, 25 had minor injuries and 30–50 people 
were in shock (Øresund Bridge, 2012:8–9).
The Swedish and Danish rescue services arrived from their respective 
directions. None of the services had received information about the exact 
position of the accident. Upon arrival, the Danish and Swedish services 
were asked to electrically ground the track, since there was an overhead 
contact wire hanging down. They also decided that work inside the train 
should not start until the grounding was complete. 
The grounding was more time-consuming than expected. Forty min-
utes passed without the carriages being opened, because of difficulties 
distributing staff in the samhandling between the Danish and Swedish 
fire rescue services. The mock victims, waiting to be rescued from the 
blacked-out carriages, became quite bored, while hundreds of rescue 
workers on the upper part of the bridge were waiting to participate. They 
waited in the windy top deck, not knowing what was happening on the 
lower deck. Eventually, the area was electrically grounded and the train 
carriages were opened. 
Responsibility for the passenger train was split up; the rear carriages 
were assigned to the Swedish rescue service and the front ones to the Dan-
ish. Since there were only three carriages in the train, confusion arose as 
to who should take responsibility for the middle carriage. The Swedish 
and Danish rescue services did not coordinate their respective actions. 
The different working routines of the Danish and Swedish rescue ser-
vices contributed to the confusion. The Swedes sent medical personnel 
to the train carriages to perform field triage, i.e. identify those who were 
in need of medical evacuation and make policy decisions. The Danes 
allowed the rescue services to empty the accident site, transporting the 
injured to the medical assembly point. These contradictory routines were 
not communicated. Misunderstandings and confusion arose at the meet-
ing between the Swedes and Danes on how to act. No initiative for triage 
was done. Having the train carriages full of mock victims hindered the 
work. In the midst of this confusion, the exercise leaders informed the 
medical staff that a woman was about to give birth in one of the car-
riages. The nurse in charge of the triage “burst out laughing”; the situa-
tion was perceived as constructed and too complex. As time was elapsing, 
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the exercise leaders decided to stop the rescue work in the carriages. The 
mock victims were asked to get out of the train and walk to the upper 
deck of the bridge. 
The command center was set up on the upper deck of Øresund Bridge, 
on the southern roadway. It was close to the assembly point for uninjured 
passengers. Despite closing the road off using vehicles, it was difficult to 
keep bystanders away. The command center was not closed off, or pro-
tected from the wind. The Danish Operational Headquarters (KST) posi-
tioned itself on the northern roadway. The distance made it difficult to 
establish samhandling between the command center and KST.
Organization on site was dominated by a focus on internal organiza-
tion, which hindered samhandling between organizations and countries. 
It turned out to be difficult to understand and explain technical terms 
between the Swedes and Danes. The evaluation report described the sam-
handling as follows:
“Generally, there was a lack of knowledge about roles, tasks, leadership 
structure and principles of the opposite country’s medical preparedness, 
as well as language problems, so that the samhandling at the leadership 
level became less effective.” (Øresund Bridge, 2012:31).
The difficulty was reflected by the fact that vehicles were sent forth 
without information about the location of the accident. Danish rescue 
services arrived first at the accident site. In the beginning, radio traffic 
was intensive, but then the flow of information stopped up. Selective, 
organization-specific radio channels started to dominate communica-
tions. Personnel at the staging area, assembly point and command center 
received less and less information about the work and its progress at the 
accident site. There was also weak radio reception at times. After a while, 
the radio contact between KST and the staging area was completely inop-
erative (Berlin & Carlström, 2013). 
Organically smooth and mechanistically predictable
A challenge for crisis organizations is to be organically smooth and at 
the same time mechanistically clear and predictable (Lalonde, 2004). 
To commute between mechanistic and organic behavior during crisis 
work is a challenge. The mechanistic behavior is deeply rooted in crisis 
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organizations, which can make them dysfunctional (Gormley & Balla, 
2008). During non-emergency situations, which allow for planning and 
discussion, there is room for organic-action logics (Kuykendall & Roberg, 
1982). In critical situations, when life and property are threatened, a need 
for structure induces a mechanistic imperative (Weick, 1998). Structure 
and simplified command and control models (C2) are used in order to 
reduce uncertainty when chaos lurks behind the corner. Standards create a 
feeling of security, reduction of confusion, and prevention of disorganized 
behavior when the situation is intense (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003).
One reason to practice samhandling is to strengthen the ability to han-
dle a course of events that do not follow a stable plan, situations that are 
overpowering and situations when the resources are disproportionate. As 
in the studied exercise, mechanistic behavior tends to contribute to inac-
tivity, delays and frustration. Much of the activity was based on repetitive 
monotonous tasks within organization-specific fields. Very rarely did the 
participants stop to seek out contact and converse with other partici-
pants, for the purpose of jointly utilizing the sum of resources. 
Although flexibility is considered as important when handling disas-
ters, crises or accidents, very few have suggested ways to operationalize 
samhandling and organic handling during crisis work (Deverell, 2012). 
The skill to act adaptively is, however, broadly accepted as a necessary 
characteristic during complex situations which are difficult to predict 
(Borodzics, 2004). If the way of acting is organic, the degree of flexibil-
ity and creativity is secured during unpredictable situations. This is true, 
especially in situations where senior management is absent and it is dif-
ficult to get an overview of the situation. Consequently, there is a need 
to alternate between organic and mechanistic behavior. Scholtens (2008) 
emphasizes that mechanistic techniques, such as C2, are impossible to 
use in the beginning of most chaotic events. Priority and action have 
to be managed on a basic operative level until a crisis organization has 
been built up. Every participant needs to be briefed about the situation, 
in order to make correct decisions and act in an effective way, preventing 
passivity and contra-productive behavior. Scholtens (2008) emphasizes 
that operative staff, in most cases, make the right decisions and act in an 
optimal way, if they are allowed to act autonomously. 
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Units involved in crisis management should be spoon-fed their tasks, as well 
as the big-picture scenario, during the preparatory phase, so that they are able 
to make relevant operational decisions themselves. Information systems would 
then exist, not to keep central decision-makers informed, but to help decentral-
ized decision makers carry out their task. (Scholtens, 2008:203)
Consequently, if samhandling is built on a balanced choice between 
organic and mechanistic strategies, the crisis work will be improved, 
especially in situations of emergencies and an overwhelming need to 
make decisions simultaneously. 
A conceptualized model
In order to conceptualize samhandling, a three-level model which is pos-
sible to operate and based on research from crisis organizations will be 
presented. It is based on studies from exercises and real events, during 
catastrophes, crises and accidents (Berlin & Carlström 2008b; 2008c; 
2010; 2013; 2014; 2015). The model will be positioned between organic ver-
sus mechanistic and auftragstaktik versus befählstaktik (these terms will 
be explained in the following). 
Three levels of samhandling
The model, “three levels of samhandling,” consists of sequential, parallel 
and synchronous types of samhandling. 
1) Sequential samhandling is a simplified form of samhandling. It is 
characterized by a traditional sequential work process (assembly 
line) where everyone performs their specified task. At the accident 
scene, this means that the various organizations’ personnel act at 
different times. Everyone waits their turn to make a contribution. 
This can be likened to a relay race, where someone starts a process 
that is then handed over to another co-worker. During sequential 
samhandling, established handling patterns are repeated, the num-
ber of meetings is minimized, and negotiations take place only on 
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an exceptional basis. It generates a relatively small degree of inter-
action between organizations. Sequential samhandling, i.e. using 
Swedish or Danish fire brigade technicians, would have been effec-
tive when carrying out the electrical grounding work during the 
“Koriander” exercise. The choice to use both Swedish and Danish 
fire brigades delayed the process, due to meetings and communica-
tion. As a consequence, forty minutes passed without the carriages 
being opened.
2) Organizations which samhandler parallel to each other, carry out 
tasks simultaneously while acting “on their own”. At an accident 
scene, this means that the organizations are in place at the same 
time and act side by side. Parallel samhandling is more complex 
than sequential samhandling. During parallel samhandling, tasks 
are strictly distributed among the organizations. The work is car-
ried out in such a way that members of each organization do not 
support each other across professional boundaries. It is charac-
terized by the standardization of developed roles and established 
procedures. The starting point is that every employee works 
according to his own organization’s agenda and a clearly-defined 
mission. In the case of parallel samhandling, giving assistance to 
other organizations is avoided. This favors intra-organizational 
standardization and strengthens internal conformity. Parallel 
samhandling is difficult if the tasks of different organizations 
overlap. If so, a present and active management is needed. In 
“Koriander,” during the grounding, a parallel samhandling was 
practiced but there were two joint managers, one Swedish and 
one Danish. The ambiguous leadership contributed to a slow and 
imprecise performance.
3) In synchronous samhandling, tasks are performed at the same time 
as in parallel samhandling. In addition, participants in the various 
organizations can mutual exchange tasks in spirit of equality. They 
cover for each other in a spontaneous and natural way. This is an 
extreme form of samhandling. The members of each organization 
do not focus only on their own tasks but are also looking for oppor-
tunities to assist others with their tasks. This is done by showing 
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flexibility and a capacity for rapid re-allocation of resources. The 
concept of “holism” describe how the organization’s members 
place all the parts of the whole in relation to each other in a mutual 
exchange. This means that the players carry out their own tasks but 
are also willing to perform operations that are otherwise considered 
to be the responsibility of others. The focus is shifted from inter-or-
ganizational tasks to finding the best way to carry out the collective 
mission. In the synchronous form of samhandling, the collective 
task is more important than the individual tasks of the respective 
organization. Since the participants are not trained to perform 
tasks for others, exchange often takes place in the form of improvi-
sation (Weick, 1998). To interact synchronously requires an ability 
to step out of one’s own professional role and take on unfamiliar 
actions. This means stepping over the boundary into the unfamiliar 
and flexibly covering for others where needed, even if this does not 
lie within your own area of competence (Berlin & Carlström, 2008). 
Synchronous samhandling is the idealized, seamless form of sam-
handling referred to when governing bodies stress their ability to 
interact (Berlin & Carlström, 2011). Synchronous samhandling can 
be necessary during extreme situations when resources are lack-
ing, such as mass casualties and waste disaster areas. Even though 
the model is strongly idealized, it is difficult to manage. It requires 
highly professional and flexible participants who are able to adjust 
to each other’s and the specific circumstances. 
These three forms of samhandling require dialogue and clarified roles. 
They are levels which make it possible to distribute samhandling on a 
scale from the mechanistic to the organic. The difference between the 
levels become obvious if management is included in the model. During 
sequential samhandling, the management needs to control the rotation 
between collaborating organizations; during parallel samhandling, the 
management needs to be present throughout to prevent crowding; and 
during synchronous samhandling, the management can remain passive 
because the teams work independently. The crisis work is distributed in 
an organic way within and between different teams. 
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Befählstaktik and auftragstaktik
The model can be illustrated by two well-established concepts, befähl-
staktik or ‘normal tactics’ based on command and control (C2), and auf-
tragstaktik, i.e. ‘mission command’ used by the military. When mission 
command is practiced, the team is informed about the goal, the purpose 
and resources to accomplish a mission. The team is free to make decisions 
and act even though they are not controlled by senior management. In 
contrast to mission command, normal tactics provides a high degree of 
management control. On the other hand, C2 is often characterized by 
inertia (Leistenschneider, 2002). 
The history of the concepts ‘normal tactics’ and ‘mission command’ 
can be traced to a reform in the Prussian army, after being defeated by 
the French army in the battles of Jena and Auerstedt in October 1806. 
Analysis of the battle showed that the Prussians recruited officers based 
on their social standing while the French recruited their officers based on 
competence. Furthermore, the French army was divided into army corps 
(Corps d’Ármée). The Prussian army was a unified, top-down organiza-
tion, strongly dependent on C2. Another difference was that every soldier 
in the French army was aware of the vision or idea behind their military 
campaigns. The vision permeated down from Napoleon to every part of 
the army. The soldiers in the Prussian army were expected to blindly obey 
orders and not to incorporate these orders into a bigger picture of ambi-
tions or visions. The Prussian model placed a heavy burden on the senior 
management and made the army vulnerable. When Karl Wilhelm Ferdi-
nand Braunschweig, who was the commander of the Prussian main army 
(63,000 soldiers), was fatally wounded during the battle of Auerstedt, the 
Prussian army was defeated by 26,000 French soldiers. 
As a result of the events of October 1806, a national quarrel arose about 
how to manage the Prussian army in war. On one side was a conservative 
movement promoting ‘normal tactics’ and on the other, a modern move-
ment promoting ‘mission command.’ In the end, the two contrasting tactics 
appeared as applicable strategies under different circumstances. Traditional 
C2 could be used as long as the management could control the situation, but 
if it became complicated, developing in an unexpected way and C2 became 
ineffective, ‘mission command’ was to be activated (Stewart, 2009). 
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When the three levels of samhandling sequential, parallel and syn-
chronous samhandling, are viewed in the light of ‘normal tactics,’ i.e. 
mechanistic imperative, and ‘mission command,’ i.e. organic imperative, 
a simple axis distributing different logics and ways to manage a crisis 
appears (figure 19.1)
Sequential Parallel Synchronous 
• Relay race-like 
distribution 
 



























       
Figure 19.1 Samhandling between the logics of the mechanistic and organic.
During sequential samhandling, the management acts according to a 
traditional C2 model. During command, the management distributes a 
sequence of actions, and the effects are followed up by control. At the 
opposite extreme of samhandling, synchronous is a status neutral distri-
bution between and within participating teams. Management is spon-
taneously distributed to staff, who independently overview the situation 
and allocate resources. A synchronous distribution is suitable when the 
resources are limited, few or no specialists are yet present and the crisis 
work is imminent, e.g. during a mass-casualty scenario. In the example 
from Øresund Bridge, the management acted, as synchronous samhan-
dling was needed even though there were enough resources to handle the 
situation. A fruitful way to manage the train accident would have been 
sequential and parallel samhandling, combined with a more distinct lead-
ership than was the case in the example. As already mentioned, one of the 
rescue services (the Danish or the Swedish) should have been appointed 
to electrically ground the track (sequential samhandling), and the paral-
lel samhandling practiced when emptying the middle carriages should 
have been controlled by an active management, preventing crowding and 
controlling actions in a common manner. Instead, the teams acted in a 
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non-coordinated, ad-hoc manner during the exercise. Sequential and 
parallel samhandling demand a present and active leadership. 
The three levels of samhandling are useful during different situations. 
When resources are lacking, the need for action is imminent, the event 
is complex and it is difficult to make predictions, a traditional C2 can be 
counterproductive. On the other hand, an organic logic during a situa-
tion of sufficient resources on the accident scene can contribute to vague 
management and a fragmented, ad-hoc-like handling of the situation. 
The proposed model brings samhandling to a pragmatic level, which is 
possible to operationalize during changing circumstances. The model has 
the potential to be less ambiguous and imprecise than idealized ideas of 
limitless samhandling when managing a crisis.
Conclusion
The model of samhandling presented in this chapter may contribute to 
the understanding that the nature of an event should be handled accord-
ing to an applicable level of samhandling during crisis work. The manage-
ment is supposed to analyze the situation, distribute resources and give 
instructions for samhandling. Competency in practicing samhandling is 
built up by training. It can be improved if exercises focus on different 
levels of samhandling. Such exercises can promote the competency to use 
samhandling as an adaptive tool adjusted to the scenario. A three-level 
samhandling model, such as the one presented, can be a useful tool in 
order to improve exercises and crisis management. 
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This chapter opens up with a description of a stressful incident where 
samhandling (interaction, cooperation) occurred. After this, a short 
overview of challenges in contemporary military operations is given. 
Thereafter, the chapter briefly discusses the concepts of stress and sam-
handling, before some factors contributing to efficient samhandling 
under stress are introduced to the reader. The factors that are discussed 
in the chapter are social support, self-efficacy, resiliency and hardiness, 
implicit coordination, and character strengths. Individual factors are self- 
efficacy, resilience and hardiness, and character strengths. Team factors are 
social support, team efficacy, and implicit coordination. Finally, a model 
describing stress and samhandling, including the above-mentioned indi-
vidual and team factors and their relations, is introduced and discussed. 
A short conclusion related to the importance of the factors for reducing 
stress and increasing samhandling is given at the end of the chapter.
Consider the following incident: 
“During an operation somewhere in the world, I was assigned as a bodyguard 
(close protection specialist) to a high-ranking military officer (the VIP). The 
VIP’s mission was to attend a meeting with a local warlord, and to negotiate on 
the issue of getting a safe passage for everyone through the warlord’s territory. 
The close protection team that I was a part of entered its vehicles and started to 
drive to the location where the VIP would meet the local warlord. On this day, 
we had to take care of the aide of the VIP, since he was joining his commander 
for the meeting. This was not the usual routine, but orders were orders. So, 
we were stuck with the aide. These things should not happen, but life is not 
always perfect. Anyway, we knew where we were going and drove to the loca-
tion. We entered the house after checking it and the surroundings, and having 
established perimeter security. The negotiations started, and everything seemed 
to be going fine for about an hour. Then suddenly, a gunshot was heard from 
below, and somebody started screaming. Both the noise of the gunshot and the 
screaming floated up the stairs to the second floor, where we were having our 
meeting. The noises seemed to come from the floor beneath us. The warlord 
and his ‘goons’ started to ‘freak out’; I could tell that they wanted to draw their 
weapons. I grabbed our VIP and retreated into a corner, shielding him with my 
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body. I used some breathing techniques, used self-talk and at the same time 
took control over the VIP, telling him what to do, because I sensed that he was 
getting a bit stressed. The rest of the team that were inside the house took up 
new positions, just changing from the positions they had held and did what 
they were trained to do. I could hear them giving orders and information about 
what was happening to each other and to me. So far, so good; we were in con-
trol. Except for the aide. I suddenly saw him standing right in the middle of the 
large room, with eyes like big balloons. He looked at me and I could tell that he 
was not really seeing me. Clearly, he was having a severe stress reaction to what 
was going on. The gunshot and screaming had put him into a temporary paral-
ysis. Things like this should never happen. We had, of course, planned ahead 
for who would be responsible for the aide, but he was just not mentally pres-
ent. Half of the inside team was working its way down the stairs and the other 
half was around the VIP, securing him and controlling the warlord. I heard the 
guys on the stairs shouting, ‘Clear!’ and ‘Move,’ and the commands just float-
ed through our communication system like they should – a good example of 
samhandling. I gave orders to the guys controlling the warlord and his ‘goons’, 
and also to the aide, that we should move out of the house and get away. The 
aide just kept standing there. I cannot tell how much time this took. Finally, I 
dragged the VIP towards the aide and slapped the aide in the face, saying, ‘Move 
towards the stairs and get out!’ It was like his brain came back to work, or like a 
light was turned on inside his eyes, and he started to move in the right direction. 
My focus returned to the VIP. We got to the stairs and one of the team members 
took care of the aide, while I concentrated on getting the VIP safely out of the 
house. We managed to do that, and nothing more happened. However, we re-
fused to bring the aide with us again.”
The incident described above is an example of when samhandling under 
stress worked well in a highly-trained team, except for the unforeseen 
incident with the aide. In Norwegian, the concept samhandling is used 
to describe this type of “interaction”. Samhandling as a concept does not 
have an exact equivalent in English, but concepts such as “interaction”, 
“cooperation”, or “collaboration” capture some of the similarities. The 
escalation in the described situation, (as in the case of the gunshot), was 
not unforeseen, because we had mentally prepared ourselves for this. The 
exact time of escalation was unforeseen, but we had practiced how to 
chapter 20
376
handle this too. The unforeseen element in this incident was the reaction 
of the aide; we had not practiced this. 
Challenges in contemporary military 
operations
A war is not won alone. An interesting point is that 85 % of all military 
training takes place in small teams, as opposed to 5 % in the civilian world 
(Mullin & Shriberg, 2005). Volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambi-
guity (VUCA) characterize contemporary military operations (Snider 
& Matthews, 2012). Participants in modern military operations will face 
unforeseen incidents. Unforeseen incidents can be defined as the follow-
ing: The unforeseen denotes something occurring relatively unexpectedly 
and with a relatively low probability or predictability for those who expe-
rience and must deal with it (Kvernbekk, Torgersen & Moe, 2015, author’s 
translation). Stress is a common element in most modern military opera-
tions. The need for coping with stress during operations can be found in 
the leadership doctrine, ADP 6–22, for the U.S. Army:
“Decentralized operations require leaders at all levels that understand their en-
vironment, learn quickly, make sound decisions and lead change. Because there 
are no predetermined solutions to problems, Army leaders must adapt their 
thinking, formations, and employment of techniques to the specific situation 
they face. This requires an adaptable and innovative mind, a willingness to ac-
cept prudent risk in unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations, and an ability to 
adjust based on continuous assessment.” (U.S. Army, 2012:0).
As a leader conducting ground operations, your span of control will func-
tion best when leading a five-man team (Marshall, 1947). This requires, 
among other things, the ability to handle stress, and to function well 
together with others during unforeseen and/or risky incidents, that is, 
samhandling. 
“Command in combat requires love. A commander must genuinely 
love his men and win their affections in return, and when the time comes, 
he must use that love to cause his men to willingly risk and even sacrifice 
their lives to accomplish the mission.” (McCoy, 2007:11). 
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The overarching supporting documents describing Norwegian mili-
tary leadership are the Norwegian Armed Forces Chief of Defense’s Basic 
view of leadership in the Norwegian Armed Forces (Forsvarsstaben, 2012), 
and the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (NAFJOD) 
(Forsvarsstaben, 2007; 2014). These documents establish mission com-
mand (oppdragsbasert ledelse in Norwegian) as the Norwegian Armed 
Forces’ basic leadership philosophy. Mission command can be traced 
back to the end of the 19th century, with the Prussian concept of Auftrag-
staktik, invented by the Prussian General von Moltke the Elder (Ben-Sha-
lom & Shamir, 2011).
Leadership is needed, as it is leadership that aims the gun so that the 
team can pull the trigger (Cannon & Cannon, 2003). Effective leadership 
exercised in cooperation with and in relation to others, can be described 
as a result of the interaction between the leader and their subordinates 
over time (Forsvarsstaben, 2007). Leadership can therefore be understood 
as the process that creates a common direction, alignment and commit-
ment in a military unit (Forsvarsstaben, 2012; McCauley, Van Velsor, & 
Ruderman, 2010). Leadership is context-dependent (Hughes, Ginnett 
& Curphy, 2014), which means that a leader’s behavior and efficiency is 
the result of interaction between individual factors and the environment 
(Bandura, 1997), where different situation variables are crucial for effec-
tive leadership (Forsvarsstaben, 2000; 2012). Military leadership can thus 
be described as a continuous process that is exercised in relation to others 
in a specific military context. One would think that a lot of research had 
been conducted on stressors and coping strategies in military contexts, 
simply because military work can be very stressful. Strangely enough, 
only a limited number of studies have explored the connection between 
stressors, coping strategies and military performance (Hall, 2009; Lim-
bert, 2004; Overdale & Gardner, 2012). However, Milgram, Orenstein and 
Zafrirs’ (1989) study of Israeli soldiers in the Lebanon War was a signif-
icant exploration of stressors and coping strategies’ impact on military 
performance. In these studies, one finding was that social support used as 
a coping strategy had a positive impact on military performance.
However, there are other organizations outside the military system 
where the personnel have to face unpredictable, difficult, and stressful 
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situations in their daily work. These are referred to as high-risk organiza-
tions. Stated differently, the personnel might face incidents with unknown 
content and the unforeseen (Kvernbekk, Torgersen, & Moe, 2015). Clear 
differences have, however, been found between the execution of leadership 
among staff or in a garrison and the execution of leadership in a military 
operation (Boe, Johansen & Bergh, forthcoming), as well as when a con-
flict changes from a high-intensity to a low-intensity conflict (Boe, Bergh, 
& Johansen, 2017). This means that in the daily routine and education 
there are less unforeseen incidents, and less stress and risk involved. The 
need for samhandling will therefore probably be less in these conditions. 
One could state that there is a clear distinction between high-risk organ-
izations (such as the military, the police, the fire department, security 
forces, and emergency organizations) and civilian organizations. The dis-
tinction is that high-risk organizations exist because they have a mission. 
An interpretation of this is that the mission is the reason for the existence 
of these types of organizations (Mullin & Shriberg, 2005). There are many 
similarities between military leadership and leadership in other organi-
zations, but civilian organizations will generally have profit and prestige 
as their main reasons for existing. In the NAFJOD from 2007, it states, 
“The opposing rigors can be extreme. Our profession represents the will 
to succeed and to strive towards results that exceed the expected – the dif-
ference between success and failure” (Forsvarsstaben, 2007:160, author’s 
translation). This quote highlights the importance for an officer to have 
a strong self-efficacy in their professional practice, in order to function 
well. It is logical to assume that individuals with high self-efficacy will be 
more apt to believe that they can meet work challenges although various 
stressors are present (Jex, Bliese, Buzzell, & Primeau, 2001).
Stress and samhandling
The Norwegian Chief of Defense (Forsvarsstaben, 2012:11) has stated: 
“[Military leadership] is about doing the uncomfortable and being able 
to cope with it, overcoming powerlessness, and avoiding emotional 
breakdown. Military leadership demands robustness in order to think 
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clearly and effectively, and cope with one’s feelings when facing complex 
and difficult situations” (author’s translation). Considering the nature 
of many military tasks, an officer will often have to cope with several 
decisions at the same time, often under severe amounts of stress. These 
types of situations are referred to as “in extremis” leadership (Kolditz, 
2010). In addition, an officer engaged in close combat will have to make 
decisions under extreme levels of stress. These decisions very often carry 
serious consequences, namely the possibility of being killed or wounded, 
and thus contain a lot of risk. A significant part of handling different 
types of situations is the ability to work efficiently together. There is a 
broad consensus that trust is a decisive factor in order to solve missions 
effectively (Horn & Walker, 2008). Trust simply reduces stress and thus 
increases the possibility for samhandling (see the chapter on trust and 
samhandling for a more in-depth discussion about this). Shared mental 
models comprise much of a unit’s collective action repertoire and deci-
sions (Knouse, 2001). 
Military training results in a high level of wear and tear on the person-
nel (Hoedebecke & Wells, 2002). How well a person masters or copes with 
a challenging situation can have a significant effect on biological symp-
toms affecting health and wellness (Bandura, 1991). In scientific literature, 
there is no doubt that stress and related stress reactions have a definite 
effect on human health and performance (see for instance Cowley et al., 
2003; Griffith & Vaitkus, 1999; Hazlett & Morgan, 2003). Activation of the 
stress reaction is caused by a person’s perception of the situation as threat-
ening (Sivik, Delima, Korenjak, & Delima, 1997). It is therefore logical 
to imagine that this perception of a situation is influenced by a person’s 
psychological resources, so that people with a high level of psychological 
resources will perceive a situation as less threatening than people who 
have a low level of psychological resources. A soldier who believes he or 
she has the resources to get through stressful situations and complete a 
mission successfully will perceive less threats and stress (Morgan, Cho, 
Hazlett, Coric, & Morgan, 2002). One’s behavior and one’s ability to lead 




Some factors contributing to more efficient  
samhandling under stress 
In the next sections of the chapter, I will propose and discuss some factors 
that may be important under stress, facilitating better samhandling. On 
the other hand, increased samhandling may also lead to reduced stress. 
Clearly, the concepts of stress and samhandling are related, and deciding 
the causal direction from one concept to the other is challenging. How-
ever, as this chapter uses a perceived reduction of stress as a main con-
tributor to better samhandling, this will infer the causal direction from 
stress to samhandling. 
The proposed and discussed factors increase the ability to cope with 
stress in relation to risk and unforeseen incidents. In addition to the fac-
tors described in Table 1 below, other factors exist, such as intelligence, 
general mental ability and personality traits, that are used to select 
personnel for the armed forces and other high-risk organizations. The 
challenge with these factors is that they do not really predict who will 
function well during unforeseen and stressful incidents (Picano, Roland, 
Rollins, & Williams, 2002). For instance, general mental ability has been 
found to be completely uncorrelated with later academic and physical 
performance in military cadets (Bang, Boe, Nilsen, & Eilertsen, 2017). 
These factors cannot be used to explain samhandling in stressful and 
unforeseen incidents. As such, they have a limited value in predicting 
performance in high-risk occupations (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Picano & 
Roland, 2012). 
However, there are some individual and team factors that have been 
found to be important when it comes to functioning better under stress 
and when things are unforeseen. As teams are built up of individuals, the 
individual factors will be discussed first. This is because it is necessary to 
take control over yourself before engaging in more complex processes, 
such as taking part in and contributing to a team. The team factors will 
then be discussed, since they build upon the previously-discussed indi-
vidual factors. In Table 20.1 below, four individual and two team factors 
are shown that contribute to reducing stress and increasing effective 
samhandling.
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Table 20.1 Factors that reduce stress and increase samhandling.
Individual factors Team factors
Self-efficacy Social support
Resilience and hardiness Team efficacy 
Character strengths –
Implicit coordination –
As can be seen in Table 20.1, individual factors are self-efficacy, resil-
ience and hardiness, character strengths, and implicit coordination. Self- 
efficacy can be defined as the belief in your own capabilities in order to 
reach specific results (Bandura, 1997). For professionals, high standards 
are required. It should be obvious that you need strong self-efficacy to 
deal with the countless scenarios you may find yourself in as a soldier 
and officer. This is not about the abilities and skills one possesses, but 
about what one considers attainable with the skills one possesses (Ban-
dura, 1986). Bandura writes that self-efficacy is a very important factor for 
people in order to perform (Bandura, 1997).
Resilience is defined here as the tendency to recover quickly from differ-
ent challenges and stresses while maintaining your focus (US Army, 2012). 
Hardiness is a similar concept, focusing upon a person’s perception of con-
trol, challenge and commitment when facing difficult situations (Kobasa, 
1979). As there is clear overlapping between the concepts of resilience and 
hardiness, they are discussed as one individual factor in this chapter. Char-
acter strengths are individual characteristics that are possible to develop 
through increased vigilance and effort (Biswas-Diener, Kashdan, & Minhas, 
2011). Looking at the concept “implicit coordination”, this indicates that each 
individual team member has a shared mental model of the situation they 
are in (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993). This becomes important 
if a team is to manage to solve and accomplish a mission together. Imagine 
a team where every team member has his or her own understanding of 
the situation. The level of samhandling will be very low, and the probability 
of being able to accomplish a given mission will also be low. 
Regarding team factors, social support and team self-efficacy are also 
important if a team is to handle stress and function well during samhan-
dling. Social support refers to the support received from the other team 
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members. According to Bandura (1997), team efficacy deals with the team’s 
collective belief in being able to solve their missions together. However, 
Bandura uses the term “collective efficacy” to describe this factor. 
Individual factors affecting samhandling
The importance of self-efficacy for samhandling
Social cognitive theory was launched in the book “Social Foundations 
of Thoughts and Action” (Bandura, 1986), and it is in this work that self- 
efficacy as a concept is presented. Bandura (1997:3) defines self-efficacy 
as “…[the] belief in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses 
of action required to produce given attainments.” Here, one’s perceived 
expertise plays a particularly important role in how one copes with sit-
uations, as perceived expertise within clearly-defined domains or activi-
ties is the most important factor in both self-perception and self-efficacy 
(Eccles, Wigfield, & Schiefele, 1998). An important factor is thus to cre-
ate in oneself a high degree of faith in one’s own mastery (Eid, 2006). 
Believing in one’s own capacities, skills and abilities has been found to be 
important for Norwegian military officers within diverse subjects. Exam-
ples are increasing the will to kill (Boe & Johannessen, 2015), learning 
aggression and aggression control (Boe & Ingdahl, 2017), preparing for a 
parachute jump (Boe & Hagen, 2015), and enhancing leadership commu-
nication skills (Boe & Holth, 2017; Holth & Boe, 2017). 
An important part of being an officer and in mission command is about 
being able to cope with various quickly-emerging and unexpected sit-
uations when dealing with others, i.e. samhandling with your team. An 
important part of being able to solve a mission is to become aware of how 
mastery is achieved and how different forms of coping strategies can help 
to achieve interaction. In a study of 141 military cadets from the three mil-
itary academies in Norway, it was found that academic self-perception 
was positively related to self-efficacy, and that self-efficacy was positively 
related to self-reported individual stress-management ability, working in 
difficult situations, and motivation to perform (Boe, Säfvenbom & Buch, 
forthcoming).
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The importance of resilience and hardiness  
for samhandling
Kobasa, Maddi and Courington (1981) have suggested that individuals 
who have a tendency to perceive stressful situations as positive, challeng-
ing, enjoyable and stimulating, can be called “hardy”. Although the term 
“hardiness” has its roots in existential psychology (Maddi, 1967), the 
term was first used in the research literature by Kobasa in 1979. Kobasa 
described the concept as organized around three relatively stable and 
interacting factors: control, challenge and commitment. Commitment 
describes how dedicated people are to themselves and their surround-
ings. Challenge describes the degree to which people are looking for new 
experiences that they perceive as interesting and exciting. Control refers 
to how much one believes that one can influence the direction life takes. 
The extent to which a person possesses these specific characteristics 
may affect their evaluation of a situation as controllable or uncontrol-
lable, challenging or threatening, and will also be crucial with regard to 
whether a person will be dedicated to a task or feel foreign to it (Kobasa, 
Maddi, Puccetti, & Zola, 1985). The three factors are thought to interact, 
so that they lead to people being less affected by stressors if they possess 
a high degree of the three factors. Hardiness has been shown to prevent 
poor physiological and psychological health among military personnel, 
such as soldiers in the Gulf War (Bartone, 1993; 1999; 2000), evacuat-
ing personnel in the US Army (Bartone, Ursano, Wright, & Ingraham, 
1989) peacekeeping soldiers (Bartone, 1996; Britt, Adler, & Bartone, 2001), 
Israeli soldiers during combat training (Florian, Mikulincer, & Taub-
man, 1995), Israeli officer candidates (Westman, 1990), cadets from the 
Norwegian Naval College (Bartone, Johnsen Eid, Brun, & Laberg, 2002) 
and also Norwegian university students (Hystad et al., 2010). The concept 
of hardiness clearly has many similarities to the concept of “resilience” 
(Leipold & Greve, 2009).
One important question is to what extent can one change and 
improve one’s hardiness? Evidence has been found indicating that har-
diness can be learned and developed (Coutu, 2002; Kobasa et al., 1985; 
Maddi, 2002). Leipold and Greve (2009) suggest that hardiness will 
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appear to others as an expression of stability, while hardiness within 
a person is the result of dynamic and interacting regulatory processes 
that continually change throughout one’s life. Hardiness is probably 
more stable than just believing in yourself, and Coutu (2002) argues 
that the ability to make a comeback when things are going badly can be 
developed and easily changed for the better. Resilience is defined here 
as the tendency to recover quickly from setbacks, shock, injuries, adver-
sity, and stress while maintaining a mission and organizational focus 
(U.S. Army, 2012). Paired closely with resilience is the concept of “per-
sistence”. Persistence in what one is doing is also an important factor 
for samhandling. Persistence is simply stated as the ability to finish what 
you start, and it is an important character strength for military officers 
(Boe, 2016a). Persistence requires a certain level of mental toughness. 
Mental toughness can be described as the ability to cope effectively with 
stress despite adversity and/or failure (Smith, Wolfe-Clark, & Bryan, 
2016). Resilience is not described as a personality trait, but rather as a 
normal, stable or successful developmental trait in potentially-danger-
ous situations. Resistant or hardy individuals can be described as people 
who have the capacity or ability to make a comeback when things have 
been difficult or challenging (Coutu, 2002). The overall ability to bounce 
back and also to respond with positive attitudes during serious diffi-
culties and trauma seems to be quite common. Bonanno (2004) argues 
that the human capacity to operate and evolve in the face of challenges 
is undervalued, and there is much to suggest that he is right. People 
who experience extremely difficult or traumatic events bounce back and 
function well in their aftermath.
The importance of character strengths  
for samhandling
Twenty-four character strengths are known to be universal and found 
in all cultures (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Previous research in 
the Norwegian Armed Forces has identified 12 of these 24 character 
strengths that are the most important for military leaders (Bang, Boe, 
Nilsen, & Eilertsen, 2015; Bang, Eilertsen, Boe & Nilsen, 2016; Boe, 2015; 
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2016a; 2016b; Boe, & Bang, 2017; Boe, Bang, & Nilsen, 2015a; 2015b; 
Boe, Davidson, Nilsen, & Bang, 2016; Boe, Heiskel, Grande, Nilsen, & 
Bang, 2016; Boe, Nilsen, Kristiansen, Krogdahl, & Bang, 2017). These 
12 character strengths are leadership, followed by integrity, persistence, 
bravery, open-mindedness, fairness, teamwork, self-regulation, love of 
learning, social intelligence, perspective and creativity. Having charac-
ter and commitment have proven to be success factors when it comes 
to, for example, completing the selection of military Special Forces and 
special police units (Boe, 2011; Boe, Woolley, & Durkin, 2011). Fur-
thermore, successful applicants to the Australian Army Special Forces 
revealed that their most frequently assigned character strength was 
integrity, followed by teamwork, persistence and love of learning (Gay-
ton & Kehoe, 2015b). The reason that character strengths are important 
for military leaders is that character strengths are based on values. An 
individual will express his or her values through their character. This 
has been found to play an important role in leadership, adaptability and 
achievement (Matthews et al., 2006; Gayton & Kehoe, 2015a; Picano & 
Roland, 2012). 
In the described incident at the beginning of the chapter, each member 
of the team was aware of the character strengths of the other team mem-
bers, both weaker and stronger character strengths. This allowed the team 
to increase their level of samhandling even during stressful situations. 
The importance of implicit coordination  
for samhandling
A special feature of military leadership is what is called “implicit coor-
dination” (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993). Implicit coordina-
tion means that participants in a team have a common or shared mental 
model of the situation they are in. This means that it is possible to pre-
dict the other team members’ actions and then adapt one’s own pattern 
of behavior to the other members’ patterns of action. A high degree of 
implicit coordination will lead to less perceived stress and enhanced 
samhandling in a team. Implicit coordination is a prerequisite for effec-
tive teams and is not just limited to the field of military leadership. The 
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need to function as well as possible together is, however, even more 
important in a military context than in a civilian context. This is due to 
the possibly devastating consequences of failure in a military context. 
Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Milanovich (1999) have also shown 
the importance of planning the development of shared mental models 
in a military context, in order to avoid catastrophic consequences as a 
result of teams being unable to cope with multiple simultaneous tasks. In 
the above-mentioned incident, our team had practiced a lot, but we had 
missed out on practicing how to cope with the aide. However, we had 
practiced enough to know what each team member would and should do 
in different types of situations. 
Team factors affecting samhandling
The importance of social support for samhandling
There is a lot of research showing that social support reduces stress 
and helps recovery (Bianco, 2001; Chan, 2002; Cohen & Wills, 1985; 
Harlow & Cantor, 1995; Lu, 1997; Pearline & LeBlanc, 2001; Rosenberg 
& McCullough, 1981; Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1994). Social support 
has been shown to protect people from unexpected stressors (Doornbos, 
1996; Thoits, 1986) and physical illness (House, Landis, & Umberson, 
1988; Kennedy, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1990), and has proven to be sig-
nificant when it comes to recovery from injuries (Wagner, Williams, & 
Long, 1990). Social support has also been shown to counteract the nega-
tive effects of stress and to protect one’s psychological sense of well-being 
(Turner, 1981). Social support is regarded in the literature as a so-called 
“environmental moderator,” since support comes from outside oneself 
(Stetz, Stetz, & Bliese, 2006). In the incident described in the beginning of 
the chapter, the team had a tremendous amount of social support in each 
other and from each other. We had been training and working together 
for a long time, and knew each other very well. This helped in reduc-
ing stress a great deal in the situation in which we found ourselves. As a 
result of this social support, our samhandling worked quite well, despite 
an unforeseen incident. 
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The importance of team efficacy for samhandling
In the aforementioned incident, our team had a high degree of what is 
known as “team (or collective) self-efficacy” (Bandura, 1997). Based upon 
our selection and later training, we were quite confident that we could 
solve our missions. 
A word of caution here. Your individual self-efficacy and your team 
efficacy need to be realistic and not inflated. Getting to know your limits 
in samhandling, as well as your weaknesses and strengths, is an essential 
part of functioning better together.
A model describing the relationship between 
stress, unforeseen incidents and samhandling
Based on the previous discussions of several factors that have an effect 
upon stress and samhandling, it is possible to conceptualize this in a sim-
ple model. The selection of factors in the model is based upon a seman-
tic theory construction, which is a process of model construction based 
upon certain parameters. Several sets of chosen parameters at both indi-
vidual and team level thus constitute the model (Kvernbekk, 2002). The 
chosen individual factors/parameters are self-efficacy, resilience and har-
diness, character strengths and implicit coordination. At the team level, 
factors such as social support and team self-efficacy are important, in 
order to cope with stress and to facilitate better samhandling. In addition 
to stress and samhandling, the model also incorporates the unforeseen 
(Kvernbekk, Torgersen & Moe, 2015). The unforeseen is included in the 
model as it is known to lead to increased stress and less samhandling. 
Figure 20.1 describes this model. 
The main point of the model in Figure 20.1 is that unforeseen inci-
dents will normally lead to an increased perception of stress and less 
ability to execute samhandling. Levels of individual and team factors 
will vary according to where one is in the model. Where one finds one-
self in the model will be dependent upon the experienced level of stress, 










Less important character strengths









Figure 20.1 Unforeseen incidents and their relation to stress and samhandling.
The relation between a low level of stress,  
samhandling and unforeseen incidents
When the level of stress is low, the level of samhandling is low and there 
is not much that is unforeseen, the individual level of self-efficacy will 
also be low. This is because there is no need for a well-developed self- 
efficacy, due to the simplicity of the tasks being executed and the low level 
of stress and unforeseen incidents. Routines and drills will take care of 
the normal incidents. The need for individual resilience and hardiness 
will also be low. As one is not challenged at this point, there is nothing 
to bounce back from. Also, when the level of stress is low, the level of 
required samhandling is low and very little is unforeseen, less important 
character strengths will be needed to solve a mission. Character strengths 
such as, for instance, prudence (being careful about your choices) and 
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kindness will be used. Implicit coordination will not be important under 
these conditions, as there will usually be enough time to sort out any 
problems that arise. One does not, therefore, need a very clear mental 
picture of what the others in a team are doing. The social support given to 
each other in the team and the team efficacy do not need to be high when 
the stress level is low, the need for samhandling is low, and not much is 
unforeseen. Things are working well at this point, so there is not much 
need for social support either. 
The relation between a high level of stress,  
samhandling and unforeseen incidents
However, as can be seen from the model, this picture changes when 
unforeseen incidents start occurring. Then the stress level increases 
and the need for samhandling also becomes more important. Individ-
ual self-efficacy becomes more important, that is, that each individual 
in a team believes that he or she will be able to handle the unforeseen 
incident. This includes, for instance, determination and goal setting 
(US Department of the Army, 2015). Resilience and hardiness will 
show their value, as one might try different solutions and perhaps fail. 
Having a well-developed level of resilience and hardiness will then facili-
tate samhandling, as one tries again and does not give up. When the level 
of stress and the need for samhandling increases, the use of character 
strengths will also change. As the level of unforeseen incidents increases, 
this will lead to one needing other more suitable and important character 
strengths. Character strengths that will be increasingly important during 
stressful incidents, when one is required to execute samhandling at the 
same time, are integrity, teamwork, and persistence (Gayton & Kehoe, 
2015a; 2015b). As the level of samhandling increases, implicit coordination 
becomes more important. It is vital for each individual to know exactly 
what the other team members are doing. This is simply because of the 
lack of time caused by a suddenly-appearing unforeseen incident, and 
the need to solve the incident quickly. The need for social support will 
be high, and social support used as a coping strategy has been found to 
improve performance under stressful situations (Milgram, Orenstein & 
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Zafrir, 1989). Social support will act as a buffer against stress and facilitate 
more efficient samhandling. Being able to function well as a team, that 
is, having a high level of team efficacy, will become increasingly impor-
tant as the level of stress and required samhandling increases. Unforeseen 
incidents will thus require a team that believes in its mutual abilities to 
handle whatever is thrown at them. However, it needs to be said that both 
individual self-efficacy and team efficacy need to be realistic and based 
upon previous training and experiences. Otherwise, the level of self-ef-
ficacy and team efficacy might not be suited to solve incidents that may 
occur suddenly.
Conclusion
This chapter started with an introduction to the theme of stress dur-
ing samhandling. There is no doubt that modern military operations 
are demanding, and are very often accompanied by various levels of 
stress. Stress affects the ability to function well together, and stress has 
a clear effect upon samhandling. Four individual and two team factors 
are seen as important if one wishes to counteract the effects of stress, 
and increase each individual’s and the team’s ability to conduct sam-
handling when facing unforeseen incidents. Working on improving 
one’s self-efficacy, resilience and hardiness, character strengths and 
implicit coordination are important on an individual level. Working on 
improving the social support given by and to the team members, and 
working on team efficacy are also important. Together, these individual 
and team factors will facilitate samhandling in stressful and unforeseen 
situations.
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The purpose of this chapter is to introduce an alternative approach to the 
long-held theoretical assumption that people need to have developed a 
high level of trust, based on an extensive history together, to be able to 
cooperate during such unexpected and dangerous situations that Torg-
ersen (2018) outlines in relation to the Bow-tie Model in Chapter 1 (e.g., 
Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Siebold, 2007). As an alternative point 
of view, I will discuss how people and groups that are strangers to each 
other may still be able to establish a well-functioning degree of cooper-
ation under such conditions, similar to that of groups with considerably 
higher levels of interpersonal knowledge and experience, by developing a 
state of “swift trust” (e.g., Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, & Ben-Ari, 2005). 
This may be a fruitful perspective, given that in dangerous and unex-
pected situations like terrorist attacks, avalanches, explosive fires, or mass 
casualties on the motorway, the people and groups standing back-to-back 
and dealing with the situation are, in many cases, not highly cohesive 
emergency units, but rather strangers that have never worked together 
before (e.g., Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Curnin, Owen, Paton, Trist, & 
Parsons, 2015; Fahy, 2012). These situations encompass a cluster of threats 
and problems that require combined efforts from a wide range of spe-
cialists and departments, often with little or no previous familiarity with 
each other. They may also entail urgency, where those present have to 
respond immediately, making the best out of the resources at hand within 
the framework of an “ad hoc” organized group of strangers. 
It is worth noting that such a gap between prevailing theory and 
operational realities, which often includes the efforts of temporal 
groups, may be the reason that establishing well-functioning coopera-
tion between strangers is a form of competency and knowledge that is 
under-stimulated or completely absent from training and education of 
professional emergency workers. This lack of awareness and focus may 
in turn lead to a lack of cooperation and the loss of life, in worst-case 
scenarios. 
Against this background, the question I pursue is the following: What 
does it take to make people or groups that do not know each other, or 
see each other as strangers, or even are prejudiced towards each other, 
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quickly establish effective cooperation in dangerous and unexpected sit-
uations? According to Meyerson (1996), a key challenge is the rapid devel-
opment of “swift trust” in temporal social systems.
Temporal systems responding to the terrorist 
attack on Utøya 2011
On the 22nd of July 2011, a terrorist first set off a bomb outside the Nor-
wegian Government Buildings in Oslo, killing eight people. Disguised 
as a police officer, he then travelled 40 km northwest of Oslo, where he 
attacked the youth summer camp of the Labor Party, on the isolated island 
of Utøya. In the space of 70 uninterrupted minutes, the terrorist shot dead 
69 people and wounded another 66, before he was eventually detained by 
the police. 
When the police SWAT unit finally arrived at the scene, while the shoot-
ing was still in progress, they chose to approach Utøya in a rubber dinghy. 
During the voyage towards the island, their engine suddenly broke down. 
Luckily, they were soon approached by two recreational boats. After a 
short conversation, a local resident (civilian), Oddvar Hansen, and his 
girlfriend, Lill-Hege Nilsen, invited four unfamiliar police officers on 
board their day-cruiser. Sailing at a speed of 45 knots, they transported 
the assault team to a landing site on Utøya chosen by Hansen, at great 
personal risk. Immediately after the first landing, Hansen was requested 
to take another two other groups into the “hot spot”, before learning that 
the terrorist had been captured. 
This assault group can be described as a temporary system, defined 
by Goodman & Goodman, 1976:494) as “a set of diversely-skilled 
people working together on a complex task over a limited period of 
time”. According to Meyerson, Weick and Kramer (1996:167), these 
systems may “exhibit behavior that presupposes trust, yet traditional 
sources of trust – familiarity, shared experience, reciprocal disclosure, 
threats and deterrents, fulfilled promises, and demonstrations of non- 
exploitation of vulnerability – are not obvious in such systems”. Thus, 
individuals have little time to sort out who knows precisely what and 
no time for the usual forms of confidence-building activities that 
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contribute to the development of trust, in more traditional, enduring 
forms of organization. This is particularly challenging, given that the 
tasks and missions usually require high levels of interdependence and 
little self-sufficiency, in order to adapt effectively to the situation. In 
other words, the members are forced to cooperate by contributing their 
partially-unique competency, in order to solve the shared problems 
ahead of them. 
In order to convert the individual expertise of strangers into an 
interdependent cooperation, a demanding challenge is to reduce the 
sense of uncertainty and vulnerability that naturally occurs among 
members that do not know one another, but still need to rely on one 
another, during dangerous circumstances. One mechanism for the 
















Figure 21.1 “Swift trust” – the link between the unexpected and temporal, and interdependent 
cooperation, during unexpected and dangerous situations.
What is “swift trust”?
There is no unified and clear definition of “swift trust”, distinguish-
ing it from other forms of trust. However, according to Meyerson et al. 
(1996:170), trust in temporary systems is not simply conventional trust 
scaled down to fit brief encounters among strangers, but arises in a situa-
tion where “…people have to wade in on trust rather than wait while expe-
rience gradually shows who can be trusted and with what: Trust must be 
conferred presumptively or ex ante”. It follows from this that rapidness of 
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the trust-development process is essential in “swift trust”, and that it forms 
in response to a different set of antecedents, based on rapid perceptions, 
compared to more history-based, conventional trust. Therefore, building 
on Meyerson, “swift trust” is better perceived as “a unique form of collec-
tive perception and relating that is capable of managing issues of vulner-
ability, uncertainty, risk and expectations” (Meyerson et al., 1996:167) in a 
temporary setting. Thus, in an emergency situation, “swift trust” can be 
seen as the result of a brief evaluation process related to fears of ending up 
hurt, leading to a sense of positive outcome expectancy that enables people 
to overcome a subsequent reluctance to contribute to the situation at hand 
(Fahy, 2012; Hyllengren et al., 2011). It is nurtured by rapid perceptions of 
variables that reduce the experience of vulnerability, uncertainty, and risk.
In order to understand “swift trust”, Meyerson et al. (1996) suggests 
three aspects of trust, based on general trust theories, that may capture 
nuances in the construct: Firstly, as an element of “accepted vulnerabil-
ity to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) 
towards one” (Baier, 1986:235). Secondly, as a belief: “that when offered the 
chance, he or she is not likely to behave in a way that is damaging to us” 
(Gambetta, 1988:219) – coincident with uncertainty reduction. Thirdly, 
as risk and the choice to expose oneself to a situation where the possi-
ble damage may be greater than the advantages sought (Luhmann, 1988, 
p. 98). Accordingly, (swift) trust is an attitude that allows for risk-taking 
decisions, and without it, risk is avoided, innovative activities dry up, and 
only routine actions are applied. This suggests that “swift trust” is not 
only a cognitive process, but is, in accordance with Popa (2005:9), “an 
individual’s willingness to take risks in a temporary group and it has a 
behavioral manifestation that involves the actual act of risk-taking”. In 
an emergency situation, such behavior could be manifested, for example, 
as the willingness to enter a dangerous avalanche area on the basis of 
strangers’ risk assessments, or participating in an attack where your sur-
vival depends on unfamiliar people’s ability to cover you. 
A lack of “swift trust” may have several negative consequences. For 
example, withdrawal, passivity or even escape by people or groups 
that could have been valuable assets during an emergency (Fahy, 2012), 
lack of information-sharing or impaired delegation and decentralized 
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decision-making, to the benefit of control behaviors that slow down 
decision cycles or increase information overload (Fahy, 2012; Mishra, 
1996). Such low trust perceptions may also lead to relevant and available 
resources at the emergency scene being ignored, due to pre-established 
negative reputations, as is frequently witnessed in the interplay between 
the police and fire department in New York (Fahy, 2012). 
Therefore, an important element in a theory about effective collabora-
tion between strangers is the identification of factors that may stimulate 
(or obstruct) the formation of “swift trust”. Here, the first meeting may be 
of great importance. 
How can “swift trust” be developed?
The first meeting – the birth of “swift trust” (?) 
For the formation of “swift trust”, the first meeting between individuals 
or groups that need to collaborate may represent the “moment of birth” 
(Ben-Shalom et al., 2005). At this meeting, people strive to learn as much 
as they can about those they are dealing with, and subsequently decide 
on how they will approach the relationship in the future (Meyerson et al., 
1996; Sunnafrank & Ramirez, 2004). A company commander puts this 
need into words in the middle of a combat operation: 
“When you don’t know, it worries you. You don’t know what his capabilities are, 
what he knows… You ask him: What can you do, what are your capabilities? … 
You study him, learn to know him a bit, you must do that.” (Ben-Shalom et al., 
2005:73). 
Little is yet known about the mechanisms and behaviors that stimulate 
the formation of “swift trust” during such initial encounters, and only 
one study has, to our knowledge, addressed the question empirically (i.e. 
Ben-Shalom et al., 2005). However, the more substantial body of research 
on first impressions may represent an alternative path to the development 
of this theory. From this research, we learn first that impressions about 
other people are formed very quickly and often sub-consciously. For 
example, in a study of trait inferences based on facial appearance, trait 
judgments made after only 100 milliseconds of exposure, concerning 
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variables like trustworthiness and competence, correlated highly with 
judgments made in the absence of time constraints (Willis & Todorov, 
2006). Second, studies suggest that first impressions have a long duration, 
and determine how communication and relations develop over time. An 
example of this is provided by Sunnafrank and Ramirez (2004), who show 
that impressions made after three-minute first encounters determine the 
long-term nature of relationships. And third, a large body of research 
shows that automatic evaluations can be relatively rigid and difficult to 
change (Bertram, Rydell, Vervliet, & De Houwer, 2010). 
The functional properties and antecedents of positive first impressions 
are still the subject of ongoing debate. Regarding functionality, “Pre-
dicted outcome value theory” (POVT) suggests that individuals attempt, 
often unconsciously, to develop relationships with those expected to be 
most rewarding, and restrict development with those who appear less 
rewarding (Sunnafrank & Ramirez, 2004). Hence, low-outcome value 
assessments will produce few to no attempts to continue a contact, and 
vice versa in the case of positive assessments. In either case, individuals 
will act and communicate in ways likely to maintain initial impressions 
and relational decisions. 
In a field study of combat units at war, Ben-Shalom and colleagues 
(2005) observed two parallel processes related to swift impression-mak-
ing in temporary settings. The members initially imported expectations 
of trust from other settings, making use of category-driven information 
processing to form stereotypical impressions, due to the limited room 
for developing expectations based on first-hand information. However, 
once different units had been placed within a new context, such catego-
ry-driven reputation was not enough to assure collaboration. A process 
of mutual testing was also activated in order to detect the possibility of 
extending cooperation to more sensitive areas. 
From this, I deduce that awareness of the first-impression processes 
interwoven in first meetings and the ability to create a positive impression, 
may represent an important competency for emergency workers, who 
often collaborate with strangers. An awareness of stereotypical impres-
sions generally attributed to one’s own profession, and the significance of 
rapid demonstrations of competency, may also represent knowledge that 
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could be transformed into pre-established strategies that can be activated 
to stimulate “swift trust”. 
It is, however, notable that no experimental studies have studied behav-
iors or traits that may stimulate positive first impressions in a complex 
and dangerous setting, affecting the level of “swift trust”. Nevertheless, 
there are strong indications that such positive impressions and trust are 
related to how leadership is conducted. 
Competent leadership and involvement
Leaders are important, and a large body of research shows a direct link 
between a leader’s behavior and how well a group functions. Many stud-
ies also show that the effect of this behavior is often mediated by trust (e.g. 
Zhu, Newman, Miao, & Hooke, 2013). In addition, it has been suggested 
that trust in a leader will have a contagious effect on the group, propelling 
the formation and distribution of trust in the group as a whole, possibly 
due to an increased optimism related to mastering the situation (Fulmer 
& Gelfand, 2012; Meyerson et al., 1996). This may explain why the lead-
ership factor, in a study of Scandinavian military officers, emerged as the 
single most important factor explaining “swift trust”, or the lack of it, in 
critical situations (Hyllengren et al., 2011). 
According to Kolditz (2007), those leader characteristics and behaviors 
that are perceived as instrumental in getting people through a dangerous 
situation alive, are the most important in the formation of follower-attrib-
uted trust. In a study of US soldiers at war in Iraq, Sweeney (2010) found 
that particularly followers’ perception of their leaders’ combat-related 
competency determined how much they trusted these leaders. This study 
also found that soldiers re-evaluated trust in their leaders at the point of 
transition from peace to combat operations, shifting from a strong appre-
ciation of relationship-oriented leadership into a much stronger apprecia-
tion of leaders’ military skills and tactical judgment, as exemplified in the 
following quote from a US soldier at war in Iraq: 
“I don’t like the guy. I don’t know how to deal with him when we get off work, 
but as far as being professional and being out there in the trenches, he is a great 
squad leader… I admire him.” (Kolditz, 2007:12).
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In the same vein, on the basis of a content analysis of 988 critical inci-
dents, Lapidot (2007) found that subordinates’ perception of vulnerability 
increased the importance of behaviors reflecting leader ability, compared 
to benevolence, to avoid swift erosion of trust. The question is, however, 
how such professional competence can be demonstrated quickly – in 
order to nurture “swift trust”. 
Few, if any, studies have investigated this important question empiri-
cally, but several assumptions can be made: 
(1) There are indications that static factors, such as leaders’ rank and 
status, may stimulate “swift trust” in the leader in a temporary group 
(Lapidot et al., 2007). By symbolizing competency and responsibil-
ity, such symbols may nurture hope and positive expectations, and 
lower a feeling of vulnerability. 
(2) As shown by Hyllengren et al. (2011), leaders’ rapid trustworthiness 
is highly dependent on their ability to display emotional stability 
in the face of danger – possibly as an indication of coping ability. 
Thus, a leader’s ability to gain control over personal fears and stress- 
reactions may be an important amplifier of “swift trust”. 
(3) As part of the observed process of mutual testing of others during 
first meetings, Ben-Shalom (2005) found that even simple arrange-
ments, like how a tank commander placed tanks in a parking area, 
served as a test of competence to detect the possibility of extending 
cooperation to more sensitive areas. This indicates that leaders should 
be involved, not only in initial decisions, but also in the actual organ-
izing, planning and first operational responses. Extended delegation, 
rendering the leader “invisible,” may give an advantage in terms of 
overview, but may obstruct the possibility for strangers to learn more 
about the leader quickly and subsequently develop “swift trust”. 
(4) Effective leadership in dangerous situations also requires rapid 
decision making, tailored to a constantly changing environment 
(Kolditz, 2007). Thus, a demonstration of decisiveness may initially 
stimulate trust swiftly, which partially concurs with Meyerson et al.’s 
(1996) suggestion that “swift trust” is more resistant in groups 
where leaders and followers are skillful improvisers. This implies 
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that for “swift trust” to evolve, the leader should not take a purely 
authoritarian role but rather demonstrate a willingness to change 
plans together with the group (Lester, 2006; Meyerson et al., 1996). 
This concurs with Hyllengren et al.’s (2011) finding that the ability 
to encourage involvement and creativity is the single-most signif-
icant leadership behavior related to “swift trust”. Here, the ques-
tion about why such involvement might stimulate “swift trust” is 
both relevant and under-researched. One could, however, speculate 
that involvement rapidly increases a sense of control, which subse-
quently stimulates positive outcome expectations and “swift trust”, 
but the basis for this claim is, as yet, thin. 
(5) A leader’s ability to share risk with followers has also been sug-
gested as a way to stimulate trust in leaders in dangerous contexts 
(Kolditz, 2007). By initially exposing him or herself to the dangers 
of the situation, the leader both communicates hope that the situa-
tion may be mastered (and will not become a death sentence), and 
nurtures a sense of justice, by demonstrating willingness to share 
the same fate as their followers – possibly stimulating “swift trust”. 
Role clarity as “swift trust” development 
An additional challenge for leaders in temporal settings is to stimulate a 
sense of common role clarity in the group (Curnin et al., 2015). Meyerson 
et al. (1996) suggest that strangers build trust faster by dealing with each 
other through roles than through personal relationships, which may 
take a long time to develop. This is further supported by McEvily and 
Perrone et al. (2003) who find that reducing role redundancies is an effec-
tive strategy to increase trust within organizations. Thus, an ability to rap-
idly establish a common understanding of each other’s responsibilities and 
tasks (i.e. role clarity), represents a form of (swift) trust building suited for 
temporary teams, as demonstrated also in a recent study of liaison officers 
in emergency operation centers in Australia (Curnin et al., 2015). 
However, according to Fahy (2012), such swift establishment of roles may 
be difficult to achieve. Often, in complex and dangerous situations, first 
responders have difficulty seeking out counterparts early in an operation 
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to share information regarding their capabilities or tactics, or to decide 
on strategies. An initial meeting does not occur and roles are not clearly 
defined; units operate independently without communicating their roles 
or understanding the roles of others. Curnin et al. (2015) also observed 
that in groupings of individuals with different backgrounds and profes-
sions, establishing clear roles was difficult, due to different perspectives 
and experience. This situation points to another challenge related to the 
development of “swift trust”: the integration of different group identities. 
The challenge of a new “us” and integration  
of “them”
During the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, the emergency response 
agencies in New York City lacked the ability to collaborate and share 
information during the initial response (Fahy, 2012), which led to the 
deaths of emergency responders at the World Trade Center, among other 
things. In the same vein, cross-agency agencies had difficulty establish-
ing trust and cooperation during Hurricane Katrina, due to strongly-held 
negative organizational stereotypes of the other organizations and per-
ceived ideological differences, according to Zolin’s (2002) findings. 
This lack of trust could be viewed as a clash of social identities and gen-
eral distrust between agencies. According to Tajfel’s (1981) Social Identity 
Theory, individuals gain positive self-identity through membership in a 
group, partially from a general overestimation of one’s own group and a 
devaluation of others, nurturing a state of competition and subsequently, 
a lack of trust between groups. This implies that a state of pre-established 
distrust and competitive attitudes may need to be changed quickly in order 
to develop a functional cooperation between groups in temporal settings. 
In their field study of Israeli combat forces, Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) 
observed four strategies that enhanced the integration of unknown “vis-
iting units” into established “host units”, and the subsequent rise of “swift 
trust”. First, any logistical needs vital for the “guest” elements to carry out 
their task were promptly met (e.g. kitchen services, sleeping areas, ammu-
nition), and the “host” demonstrated a strong will to learn from the others. 
Second, allowance was made for the smaller units to freely express their 
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professional knowledge and authority without direct relation to their rank 
in the military, so that a tank commander, for example, might be consulted 
by a brigadier commander on how to best utilize the tanks. A third factor 
was related to “distributive justice” and a fair balance in the allocation of 
quality assignments during the mission. And fourth, an innovative combi-
nation of doctrinal and “local” practices that entailed a toolbox of routines, 
language, drills, etc. was often developed to fit the specific situation, stimu-
lating a commonality among forces that had no common history. 
In the same vein, Zolin (2002) emphasizes the importance of creating 
a unique and temporal task group identity, a new “we” that encompasses 
all present groups, possibly even by naming the new formation in order to 
enhance cooperation. In this process, a leader’s enthusiasm for the tem-
porary group is seen as a decisive factor in establishing a team mindset. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tried to emphasize the relevance of developing “swift 
trust” in emergency situations and some ways of succeeding in this. It is 
my opinion that there should be more focus on this topic in both research 
and training of emergency workers. A search in Google Scholar puts this 
in perspective. On the topic “team building”, about 179,000 references 
occur, while “team development” gives about 41,800, and “social cohe-
sion” 361,000. In comparison, the topic “cooperation between strangers” 
receives about 555 references. If you add “swift”, “rapid” or “quick” to all 
of the above-mentioned topics, notably no references occur. From this we 
learn that much is known about what constitutes a well-functioning group, 
but it also shows a gap between the realities often facing first responders to 
an emergency situation, having to cooperate with people and groups they 
have never met before – and the body of contemporary theory. 
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Abstract
This study shows some generic characteristics from sports that are of relevance to 
samhandling structures under risk. The findings are based on a case study of the 
concept of “Total Football” and the Rosenborg Football Club (RBK) in Norway. 
Football is a dynamic sport with several factors that come into play and where 
flexible solutions are demanded. The case is also of relevance for organizations in 
handling risk. RBK’s samhandling is based on “Total Football” and flow theory. In 
analyzing RBK, we also apply theories of improvisation. RBK created a platform 
that gave both direction to choices and a clear playing pattern. This platform further 
ensured that tasks could be executed at high speed and high intensity, described as 
“flow”. Flow contributed to both speed and precision in the playing pattern. It is 
concluded that the following is relevant for other organizations: 1) Forming a deep-
er understanding of samhandling and ensuring top management commitment; 2) 
Creating, establishing and maintaining samhandling in a manner that suits the or-
ganization; and 3) Minimal structures can be of great importance for organizations 
in unforeseen and risky situations. 
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Are there characteristics in sports that are of relevance for samhandling 
structures that can also have relevance for risk situations and unfore-
seen situations in other organizations and branches? We have examined 
the samhandling concept, play pattern and philosophy of RBK. A well- 
performing and functioning soccer team can be viewed as the product 
of several factors. In the following example, football will be used. It can 
be used to determine which football team is performing best. A football 
player has ten other players to relate to; he or she also has eleven other 
players on the opposing team to consider.
This provides a myriad of possibilities, which makes the game complex. 
In that sense, football is a very good example of studying the unforeseen. 
“Football players have to react to surprising moves from the opposi-
tion and also generate moves that catch opposing players off guard” 
(Montuori, 2003:240). Improvisation plays a key role here. This can be 
termed as “react and act” (Bjurwill, 1993). The coach has less impact 
on the team during the match, when the noise in the stadium prevents 
verbal communication and communication is reduced to short messages 
or signals. Hedberg et al. (1976) observes that system designers have weak 
direct influence on participants’ behavior. That is, it is not possible to 
command and control the situation. 
The risk concept here is linked to both the potential for injuries dur-
ing training and matches and to the uncertainty of match results. Firstly, 
training will need to identify hazard signals and maneuver away from 
them, often very quickly. Secondly, both players and the team as a whole 
must have an overview of the game. The uncertainty of match results is 
linked to the extent to which team-based play systems and the individ-
ual’s skills work along the way, when faced with the other team, and the 
game’s development from second to second.
Similarly, Hedberg et al. (1976) suggests that designers should recon-
ceive their roles as catalysts for a system’s self-design. Becker (1986) offers 
the concept of culture to explain the phenomenon of concerted activity 
and draws insight from playing improvised music such as jazz. There-
fore, Weick (1993; 1999) suggests the jazz band as a preferable prototype 
organization. Barret (1998) claims that an orchestra metaphor, connoting 
learning from sports
415
pre-described musical scores and having a single conductor as leader, is 
limited when compared to the ambiguity and high level of turbulence that 
many managers experience. Alvesson and Spicer (2011) claim that how we 
understand and interpret leadership is absolutely central to whether we 
actually respond to it. What is more important is what we do with the 
metaphors (Davidson, 1984; Hatch, 1997:2002; Rorty, 1989). 
Morgan (1986) points out that viewing through a metaphorical lenses 
provides a way of seeing that might actually block other ways of seeing, 
putting us in a position of not being able to see. Barrett (1998) writes, “Jazz 
players do what managers find themselves doing: fabricating and invent-
ing novel responses without a pre-described plan and without certainty 
of outcomes, discovering the future that their action creates as it unfolds.” 
(Barrett, 1998:605). Perky (1991) also supports the view that organiza-
tional strategy may be seen through the lens of jazz improvisation. His 
central premise is that the organization might be better off if they started 
to conduct themselves with the sense of flexibility and environmental 
negotiation that jazz improvisation employs. Brady (2011) examines the 
Battle of Stalingrad and stresses that, while the German commander, 
Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, stuck to the plan and doctrines too rig-
idly, his opponent, the Russian Marshal, Georgij Zjukov, improvised and 
allowed improvisation by the Russian high command, Stavka, providing 
him with more freedom and flexibility to adapt to urban warfare. 
The case in this article concerns RBK and their samhandling pattern 
under coach Nils Arne Eggen’s leadership. This chapter examines the fol-
lowing research question: How can RBK’s way of playing be explained 
by structure and the ability to improvise? We use football and jazz as 
metaphors for understanding organizations dealing with complexity and 
the unforeseen. 
Brief case description
During Nils Arne Eggen’s term as head coach, spanning from 1988–2002, 
RBK experienced remarkable success. In short, they won the national 
series thirteen times during this period (and every year between 1992–
2002), becoming Norwegian Cup champions five times in the same 
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period. From 1995 to 2002, they qualified for the Champions League 
tournament every year, reaching the quarter-final in the 1996–1997 sea-
son and winning the group stage in the 1999–2000 season. By 2002, RBK 
was amongst the most experienced teams in the tournament. They quali-
fied for the Champions League tournament again in 2004, 2005 and 2007, 
after the reign of Nils Arne Eggen had ended. 
The influences on their play can be traced back to two sources. The 
most influential source is “Total Football” (Eggen & Nyrønning, 1999). 
Here we can connect “Total Football” to Nils Arne Eggen and his focus 
on the samhandling between players as a means of exploiting opportu-
nities. Nils Arne Eggen uses the term samhandling. The other important 
term is the favored foot (“Godfoten”). The idea is that you should focus on 
your strongest side and use it as a part of the system, for the benefit of all. 
Steiro & Torgersen (2013) imply that samhandling is about something to 
do “in action” rather “on action”; that is, it is a deeper form of cooperation 
which involves more direct influence between individuals, building on 
each other’s skills and competence. The latter can also be traced to Bel-
bin (1998; 1999), Miles & Watkins (2007) and Torgersen & Steiro (2009), 
focusing on complementary skills and roles. 
Theoretical background
“Total Football” and samhandling
“Total Football” was developed by the legendary Dutch coach, Rinus 
Michels, and the legendary player and later coach, Johan Cruijff. Michels 
(2003) borrows the conductor metaphor of the philharmonic orchestra 
but, at the same time, he pinpoints some obvious differences: in contrast 
to the musicians, who can sit down and concentrate, football players are 
constantly confronted with elements all around them (Michels, 2003). 
Wilson (2008) notes, “‘Total Football’ is the label given to an influential 
tactical theory of association football, in which any outfield player can 
take over the role of any other player in a team.…You make space, you 
come into space. And if the ball doesn’t come, you leave this place and 
another player will come into it.” (Wilson, 2008:37). “Total Football” was 
pioneered by Ajax and the Dutch national football team. “Total Football” 
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was exported to Barcelona Footbal Club when Rinus Michels moved to 
the club; he was later joined by Johan Cruijff (Wilson, 2008; Winner, 
2000). Space and the creation of space are central to the concept of “Total 
Football”. The constant switching of positions that became known as 
“Total Football” only came about because of this spatial awareness. On 
the dynamics of football coaches, Carson (2013) writes, “As with many 
leadership arenas, football leadership has become a whole lot more com-
plex. But the leader who can use his team of staff to bring simplicity out 
of the complexity will win the day.” (Carson, 2013:122). 
The second influence is that of Nils Arne Eggens’s coaching colleague, 
Kjell Schou Andreassen, who led the Viking Football Club to three cham-
pionships between 1971–1974 in Norway. They coached the Norwegian 
national team together, albeit with limited success. Andreassen was later 
strongly influenced by the psychologist Csikszentmihalyi (1996; 2002) 
and the focus on flow theory (Andreassen & Wadel, 1989). 
Kuper and Szymanski (2009) explain Johan Cruijff’s thinking, “He was 
a philosopher of football and the most important thing about football, for 
Cruijff, was the pass. ‘You never passed to a teammate’s feet,’ he lectured, 
‘but always a yard in front of him, to keep the pace in the game.’ While 
the first player was passing to the second player, the third player already 
had to be in motion, ready to receive the second player’s pass.” (Kuper & 
Sxymanski, 2009:397). Samhandling between the players and their special 
skills in a more structured setting becomes more important and raises 
tactical awareness. For Cruijff, 4-3-3 was the formation that best covered 
all spaces on the football field. It was a more explicit way of using the 
wings and focusing on complementary skills. The wing backs could also 
be used offensively, given that other players covered their defensive tasks. 
Improvisation and flow
Eisenberg defines improvisation as “making do with minimal common-
alities and elaborating on simple structures in complex ways” (Eisenberg, 
1990:154). Eisenberg writes further on players balancing autonomy and 
interdependence. Improvisation can be labeled as flow, that is, a phe-
nomenon in which spontaneity and creativity reach such high levels that 
radical transformation happens in real time (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). 
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Hatch (1997) focuses on intuition guiding something in a spontaneous 
but historically contextualized way. Organizational improvisation can 
be defined as “the conception of action as it unfolds, by an organization 
and/or its members, drawing on available material, cognitive, effective 
and social resources” (Cunha, Cunha & Kamoche, 2002:99). Seligman 
(2003) proposes that flow is more likely if a person concentrates on using 
their “signature strengths”. The theoretical foundation can be linked to 
Csikszentmihalyi (1996; 2002). Most studies of flow in sport have focused 
on individual sports, as it has been argued that these are more likely to 
elicit flow, particularly sports that are repetitive and provide fast feed-
back (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). However, there is empirical support of flow 
experience in team sports as well (Jackson, 1995). 
Flow theory and samhandling
Flow theory can be linked to samhandling in football. In all situations, 
the balance between challenges and skills is important. Challenges 
beyond our skills push us out of the comfort zone and lead to frustration 
and then anxiety (Andreassen & Wadel, 1989; Eggen & Nyrønning, 1999; 
Simonsen, 2005; Skrede, 1992). Left alone, one cannot adjust this imbal-
ance and is in need of good helpers. Eggen explains, “Teammates using 
their ‘favored foot aim at your favored foot, resulting in plus experiences. 
A platform of mastery is built together.” (Skrede, 1992:106). Eggen & 
Nyrønning (1999) point out that, “There are no problems in performance 
demands that bring you out of the flow zone, if you collectively control 
performance you can be adjusting and be rooted at a higher performance 
level.” (Eggen & Nyronning, 1999:225). Flow is defined as “that holistic sen-
sation that people feel when they act with total involvement” (Csikszent-
mihalyi, 1975:36). Csikszentmihalyi (1997) and Jackson and Marsh (1996) 
identified nine characteristics that are the fundamentals of flow: balance 
between challenges and skills, fusion of action and consciousness, clear 
goals, immediate feedback, concentration and focus on activities, feeling 
of control, loss of self-consciousness, time distortion and autoelic expe-
rience. Flow can be achieved by job design (Bakker, 2008; Demerouti, 
2006; Salanova, Bakker & Llorens, 2006). There are similarities between 
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Csikszentmihalyi (1975; 1997; 2003) and the Demand and Control Model 
proposed by Karasek and Theorell (1979). The model states that there is 
an interactional effect between demand and control. Karasek and Theo-
rell (1990) added social support to the model later. Leitao (2009) studied 
RBK and concluded that ability is not the sum of the group’s individual 
competence, but the sum of competence that is created together. Her-
berg, Torgersen & Rundmo (2018) (Chapter 15) found that samhandling is 
the most important factor in risk situations and meeting the unforeseen. 
Lagadec (1993) has stressed that the foundation for crisis management is 
established before the crisis occurs. 
Therefore, it is of great interest to study an organization that has been 
very aware of samhandling and see how it has been both developed and 
maintained. Sports have the advantage of making it easier to assess good 
performances, particularly over a period of time. A football team can 
work with a plan but needs to take into account the dynamics of the sit-
uation. They need to take certain risks to win or to secure a good result. 
Method
The empirical data of this study is based on document analysis and 
semi-structured interviews. The starting point is Nils Arne Eggen’s book 
Godfoten: Samhandling – veien til suksess [The favored foot. Samhandling 
as the road to success] (Eggen & Nyrønning, 1999). It describes the foot-
ball philosophy clearly. Skrede (1992) has also provided insight into the 
ideas behind the RBK philosophy and Nils Arne Eggen’s way of leading. 
The following two documents provide valuable insight into the devel-
opment of ideas. Åsvoll, Gudmundsdottir & Karlsdottir (2002) studied 
coach Bjørn Hansen (head coach of RBK between 1984 and 1985, and 
assistant coach to Nils Arne Eggen 1990 –1997). Simensen’s (2005) book 
Godfotarven [Favored foot heritage] also provides an important window 
into the RBK mentality. Nils Arne Eggen and four key players of the 
golden era were interviewed between September 2015 and February 2016. 
The interview guide was based on reading the documents listed above 
and linked directly to the problem formulation. Nils Arne Eggen was 
interviewed for one and a half hours. We also asked four key players for 
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interviews, which they all agreed to do. These interviews lasted between 
45–60 minutes. The players’ identities are kept anonymous. They are all 
players who were considered to be part of the starting 11, who had played 
for several seasons and who had substantial Champions League expe-
rience. Thematic analysis was adopted to analyze the interview mate-
rial (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Our analytical approach was driven by the 
researchers’ interest in the research question and, in particular, the works 
of Skrede (1992) and Eggen and Nyrønning (1999). 
The analysis can be classified as a deductive, thematic analysis or a “top 
down” process, according to Braun & Clarke (2006). A theme was defined 
as patterned response or meaning within the data set (Braun and Clarke, 
2006:82). In addition, we have used concepts from Torgersen and Steiro 
(2009) as a framework. We have also examined other relevant chapters in 
this anthology (see Chapter 1, Torgersen, 2018), in order to put the current 
study within a context of risk and the unforeseen. 
Results and discussion
Nils Arne Eggen was very concerned with collective issues and his 
philosophy is best illustrated by the following quotation: “The highest 
form of collaboration is when the player moves away from ‘must do’ to 
‘want to do’ the same thing.” The foundation lies in the individual play-
er’s educational skills: their ability to make others good. The ability to 
take responsibility for others’ development and performance. Nils Arne 
Eggen focuses a lot on social resources that bring out the best in players. 
A left wing needs to constantly run, either to get a pass or to open up and 
create a space for the second or even third attacker. The left wing player 
“Mini” Jakobsen needed to get a pass which allowed him to utilize his 
“favored foot”; in this case, a low pass in front of him. This is completely 
in line with the thinking of “Total Football” (Michels, 2003; Wilson, 
2008). High, curved balls would not lead to mastery but only frustration 
for this left wing. According to Nils Arne Eggen’s philosophy, the follow-
ing points are the foundation for the postulates and the interaction: 1) 
You will play well if you make others good, and 2) It is all about channe-
ling the ego-drives to a collective effort. This was very evident both from 
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the literature review and from the interviews. The players mentioned the 
collective as a crucial point. 
From football to jazz
It is interesting to note that Nils Arne Eggen uses an example from jazz, 
claiming, “…it is not until common ground is established that creative 
improvisation provides meaning and development.” (Eggen and Nyronning, 
1999:125, authors’ translation). Montuori (2003) has also compared football 
to jazz. Amabile (2001) stresses the importance for a group to share excite-
ment over the team’s goal and mutual recognition of each other. Løfdali 
(2014), referring to RBK’s success, says “Eggen’s explanation of the basis 
of success can be summed up in one word: samhandling. What the players 
highlight is the coach’s clear picture of how to play football and his unique 
ability to transfer this to the players.” (Løfdali, 2014:29, authors’ translation).
This is also supported by By Rise (2014). In the interviews this was very 
evident too. All the players agreed that the basic structure could be iden-
tified and they all talked about focusing on the group before one’s own 
interest. The players recognized an overall theme. They also acknowl-
edged the high quality of training using the same theme. “After a while, 
we got tired of Nils Arne’s nagging and adapted to his style. We recognized 
the pattern, became familiar with our roles and a feeling of mastery devel-
oped.” (Player 1). 
Minimal structures
The RBK philosophy consisted of 50 postulates which cannot be fully 
articulated here. For a complete overview, see Eggen & Nyrønning (1999). 
The game postulates were first introduced in 1994 to ease learning. Pre-
sented in keywords and articulated briefly, they are best understood in 
relation to practical execution (Eggen & Nyrønning, 1999). Based on the 
interviews, the following postulates seem to be of special importance and 
are often repeated, therefore serving as an educational tool. Other pos-
tulates are also relevant but these seven are the most common. They are 
presented in Table 22.1. 
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Table 22.1 Play postulates and their explanation
Advance ahead Start movement before a pass is made.
Third attacker movement Attacker one and two move, attracting the attention 
of the opposing team, allowing the third attacker to 
excel.
Play in longitudinal direction Focus mainly on forward play.
Speedy transfers Exploit the immediate possibilities that a mistake or 
non-intended pass from a co-player provides.
Concurrent movements Several movements that the opposing team have to 
react to, also linked particularly to the third attacker 
movement.
Create outnumbering situations One or two players in attack, such as on the left 
flank, open up different opportunities, creating a 
dilemma for the right back in defense.
Table 22.1 illustrates the play postulates of minimal structures. Minimal 
structures can be used as powerful tools in training. During the Battle of 
Britain, the Royal Air Force adopted the minimal structure, “Beware of 
the Hun in the sun.” (Holland, 2010; Hillary, 2015). The German fighters 
preferred to attack from above, with the sun behind them. The German 
Messerschmitt BF 109E had its strength in steep dives and steep climbs to 
attack the British fighters, Spitfire MK 1 and 2 and Hurricanes MK 1 and 2. 
“Beware of the Hun in the sun” is simple; it was easy and essential for a 
fighter pilot’s survival in the Battle of Britain. 
Similarly, it is worth noticing that the play postulates, in Eggen’s 
own words, are very brief and need to be seen in relation to practical 
exercises. The team trains intensively on a few selected movement pat-
terns that are so clearly set out that they become automatic, releasing a 
significant amount of energy for improvisation and creativity. The jazz 
musician Charles Mingus focused heavily on collective improvisation 
and insisted, “You can’t improvise on nothing; you’ve got to improvise 
on something” (Kernfeld, 1995:119). This is also illustrated by Nils Arne 
Eggen, “It can be an educational and linguistic challenge to slightly vary 
the same message from time to time, just like jazz. This is an impor-
tant skill for a coach. Good coaches manage to convey the same mes-





The same idea was very clearly expressed in Eggen’s book (Eggen & 
Nyrønning, 1999) and both the coach and players reported that this was 
reinforced during training sessions: “Look out for opportunities. A bad 
pass can create a new opportunity.” The last twenty minutes of train-
ing were spent on “shadow training”. Here, the eleven players from the 
starting lineup played against the rest of the team. In addition, Eggen 
demanded a fast pace during training. However, when necessary, Eggen 
would intercept with his characteristic “Stop!”, meaning freezing play 
momentarily while he demonstrated a principle, such as “creating out-
numbering situations,” to get the players to interact properly. In the inter-
views, all of the players highlighted the quality of training, from Monday 
to Friday. “The training sessions were the foundation, with clear objectives 
and high quality” (Player 3). “We were the best team, so when the attack 
formation played against the defense they were up against the very best. If 
we had flow, we knew match day would not be any harder” (Player 1). We 
can see this in relation to the thinking of “Total Football”, of being aware 
of one’s own role and seeing one’s contribution – “I can participate too” 
(Michels, 2003; Wilson, 2008).
Conclusion
This study shows that there are several factors we can learn from sports 
that are important for samhandling under risk. Firstly, in the current 
study, a very interesting approach emerges, regarding the use of comple-
mentary skills in a framework or picture. As Charles Mingus put it, so 
succinctly: You can’t improvise on nothing; you’ve got to improvise on 
something.” The picture is an educational tool to illustrate, create, train 
and adjust skills and competencies to the structure. It also demonstrates 
an example of focusing on competence rather than position. Secondly, it 
also illustrates that it takes time to establish samhandling. We see a strong 
link to the Dutch concept of “Total Football” and this has been a major 
inspiration for samhandling. The generic lessons from this case study for 
other organizations where samhandling is important can be summed up 
as follows in Table 22.2, with the implications on the right. 
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Table 22.2 Summing-up of the important factors for samhandling
1.  Form a deeper understanding 
of samhandling and ensure top 
management commitment
It is important that the organization does not have 
plans that cover everything. Organizations should 
plan, but at the same time, they should create a 
framework for samhandling that is rooted in some 
basic structure within the culture of the organization. 
This could be, for example, acknowledging the 
competence of the people in the sharp end to make 
sound decisions. 
2.  Create, establish and maintain 
samhandling in a sense that suits 
the organization
The organization, with the support of top 
management, should train the organization for 
the unforeseen and make resources available in 
accordance with existing culture. 
3.  Minimal structures can be of great 
importance for organizations in 
unforeseen and risky situations. 
Minimal structures, as demonstrated in this 
chapter, could serve as guiding principles that are 
recognizable throughout the organization. Rather 
than stressing that everything should be covered 
by plans, minimal structures could be enforced as 
strong guiding principles, regardless of the situation. 
The understanding of, or again, the picture of samhandling needs to be 
created and reinforced by leadership and institutionalized within the 
organization. We can see from the current study the importance of sam-
handling through the alignment of educational, organizational and oper-
ational structures. 
The main point is that top leadership creates the framework and the 
people in the sharp ends find out how to execute it. This means that all 
levels in an organization are important but in different ways. Minimal 
structures can create a strong common ground and, at the same time, 
provide flexibility within a certain framework, which is so important for 
meeting the unforeseen. 
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The World Health Organisation (WHO, 2007) defines patient handover 
as a high-risk area in health care. In Norway, the Coordination Reform 
[Samhandlingsreformen] (White Paper No. 47, 2008–2009) points to frag-
mented and poorly-coordinated services as a key challenge in the health 
services. We use the term “coordination” in this field and chapter. The 
tasks related to treatment and care are carried out in separate units or 
‘silos’ (Gloubermann & Mintzberg, 2001), although the municipality and 
specialist healthcare services have complementary roles and functions 
(Kodner & Spreeuwenberg, 2002). The hospital focuses on treatment and 
the municipal healthcare services focus on patient care, function and 
coping with daily life. Communication between involved healthcare per-
sonnel, continuity of information and transfer of care responsibility are 
some key factors for patient safety in care coordination between hospital 
and municipal healthcare services.
Insufficient care coordination across hospital and municipal health-
care services may increase the risk of adverse events (Laugaland, Aase, 
& Barach, 2011). This can be due to unclear, delayed or insufficient infor-
mation and communication between healthcare personnel about the 
patient’s medication and treatment, inadequate preparations for upcom-
ing care transitions, and poor coordination of measures in the municipal 
healthcare services (Hellesø, Sørensen, & Lorensen, 2005; Hesselink, et 
al., 2013). Inadequate care coordination leads to problems maintaining 
continuity of care, and increases the risk of adverse events, patient re- 
admissions to hospitals and mortality (Stoyanov et al., 2012; Tsmilligras 
& Bates, 2008). The preparation of elderly patients and their next of kin 
for upcoming care transitions to municipal healthcare services may be 
one way of improving care coordination and patient safety (Bull, Hansen, 
& Gross, 2000; Foss & Hofoss, 2011).
This chapter will shed light on the issue of care coordination within 
the framework of patient safety, health policy directives and legislation. 
We use the term “care coordination” in order to be consistent with the 
Norwegian government’s use of the concept in the Coordination Reform 
(White Paper No. 47, 2008–2009). The Coordination Reform and related 
laws emphasize responsibilities; rights and duties for specialist health 
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services and municipalities to ensure care coordination and continuity 
in healthcare services (Municipal Health and Care Services Act, 2011; 
Specialist Health Services Act, 1999; White Paper No. 47, 2008–2009). 
The concepts of “care coordination”, “continuity of care” and “patient 
handover” will be explored in relation to patient safety. We will present 
some results of a research study that examines care coordination between 
hospitals and the municipal healthcare services. We will also identify 
some factors that affect patient safety in care coordination. Finally, we 
will comment on the work and follow-up efforts by the authorities, seen 
in the form of country-wide audits, and we will present some measures to 
improve care coordination and patient safety.
Health policy
The Coordination Reform, came into force in Norway on January 1 2012. 
The reform emphasizes strengthening patient autonomy, establishing care 
pathways for specific patient groups, ensuring consistency in contact and 
follow-up from health services during periods of illness, improving staff 
clinical competence in the municipalities, and establishing binding agree-
ments between municipalities and hospital trusts to ensure collaboration 
and shared-accountability for patient care and follow-up. In the National 
Health Plan for Norway (2011–2015), tasks related to the Coordination 
Reform occupy a central role. Its objective is to ensure the provision of high 
quality, comprehensive services, a high degree of patient safety and short 
waiting times. The White Paper, ‘High Quality – Safe Services – Quality 
and Patient Safety in the Health and Care Services’ (White Paper No. 10, 
2012–2013) identifies three main goals for work, related to quality and safety: 
1) Services need to become more user-oriented. The experiences of 
the individual patient/user need to be used in quality improvement, 
and service providers and patients need to engage in collaborative 
work, to ensure shared decisions about the individual’s treatment 
and care. The next of kin are a vital resource. 
2) Clearer prioritization of tasks related to systematic quality improve-
ment. Work related to healthcare quality needs to be integrated into 
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the service. Improving on the systems measuring quality, ensur-
ing leadership support and expectations for results, including fol-
low-up, with appropriate improvement measures when necessary.
3) Improved patient safety and a reduction in adverse events, through 
mechanisms and a culture for reporting, analysing, and learning 
from and preventing adverse events. Additionally, oversight over 
risk areas needs to be improved.
The White Paper assumes a broad approach to quality in the health 
services. It is based on the principle that the services are effective, safe 
and secure; involve users and give them influence; are coordinated and 
characterised by continuity; utilize resources effectively; are accessible 
and equitably distributed (Norwegian Directorate for Health and Social 
Affairs, 2005; White Paper no. 10, 2012–13, Institute of Medicine 2001). In 
the Paper, patient safety is one of the six dimensions of quality, or charac-
teristics, of the services (Aase, 2015; White Paper No. 10, 2012–2013; Direc-
torate of Health and Social Affairs, 2005). In this chapter, we will focus on 
patient safety as a central concept, even though it is often used in conjunc-
tion with quality. 
Legislation related to care coordination  
and patient safety
Norwegian regional health authorities have a duty to facilitate necessary 
collaboration between health trusts within the regional health authority 
and other regional health authorities, counties, and local municipalities, 
or other providers delivering services prescribed by law (Specialist Health 
Services Act, 1999). The Coordination Reform (White Paper, No. 47, 2008–
2009) and relevant legislation require hospital trusts in specialized health 
services and municipalities to establish binding agreements, in order to 
improve coordination and integration of healthcare services (Specialist 
Health Services Act, 1999; Municipal Health and Care Services Act, 2011). 
This is intended to ensure that patients and users experience continuity and 
coordination of services. The agreement includes, among other aspects, 
that the parties have to agree on which tasks the healthcare providers have 
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responsibility for. In addition, the agreement requires the specification of a 
common understanding of measures which the parties are responsible for 
implementing, if necessary. It also includes guidelines on collaboration, in 
relation to both admission to hospitals and the discharge of patients who 
require healthcare from providers in the municipality. A breach of the 
agreement may result in a written notification of irregularity and possible 
penalties. Individual plans, patient coordinators and coordinating bodies 
or offices are other instruments in the legislation, established to ensure con-
tinuity and coordination of care for patients with long-term needs. 
There are several legal requirements for the purpose of promoting 
patient safety. There is no specific patient safety act in Norway. However, 
there are requirements specified in several laws and regulations. Herein, 
we will briefly mention the most important ones. The concept of sound 
professional practice is one of the most central requirements for health-
care personnel and service providers. This requirement can be found in 
the Specialist Health Services Act (1999), the Municipal Health and Care 
Services Act (2011) and the Health Personnel Act (1999). The requirement 
of sound professional practice is not the only requirement in health leg-
islation with implications for patient safety. The Regulations on Leading 
Quality Improvement in the Health and Care Services (2016) describe 
central parts of the legally-required safety management system, which 
the provider must have in place. The provider is responsible for having 
an oversight over risk areas, and establishing mechanisms for prevention 
and following-up of adverse events, in addition to other things. There is 
also a specific requirement in relation to assessment of risk in handovers, 
within providers and between providers. Moreover, there are require-
ments imposing a duty on health personnel to hand over any available 
information on conditions that may endanger patient safety to supervi-
sory authorities. There is a requirement in the Specialist Health Services 
Act stating that healthcare providers have a mandatory duty to report 
adverse events to the Directorate of Health, and notify the Norwegian 
Board of Health Supervision about the most severe adverse events. The 
latter concerns deaths or significant injuries where the outcome is unex-
pected in terms of foreseeable risk. Figure 23.1 depicts the participants 
and their roles in care coordination and patient safety. 
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Patient and next of kin - involvement in care 
coordination and patient safety
Hospitals/local hospital trusts - sound 
professional practice, agreements and protocols 
for care coordination and patient safety
Supervisory body - audits to ensure health care 
providers’ regulatory compliance in relation to 
care coordination and patient safety
Ministry - policy, reforms and regulations in 
relation to care coordination and patient safety
Municipality - proper healthcare service, 
agreements and protocols for care coordinaton 
and patient safety
Figure 23.1 The participants and their roles in care coordination and patient safety.
Coordination and patient safety
Patient safety has become an established research area, both nationally 
and internationally (Aase, 2015). The development of the patient safety 
field in Norway has, to a large degree, been influenced by developments 
in other countries and international organizations, such as the World 
Health Organization (WHO) (NOU, 2015:11). WHO defines patient safety 
in the following terms:
“Patient safety is the absence of preventable harm to a patient during the process 
of health care. The discipline of patient safety is the coordinated efforts to pre-
vent harm, caused by the process of health care itself, from occurring to patients.” 
(WHO in NOU, 2015:11:26)
In 2010, the Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the Health Services 
explored taxonomies related to patient safety in the international liter-
ature. The following definition is currently used: “Patients shall not be 
subject to unnecessary harm, or the risk of unnecessary harm, as a result of 
the health service’s efforts and performance or lack of the same.” (Saunes, 
Svensby, Mølstad, & Thesen, 2010:6).
Research plays a central role in improving patient safety (Wiig & 
Manser, 2016). In a report on prioritized research themes in the field of 
patient safety, WHO has suggested that developed countries, such as 
care coordination,  samhandling and patient safety
435
Norway, should prioritize research on the lack of communication and 
coordination in the health services, (including discontinuity and coor-
dination across organizations/levels) as one of the top priorities (WHO, 
2008; Bates, et al. 2009). This highlights the need for knowledge related 
to care coordination and the risk of adverse events, as a result of the rapid 
exchange of information between ever-more specialized health personnel 
at various levels. We will now present and explore the following concepts: 
care coordination, continuity of care and patient handover, after which 
they will be related to patient safety using results from current research. 
Care coordination
According to Øgar and Hovland (2004:166), “care coordination” in the 
healthcare service concerns “… information exchange, knowledge trans-
fer, a division of responsibilities and tasks to properly safeguard the needs 
of the patient, and the overarching health policy goals and regulatory 
requirements which apply to the health service.” The goal is the compre-
hensive provision of healthcare services centred on the patient’s needs. 
Øgar and Hovland identify a series of factors that affect care coordina-
tion. These are: familiarity with and respect for involved stakeholders 
(health personnel, patients and next of kin); positive attitudes towards 
collaboration; a common understanding of the division of work tasks 
and responsibilities; familiarity with each other’s organizational cultures 
and professional language; platforms for cross-level communication and 
collaboration; trust and continuity in relations; possession of necessary 
clinical skills; and legislation and financing arrangements. Similarly, 
Torgersen and Steiro (2009) emphasize that care coordination is a com-
plementary process, including communication and the mutual exchange 
of information, and the use of involved stakeholder’s competence, experi-
ence and professional background. 
Nedreskår and Storm (2016) conducted an interview study with admin-
istrative personnel and leaders in hospital and municipal health services, 
focusing on care coordination during the discharge of elderly patients 
from hospitals to short-term nursing-home wards in the municipality. 
According to the interviewees, there could be disagreement between the 
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municipalities and hospitals in relation to whether or not the patient had 
completed his/her treatment, and was ready to be discharged from the 
hospital. It could also be difficult for health personnel in the hospital to 
decide when the patient had completed his/her treatment, because the 
patient’s health status can change fast. This requires regular communi-
cation between hospitals and the municipal health services. Municipal 
health services were under pressure to receive patients from hospital who 
had completed treatment, but had subsequent needs for follow-up care. 
This demands that the municipal health services have available beds in 
nursing homes, and that receiving healthcare personnel have the nec-
essary resources and competence to take on full responsibility for the 
patient’s care (Nedreskår & Storm, 2016).
Continuity of care
Continuity in patient information, efficient communication between the 
health personnel involved and the patient, flexibility and adaptability of 
care provision to the needs of the individual over time, are important 
preconditions for the patient to experience coordination and continuity 
in the health service (Freeman, Shepperd, Robinson, Enrich, & Richards, 
2000). Haggerty et al. (2003) have identified three types of continuity:
1. Management and organizational continuity
2. Information continuity
3. Relational continuity
Continuity in information contributes to ensuring that the health services 
provided to a patient are consistent and continuous, in spite of different 
health personnel being involved. The information may be related to an 
illness or a person. Management and organizational continuity are impor-
tant for patients with chronic or complex illnesses that require follow-
ing-up by health personnel in the municipal and specialist health services 
over time. An individual care plan is a mechanism for organizing and sys-
tematizing knowledge about the patient, creating a plan and setting goals 
for further following-up. It can also contribute to ensuring information 
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continuity and foreseeability in the provision of care (Wierdsma, Mulder, 
de Vries, & Sytema, 2009). Relational continuity can be ensured when 
the patient accesses services from a limited number of health personnel, 
and is able to establish meaningful and therapeutic relationships with 
them. In the field of mental health and municipal healthcare, relational 
continuity is particularly emphasized in the following-up of patients with 
long-term and chronic illnesses. However, it is also present in other situa-
tions (for instance, during a hospital stay), in which a core element of the 
staff provides the patient with an experience of foreseeability and conti-
nuity (Haggerty, et al. 2003).
Staffing levels, workload, time pressure, incompatible ICT systems and 
complex patient needs all affect the potential for continuity in the health 
services (Belling, et al. 2011). In the study by Nedreskår and Storm (2016), 
health personnel state that sufficient time, experience, competence and 
stability among nurses are important and contribute to coordinated care. 
Research in the field of mental health indicates that a lack of continuity in 
the provision of care may lead to re-admissions (Freeman, Weaver, Low, 
Crawford, & de Jong, 2002). Risk factors for suicide among users of men-
tal health services include a reduction in the frequency and scope of con-
tact between patients and health personnel, poorly-planned discharges 
from hospitals, changes in contact persons, and the absence of familiar 
health personnel (Freeman et al., 2002; Sweeney et al., 2012). 
Patient handover
Patient handover is central in care coordination and for continuity in the 
health service. A distinction can be made between intra-hospital patient 
handover, for example, between hospital wards or across work shifts, and 
inter-organizational patient handover, for example, between hospitals 
and municipal health services, or between healthcare organizations in 
the municipality (Schibevåg, Laugaland, & Aase, 2015). The key compo-
nents of patient handover are: 
• The exchange of patient information (for example, current medica-
tions, ongoing treatment, changes in health status) 
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• Communication between involved health personnel (on different 
work shifts, in different hospital wards, in specialist and municipal 
health services) 
• The transfer of responsibility for the patient’s treatment and care 
(Jeffcott, Evans, Cameron, Chin, & Ibrahim, 2009; WHO, 2007). 
Furthermore, the coordination of resources, staff training, involvement 
and training of the patient and family are important aspects (Hasting & 
Heflin, 2005; Wong, Yee & Turner, 2008; Laugaland, Aase, & Barach, 2012). 
A review of the literature by Laugaland et al. (2011) identifies poor 
communication, improperly-written transfer notes, lack of medication 
lists, and failures in procedures and responsibility for follow-up care, as 
risk areas in patient handover. Failures in medication lists may be the 
omission of regular medications, the cessation of medication, changes in 
dosage as well as the use of generic drugs. Poorly-integrated ICT systems 
have been one reason for the discrepancies in patients’ medication lists. 
When there is inadequate communication and information exchange 
about the patient, (for example, regarding diagnosis, test results, treat-
ment and medication, and plans for following-up) receiving health-
care personnel are not sufficiently prepared to safeguard the necessary 
treatment and provision of care for the patient (Laugaland, Schibevåg, 
& Aase, 2015). The consequences for the patient can be discomfort, a 
worsening of the health condition and possibly a hospital readmission 
(Boockvar, Fishman, Kyriacou, Monias, Gavi, & Cortes, 2004; Corn-
hish, et al. 2005).
Patient experiences with care coordination
National surveys of patient experiences of hospital-based care are car-
ried out regularly in Norway. They show a high degree of satisfaction, for 
example, with communication with health personnel, but there is need 
for improvement when it comes to engaging patients in participation in 
treatment decision-making, information and preparation for up-coming 
hospital discharge, coordination of care across hospital and municipal 
health services and the availability of services (Bjerkan, Skudal & Egge, 
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2014). A study by the Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy 
Survey of Adults, which incorporated data from Norway, also points to 
a lack of information given to patients during discharge from hospital 
(Schoen, Osborn, Squires, Doty, Pierson, & Applebaum, 2011). In Nor-
way, over 60 % of those surveyed reported that they received inadequate 
information on how to manage symptoms and where to seek medical 
assistance, lacked a written care plan for the immediate period after dis-
charge, had not made any agreement for follow-up visits and lacked clear 
instructions for prescribed medications. This is cause for concern, as a 
lack of preparedness and support for self-care after a hospital admission 
can increase the risk of medication errors and unwanted side effects of 
the medication. Inadequate following-up of a patient’s medical treatment 
and care may also lead to unnecessary readmissions to hospitals and, at 
worst, death (Storm & Coulter, 2016). 
Factors that affect coordination and patient 
safety in care coordination of the elderly
To provide an insight into patient safety and care coordination of the 
elderly, we will present the results of a Norwegian study from two Nor-
wegian hospitals and their respective municipalities (Storm, Siemsen, 
Laugaland, Dyrstad, & Aase, 2014a). Forty-one patient observations 
were carried out in different hospital departments (the emergency, ger-
iatric, general medical and surgical departments), in connection with 
hospital admission and discharge. The patients were over 75 years of 
age with a hip fracture or medical diagnosis, used more than five med-
ications daily and required following-up from the municipal health 
services. The observations included conversations with the patient, 
next of kin and the involved health personnel. Two researchers carried 
out the observations over a period of eight months in 2012. One of the 
aims of the study was to identify factors which affected patient safety 
in care coordination. Table 23.1 based on Storm et al. (2014a) presents 
some factors that affect safety in care coordination, as well as the chal-
lenges associated with each of the factors, illustrated with statements 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Measures to improve care coordination  
and patient safety 
The research literature identifies a series of targeted measures, often used 
in combination, to improve patient safety in care coordination of older 
patients (Laugaland, Aase, & Barach, 2012). We can differentiate between 
the following measures:
1) Measures targeted at patients and next of kin to improve coping and 
self-care (information and education to promote self-management 
of medications and how to manage symptoms, awareness of 
warning signs of worsening health conditions, engaging caregiver/
next of kin, patient-centred health records) (Coleman & Berenson, 
2004).
2) Organizational measures (discharge coordinator, systematic dis-
charge planning, standardized discharge reports, including med-
ication lists and electronic tools for exchange of information).
3) Profession-oriented measures (inter-organizational staff meetings, 
education and training of health personnel) (Gordon & Findley, 
2011; Kirsebom, Wadesten, & Hedström, 2012).
4) Measures consisting of a follow-up audit of care coordination and 
patient safety.
Studies show that elderly patients benefit from different measures, and 
that the measures can promote better care coordination and patient 
safety through a reduction in adverse events related to medication, fewer 
re-admissions and increased patient satisfaction. We will further explore 
profession-oriented measures as well as measures in the form of audits 
and follow-up. 
Profession-oriented measures
Inter-organizational staff meetings and discussion platforms have 
been suggested as strategies to stimulate inter-professional and inter- 
organizational collaboration, and for developing mutual understand-
ing of the role and functions of health personnel in care coordination 
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(Kirsebom, Wadesten, & Hedström, 2012; Storm et al., 2014a). Gordon & 
Findley (2011) conducted a review of educational interventions to improve 
handover in health care. They report a paucity of research in the area, but 
there are some studies demonstrating improvements in health person-
nel’s handover attitudes, knowledge, and skills, following participation in 
an educational program. In the research project, “Quality and Safety in 
Transitional Care of the Elderly”, an educational intervention programme, 
“Meeting Point”, was developed to increase healthcare personnel’s com-
petence with regard to quality and safety in care transitions. The pro-
gram addresses the factors important for care coordination and patient 
safety presented in Table 23.1. “Meeting Point” is an inter-professional 
arena for knowledge exchange and education of healthcare personnel 
involved in care coordination in hospital and municipal health services 
(Storm, Groene, Testad, Dyrstad, Heskestad, & Aase, 2014b). 
“Meeting Point” was organized as a series of three seminars, address-
ing the following themes: patient safety, patient involvement and system- 
level aspects of care coordination. The seminar focusing on patient safety 
included an educational component, with a teaching session addressing 
patient safety in care coordination, the review of a case report, both indi-
vidually and in groups, and the identification of measures to improve 
patient safety and care coordination in own work unit. Approximately 
100 participants (nurses, doctors, patient coordinators, physiotherapists, 
health care assistants and leaders) working in hospital wards, nurs-
ing-home wards and home healthcare services participated in “Meeting 
Point”. The results show that “Meeting Point” can contribute to knowl-
edge transfer between the participants and stronger awareness among 
health personnel of key factors related to patient safety and care coordi-
nation (Heskestad & Aase, 2015; Dyrstad & Storm, 2016).
Regulatory-oriented measures
The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision (NBHS) is a national public 
institution organized under the Ministry of Health and Care Services. 
The NBHS has responsibility for supervision of child welfare services, 
social services, and health and care services. It carries out its duties in 
chapter 23
444
accordance with the relevant legislation and directives (Act on Govern-
ment State Inspection of the Health and Care Services, 1984; Braut & 
Holmboe, 2015). Its duties as auditor are roughly divided into two groups: 
planned inspections and event-based inspections. Event-based inspec-
tions are instigated on the basis of an adverse event, situation or set of 
conditions which have arisen or become a matter of concern. The planned 
inspection is carried out in the form of system audits that aim to be risk-
based and identify possible factors constituting a risk in care provision or 
where changes are needed (Braut & Holmboe, 2015). Certain tasks in the 
planned system audits are carried out as country-wide inspection activ-
ities. In such cases, the NBHS decides on the themes for the audit and 
which category of providers that will be included in the scope of the audit. 
The County Governors carry out the country-wide audits, according to a 
common template developed by the NBHS (NOU, 2015:11; Braut & Holm-
boe, 2015).
In 2015, one of the themes of the country-wide audit was care coor-
dination during patient discharge from specialist health services to the 
municipality. The audit encompassed acute health care, except services 
related to addiction and the mental health service. The country-wide 
audits reviewed the activities involved in the care coordination process 
between the hospital and the municipality, when patients are admitted/
discharged. 
Audits were carried out in 19 hospital trusts and 37 municipalities. In 
36 audits, the County Governors found noncompliance with the law. In 
23 audits, clear areas for improvement were highlighted. According to the 
synoptic report, the investigation uncovered several areas in which care 
coordination had failed:
“The audit discovered that patients were not given enough information about 
their treatment at the hospital nor about what was to happen when they returned 
home. The audit also pointed to serious failures in care coordination between the 
hospitals and the municipalities. The transfer of information between the hospitals 
and municipalities was the area in which the County Governors found the highest 
degree of noncompliance and areas for improvement. This was partly related to the 
way in which information was communicated. However, it also owed to deficien-
cies in terms of the content; for instance, the patient’s condition, assessment of the 
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patient’s functionality assessment, and information on medication. Where there 
are significant deficiencies in terms of patient information or where it is incom-
plete, serious consequences may arise for patient treatment in the municipality.” 
(Norwegian Board of Health Supervision, 2016:3).
The County Governors are following-up the hospital trusts and the 
municipalities where noncompliance with the law was found, until the 
conditions are carried out according to the law. The NBHS argues that it 
is fair to assume that the same conditions of noncompliance are present 
in other municipalities and hospital trusts, and therefore recommends 
others to review their own management system, to ensure that practices 
comply with the law (Norwegian Board of Health Supervision, 2016). 
Conclusion
Care coordination and patient safety are high on the health policy agenda 
in Norway. Policies and legislation have been implemented to ensure 
that the patients receive timely and proper medical treatment and care 
in specialist and municipal health services. This chapter has presented 
key and overlapping features of the concepts of care coordination, con-
tinuity of care and patient handover, and related them to patient safety 
using results from current research. Important factors for care coordi-
nation and patient safety have been emphasized as: exchange of informa-
tion and communication between involved health personnel; adequate 
staffing levels; protocols for care coordination; clinical competence about 
the patient’s health situation; competence with regard to involved per-
sonnel’s roles and responsibilities; as well as information to, and prepara-
tion of, patients and next of kin for upcoming care transitions. National 
and international studies of patient experiences with hospital discharge 
highlight challenges associated with the coordination of services, poor 
information and preparation of patients for upcoming discharge. In 2015, 
the Norwegian authorities carried out an audit of health providers’ work 
related to care coordination and reported serious failures in information 
transfer between the hospitals and the municipalities, despite existing 
policies and legislation, and research which shows that measures exist to 
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Abstract: The frame of this chapter is how clinicians and leaders employed in psy-
chiatric departments in hospitals experience and cope with patients who commit 
suicide while undergoing treatment. The major focus is the phenomenon which in 
the Bow-tie model is called “stabilization”. To explore this phenomenon in an empir-
ical analysis, two concepts of samhandling are introduced, these being coordination 
and cooperation. These two concepts are used in an interpretation of what eight 
leaders and clinicians report on how they handle working together after a patient 
during treatment in a psychiatric hospital has unexpectedly committed suicide. 
The findings are that leaders and clinicians have different views on what stabiliza-
tion is. Stabilization to the leaders seems to be something they can handle by using 
mandatory organizational procedures of coordination. To the clinicians (psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists) however, stabilization is less straightforward. Professional 
stabilization is, to them, more important than organizational stabilization, and it 
requires another form of interaction – namely, cooperation. Cooperation is, in its 
simplest and purest form, a symmetrical way of working together, based on equality 
in competence and an unforced relation between the parties. For the purpose of 
professional stabilization, this is the form of interaction preferred by the clinicians. 
However, these findings are tentative and more research is needed to elaborate why 
leaders and clinicians respond as they do after a patient suicide.
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The subject matter of this chapter is how clinicians and leaders employed 
in psychiatric departments in hospitals experience and cope with pati-
ents who commit suicide while undergoing treatment. Thoughts and 
plans of causing one’s own death are not unusual amongst people who 
suffer from mental disorders, but very few of the patients actually carry 
out their plans of suicide. Based on data obtained from interviews with 
a selected group of psychiatrists, psychologists, heads of department 
and sectional leaders, all of whom have experienced the suicide of at 
least one of their patients, we seek answers to the following question: 
After a patient undergoing treatment has committed suicide, how do leaders 
and clinicians at psychiatric departments in hospitals work together? And how 
do they handle the elements of unpredictability in their work?
The analytical aim of this chapter is to explore if, and how, the two 
organizational-theoretical terms, ‘coordination’ and ‘cooperation’ (Axels-
son & Axelsson, 2006) can be used to illuminate differences between 
leaders’ and clinicians’ understanding of an unexpected suicide. From 
the Bow-tie Model (Chapter 1, Torgersen, 2018), our point of departure 
is a phenomenon called ‘stabilization’. ‘Stabilization’ is illustrated in the 
right field of the model and correlates to ‘prevention’ in the left field. 
‘Stabilization’ can occur over a longer or shorter time span. The stabiliza-
tion process starts right after, or in some cases, almost at the same time 
the unexpected incident occurs. The model suggests that ‘loss of control’ 
amongst those who have to cope with the incident, and are affected by it, 
is temporary. 
Cooperation and coordination 
Working together after a patient has committed suicide during treatment 
can be done in multiple ways. Cooperation is, in its purest and simplest 
form, a symmetrical way of working together, based on equality in compe-
tence and an unforced relation between the parties (Axelsson & Axelsson, 
2006). In our context, the concept ‘cooperation’ describes, for example, 
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what the person responsible for the patient’s treatment, e.g. a psychiatrist 
or a psychologist, is seeking if he or she asks an entrusted colleague with 
the same professional background for help to go through the case history 
of a patient who has committed suicide. Cooperation between profes-
sionals usually involves a small number of people. In favorable cases, this 
way of working together can result in the development of new knowledge, 
without the need for a larger organizational apparatus. However, coac-
tion in small professional groups has, as some scholars have observed, a 
‘clan element’ about it (Ouchi, 1980). The ‘clan element’ describes inner 
solidarity between group participants, which tends to develop over time. 
The flip side of the coin of this professional, in-group solidarity, especially 
in critical situations, is that the group is sometimes inclined to reject 
external evaluations. Different variations and degrees of coaction, based 
on a voluntary and symmetric relation between experts in the same field, 
is what we will further on describe as cooperation.
Coordination is a different way of working together. Unlike cooper-
ation, which in its purest form does not involve any division of labor, 
this is a prerequisite for coordination. In this context, coordination 
may be described as when, for example, one leader or a small num-
ber of leaders get a large number of workers, who perform small and 
specialized functions within a department, section or organization, to 
pull in the same direction. This form of coaction has an element of 
hierarchy in it (Axelsson & Axelsson, 2006). The integration is based 
on dependency, which occurs when each contributor only works 
on a small and specialized task within a larger organizational entity 
(Durkheim, 2000). For this entity to work properly, coordination is 
required. The leader who coordinates is to be found in the upper level 
of the hierarchy, and has the final authority to decide in cases where 
there are mixed opinions. The workers, some with higher professional 
acquirements, are to be found in the lower level of the hierarchy. 
Coordination is, for example, used in bureaucracies to carry out a 
wide array of routine tasks, involving a large number of people with 
different skills.
The difference between coordinating leaders and cooperative clini-
cians can be further explored by adding Michael Power’s distinction 
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between first-order and second-order risk (Power, 2004). First-order risk 
is addressed when a peer group of psychiatrists or psychologists coop-
erate to reconstruct the individual medical history of a patient who has 
committed suicide, in order to learn more and in the long run, ideally to 
strengthen professional evaluation so that there is less likelihood of new 
patients committing suicide. The aim of the leader’s coordination and 
second-order risk evaluation is not to reduce future incidents of suicide, 
but to reduce future chances of not discovering administrative mistakes 
and omissions in the department, section or in the overall internal con-
trol system. 
Before we present and analyze our findings from the study of the 
terms cooperation and coordination, we will briefly explain the status of 
knowledge concerning suicide amongst patients, and the administrative 
provisions that leaders and clinicians in the Norwegian specialist health 
services are subject to when a patient undergoing treatment commits 
suicide. 
Administration of suicides in the specialist 
health care services
Suicide prevention amongst psychiatric patients is an important prior-
ity of the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision (NBHS). The national 
cause of death statistics from 2016 show that the number of registered 
suicides in Norway was 614; 418 of these were men and 198 were women. 
The most common method is hanging, followed by poisoning, shooting 
and drowning. Suicide attempts are more common amongst women, and 
the number of suicide attempts is assumed to be between 5000 and 6000 
each year (Folkehelseinstituttet.no). Mental illnesses increase the chance 
of committing suicide, but even so, the suicide rate amongst people with 
psychiatric diagnoses is low. Each year, there are approximately 50 reg-
istered suicides among patients admitted to psychiatric institutions. In 
addition, there is an unknown number of suicides amongst patients 
undergoing outpatient treatment and those newly discharged from a psy-
chiatric institution. We do not know how many unreported suicides there 
are among psychiatric patients. 
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According to specialist health care legislation in Norway, it is the 
leaders at hospitals who are formally responsible for detecting different 
kinds of adverse events and also initiating changes when mistakes that 
put patients at risk are made. When a patient commits suicide during 
treatment, an inspection unit investigates the case on behalf of the NBHS. 
The inspection unit is a multidisciplinary team with members from the 
health profession, the legal system and the police. According to the law, 
the inspection unit from the NBHS must be informed about the suicide 
within 24 hours. In the most complicated cases, the inspection unit con-
ducts an inspection in the department in question, to collect information 
from clinicians, leaders, and the patient’s family or dependents. The pur-
pose is to clarify the causes of actions and to prevent similar cases from 
happening in the future. The requirement of patient safety has always been 
integrated in the professional ethics of clinicians, but it was first in 1980 
that the law regarding professional advisability was passed. In our con-
text, meeting the requirements of professional advisability involves both 
leaders serving an administrative system designed to expose and correct 
mistakes which may have a potential impact on patients’ health and safety, 
and psychiatrists or psychologists who carry out satisfactory clinical eval-
uations and acceptable treatment of each individual patient. The shared 
legal responsibility between leaders and clinicians does not, however, 
prevent them from experiencing a patient’s suicide very differently.
Statistics, suicide risk and discretionary 
assessment
To reduce the chances of suicide committed by patients undergoing treat-
ment, suicide risk is measured. Complex relations between a person and 
a situation must be discretionary evaluated up against suicidal thoughts 
and plans, in addition to many other factors of risk. The risk factors for 
suicide are estimated according to studies of previous suicide cases. At 
the group level, it is possible to predict the suicide rate in the population 
from statistical examinations, but at the individual level, it is not possible 
to predict accurately who will commit suicide (Motto & Bostrom, 1990). 
Suicides are so rare that as a clinician, in the long run one will make 
chapter 24
456
less mistakes without even trying to use one’s professional discretion on 
the individual patient and instead make a general assumption that no 
patient will commit suicide, even in a population where a lot of risk fac-
tors are present (Kapur, 2004). This does not mean that data from group 
statistics is completely irrelevant for clinical purposes, but it must be crit-
ically rather than casually interpreted (Larsen & Teigen, 2015). Different 
methods for improving our knowledge about suicide risk in Norway are 
suggested. We do not have a personal register over suicides committed 
by patients in psychiatric health care, and according to Rønneberg and 
Walby, we should look to Denmark, which has introduced this kind of 
register, to improve our clinical prognostic accuracy of suicides in Nor-
way (Rønneberg & Walby, 2008). 
There is no unified agreement between experts on the potential of 
increasing the utility of suicide statistics for clinical purposes in the 
future. The statistical basis of knowledge used today to predict suicide 
gives a low grade of specificity and sensitivity. Because of its low grade of 
specificity, the risk evaluation can cause ‘fake positives’, namely patients 
whom the clinician believes will commit suicide and actually do not. The 
same applies to its low grade of sensitivity, causing ‘fake negatives’, refer-
ring to patients the clinician believes will not commit suicide but actually 
do (Larsen, 2012). Despite the fact that many risk factors for suicide are 
well known, it is not possible to predict the individual cases. 
Method 
We have conducted individual interviews with eight clinicians and lead-
ers, who have experienced at least one suicide committed by one of their 
patients while undergoing treatment in a psychiatric department in a 
hospital. To recruit informants who made it possible to collect informa-
tive data on sensitive content, it was important to build trust between the 
researchers and respondents. The method we used was firstly, to ask for 
permission from the leaders of the psychiatric department in the hospitals 
where the study was planned to be carried out. Then we asked for permis-
sion to use the internal e-mail systems at the hospitals to inform our poten-
tial respondents about the project, and also to send an interview request 
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to the current leaders and clinicians who had experienced the suicide of 
at least one of their patients during treatment. The e-mail was used to 
reduce external pressure to take part in the study. Ten people volunteered; 
amongst these were six psychiatrists and psychologists, and the remainder 
were heads of departments and sectional leaders. For the clinicians, it was 
a prerequisite to have experienced the suicide of at least one of the patients 
whom they were mainly or partly responsible for under treatment. For the 
leaders, it was a prerequisite that they had experienced leading a section or 
department where the suicide of a patient under treatment had occurred. 
Two of the volunteering leaders did not meet these requirements, and were 
therefore not included in our group of respondents.
Each interview was conducted at the respondent’s workplace during 
working hours. To be interviewed about a serious case at the hospital can 
be experienced as a burden. It was important for us to treat the interview-
ees with respect while interviewing them, as well as in the presentation of 
data and in our analysis. To protect the anonymity of the individuals, we 
have avoided using longer quotes which might make it possible to recog-
nize them by their form of expression. The transcription of the interviews 
was made verbatim, and to systemize the transcript material we used sys-
tematic thematic text analysis (Malterud, 2012).
Results 
Below (Table 24.1) is a thematic collection of quotes, illustrating some 
main tendencies from the interviews with the clinicians and leaders who 
took part in the study. We have chosen to emphasize themes relevant to 
clinicians and leaders’ perspectives on coaction after a patient has com-
mitted suicide.
Analysis 
The patient’s suicide came unexpectedly to all the informants in our study. 
Despite the fact that both the clinicians and the leaders at a general level 
knew that patients in crisis tend to have a higher suicide risk, they did 
not see the individual suicide coming. The clinicians in our study had the 
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“It was a shock when it 
happened. It could not be 
possible. How could it happen?” 
“The despair of understanding 
that everything had gone wrong, 
questions about what we could 
have done differently, and should 
we have seen this coming?”
“The leader phones the clinicians 
and says ‘This happens, and it is a 
part of our job.’”
“Everyone on the shift gets 
information and each individual 
person reacts differently.”
“Within 24 hours, I had a meeting 
with the closest leaders and the 
clinical leaders. After the meeting, 





“There will always be many 
thoughts and self-examinations.” 
“There could be a patient that 
resembles the one that took 
his or her life. And it makes you 
react differently. The atmosphere 
is changed and you are more 
careful, and observe the other 
patients more closely.”
“In the first period we were scared. 
That is for sure.” 
“When a suicide happens, we all of 
a sudden get the need to go through 
(the internal control system) to 




“The heaviest burden is when 
the dependents come…. I have 
experienced a clinician having a 
physical reaction. It probably had 
to do with the discomfort he/she 
felt in the meeting. The superior 
sent this person home and talked 
to the dependents instead.”
“We sent all the papers to NBHS, 
and we got no comments back from 
them. Everything was documented 
and evaluated well enough, so there 
were no comments on the way we 
had handled this.”
“We were examined about how my 
employees did their job. And that is 
possibly why it was easier for me, 
because I’m not the responsible 
person. It wasn’t me who wrote the 
journal, and it wasn’t me who made 
the decision to unlock the door and 
let the patient go.”
WHO EXAMINES 
THE SUICIDE?
“Suicide examination? No, we 
don’t have any culture for doing 
that.”
“The emergency team is established, 
and we assume they examine what 
happened concerning the suicide.”
RIGHT TIMING 
OF AN INTERNAL 
EXAMINATION 
OF THE SUICIDE 
“At least two months, then you 
get a sense of distance without 
it being forgotten. You’ve had 
time to go through it over and 
over again, and at the same time 
you are less emotionally involved 
with it.” 
“I think it is smart to have a 
systematic examination closely 
following the suicide.”
“An examination after 4 weeks is 
okay, but preferably as soon as 
possible. We continuously admit 
many new patients, and for me it is 
good to get things done.”
(Continued)







“I had a need to explain my role, 
but it was never talked about. “ 
“I couldn’t bring up my issues at a 
meeting. They don’t belong there. 
To take care of the nurses is one of 
our tasks as doctors, and it would 
have been a burden to bring up 
my own issues there .”
“The workplace is mostly 
concerned with protecting itself 
legally, and a list of suicide risk 
factors must be put in the journal, 
without it necessarily being good 
for the patient, the dependents or 
the therapist.”
“My experience is that doctors are 
not good at reporting their needs, 
and it is easy to miscalculate them. 
They usually say things are fine, and 
that they have full control over the 
situation; then I discover that they 
have a need for support that they 
have not conveyed.”
“It is very important for us to show 
how well the patients have become, 
and a part of the treatment is to 
be allowed to go out on their own 
undertaking. But we can become 
even better at coping with what this 
does to the clinician who lets the 
patient go, when the patient then 
commits suicide.”
COACTION 
EXPECTED TO BE 
ADEQUATE
“I would prefer an examination 
(of the suicide) to include only 
clinicians and leaders. I think that 
an interdisciplinary examination 
(including nurses) is more 
uncomfortable, and that the risk 
of ending up shooting at each 
other increases.” 
“For me, I think it would have 
been expedient if it was only the 
clinicians who had the meeting.” 
“I doubt if the person responsible 
for treatment is comfortable with 
everyone being present, but at the 
same time, this suicide examination 
should be interdisciplinary because it 
is the way we work.”
“We have pretty good guidelines for 
evaluating suicide risk. It was maybe 
a bit random at the start, but after the 
first episodes… then we decided to 
have very good control over this… and 
that is good to have, and to know that 
the evaluation is documented.”
overall strongest emotional reaction to the suicide, but the feeling of fear 
and the need for self-examination affected both the clinicians and the 
leaders. After being informed about the suicide, the clinicians describe 
thoughts about what they could have done differently in the treatment 
of the patient. Fear of contravening the law was a central issue, both for 
the leaders and the clinicians’ self-examination. But in contrast to the 
leaders, whose first reaction was to focus on checking organizational rou-
tines, the clinicians’ attention was drawn to the personal ‘me and you’ 
relationship with the patient. 
The clinicians describe the first period after the suicide as a time for 
questioning themselves on what they might have done differently to pre-
vent this particular individual from committing suicide. Some clinicians 
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describe the discomfort before the upcoming meeting with the patient’s 
dependents, as an overwhelming experience, and doubt about one’s own 
professional competence as a clinician is linked to fear of what the future 
holds regarding meetings with new patients. During the first period after 
the suicide, the clinicians in our study seek to reduce first-order risk, 
namely, the chances of another patient committing suicide. One of the 
informants also mentions that after the suicide, he experienced a period 
of increased awareness of potential signs of danger occurring in the treat-
ment of new patients, and that he more closely observed patients who 
reminded him of the one who committed suicide. 
Compared to the leaders in our study, it seems like the clinicians to 
a lesser extent come to accept the genuinely unpredictable aspects of 
the individual suicide. Thoughts about what they could have done better 
persist longer for the clinicians. The clinicians describe a need to wait sev-
eral months before the emotional pressure decreases and they are ready 
for an examination of the suicide. When, and if, the suicide is examined 
systematically, they describe a need for a ‘closed circle’, where guilt and 
scapegoating are put aside. For the clinicians in our study, the preferred 
way of working together is to cooperate in a peer-review, to find out more 
about what actually happened with the individual person who commit-
ted suicide. When the clinicians in our study are stuck and seek help, 
they prefer a small group of peers with equal responsibility and/or equal 
qualifications. In this preferred peer-group, the members have either per-
sonally experienced, or realize that in the future they might experience, 
the suicide of a patient they were responsible for. 
‘To cooperate’ is a term we have previously used to describe a voluntary 
relation between experts on the same subject who are working together. 
However, the meaning of the term ‘cooperation’, in our particular context, 
must not be confused with the organizing principles of interdisciplinary 
teams. The different professions involved in the interdisciplinary teams in 
our study have an asymmetrical relation to each other and, in accordance 
with the principles of division of labor used in all complex organizations, 
the members of the interdisciplinary teams help out with their unique 
skills in the treatment of a patient. The asymmetrical relations between 
the members of an interdisciplinary team is what concerns some of the 
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clinicians in our study. After a patient has unexpectedly committed sui-
cide, the psychologists and psychiatrists we interviewed describe a need 
to step out of their roles as professional leaders at the top of the interdisci-
plinary team hierarchy. To replace the asymmetrical relations, they seek 
peers with equal competence or an equal formal responsibility, to develop 
more systemized knowledge about the individual patient’s suicide. ‘To 
cooperate’ is, for some clinicians, something that can only occur in the 
absence of a formal hierarchy defining the different positions of group 
members in the hospital’s interdisciplinary team. The psychologists and 
psychiatrists we met were seeking to prevent the pursuit of the ‘guilty’ 
person, or ‘shooting at each other’ as one of them puts it.
For the leaders who are responsible for coordination of all the internal 
and external bodies which must be informed consecutively after the sui-
cide, the fact that documentation of risk evaluation is performed means 
something more than a simple technical analytical praxis with the aim of 
preventing suicide. Documentation is a key element for heads of depart-
ments and sectional leaders, who must cope with both internal and exter-
nal claims for accountability after the suicide.
For the leaders, the response from the Emergency Services team from 
the State Health Authority is important. It reduces their uncertainty 
about the quality of the documentation, and gives them an answer to the 
question of whether the evaluation of the patient was good enough. The 
Health Authority’s administrative vocabulary, where expressions like 
no comments or everything was documented well enough are used also 
by the leaders, to show that an external state-controlled inspection has 
ensured them that their responsibility for the organization’s second-de-
gree suicide risk evaluation has been properly handled.
The leaders in our interviews describe their coordinating function 
after an unexpected suicide as a ‘leader-organization’ relation, where 
the organization’s internal control system is at the center of their overall 
administrative responsibility, while they also try to give attention to ‘the 
human factor,’ by protecting the individual clinicians who only to vary-
ing degrees express their personal needs after the suicide of one of their 
patients. The hospital’s mandatory way of organizing work is regarded 
by the leaders as binding, and the interdisciplinary teams are seen as 
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the right forum for an examination of the suicide. If the present way of 
organizing teamwork makes things harder for the psychiatrists and the 
psychologists, it might be possible to adjust the interdisciplinary team-
work on a smaller scale; “we can look at who’s participating”, but the lead-
ers do not give permission to deselect the interdisciplinary teamwork.
For the clinicians, it is of crucial importance to understand what actu-
ally happened to the individual patient who committed suicide. They are 
not always satisfied and done with a case even though the State Health 
Authorities have not found any formal faults in the documentation of 
their treatment of the patient. The leaders, on the other hand, are more 
impatient and eager to close the case. They focus on standardized proce-
dures which are mandatory after the suicide, and on the general organi-
zational demand to get things done. Unlike the clinicians, the leaders in 
our study do not question the assumption that the Emergency Services 
team from the State Health Authority is the right organ to evaluate the 
case and provide learning from the individual suicide. The leaders seem 
to have a quite well-defined set of standardized procedures to put into 
action when a patient commits suicide in their section or department. In 
contrast, the psychiatrists and psychologists in our study describe fewer 
adequate, organized routines to guide their coaction as clinical experts 
after a patient has committed suicide under treatment. 
The fact that the statistical foundation for knowledge about suicide-risk 
evaluation is based on a weak prediction of individual suicides, was not 
reflected upon by our informants. Another issue, of silence, was explicitly 
noticed by one of the clinicians, who described an urgent need to explain 
his or her role after the suicide, but says, “it was not mentioned”. The 
mute space which sometimes surrounds the responsible clinician after a 
patient has committed suicide, was also pointed to by some of the leaders.
Discussion
By using the two terms, ‘coordination’ and ‘cooperation’, to study coac-
tion in the meeting with the unexpected, we have discovered things and 
asked questions in accordance with organizational theory. Coordina-
tion is an organizational function that leaders are responsible for. The 
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leaders in our study experience their coordinating work as effective. The 
success criteria for their coordination work after a patient’s suicide is to 
facilitate organizational communication between a formally-defined set 
of positions at different hierarchical levels, in a quick and correct way. 
The leaders coordinating tasks are guided and supported by the hospi-
tal’s administrative routines and established ways of working. When the 
unexpected suicide occurs, the leader knows exactly what he or she must 
do, since the principles of coordination are the same in all cases of suicide.
Cooperation is a different way of working together. Compared to coor-
dination, it is to a lesser degree practiced in the hospital’s departments 
and sections. However, some of the clinicians in our study describe their 
experiences or needs for cooperation in situations when they are stuck and 
need help from colleagues who share their competence and responsibility. 
The principles of voluntary participation and equal expertise or responsi-
bility are important qualities for this type of coaction between peers. Only 
some of the clinicians have succeeded in initiating cooperative networks 
with their peers. Cooperation is when an expert who has experienced the 
loss of a patient as a result of suicide, asks one or more experts who have 
had the same experience, or who may be likely to have it, to go through the 
patient’s history thoroughly from start to finish, in order to understand 
it better and to learn more about what happened. This way of working 
together as experts has the potential to strengthen the involved parties’ 
clinical judgment, but our respondents have not seen many examples of 
this way of coaction after a suicide from their own experience. 
Whether the use of clinical judgment has any effect at all on the predic-
tion of suicide is uncertain. The experts think differently about the effect 
of clinical predictability. Rønneberg and Walby (2008) advocate that psy-
chiatry, as well as other medical specialties, can become, in the long run, a 
fairly trustworthy prognostic science. In their opinion, Norway should fol-
low Denmark’s example and establish person-identifiable patient records, 
which show that in Denmark, the population’s attributable risk of suicide 
is approximately 40% of those who have been hospitalized in a psychiatric 
daycare department. Nikolas Rose positions himself on the other side of 
the continuum, and thinks that suicide amongst patients under psychiat-
ric treatment is a genuinely unpredictable phenomenon; this fundamental 
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unpredictability cannot be eliminated by psychiatrists or psychologists 
(Rose 1996, 1998). Berg and Teigen disagree that the efforts in regard to 
clinical predictions are a waste, but the problem with these predictions is 
that they make us more pessimistic than necessary (Berg & Teigen, 2003). 
Larsen and Teigen remind us that suicide, after it has happened, will always 
seem to have been forewarned, even though it could not be predicted in 
the past (Larsen & Teigen, 2015). This difference in perspectives does not 
show up in statistics, but can cause unfair scapegoating of clinicians, and 
unrealistic hopes for scientific studies promising suicide prevention. 
Concluding remarks 
As we have seen in the analysis above, the leaders and clinicians in our 
study have different ways of coping with the unexpected. The leaders stabi-
lize the organization after a patient has committed suicide, by using admin-
istrative routines which are the same in every suicide case. As coordinators, 
our leaders experienced that their past knowledge could be used in new 
cases. Over time, they accumulate trust in the procedures connecting all 
the different participants at multiple hierarchical levels, both inside and 
outside of their own section or department. Together, all these participants 
coordinated in formalized relations to each other have a capacity to handle 
even the most complex and unpredictable events, according to the leaders. 
The clinicians in our study have fewer ready-made guidelines for 
action in the face of an unforeseen suicide. As opposed to the leaders, 
who already know what to do, the clinicians seek to learn from the case 
as it unfolds. They do not want to close the case before they understand it. 
If the suicide is reviewed systematically, which rarely happens, according 
to our respondents, the clinician wants it to take place in a closed colle-
gial circle where issues of responsibility and guilt are set aside to work 
together, to cooperate. 
In the Bow-tie Model (Chapter 1, Torgersen, 2018), ‘loss of control’ is a 
phenomenon that is closely linked to the moment the unforeseen occurs. 
To the leaders in our study, this way of picturing the unpredictable 
matches the experience and the way of coping with it. The leaders prac-
tice ways of working together which effectively stabilize the organization 
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after a suicide, while the situation for the clinicians is different. ‘Loss of 
control’ for them is not a phenomenon lasting for a short period after the 
moment of the incident. On the contrary, for the clinicians in our study 
it looks like the ‘loss of control’ is a long-lasting condition. Our study 
indicates that professional recovery after a patient’s unexpected suicide 
is not a ‘straight-forward process’ after the examination of the individual 
suicide has been taken out of the clinicians’ hands and transferred to an 
external investigation body, The Inspection Unit of the NBHS. 
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Abstract: The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, a rather paradoxical sit-
uation will be discussed. Even though most military practitioners seem to agree 
on the characteristics of war, two almost diametrically-opposed norms for how to 
samhandle have arisen: a centralized one and a decentralized one. We argue that the 
decentralized approach, called Auftragstaktik, is the most effective. In the second 
part of the chapter we discuss the pedagogical challenge of educating personnel to 
thrive in a decentralized organization, which must operate effectively in unforeseen 
and threatening environments. Based on the teachings of Moltke the Elder (1800–
1891) and the much more recent writings of Torgersen, Steiro and Saeverot (2015), 
we argue that a crucial step in educating for the unforeseen is to give the students 
the opportunity to solve new problems by themselves, gaining experience that is, as 
far as possible, self-generated and thereby becoming more aware and confident in 
dealing with new situations. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe the historical roots of mission 
command as a norm for how to samhandle [“interact”] when facing the 
unforeseen in high-risk military operations. Throughout history, both 
practitioners and researchers have seemed to agree that war and con-
flict imply a high degree of uncertainty. Due to this pervasive uncer-
tainty, the development of military command systems has, according 
to van Creveld (1985:264), “From Plato to NATO…been an endless 
quest for certainty.” Where is the enemy? Who is the enemy? What is 
the weather going to be like? Not to mention your own forces’ activi-
ties and intentions. In a rather sharp contrast to the agreement when 
it comes to uncertainty as a defining character of military operations, 
there has been and perhaps still is, strong disagreement when it comes 
to the design of military command systems (Murray, 2011). However, 
one command system stands out in an almost mythically canonized 
way, namely Auftragstaktik (Shamir, 2011). 
As a command system, Auftragstaktik embraces both a tactical norm 
(maneuver warfare), and a norm for how to samhandle (mission com-
mand), which will be the main focus in this chapter. In Norway’s case, 
mission command was implemented in response to a lesson identified 
after a tragic accident where 16 soldiers died, as a measure to improve the 
ability to samhandle when facing uncertainty (NOU 1991:19). However, 
in an interesting comment to the implementation of mission command 
in Norway, Lind (2001:19) writes that the Norwegian government did 
not have “the slightest idea of what it is.” And in more recent research, it 
is claimed that mission command has not been implemented yet, more 
than 20 years after it was formally implemented (Krabberød, 2017). 
But also international research indicates that implementing mission 
command is challenging (Muth, 2016; Shamir, 2011; Vandergriff, 2015). 
One challenge that has been identified, perhaps the most important, is 
pedagogical – how to educate military personnel in the use of mission 
command. Thus the challenge of how to develop and train military per-
sonnel to be able to act according to the mission command norm will 
be discussed.
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The non-repetitive character of war
If we define complexity as unpredictability that can vary from a high to a 
low degree, then chaos will represent states or situations where it is mean-
ingless to calculate probabilities. Anything may happen. War will always 
be characterized by uncertainty and chaos, because there is a thinking 
opponent who thinks he or she can win; if not, there would be no war 
(Herwig, 1988:75). This makes the uncertainty and chaos aspect fundamen-
tal; you can never be sure what the enemy’s next move will be. In addition, 
there is what Clausewitz (1832/1976:119) termed “friction”, which are the 
“factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.” Clausewitz describes 
friction as a force that makes the apparently easy so difficult. In the Bow-tie 
Model (Chapter 1, Torgersen, 2018), these challenges are presented as three 
phases (warning signs, event/accident (UN-0) and recovery).
In modern times, two very different kinds of organizational designs 
have been established as formulas for how a military organization should 
samhandle, in order to avoid the demoralizing effects of mastering a con-
tinuous stream of unpredictable high-risk situations, and win. In one 
design, the intention is to enforce order on the battlefield by focusing on 
pre-planning, centralization and strict internal organization as mecha-
nisms to secure effective samhandling. In the other design, the intention 
is to use the chaos of the battlefield as an advantage. The purpose is to 
increase the enemy’s perception of chaos and thereby increase the enemy’s 
friction, by exploiting windows of opportunity quickly and in unpredict-
able ways. This school focuses on agility, initiative and decentralization. 
The mechanism for ensuring samhandling is the intention and not the 
plan. Thus, in an almost paradoxical way, two diametrically-opposed 
organizational designs have been developed as norms for handling the 
same challenge: effective samhandling when facing the unforeseen. 
Order and structure as mechanisms  
for samhandling
When the Dutch wanted to start an uprising against their Spanish rulers, 
they needed to develop a new way to fight if they were to be able to defeat 
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the superior Spanish army. Fortunately for the Dutch, a large part of the 
Spanish army was taken by a heavy storm in the English Channel on 
its way to conquer England. Additionally, the Spanish fleet was attacked 
by English warships and a significant part of the Spanish forces were 
lost. This gave the commander of the Dutch forces, Maurice of Nassau, a 
golden opportunity to organize a new army.
Inspired by his brother, who was a historian and had studied ancient 
Roman drill manuals, Maurice of Nassau developed an army organized 
like the Roman Legion, but using muskets as their main weapon. He found 
out that the soldiers had to perform 16 movements between firing the 
musket until it was ready to fire again (Parker, 1988:21). These movements 
could be drilled so that they were performed automatically, regardless of 
the chaos that ruled on the battlefield. The timespan for completing the 
drill laid the basis for the number of rows the soldiers were organized in. 
They were set up in eight rows, where the first row fired their weapons 
and then stepped back and began performing the 16 movements. At the 
same time, all the others took one step forward. When the full drill was 
completed, the row that had fired their weapons first, had moved, step-
by-step, forward to the front row again, and were loaded and ready to 
fire their second shots (Parker, 1988:20). All soldiers were led by officers 
and all movements were commenced on command. If the enemy tried to 
outflank them, only one command (e.g. turn right) was required to turn 
the front towards the enemy.
An important prerequisite for this drill to work in battle was that the 
soldiers must arrive on the battlefield in the same formation they were 
going to fight in. Thus, Maurice implemented close-order drills as an 
important part of his tactics. The soldiers were drilled to stop on the 
same foot, raise their guns simultaneously and fire at the same time. 
If the enemy came from an unexpected direction, the troops could be 
moved quickly to the new location or direction. The crucial thing was 
that they did not lose the basic eight-row order, which was the basis for 
the sequence of firing and recharging the musket (Rothenberg, 1986:43). 
In this system, there was no room for independent action or initiative, 
beyond fulfilling one’s role in the larger system. Obedience, in the form 
of complete and immediate execution of orders, was the requirement. 
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According to Max Weber, it was this tactic that made gunpowder a sig-
nificant force multiplier on the battlefield; it was not the gunpowder that 
developed the tactics (Weber, 1978:1152).
In the war against the Spanish, Maurice’s way of fighting turned out 
to be superior. The Spaniards were not able to develop a tactic that could 
beat the Dutch, and all the rulers of Europe marveled at what Maurice 
had developed and tried to copy his tactics. One of those who found 
inspiration in Maurice of Nassau’s tactics was King Gustav Adolf of Swe-
den. He developed the tactics to be used offensively, each line now going 
forward and passing by the others while they were charging. In that way, 
the army could roll forward.
In the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631, this way of fighting turned out to 
be superior once again. The Swedes had been assigned a role as the Sax-
ons’ reserve troops in the battle, but after General Tilly, the leader of the 
German-Roman forces, had broken the Saxons, he turned his forces to 
the Swedes’ flanks and attacked. However, in what seemed to Tilly as an 
incomprehensibly short time, the Swedes had maneuvered their forces. 
What Tilly thought was the Swedish flank had now become their main 
front, and the Swedish forces rolled systematically towards Tilly’s. Tilly 
failed to reorganize his forces and they were crushed. Nine thousand 
prisoners of war were enrolled in the Swedish army and trained in its way 
of fighting, which made the Swedish army even more terrifying (Roth-
enberg, 1986:52; Wilson, 2009:472–75). Gustav Adolf ’s great victories and 
the unexpected success of the new tactics made almost everyone copy 
them, except in the Ottoman Empire, where they still believed more in 
individual skills than organization. The Ottoman Empire thereby started 
its long decline, which led to a full dissolution of the empire. In this light, 
Napoleon’s statement that, “whereas one Mameluke was the equal of 
three Frenchmen, one hundred Frenchmen could confidently take on five 
times their number in Mamelukes” (Høiback, 2014:293), is rather inter-
esting; that is, organization is the key. 
Out of the ruins of the Thirty Years’ War, Prussia survived. From being 
a poor scattered backdrop, the Hohenzollern’s kingdom grew strong, by 
becoming the best in class on strict organizational structure on the bat-
tlefield. Frederick the Great’s victorious army functioned on the basis of 
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the maxim, “No one reasons, everyone executes” (Palmer, 1986:99). How-
ever, in the battles of Jena and Auerstadt, Prussia lost to Napoleon’s army 
both times. To Prussia, these were shocking defeats, and they led to a pro-
longed and profound reform in the Prussian, and later German, forces. 
In the Prussians’ own analyses of what had failed, it became apparent 
that not only did Napoleon’s soldiers have higher morals but, perhaps 
even more importantly, the French forces were able to utilize windows of 
opportunity faster than the Prussians; they were far more agile.1
Auftragstaktik – harvesting the fruits of chaos 
as a strategy for samhandling
Learning is a difficult exercise, also for military organizations (Murray, 
2011). For what should be learned? There may be many explanations for a 
defeat, but if you change too much, it may be that the things that worked 
well will also be affected. However, many organizations conclude that 
“bad luck” or the failure to follow plans or procedures are the main expla-
nations if something goes wrong, and consequently little is changed. Be 
that as it may, the Prussians did not follow this path and their defeat to 
Napoleon led to massive innovation and organizational development. 
Scharnhorst, who himself participated in the Jena-Auerstadt battles, 
was responsible for the reforms and started a thorough process. Merce-
naries fight without heart and had to be replaced by conscripts. Nobility 
was no guarantee of effective leadership, and all officers had to attend a 
military academy. And during a war, the officers had to have the oppor-
tunity to make decisions based on their own judgment, so they could 
act without first sending a request for permission through the chain of 
command, thus saving time. It was not the lack of courage but rather the 
lack of wisdom and initiative that had been the main problem when they 
were beaten by Napoleon. The problem, as perceived by Scharnhorst, was 
1 It is interesting to note that Maurice’s reforms gained their renaissance in civilian working life, 
when Fredric Taylor introduced them as principles for organizing the workplace. Taylorism, or 
“Scientific Management” as his school is called, studied the workers’ movements to reduce all the 
unnecessary ones and standardize the most effective in task-work procedures. Along with orga-
nizing the production lines, this led to an explosion in productivity, and became an important 
formula for organizational design in the United States.
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the norm “Nie eine Schritt ohne Befehl”; that is, the operation was to be 
carried out according to plan and if changes were to be made, they would 
be implemented by the commander-in-chief (Oetting, 1993:42–43). 
In 1857, Helmuth von Moltke was appointed Chief of the Prussian Gen-
eral Staff, a position he held for 30 years, and he gave new impetus to the 
reforms Scharnhorst had started. Moltke abandoned the idea that inter-
nal order and structure could tame the chaos of war. As Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff, he was stunned by the huge amounts of paper and the degree 
of detail that were needed to formulate orders to his own forces. Moltke 
claimed that, “as a rule, an order should contain only what the subor-
dinate, for the achievement of his goals, cannot determine on his own.” 
(Muth, 2016). The non-repetitive character of war implies that no one can 
know in advance which decision is the best; on the contrary, decisions 
in war are taken in a fog of uncertainty, by the person on the spot. “To 
know” is a luxury reserved for historians (Oetting, 1993:105). 
Moltke was convinced that on the battlefield, haste was essential. 
Thus, in Moltke’s system, the worst sin was to be passive and wait for 
orders. The second worst was not to think, and to execute orders that the 
enemy might have made irrelevant, instead of acting on the basis of one’s 
own judgment of the situation (Oetting, 1993:117). Fast and self-reliant 
action was the new norm. It was crucial to have the shortest UN-interval 
(unforeseen-interval, see Chapter 1). To begin with, only army command-
ers were authorized to make adjustments based on their own judgment, 
but after a while, this authority was decentralized to corps commanders, 
and then to commanders of regiments, company commanders and finally, 
in 1877, it was set as a requirement that the army should be a decentralized 
organization. Everyone, from the oldest General to the youngest soldier, 
was expected to show initiative and take appropriate action. 
As commander-in-chief, Moltke did not perceive it as his primary task 
to make detailed plans for how his forces should solve their missions. 
His job was to try to keep up with what was happening, in order to have 
an updated situational awareness and, on that basis, send out strategic 
guidelines and intentions, for the purpose of supporting and coordinat-
ing further actions (Wittmann, 2012). Soldiers had to learn to act on less 
information. They had to be given less restrictive instructions and more 
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leeway, by using general directives (Bungay, 2011). Any plan, regardless of 
how meticulously it was laid out, would be offset when meeting the enemy 
(Gross, 2016:29). In the system that emphasized strict internal order and 
structure as mechanisms for effective samhandling, the response to a lack 
of information was to seek more, and the response to subordinates that 
did not do exactly what they were told was to give them supplementary 
instructions and tighten control, and the response to uncertainty and 
risk was better and more detailed plans. 
How radical Moltke’s system was cannot, probably, be overestimated. 
The belief that order and structure could tame the battlefield was replaced 
by an acknowledgment that war consisted of unforeseen events, that had 
to be exploited when and where they arose, and without certain knowl-
edge of the outcome. Rather than meeting friction with structure, the 
fruits of chaos should be harvested. By exploiting windows of opportunity 
faster than the enemy, the ambition was to create more unforeseen events 
for the enemy; new elements of surprise, i.e. new DU-intervals, that the 
enemy had to use time and energy to figure out. The basic assumption in 
Moltke’s strategy is that as the enemy no longer manages to make sense of 
the surroundings and create a meaningful basis for samhandling, he will 
mentally collapse and surrender. This formula for samhandling is called 
Auftragstaktik (Shamir, 2011).
However, Auftragstaktik is a very ambitious norm. It is naïve to think 
that harmonized samhandling will occur spontaneously, and an organ-
ization cannot be ordered to function in a decentralized manner. Auf-
tragstaktik is a certain organizational culture (Vandergriff, 2015). Moltke 
emphasized that Auftragstaktik was something that had to be trained, 
practiced and lived, on all levels in the organization. It had to be social-
ized (Muth, 2016). This had implications for officer selection, personnel 
administration and, last but not least, education. 
Through conscious training, the officers developed an intuitive knowl-
edge of their commanding officers’, peers’ and subordinates’ thinking 
and how they approached tactical challenges. This established a basis for 
an implicit mutual adjustment when facing unforeseen situations. In an 
interview with John Boyd (1982), German World War II General Blumen-
tritt explains:
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“a common outlook, based upon a body of professional officers who have re-
ceived exactly the same training during the long years of peace and with the same 
tactical education, the same way of thinking, identical speech, hence a body of 
officers to whom all tactical conceptions were fully clear.” (Boyd, 1982:74).
After completing education at the academy, officers in the German army 
served in the same unit their entire career, where they also continued their 
education. If a unit had casualties during battle, they were not replaced 
individually. In order to maintain the degree of cohesion and common 
outlook needed to operate in a decentralized fashion, a whole unit was 
replaced by another unit. (Van Creveld, 1982:75–76). Cohesion and com-
mon outlook were deemed more important than merely unit size. 
In Martin van Creveld’s (1982) comparative study of the Wehrmacht 
and the US Army during World War II, he shows that, although the 
conception of how to fight a war was relatively similar, and the Amer-
ican doctrine was almost a pure translation of the German doctrine in 
which Auftragstaktik was described, the two forces ended up fighting very 
differently. In a study of the US officer’s education before WWII, Muth 
(2011) claims that an important reason why the US Army failed to deal 
with chaos as well as the German Wehrmacht, despite having attempted 
to copy Auftragstaktik, was to be found in their pedagogical approach. 
The officers had not learned to trust their own judgment when having to 
make decisions in unforeseen situations. Instead, as cadets, they had been 
trained in hunting for the school’s solution.
Educating for the unforeseen
Torgersen, Steiro and Saeverot (2015:297) raise the question whether it is 
at all possible to train for something that is not yet known. Is it possible to 
put in place some educational principles for how to train in a structured 
way, in order to reduce the UN-interval? Torgersen, Steiro and Saeverot 
(2015) believe that it is possible to present what they refer to as a “fourth 
way”. Particularly interesting in this context is that the authors explic-
itly write that they base “the fourth way” on “military experience-based 
learning models” (Torgersen et al., 2015:297). They further argue that 
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the model focuses on “generic general skills and the competence needed 
to solve complex military missions” (“the demands of war”) and that, 
“the goal is to develop the soldiers’ competence to act when facing the 
‘demands of war’.” (Torgersen et al., 2015:301).
The “fourth way” differs from the other three in that it is based on 
“indirect education”; that is, the students are given the opportunity to 
solve new problems by themselves, to gain experience that is, as far as pos-
sible, self-generated and thereby they become more aware and confident 
in dealing with new situations. The problem with the other three “direct 
education models” is that the teacher remains the master and thereby con-
trols the student’s thinking when acting in unforeseen situations. Done 
that way, it shines through that there is one, and only one, solution to the 
problem, and that is the teacher’s solution. Thus, the student’s mindset is 
directed towards finding out how the teacher would solve the problem, 
rather than reaching a solution by himself. Hence, the teacher in fact pre-
vents the student from becoming confident in his or her ability to act in 
unforeseen situations. The same problem applies when role modeling is an 
important part of an education; the student is socialized into a pattern that 
has to be followed. (Torgersen, Steiro & Saeverot, 2015:301–304).
But as we have explained above, two very different ways of organizing 
have crystallized in order to be able to samhandle effectively in war, that is, 
reduce the UN-interval faster than the enemy. One strategy that focuses 
on strict internal order and adherence to a detailed plan, and another 
strategy, Auftragstaktik, where the focus is to ride the chaos and thereby 
confuse and demoralize the enemy. And according to military histori-
ans, how you train will decide whether the organizational culture will 
be a centralized, order culture or decentralized (Boyd, 1986; Vandergriff, 
2006; Shamir, 2011). It has even been argued that by using improper ped-
agogy, military organizations have ended up with an order culture, even 
though they believed that they were training for Auftragstaktik (Muth, 
2011; van Creveld, 1982; Vandergriff, 2015). It may therefore appear that 
“the demands of the war” can give rise to widely different educational 
arrangements. 
The issues with direct education, as outlined by Torgersen, Steiro and 
Saeverot (2015), are described in a number of studies as an explanation 
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for why military organizations fail to implement a decentralized organi-
zation that will be effective when facing the unforeseen in high risk envi-
ronments (Creveld, 1985; Muth, 2011; Vandergriff, 2006). And in a similar 
manner, but with positive signs, indirect education seems to harmonize 
with Moltke’s and several others’ logic of how to educate soldiers in order 
to develop and maintain an Auftragstaktik culture. 
The essence of the pedagogy that formed the basis of the Auftragtaktik 
was that the cadets should learn to think, and the instructors focused on 
what the cadets did in new and complex situations. The crucial thing was 
whether the cadet showed willingness to solve the problem and not what 
the cadet had already learned. It was not the solution in itself that was 
the learning objective, but how the cadets reasoned before they arrived 
at a decision, and their ability to elaborate on and defend their choice 
to their peers. By exercising defending and explaining difficult decisions 
that were made in new and complex situations, the cadets developed their 
character. The worst thing a cadet could do was to not make a decision. 
Inability to make independent decisions, or inability to substantiate their 
decisions could result in relegation. 
Leadership in war was a function of the officers’ ability to apply their 
professional judgment in chaotic, unexpected situations, which is quite 
different from applying preplanned responses, that is, standardized drills 
and procedures, to predictable situations. In Moltke’s system, the empha-
sis was on learning how to think about a problem, rather than what to 
think in pre-defined, clear-cut situations (Vandergriff, 2006). As exem-
plified by a superintendent of the German Military Academy:
“In training officers, I will pose a problem for them in field exercises that can-
not be solved within the framework of their explicit orders. For example, to go 
through one element of your division and lead a river crossing [sic!]. But there was 
also a hill to the right, and enemy forces were moving toward that hill to threaten 
the division flank. The young officer had to see that the proper response was to 
change his own orders and protect the division flank by taking the hill, thereby 
making it possible for the division to cross the river later. This is the essence of 
Auftragstaktik, to be free to interpret orders so as to fulfill the larger goal. If they 
can’t see that, they get poor marks. If the pattern persists, they will eventually be 
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marked as either too stupid or to servile to ever be effective field commanders, 
and get pushed aside into less responsible positions. ” (Rochlin, 1995:6). 
Conclusion
To be able to samhandle effectively in the face of the unknown, under 
time pressure and high risk, is to put high expectations on an organiza-
tion. In modern military history, two fundamentally different strategies 
for samhandling in response to the “demands of war” are presented, one 
based on strict, internal order and one based on initiative and “riding” 
the chaos, which is called Auftragstaktik. History has shown that if you 
are to succeed in operating according to the Auftragstaktik standard, you 
must be very deliberate when it comes to pedagogy. “The fourth way” 
seems to be a fruitful contribution to that deliberation. 
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chapter 26
Interaction in Aerial Warfare:  
The Role of the Mission 
Commander in Composite Air 
Operations (COMAO)
Pål Kristian Fredriksen
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Abstract: This chapter explores the leadership practices of Mission Commanders. 
The major focus is on key features in leadership practices that contribute to effec-
tive samhandling in the execution of Composite Air Operations and handling of 
unexpected events. “Aerial warfare” is the term used to describe the use of military 
aircraft and other aeronautical equipment in warfare. Air power has become the 
preferred instrument for politicians and commanders to achieve strategic and oper-
ational objectives across a spectrum of conflicts, ranging from humanitarian aid to 
combat action. Air campaigns like OD/UP and MINUSMA are conducted through 
a series of parallel and sequential Composite Air Operations (COMAO). COMAO 
is the term used when dissimilar types of aircraft interact in coordinated actions to 
achieve defined military objectives within a given time and geographical area. The 
study indicates that joint practice and a joint process for learning and leadership play 
vital roles in the successful conduct of COMAO in war. Joint practice during exer-
cises like RED FLAG provides the opportunity to develop the interactional skills 
that are needed in modern aerial warfare. Important principles in joint practice are 
that you train as you fight, you experience a progression in challenge and that all 
participants participate in the exchange of ideas and lessons learned.
Keywords: Samhandling, interaction, training, joint processes, joint learning, aerial 
warfare, COMAO, unforeseen
Citation: Fredriksen, P. K. (2018). Interaction in Aerial Warfare: The Role of the Mission 
Commander in Composite Air Operations (COMAO). In G.-E. Torgersen (Ed.), Inte-
raction: ‘Samhandling’ Under Risk. A Step Ahead of the Unforeseen (pp. 481–500). Oslo: 
Cappelen Damm Akademisk. DOI: https://doi.org/10.23865/noasp.36.ch26




“Aerial warfare” is the term used to describe the use of military aircraft 
and other flying machines in warfare. This includes a wide range of air-
craft, helicopters, missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles designed to 
establish control of airspace, attack targets, maintain air mobility and 
conduct intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance (NATO, 
2016). Because of its unique attributes, air power has become the pre-
ferred instrument for politicians and commanders to achieve strategic 
and operational objectives across a spectrum of conflicts, ranging from 
humanitarian aid to combat action. Consequently, the Royal Norwegian 
Air Force (RNOAF) has deployed air assets to a wide range of operations 
in Europe, Asia and Africa during the last two decades. Most recently, 
RNOAF deployed F-16 combat aircraft to operation Odyssey Dawn (OD) 
and Unified Protector (UP) in Libya (2011), and C-130 transport aircraft 
to operation MINUSMA in Mali (2016, still ongoing). 
Air campaigns like OD/UP and MINUSMA are conducted through a 
series of parallel and sequential Composite Air Operations (COMAO). 
COMAO is the term used when dissimilar types of aircraft interact in 
coordinated actions, to achieve defined military objectives within a 
given time and geographical area. It normally involves between 20–100 
aircraft. In order to achieve effect through interaction in COMAO, a key 
leadership principle is centralized control and decentralized execution 
(NATO, 2016). Centralized control places the responsibility and author-
ity for planning, directing and coordinating air capabilities with a single 
commander and his staff. The centralized authority is usually located 
at a Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC). Decentralized execu-
tion involves delegating execution authority to sub-commanders, to 
make on-scene decisions that exploit opportunities in complex, rapidly- 
changing or fluid situations. The latter leadership role is referred to as 
the Mission Commander (MC). The MC is given the task through an 
Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO describes essential task informa-
tion for the COMAO, such as objectives, participating forces, target, 
time frame, Rules of Engagement and deconfliction parameters. Even 
though the ATO contains a lot of information, it serves only as a broad 
set of parameters for the COMAO. Through planning and coordination 
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with all participating forces, the MC must develop an air operation plan 
that enhances interaction, ensures effectiveness, as well as minimizing 
threats to the COMAO. 
Being the MC is thus an extraordinary leadership challenge. The role 
involves having overall responsibility for the COMAO, in combination 
with solving specific tasks as a flying crew member within the COMAO. 
Key leadership qualities needed to succeed are the ability to (Fredriksen, 
2012):
• Create effective interaction with professionals within and across 
organizational boundaries.
• Create and maintain interaction with co-located and geographically- 
distributed forces.
• Maintain high situational awareness (SA) in dynamic and rapidly- 
changing situations. 
• Make sound decisions under time pressure, with limited informa-
tion and means of communication.
• Cope with stress.
This chapter explores the leadership practices of Mission Commanders, 
with the aim of discussing key features in their leadership practices that 
contribute to effective interaction in the execution of COMAO operations 
and handling of unexpected events. 
Theoretical framework
In this chapter, High Reliability Organizations (HRO) is the chosen the-
oretical framework, since it fits the description and the development of 
operations and risk management in the RNOAF. HRO is a theoretical 
perspective that describes organizations with high complexity, that expe-
rience extraordinarily few accidents despite the assumption that com-
plex organizations cannot avoid accidents in the long run (La Porte & 
Consolini, 1991; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). HRO is often portrayed as an 
opposing view to Normal Accident Theory (NAT) (Perrow, 1984). RNOAF 
acquired the F-16 as their primary fighter aircraft in 1980. In the period 
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between 1980–1989, 14 serious accidents, killing six pilots, were recorded. 
This drew attention to the need for safety and risk management in the 
organization, and the subsequent measures led to a significant drop in 
accidents. The latest accident resulting in the loss of an F-16 aircraft was 
recorded in 2001. Since the year 2000, the F-16 fleet has been continuously 
updated with new technology. The operational demand has expanded to 
involve more complex operations, and a shift in Norwegian defense poli-
cies has brought the F-16 community to combat action. 
In the context of organizational structure, a COMAO can be 
described as a multi-team system (MTS). An MTS is defined as two or 
more teams that interact directly and interdependently in response to 
environmental contingencies, towards the accomplishment of collec-
tive goals (Zaccaro, Marks & DeChurch, 2012). While pursuing differ-
ent proximal goals, all teams share at least one common distal goal; in 
doing so, they exhibit input, process and outcome interdependence with 
at least one other team in the system (Mathieu et al., 2001 in Zaccaro, 
Marks & DeChurch, 2012). Figure 26.1 depicts a typical COMAO organ-
ization, where the team level represents the smallest fighting unit in the 
COMAO. A fighting team in air combat is called a formation, and nor-
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Figure 26.1 An example of the organizational structure of a COMAO.
Multi-team systems are usually formed to deal with highly turbulent 
environments. They consist of teams from different organizations that 
may have very different core missions, expertise, norms and operating 
procedures. Yet, they need to create effective interaction quickly to solve 
a common task that can withstand critical situations and unexpected 
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events. In accordance with DeChurch et al., (2001) “..they represent 
a point on the organizational environment continuum precisely where 
leaders are most needed” (DeChurch et al., 2001, in Zaccaro et al., 2012). 
Despite its importance, there is little research on the topic of leadership 
in MTS. 
Research methods
Exploring the leadership practices of MCs, this study takes a pragmatic 
approach (Creswell, 2009). A pragmatic approach allows for a greater 
freedom of choice with regards to methods, techniques and procedures 
for collecting data about the research problem. Data has been col-
lected through observation of COMAO execution, interviewing MCs 
and pilots to better understand the leadership required to maintain 
effective interaction and decision-making in the event of dealing with 
unexpected situations. The leadership practices that will be described 
are practices that work within the social and historical context of the 
RNOAF and NATO. They may not apply directly to other professions 
or organization cultures, but might inspire critical reflection on general 
leadership practices regarding interaction and handling of unexpected 
events. 
Creating effective interaction in COMAO
Creating effective interaction and handling unexpected events suc-
cessfully, is the product of many factors. The aim of this chapter is not 
to explain all of them, but to explore how MCs contribute in making 
COMAO relatively safe in aerial warfare. In accordance with HRT, the 
assumption is that they are doing something that others can learn from. 
They are assumed to be good at it. Observing the field of study, three dis-
tinct factors were discovered that enhance interaction in COMAO: a joint 
practice of COMAO, a joint process for learning, and leadership. Each 
factor will be explored in detail. Leadership characteristics are described 











Figure 26.2 Factors developing effective interaction and handling of unexpected events in COMAO.
Joint practice
“(OD/UF Libya) Due to technical problems, we were unable to contact the other 
participants in the COMAO prior to flight. We only received a coordination card 
from the Combined Air Operation Center and executed the mission. It all worked 
out very well since we had practiced COMAO training with the same nations in 
different exercises previously.”
F-16 pilot, RNOAF 
Developing effective interaction in training between formations from 
different armies and nationalities is the key to success in warfare. In 
the pilot community, this is referred to as establishing mutual support. 
Since WWII, it has been a well-established practice that mutual sup-
port between aircraft is a force multiplier: A formation of two fight-
ers outperform two fighters employed singularly. Even though today’s 
fourth and fifth generation multi-role aircraft are less specialized than 
their WWII ancestors, they still operate under the same principle of 
mutual support. For example, an F-16 has a combat endurance of 1.5 
hours, but when it is supported by an air-refueling aircraft, its endur-
ance increases to human factor limits (approximately 6–8 hours). Inter-
action in COMAO is a matter of establishing mutual support across 
organizational boundaries. 
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Interaction – a skill that can be mastered
Scholars present different definitions and perspectives on the essence 
of interaction (Eggen & Nyrønning, 1999; Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). In 
the practice of aerial COMAO, effective interaction that sustains the 
demands and threats in a war campaign is viewed as a skill that can 
be mastered through practice. If NATO practices COMAO in peace-
time, they will gain experience and knowledge that will also work in 
war. In other words, interaction and the mastering of unexpected events 
are controllable factors if you follow certain principles in training. One 
principle is to train as you fight. This implies that the training must be in 
accordance with what you will actually do in combat. This, which might 
be viewed as an obvious lesson today, can be traced back to the US com-
bat experience in Vietnam. Prior to the Vietnam War, the US Air Force 
experienced many restrictions in training. Air crew were not properly 
prepared for the threats they faced in the war, which resulted in heavy 
casualties. In order to mitigate these lessons, Exercise RED FLAG was 
initiated to better prepare aircrew for combat. For the first time, USAF 
airmen started to train systematically during peacetime, employing 
COMAO (Norwood, 1994). RED FLAG provided realistic training in a 
combined air, ground, space and electronic threat environment, and cre-
ated a learning environment where ideas could be exchanged between 
participants. Due to its success, RED FLAG is today one of many exer-
cises where NATO aircrew interact in COMAO training. The sole pur-
pose is to reach a level of proficiency that will sustain the demands of 
modern aerial warfare. 
A second important principle of COMAO training is that it needs to 
be conducted with a progression in challenge. Since NATO is the domi-
nating air power in the world, both in terms of numbers and technology, 
a pitfall in the training is that a realistic opponent in an exercise scenario 
is an inferior opponent. In other words, you risk facing an opponent who 
does not challenge your abilities. For that reason, COMAO exercises, 
which usually last for ten days, are designed with a progression in chal-
lenge. They generally start out with realistic best-case and expected sce-
narios based on likely war scenarios in the world today, and progress to 
worst-case scenarios and occurrences of unexpected events. In this way, 
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aircrews are exposed to different interaction problems in controlled sce-
narios and can learn from different situations.
A third principle is that all participants must be willing to expose 
their own mistakes to give others a chance to learn from them. As they 
say, people learn from their own mistakes, but smart people learn from 
others’ mistakes. Hence, joint exercises provide NATO forces with a 
unique opportunity for collective learning, that can be described as a 
community of practice, according to Lave & Wenger (1991). Joint prac-
ticing of the operational skills required for effective interaction in 
combat leads to a development of standardized concepts of operation, 
tactics and standard operating procedures (SOP). In most COMAO 
exercises, participants come together at a common air base. They meet 
face-to-face for planning and learning processes, and interact in social 
programs in the evening. All these activities facilitate the develop-
ment of trust and knowledge about differences in norms and culture 
(Hislop, 2009:165–175). 
Norwegian fighter pilots who served in Libya found that COMAO exer-
cises serve their purposes in war (Fredriksen, 2012). The way COMAO is 
conducted in war does not change from how it is practiced in training. 
Knowing the structures of interaction in advance creates a greater oppor-
tunity to be successful from day one in a war. It also reduces pilot stress 
and increases pilots’ work capacity, so that they are able to cope with the 
unique challenges that only occur in war. 
Joint process for learning
Every COMAO follows a standardized working process of four phases led 
by the MC: a planning phase, a briefing phase, a performance phase and 
a debriefing phase. The cycle lasts about twelve hours: four hours plan-
ning, two hours briefing, four hours performing, and two hours debrief-
ing. This process is embedded in the practice, and is comparable to the 
Experimental Learning Model (ELM) (Kolb, 1984), where the planning, 
briefing and performing phases can be viewed as the concrete experience, 
the debriefing phase as reflective observation and abstract conceptualiza-
tion, and the following day COMAO as active experimentation. 
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This process is not only embedded in the conduct of the overall 
COMAO. It is present on all sub-levels in the COMAO hierarchical struc-
ture. Parallel to contributing to the COMAO learning process, all air 
crews need to participate in the learning process on the sub-commanding 




Figure 26.3 COMAO learning process.
Planning
“The planning phase is the most challenging process to lead. First of all, you 
need to come up with a good plan. Then you have to make sure that everybody 
shares a common understanding of the plan. If not, there will be misunder-
standings and chaos.”
MC, RNOAF
The planning process serves two main purposes: (1) To create a plan that 
will solve a specific task and meet established safety requirements, and (2) 
create a collective situational awareness (SA). The former is similar to a 
rational analytic decision-making process. The MC normally uses a check-
list that guides him/her through the most important steps and issues that 
need to be solved. There are established common MC checklists, but many 
MCs prefer personal guides that are tailored to their own experience and 
planning knowledge. Before the actual planning starts, the process begins 
with a brainstorming session that is often referred to as “the 4 Ts”:
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Table 26.1 The 4 Ts brainstorming structure in a COMAO planning process (based on the 
syllabus in the Tactical Leadership Program COMAO Course, https://www.tlp-info.org/home/
composite-air-operations).
COMAO Planning process: The 4 Ts
TASK Analyzing the task given in the ATO:
What is the commander’s intent? 
What are we supposed to achieve? 
What is a satisfactory end-state? 
What are the resources? 
What are the limitations?
TARGET What are the goals?
Which targets are to be attacked?
At what time?
What kind of damage level is required?
THREATS What may stop us from achieving the goal?
What can intelligence tell us about the enemy?
Weather, clouds, terrain, time of day? 
TACTICS Analyzing task, target and threats: What is a suitable plan for this COMAO?
After having decided upon an overall game plan, the actual planning 
phase progresses with detailed planning, coordination and decision 
making, that must be resolved before the COMAO can fly in a safe man-
ner. Representatives from all participating formations participate in the 
planning process. This practice has several advantages:
• The MC can monitor progress in the planning process and interact 
with sub-commanders in problem-solving immediately when needed.
• The MC can call for a status meeting (usually lasting only ten min-
utes) to get and give all participants an overall status of the process.
• All formations flying in the COMAO have one representative who 
has SA over the process and the overall plan for the COMAO, and 
who can relay information to planning processes that are happen-
ing at formation and individual level.
Together, this contributes to collective SA. About 20 % of the air crew fly-
ing in the COMAO are directly involved in the creation of the plan, and 
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know their own specific task and what role it plays in solving the overall 
objective of the COMAO. 
Contingency planning
A plan will always be the product of many assumptions. If the assump-
tions are incorrect, it may lead to the occurrence of unexpected events that 
can be dangerous or reduce the COMAO’s ability to achieve its objective. 
The MC needs to prepare for changes in the assumptions. In the planning 
process, this is called contingency planning. Contingency planning is a 
risk-assessment and risk-management process, often associated with mod-
els and processes like the Bow-tie Model (Torgersen, 2015:48–53) and Oper-
ational Risk Management (ORM)(OPNAVINST 3500.39B, 2004). The latter 
is incorporated as standard procedure for all safety work in the RNOAF 
(BFL 0101–1). Due to time pressure in the planning phase, a mental ORM 
is performed. This means that the ORM process is carried out verbally, as 
opposed to a more time-consuming written process. Subject to so many 
different types of hazards, this may seem inadequate. Since separate con-
tingency-planning processes are completed on all hierarchical levels in the 
COMAO organization, it actually covers a wide aspect of potential dangers. 
The contingency-planning process usually reflects changes in four 
assumptions: the enemy’s expected course of action, the environment, 
technical equipment and reduction in capabilities (aircraft that perform 
specific tasks). Changes in any of these factors are compared with what 
the ATO depicts as an Acceptable Risk Level (ARL) for the COMAO. The 
ARL is a guideline for how many people and aircraft the commander is 
willing to lose to achieve the goal of the mission. The MC uses deduction, 
by reflecting on scenarios that may be unique to this specific mission, 
and experience, when reflecting on different scenarios that are known to 
happen in COMAO. The result of this process ends up in a picture of 
changes that might lead to a cancellation of the entire COMAO (known 
as a NO GO criteria), and for changes in the assumption that will require 
adjustments to the main plan. A complete planning process will therefore 
result in a main plan, a set of NO GO criteria, and a number of alternative 
plans that will take effect when unexpected events occur. As a princi-
ple, all alternative plans are kept as close as possible to the main plan. 
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All planning information is written down on a coordination card that all 
participants receive in the MASS BRIEFING.
Leading the planning process, the MC needs to have enough experience 
and knowledge of all the capabilities in the COMAO to create an initial plan 
that makes use of all the resources at hand. The MC must be able to engage 
in fruitful discussions with sub-commanders and formation leaders, and 
make decisions that take into account individual needs without hampering 
effective interaction in the overall COMAO plan. Keeping oversight in the 
process, delegating and engaging in problem-solving are important qual-
ities. Working under time pressure, the MC needs to demand progress in 
the work, balancing communication to respect cultural diversity. 
Briefing
“What separates the excellent MCs from the others is their ability to convey the 
plan in the MASS BRIEFING in such a way that everybody understands the big 
picture and how their task is important in the plan.” 
MC, RNOAF
The briefing, or MASS BRIEFING as it is called in COMAO, may be con-
sidered the most important leadership process in creating a collective SA 
(Fredriksen & Moen, 2013:209–212). All participants in the COMAO attend 
the MASS BRIEFING, as it is considered to be too dangerous to have par-
ticipants flying who are not thoroughly familiar with the overall COMAO 
plan. The content of the brief is a repetition of the 4 Ts, that balances the 
level of details to what is relevant for all the participants. Details that are 
only relevant at the sub-commander or formation level are covered in a 
separate briefing held after the MASS BRIEF. At the end of the briefing, all 
participants should know what the plan is, why, what their individual task 
is in the main plan, as well as the different contingency plans.
The briefing process follows norms. It always starts punctually with a roll 
call of all formation members. The briefing is a one-way communication 
process lead by the MC, and it is supported by sub-commanders and other 
personnel who have been delegated responsibilities in the COMAO plan-
ning phase. In order to ensure efficiency, questions are always addressed 
at the end, and they are limited to clarifying or confirming information. 
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Either the plan is safe and sound or the COMAO must be cancelled. At this 
point in the process, there is no time to make big changes. 
The MASS BRIEFING tests the MC’s communication skills. The 
plan needs to be visualized for the participants. They must understand 
every time-critical interaction that happens in the COMAO, potentially- 
dangerous situations that can occur with non-compliance, and which 
events that could trigger changes in the plan.
Performing
“The MC needs to have enough brain bytes available to maintain SA on the 
COMAO, and not only the action that is going on within his own formation. I 
have seen many times that trigger events occur that should alter the main plan, 
but the MC for some reason doesn’t act on it.”
MC, RNOAF
In the performance phase, the COMAO plan is set out in reality. In aca-
demic terms, this is when the theory is tested. The main focus for the 
MC is to maintain high SA and to monitor the COMAO. A UHF radio 
is the means of communication between the different formations in the 
COMAO. Since radio communication is limited to one person speaking 
at a time, it is difficult for the MC to give instructions to the other ele-
ments during flight. It requires significant communication discipline and 
a solid communication plan that establishes how information is prior-
itized on the common UHF frequency. Adherence to the communication 
plan is the most important factor to maintain a high collective SA. 
If the assumptions in the plan are correct, the COMAO will be exe-
cuted in an orderly fashion with effective communication. The collective 
SA in the COMAO will be high, resulting in actions being performed 
without the need for further coordination and communication. This is 
referred to as implicit coordination (Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Converse, 
1993). When unexpected events happen (a trigger event), it is of utmost 
importance that this is recognized by the MC, and that he/she reacts to 
it in accordance with the contingency plan. If this is the case, an unex-
pected event may not create a problem for the COMAO. If not, a dan-
gerous situation might develop, either because formations are flying in 
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accordance with a plan that is not based on the right assumptions, or 
because formations are executing different plans. In both these cases, the 
collective SA is drastically reduced and actual communication increased, 
making it even harder for the MC to establish control and give instruc-
tions. Degraded SA often leads to formation prioritizing safety actions 
rather than executing the planned task.
The role of improvisation
Since the COMAO planning process covers a lot of contingencies, the 
occurrence of unexpected events that the MC is not prepared for are 
rare. During the interviews with RNOAF MCs, all had problems remem-
bering such events. This does not mean that the role of MC can be per-
formed with an absence of improvisation. A COMAO plan almost always 
requires small adjustments in the performance phase. These adjust-
ments, or improvisations, follow specific patterns. First of all, they are 
variations on the existing plan. The communication needed to initiate 
improvised actions cannot be open for discussion or vast amounts of 
information exchange, due to the means of communication. Hence, it is 
often transmitted as orders to be recognized and confirmed. The changes 
implemented in improvised actions are limited to as few as possible, and 
decision making is delegated to the most suitable level of authority in 
the hierarchical structure of the COMAO. This action limits the prob-
lem-solving process to the formations effected by it, and leaves it up to 
the specialists to make the right decision. Decisions made in the improv-
isation process are a balance between obtaining goals and maintaining 
safety, but safety will always predominate.
Debriefing
“The hard part is to identify the really important lessons that are valid for every-
body in the COMAO and communicate them clearly.” 
MC, RNOAF
The debriefing is an organized and structured reflection on action 
(Schön, 1983, 1987; Folland, 2012; Moldjord, 2016). The purpose of this 
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process is to create learning. As in all steps in the COMAO learning pro-
cess, the debriefing is conducted on all hierarchical levels in the COMAO 
organization. The MASS DEBRIEF focuses on the overall execution of 
the COMAO. The goal is to identify learning points that are relevant for 
all participants. The later formation debriefings will cover more specific 
learning points relevant for the formation or individual pilots. In total, 
the debriefing process will cover a spectrum of operational and tactical 
learning points, down to individual pilot switch-actions and maneuvers 
in specific situations.
The air crew uses two terms in the learning process: lessons identified 
and lessons learned. The goal of the debriefing is to identify important les-
sons that the participants can add to their knowledge for future COMAO 
operations. “Lessons identified” are not considered learned until the 
application of action has changed. As in most performance cultures, 
the debriefing is mainly concerned with what went wrong and correct-
ing these errors. The process seldom dwells on the positive aspects of the 
COMAO, mainly because they have a high-performance expectancy and 
limited time to cover all possible learning points in the debriefing. 
The debriefing process mainly addresses four questions (Fredriksen & 
Moen, 2013:215–217):
1. Were there any safety issues?
2. What happened?
3. What went wrong? Why?
4. How do we change it next time?
Safety is always paramount in COMAO exercises. What cannot be per-
formed safely in a training environment will become hazardous in the 
fog of war. In this part of the debriefing, anybody can address issues 
concerning any aspect of the COMAO. Bringing up safety issues in the 
beginning of the debriefing has two important functions: (1) Impor-
tant learning points are identified and can be corrected. (2) Real safety 
issues evoke emotions. If emotions such as fright and anger are not 




The re-construction of what happened is really the key to create valid 
learning. In a COMAO scenario where 100 aircraft are performing differ-
ent tasks in a dynamic air-combat scenario, nobody will have complete 
SA of what happens. While in war, aircraft are shot down and ground 
targets are destroyed, in a COMAO exercise, munition drops and mis-
sile firings are simulated in the aircraft. Even though these actions are 
assessed in real time in the air, they need to be validated on the ground 
after flight, to make sure the assessment was correct. Different tools, like 
a recorded radar picture, are used to reconstruct the COMAO execu-
tion and replay it chronologically for the participants in the debriefing. 
Munition drops and missile shots are called out at the correct time, with 
validation by the pilots performing the action. At the end of this run-
through, the MC and the COMAO participants have a picture of how 
the plan was actually executed in the air by the COMAO, which targets 
were destroyed, how many enemy aircraft were shot down and their own 
losses. This information is compared to the task and the overall objective 
of the mission, highlighting what could have been done differently to 
increase performance. 
Leadership trust
“In some cases, my confidence in the MC and the plan have been so low that 
the mindset leading my own formation has been to avoid collision with other 
formations and get us all safely back on the ground. These missions have no 
tactical value, except the learning of how not to do it.” 
MC, RNOAF
On all levels, in any organization, leadership is appraised as an important 
factor in task performance. However, in COMAO, leadership seems to 
be of the utmost importance to the overall task performance. The main 
reason for this is the constant time pressure that comes with the task. 
Time is often described as your worst enemy, especially in the planning 
phase, as the MC needs to keep pushing for results to meet deadlines 
given in the ATO. Trust is a factor that correlates with interaction and 
performance, especially in a high-risk and high-stress environment 
(Costa et al., 2001, Kramer, 1999; Rousseau et al., 1998). Temporary MTS, 
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like a COMAO, gives very little time to build trust. “Swift trust” build-
ing describes a condition where there is too little time to perceive deep 
relational trust (Meyerson et al., 1996). Expectations and stereotypes are 
imported from other settings, and play an important role in this process. 
The initial phase of working together in the COMAO is therefore crucial 
for establishing trust (Wildman et al., 2012). In the initial planning meet-
ing, the MC needs to give an impression of control over the situation. This 
is conveyed by demonstrating self-confidence, and by providing an initial 
idea of how the task and the process can be solved, as well as through the 
ability to delegate tasks. Further, the MC needs to be open minded to 
other solutions suggested by participants, challenge new ideas and only 
accept them if they contribute to a better plan for the overall COMAO. 
Language skills seem to play a vital role in establishing “swift trust”. The 
MC needs to be confident in speaking English. He or she should have a 
good grasp of the basic professional terms used by the different capabili-
ties in the COMAO, and understand typical problems that may degrade 
their performance. In the planning phase, the MC needs to keep the pres-
sure up in order to achieve results. Showing signs of hesitation will only 
cause frustration and reduced trust. Therefore, tasks are often delegated 
to nationalities and formations that have shown solid performance in the 
past. This type of MC knowledge is only gained through experience and 
participation in COMAO. Hence, the MC is always a very experienced 
and qualified pilot. 
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the leadership practices of Mission Command-
ers (MC) in Composite Air Operations (COMAO), giving insight into 
details in the practices that contribute to interaction and the handling of 
unexpected events, in an organization that can be described as an HRO 
and an MTS. The study indicates that joint practice and a joint process 
for learning and leadership play a vital role in the successful conduct of 
COMAO in war. Joint practice during exercises like RED FLAG provides 
the opportunity to develop the interaction skills that are needed in mod-
ern aerial warfare. Important principles in joint practice are that you train 
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as you fight, that you experience a progression in challenge and that all 
participants participate in the exchange of ideas and lessons learned. In 
developing interaction skills, COMAO exercises have a structured process 
for learning, consisting of four phases: planning, briefing, performing and 
debriefing. This learning process is present on all hierarchical levels in the 
COMAO organization. The handling of unexpected events is prepared for 
in the contingency-planning process. This process is similar to common 
risk-assessment processes. Actual unexpected events in the performance 
phase are handled through execution of alternative plans and improvisa-
tion. All actions are evaluated and corrected in the debriefing. The role of 
the MC is vital in all phases of the learning process. Leadership trust plays 
a significant role in the overall performance of the COMAO. The lack 
of trust may reduce task-oriented behavior and increase safety-oriented 
behavior in the performance phase. The development of “swift trust” 
is established in the planning phase. Self-confidence, language skills, 
an ability to create ideas and solve problems, make progress, and have 
knowledge of different capabilities and their special interests are impor-
tant characteristics in building “swift trust”. Therefore, the role of MC is 
given to very experienced pilots who are trained in COMAO operations. 
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response if this is called for. Acknowledging that supply chains are made up of 
two or more organisations, and that interaction describes relations between two or 
more actors, the purpose of this research is to explore whether the introduction of  
the concept of interaction (samhandling) to supply-chain thinking adds to our un-
derstanding of efficiency and the effectiveness of logistics preparedness.
 We position our work along three dimensions: a profit – non-profit classification, 
a descriptive – normative dichotomy, and a micro – macro continuum. Information 
was retrieved both through semi-structured interviews and by studying secondary 
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Why are inter-organisational relations important for preparedness? The 
Cold War ended, as the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact collapsed after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. During the Cold War, the defence strat-
egies of smaller NATO members aimed at establishing and supporting 
strongholds along national borders, to prevent or delay invasion from an 
identified adversary. From a logistics point of view, this meant employ-
ing pre-determined nodes and links for feeding troops and transporting 
equipment from other parts of the country and from allied partners, to 
these strongholds. The conclusion of the Cold War, together with the Bal-
kan crises and the War on Terror, caused a redirection of the NATO alli-
ance. Peace and security would be ensured through engagements outside 
the NATO home territories. After almost two decades, in which NATO 
and its member states directed their attention towards expeditionary 
operations, the pendulum swung the other way again, as a consequence 
of Russian involvement in Georgia in 2008, and indeed, the Russian – 
Ukrainian conflict since 2014. Preparedness and homeland defence is 
again at the centre of defence planning.
Running parallel to this, and rooted in the Neoliberal ideas of the 1970s 
and 80s, the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm was adopted in 
several nations, including Norway (Måseidvåg, 2011). NPM is built on 
the premise that the public sector should put more emphasis on results, 
management, competition, markets and consumers (see e.g. Hood, 1995). 
Such ideas, commonly applied in the commercial sector, manifested 
themselves as competitive bidding, outsourcing, Public Private Partner-
ships (PPP) and Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) in public organisations. 
The belief in a ‘peace dividend’ (see e.g. Garfinkel, 1990; Mintz & Huang, 
1990) after the Cold War made the Defence sector particularly prone to 
such ideas. Organisational downsizing and outsourcing alter the rela-
tions and dependencies between the Defence forces and external agents. 
Unless managed wisely, this will probably have consequences for the 
Defence forces responsiveness. The ability to quickly respond, i.e. to be 
prepared to act, assumes logistics systems designed for responsiveness. 
As (Mentzer et al., 2001) point out, optimising the supply-chain output 
presupposes a supply chain orientation; a recognition that processes need 
samhandling,  preparedness  and supply chains 
503
to be aligned throughout the whole supply chain. Understanding how 
supply chains for high-readiness defence units are designed and man-
aged is important for dealing with the seeming divergence between being 
efficient during the dormant period and effective in action (Kovács & 
Tatham, 2009). Acknowledging that supply chains are made up of two or 
more organisations, and that interaction describes relations between two 
or more parties, the research question reads: 
Would the introduction of interaction to supply chain thinking add to our under-
standing of efficiency and effectiveness of logistics preparedness?
An open systems perspective
To answer this question, this research builds on the most common epis-
temological stance within Scandinavian logistics research: the open sys-
tems perspective. Performance of a supply chain depends not only on 
activities and processes within a focal company, but also on the ties, 
bonds, and links to other parties. From a supply chain perspective, which 
will be defined shortly, this encompasses all parties that directly or indi-
rectly control resources of value for the focal party, and that perform 
activities linked to activities within the focal party.
This work is positioned along three dimensions: a profit – non-profit 
classification, a descriptive – normative dichotomy and a micro – macro 
continuum. The investigated context is interaction in defence supply 
chains. The conception of interaction follows the operationalisation of 
the Norwegian term samhandling, as described by (Torgersen & Steiro, 
2009). The main rationale for defence organisations is to offer welfare, 
in the form of safety and security, to a population and not to maximise 
for example, return on investments. This research will therefore contrib-
ute to enhancing our understanding of interaction in a non-profit context 
(although the commercial parties which make up the civilian part of the 
defence supply chains have other goals). The aim is to explore how inter-
action is perceived in logistics and supply chain management literature; 
hence a descriptive approach to research. The micro – macro continuum 
in a supply chain perspective means that the individual constitutes the 
micro perspective, whereas the supply chain, with its many participants 
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and activities directly and indirectly influencing processes and outcomes, 

















 Figure 27.1 Positioning of research.
Between these there are processes linking the individual to its organi-
sation (be it a project, a parent organisation or the whole supply chain); 
processes and dependencies which can be defined as a meso perspective. 
(Torgersen & Steiro, 2009) describe constructs related both to inter- 
personal relations, relations between individuals and organisations, and 
inter-organisational relations. Hence, these findings relate to both the 
micro, meso and macro perspectives.
Reviewing articles published in peer-reviewed logistics and Supply 
Chain Management (SCM) journals between 2007 and 2017 revealed the-
oretical knowledge about supply chain interaction. In Science Direct, the 
search term ‘supply chain interaction’ was applied to titles and key works. 
This resulted in 83 hits. Similarly, a search for ‘Supply chain collaboration’ 
and ‘Supply chain interaction’ under titles, ‘Supply chain interaction’ 
under keywords and abstracts, and ‘Supply chain preparedness’ under 
abstracts in Academic Search Premier, resulted in 65 articles. And an 
additional 83 hits were found by searching for ‘supply chain interaction’ 
under titles and keywords in Google Scholar. 
Semi-structured interviews, with personnel from both the Defence 
forces and a logistics provider involved in the planning and execution of 
samhandling,  preparedness  and supply chains 
505
Operation Atalanta, provided valuable insight into the status of interac-
tion in defence supply chains. This was part of the EU operation against 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden in 2009. Norway contributed with one frig-
ate, and a commercial logistics provider worked closely together with the 
National Support Element (NSE) in serving the frigate.
Preparedness and supply chains
A supply chain is ‘an integrated process wherein raw materials are manu-
factured into final products, then delivered to customers.’ (Beamon, 1999). 
The supply chain includes various flows, where the flows of products, 
services, finances and information are assumed to be the most central. 
Applying a supply chain perspective indicates a strategic view of materi-
als and distribution management, emphasising joint benefits across func-
tional and corporate borders (LaLonde & Pohlen, 1996; Mentzer et al., 
2001; Kemppainen & Vepsäläinen, 2003). 
Managing a supply chain (termed Supply Chain Management, or 
SCM) as an integrated system encompasses both coordination and 
structuring decisions (Truong & Azadivar, 2003). This requires a supply 
chain orientation (SCO), defined as ‘the recognition by an organization 
of the systemic, strategic implications of the tactical activities involved 
in managing the various flows in a supply chain.’ (Mentzer et al., 2001). 
An SCO assumes a willingness to: assess inter-organisational trust and 
commitment; recognise interdependencies between participants in the 
supply chain; focus on organisational compatibility regarding goals and 
objectives, operating philosophies and corporate cultures; emphasise key 
supply chain processes; and, apply top management support and visions 
(ibid). Supply chain management thus presumes not only a recognition 
that supply chains exist, but also that supply chain participants acknowl-
edge the interconnectedness and interdependencies between them.
In their work, (Chopra & Meindl, 2013) argue for the need of a strategic 
fit between company strategy and supply chain designs. They claim that, 
‘a company may fail either because of a lack of strategic fit, or because the 
overall supply chain design, processes, and resources do not provide the 
capabilities to support the desired strategic fit.’ (p. 33) To ensure strategic 
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fit, one must assess the supply chain’s capabilities – whether the sup-
ply chain needs the ability to be responsive or efficient. (Fischer, 1997) 
argues that efficiency is a preferred strategy when demand is predictable, 
whereas strategies ensuring responsiveness are best suited when needs 
are unknown or uncertain. In such situations, the supply chain needs 
the ability to respond quickly to: fluctuations in required quantities and 
products; handle short lead times; and, provide a high service level (Cho-
pra & Meindl, 2013; Demeter, Gelei, & Jenei, 2006; Fischer, 1997; Gunase-
karan, Laib, & Cheng, 2008; Parmigiani, Klassen, & Russo, 2011). Since 
demand in a preparedness context is uncertain or even unknown, one 
would expect supply chains for preparedness to have the properties of 
responsiveness rather than of efficiency.
(Zacharia, Nix, & Lusch, 2009) find a strong relationship between 
supply chain collaboration and business performance. Finding inter-
dependent supply chain partners, investing the time and resources to 
understand them and to collaborate intensely, are critical to achieving 
successful operational and relational outcomes (p. 116). Thus, one needs 
to understand the partners’ processes, objectives, and values, openly 
share information, and ensure that supply chain goals are understood 
and shared. As proposed by (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005), ‘in order 
to ensure effective collaboration, the chain members are encouraged to 
clearly define mutual objectives and associated performance measures and 
link their performance systems with decision synchronisation, information 
sharing, and incentive alignment.’ (p. 271). This is supported by (Parmi-
giani et al., 2011), who find that relational capabilities in responsive supply 
chains reflect the ability to collaborate and exchange knowledge that pro-
motes flexibility and innovation in the supply chain (p. 218).
Hence, choosing supply chain partners and deciding how to interact 
with these, are important aspects of supply chain management. In fact, 
(Truong & Azadivar, 2003) show that supplier selection, partnership, 
inventory ownership, information sharing, and trust and commitment 
are central elements of a supply chain strategy. Such cooperation is often 
thought of as being close and long-term (Marasco, 2008; Skjøtt-Larsen, 
2000), since inter-organisational factors take time to develop, and man-
aging close supply chain relationships is resource demanding.
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On preparedness
To be trustworthy, defence organisations should demonstrate a real, or 
perceived, ability to respond when certain adverse events or disasters 
occur. Carter (1999), cited in (Pettit & Beresford, 2005), defines ‘disaster 
management’ as ‘an applied science which seeks, by the systematic observa-
tion and analysis of disasters, to improve measures relating to prevention, 
mitigation, preparedness, emergency response and recovery.’ 
(Kruchten, Woo, Monu, & Sotoodeh, 2008), in their study of the impact 
of disasters on critical infrastructure, claim that research on emergency 
preparedness can be identified in the intersection between hazard and dis-
aster research. Building on Tierney et al. (2001), they identify three phases 
related to disasters: pre-impact, trans-impact, and post-impact. (Kovács 
& Tatham, 2009), comparing defence organisations with humanitar-
ian organisations and their ability to respond to large-scale disruptions, 
pointed out that ‘[m]ilitary organisations need to prepare for (and engage 
in) warfare or peacekeeping missions […] [this] require[s] the speedy mobili-
sation of resources and capabilities, from a “dormant” to an “active” state.’ 
When relating this to a supply chain perspective, disaster preparedness 
should encompass measures such as: ensuring compatible communication 
and ICT systems; pre-stocking of emergency supplies; pre-designed pur-
chasing agreements; preparation for cooperation with other organisations; 
establishment of planning teams; analysis of capabilities and hazards; devel-
opment and implementation of plans; creation and validation of scenar-
ios; development of detection plans; and, development of mitigation plans 
(Hale & Moberg, 2005; Kovács & Spens, 2007; Pettit & Beresford, 2005).
In this research, I define preparedness in a supply chain perspective 
thus: as a means to design inter-organisational structures, to organise 
supply chain resources, and to (jointly) plan and train to ensure efficient 
response if response is called for (Listou, 2015).
When discussing relations between public and private parties, (Smyth 
& Edkins, 2007) find that such relations are often reactively managed, due 
to a lack of trust and confidence, and weak interfaces between the private 
supplier and the public client. Often, relationship development and man-
agement depends on the initiatives of individuals, without systematic 
leadership, organisational management support, systems or procedures. 
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This might influence the effectiveness of public participants’ prepared-
ness measures.
Supply chain literature and interaction
The SCM literature search identified works that seek to explore or explain 
how partners in a supply chain work together, and how this influences 
supply chain success. Different authors apply different constructs for 
describing and analysing relations between business partners, such as 
coordination, cooperation, collaboration and integration.
(Zacharia et al., 2009), when analysing supply chain collaboration and 
effects on performance, refer to (Malone & Crowston, 1994), who define 
supply chain coordination as managing interdependencies between 
firms. They posit that there are three distinct approaches to managing 
such interdependencies: competition, cooperation, and collaboration. 
These approaches represent a continuum from competition, which repre-
sents the least direct contact between participants, to collaboration. 
(Xu & Beamon, 2006), although not defining coordination, claim 
that coordination is a strategic response to problems arising from inter- 
organisational dependencies within supply chains. They describe a 
framework for selecting the appropriate coordination mechanism, con-
sisting of a resource-sharing structure, decision style, level of control, and 
risk/reward sharing between firms.
(Singh & Power, 2009), cited in (Soosay & Hyland, 2015), define supply 
chain cooperation as firms exchanging basic information and having some 
long-term relations with multiple suppliers or customers. At the same time, 
they state that coordination, where a continuous flow of critical and essen-
tial information takes place using information technology, is at a higher 
level than cooperation. In this respect, their view differs from Zacharia 
et al. (2009), who view cooperation as a subset of coordination. Furthermore, 
they claim that collaboration, including high commitment, trust and infor-
mation sharing, is again a more advanced level than coordination. Zacharia 
et al. (2009), share this opinion, defining high level of collaboration as high 
levels of commitment, numerous joint activities, overlapping operations and 
relationships that cause changes in each other’s organisations. This requires a 
commitment of time and resources on the part of each firm. 
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(La Forme, Genoulaz, & Campagne, 2007), in their framework for ana-
lysing collaborative performance, define collaboration as ‘a way by which 
all companies in a supply chain are actively working together toward com-
mon objectives…characterised by sharing information, knowledge, risks and 
profits. At this level, the company announces information related to its sourc-
ing strategy, goals or stakes, in order to improve the supply performance.’ 
In their meta-analysis of literature on supply chain collaboration, (Soosay 
& Hyland, 2015) distinguish between horizontal collaboration and vertical 
collaboration. Whereas the former describes collaboration between firms/
organisations at the same level in the supply chain, the latter relates to sup-
ply chain issues, which is the one of interest in this work. Identifying 12 dif-
ferent theoretical bases (including resource-based theory, social-exchange 
theory, stakeholder theory and transaction cost theory, to mention a few), 
they conclude that most studies takes a dyadic perspective, for the most 
part between buyers and suppliers. Adding to this, (Simatupang & Sridha-
ran, 2008) show that (vertical) supply chain collaboration should include 
collaborative performance systems, decision synchronisation, information 
sharing, incentive alignment, and innovative supply chain processes.
(Chen & Daugherty, 2009), when describing supply chain integration, 
claim that this term is often used interchangeably with the related but 
distinct concepts of cooperation and collaboration. Referring to (Har-
rison, Van Hoek, & Skipworth, 2014), (Soosay & Hyland, 2015) show 
that some authors conclude that cooperation is ‘the indispensable step 
to supply chain integration’, and that collaboration goes beyond (supply 
chain) integration, by including long-term commitments to technol-
ogy sharing and closely-integrated planning and control systems. (Fab-
bes-Costes & Jahre, 2007), in their systematic literature study, set out to 
test the established conception that (more) supply chain integration has a 
positive effect on supply chain performance. They identify four layers of 
integration between supply chain participants: 1) integration of flows; 2) 
integration of processes and activities; 3) integration of technologies and 
systems; and, 4) integration of participants. They analyse dyadic relations, 
both upstream and downstream (between a focal company and either a 
supplier or customer), triadic relations (supplier – focal company – cus-
tomer), and extended relations (i.e. more than three parties). Contrary to 
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conventional wisdom, they do not conclude that more integration leads 
to better performance of the supply chain.
The literature review was designed to find articles about relation-
ships within supply chains. Based on the above, one might conceive that 
SCM literature describes a hierarchy of relations, from competition – 






 Figure 27.2 Hierarchy of relations.
Supply chains and interaction (samhandling)
Although identified works recognise interactional mechanisms, such as 
power, trust, and social contracts, most of them seem to focus on the 
macro level; the units of analysis are the organisation, relationships 
between organisations, or the supply chain as a whole. Thus, when 
(Fabbes-Costes & Jahre, 2007) could not find proven effects of supply 
chain integration on performance, they analysed articles focussing on 
inter-organisational relations, and not explicitly inter-organisational or 
inter-personal relations. 
Whereas supply chain literature seems to focus predominantly on rela-
tions between organisations, Torgersen & Steiro (2009) build on an array 
of literatures when defining interaction (samhandling). Their indicators 
cover both micro, meso, and macro relations. Does this matter when try-
ing to improve supply chain effectiveness in preparedness situations? 
A case presented in Listou (2013) helps to shed light on this question. 
The case study investigated supply chain relations before and during 
Operation Atalanta 2009. In this operation, in which a Norwegian frig-
ate participated in the UN-initiated anti-piracy operation, the Norwegian 
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Defence Forces relied on a civilian logistics provider to supply and sus-
tain the frigate in the Gulf of Aden. The supplier was co-located with the 
National Support Element (NSE), which is the mediating point between 
the deployed frigate and operational headquarters in Norway. Based on 
interviews with involved personnel from both organisations, studies of 
secondary sources such as evaluation reports, e-mail correspondence and 
meeting minutes, cooperation both before the operation started (the pre-
paredness phase) and during the operation was assessed (Listou, 2013). 
The findings are summarised in Table 27.1 (Interactional Factors, from 
Torgersen & Steiro, 2009): 
Table 27.1 Interactional aspects and Operation Atalanta (Listou, 2013).
The ethical dimension 
Before: Not discussed at 
individual level 
During: Consensus about 
work ethics and moral 
standards 
Sense of involvement 
Before: Not established since 
personnel not assigned  
During: Involved personnel 
contributed actively
Coordination of tasks 
Before: Not detailed in 
advance 
During: Worked very well
Complementary expertise 
Identified at institutional 
level, not individual level
Shared situational 
awareness 
Before: At institutional level, 
not individual level 
During: Evolved between 
NSE personnel and logistics 
provider
Role awareness 
Before: At institutional level  
During: Evolved at individual 
level
Precise communication 
Personnel acquainted with 
maritime vocabulary 
Institutional logic 
Personnel familiar with 
maritime operations and 
ships services
Balance of power:  
Institutional level: Defence 
needed external competence, 
logistics provider wanted 




Before: Not at individual 
level; personnel didn’t meet 
before operation started  
During: Evolved at individual 
level during operation
Understanding of the 
organisation and culture 
Before: At institutional level: 
supplier knew the Defence 
Forces. Informal talks prior to 
engagement 
During: Differences between 
military and commercial 
culture
Mastery of tools 
Before: No compatible 
information systems 
During: Relied on Gmail
Joint learning  
Before: Not at individual level 
During: High degree of joint 
(informal) learning, both at 
individual and institutional 
level
Instinct  
Before: Not assessed  
During: Logistics provider 
developed good sense of 
Defence needs
Training in interaction 
No; new supplier, no history 
together, no joint training
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As pointed out by Listou (2015), the Defence Forces and the logistics pro-
vider did not work closely together before Operation Atalanta. Defence 
personnel and supplier personnel did not know each other and hence did 
not develop social contracts before the operation and cooperation started. 
Although the logistics provider organised a joint assessment trip to the 
Gulf of Aden during operation planning, the officers who were to man the 
NSE were not appointed at the time. The logistics provider was not included 
in the planning and training of the force. As the supplier maintained, joint 
training would be most welcome, since they have employees that aren’t 
familiar with the military system and cooperation during an operation 
runs smoother if personnel have developed social contracts beforehand.
If we relate this to the supply chain literature hierarchy presented 
in Figure 27.2, one could claim that the relations at an organisational 
level were at a Cooperation level during the preparedness phase, and at 
a Coordination, or possibly Collaboration, level during the operation. In 
the after-action evaluation report, both parties claim that the operation 
was a success, since the frigate was operational at all times. However, 
quantitative key performance indicators (KPIs) were not defined before-
hand. As such, this confirms the impression of (Fabbes-Costes & Jahre, 
2007), that effects of supply chain integration are difficult to measure 
quantitatively. If so, then ‘success’ must be assessed otherwise. In this 
case, the parties point to the fact that inter-personal cooperation (i.e. 
interaction) between Defence and logistics provider personnel worked 
smoothly. Although, as the assessment of the interactional indicators 
show, this was not planned or catered for beforehand and as such, inter-
action was not emphasised during the preparedness phase. Hence, the 
level of interaction was not a result of deliberate organisational actions. 
This supports the findings of (Smyth & Edkins, 2007), that success in 
public-private cooperation is often a result of individual initiatives, not 
rooted in a deliberate strategy.
Conclusions
A supply chain is a business process that crosses organisational borders. 
In an open systems perspective, one acknowledges that supply chain 
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output depends on all participants directly or indirectly controlling 
activities and resources necessary for the supply chain. Preparedness 
poses some other challenges to supply chains than ongoing business 
does. Preparedness is a form of insurance that one acknowledges the 
need for but hopes will not be called for. If resources on stand-by for 
preparedness are not called for, then supply chain effectiveness is diffi-
cult to assess. Hence, preparedness organisations need to demonstrate a 
presumed ability to act. This includes establishing routines for efficient 
interaction at all levels – both micro, meso, and macro, and between per-
sonnel, both within the focal organisation and in inter-organisational 
projects.
SCM literature seems to focus predominantly on inter-organisational 
relations and to a lesser degree, on inter-personal relations. Relations can 
be organised along a continuum ranging from competition to collabora-
tion, although it is not clear how to distinguish between these levels. Fur-
thermore, there are different opinions about the connection between this 
continuum and the concept of supply chain integration; does integration 
require relations at a coordination level, and is supply chain integration a 
prerequisite for supply chain collaboration?
By applying the interactional indicators when analysing inter- 
organisational relations, enablers and barriers for relationship success 
can be studied at both micro, meso, and macro levels simultaneously. As 
illustrated in the Atalanta example, interaction was not emphasised dur-
ing the operation planning, at least not at the micro (individual) level. 
The operation and cooperation was evaluated as a success, which could 
be the effect of a lucky combination of personnel being available when the 
posts were manned. If so, this would indicate that interaction took place 
at a macro level, whereas the micro and meso levels were not addressed. 
Without understanding the mechanisms leading to interactional com-
petence and without defining indicators to assess interactional processes, 
success (or lack of success) in supply chain preparedness is difficult to 
address properly.
Hence, managers need to assess the interactional constructs when 
planning and training for preparedness. Moreover, these constructs 
must be assessed at all three levels. If not, success of inter-organisational 
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cooperation during operations (i.e. after the preparedness phase) would 
most likely depend on individual initiatives and competence, not on 
deliberate strategy. 
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Section IV: Theory Construction 
and the Way Forward
This research aggregates experiences and findings from all chapters of the 
book. A number of SUR structures are derived based on semantic theory 
construction. These are organized into three interchangeable categories 
(EdSUR, OrgSUR and OpSUR), described in an overall definition and 
visualized in a model, which in turn, can form the basis of a SUR the-
ory. Extended learning and educational models will contribute to achieve 
this. Further SUR research is needed, and one of the ways forward should 
be cross-cultural, using a global perspective, where different languages 
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through samhandling where the conditions are predictable - where completed plans 
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edge and qualities is required to extract information from the disorder. For the 
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organizations for this. Training and SUR should be incorporated into strategic 
plans, management training and leadership development. An expansion of estab-
lished pedagogical models is also needed to achieve this aim. Invisible learning is 
one approach. Samhandling does not simply happen in a vacuum, and the chapter 
encourages further SUR research in a global perspective, where different languages 
and cultures can contribute to enhanced understanding of SUR issues. As a starting 
point for such an approach, we explore how the term is expressed in the Japanese 
language. A more global approach to SUR structures can contribute to a deeper 
understanding of what is needed, to avoid unwanted misunderstandings and cri-
ses, learn from each other and solve complex and unforeseen situations through 
samhandling.
Keywords: Samhandling, interaction, SUR, semantic model, training, strategy, glob-
al understanding, organizational learning, unforeseen.
Introduction
In this anthology, it is argued that samhandling plays a key role in meet-
ing the unforeseen, as a capacity in predicting the unforeseen, during 
an impact and in the aftermath of an incident. This is very evident and 
presented in detail in Chapter 14 (Steiro & Torgersen, 2018). The core is, 
however, that in particular the study of Torgersen & Steiro (2009) and 
the majority of studies we have undergone have examined collaborative 
processes under predictable conditions without the risk of material, per-
sonnel or values, and related to work processes where the goals have been 
clear and unambiguous. In other words, unforeseen events have not been 
studied as part of the conditions in which samhandling has taken place. In 
the present anthology, however, we have focused on samhandling under 
risk and unforeseen conditions. 
The overall and fundamental research question we have asked is: What 
are the basic structures of the concept of samhandling under risk and how 
can samhandling be created when the conditions are unpredictable? Or 
more concentrated: What should be emphasized in order to achieve sam-
handling under risk and unpredictable conditions (SUR)? (see Chapter 1). 
In other words, this question implies how the traditional underlying pro-
cesses of samhandling (cf. the 15 indicators given in Chapter 2) behave 
during risk and whether there are other conditions that are important 
under such conditions especially for organizations such as emergency 
services and armed forces. 
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Nevertheless, it is essential for us to point out the following: Samhandling 
Under Risk (SUR) focuses on competence levels and strategic approaches 
for what should be emphasized in addition to basic competencies and basic 
capabilities (Torgersen, 2015) to interact under unpredictable conditions. 
Here, the level of competence is important regarding individual, group 
and the organizational level. In our perspective, the competence consist 
of both explicit and tacit knowledge. On the organizational level compe-
tence on tactical, operational and strategic/ play an important factor and 
the interplay between the different organizational levels. There is no doubt 
that basic capabilities and conditions, must be at the bottom for effective 
samhandling and coping with unforeseen events. i.e.; 
• experience with past events;
• clear communications;
• coordination;
• best possible common situation awareness;
• theoretical and practical competence about events and exercises;
• drilling of known and necessary procedures;
• availability and coping of necessary equipment
The same applies to the satisfaction and performance of the underlying 
processes (the 15 indicators, or structures) for samhandling (Torgersen & 
Steiro, 2009, see also chapter 2 of the present book, Torgersen & Steiro, 
2018), if one wishes samhandling at a high level of ambition and which dif-
fers from “cooperation” and only “communication.” In the vast majority 
of events, it is also sufficient to have basic capabilities in place and focus 
on samhandling at a low to medium ambition level. Under such condi-
tions, it will also be possible and sufficient to develop and use clear goals 
for both competence development and evaluation (i.e. SMART goals) in 
planning, implementation and evaluation of exercises. 
However, the research contributions in this anthology have demonstrated 
that this low-level ambition is insufficient when the conditions are unpre-
dictable and the situation involves risk. In that case, competence for and 
emphasis on other underlying processes, in order to extract the effect of such 
samhandling processes (at a high ambition level). These are the underlying 
processes we denote «SUR structures», and as we will clarify in this chapter.
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Identifying and defining SUR structures
We have used the semantic view of theories and theory construction 
STC (Kvernbekk, 2005; Giere, 1988; Suppe, 1989; van Fraassen, 1988) 
as the principle and method to identify underlying processes for SUR. 
STC is a meta theory, which describes the constituents of data as the 
basis for models, theories and related key concepts. STC is a theoretical 
meta study based on both empirical and theoretical sources, in this case 
the chapters of the book.
Semantic theory construction (STC)
The essence of STC is that a theory consists of, or is built up by several 
selected models and associated concepts. This in turn relies on a selec-
tion of collected data, both empirical and in-house. At all stages of such 
a model and theory building, professional and meaningful (semantic) 
assessments are conducted as a basis for selection and construction. Sim-
ilarly, we have examined all chapters in this anthology and drawn up 
key approaches and concepts (basic structures). This process have been 
responsible for the main message in the chapters, and relates to basic pro-
cesses that have been derived and/or discussed. These foundations have 
been emphasized as the most important for samhandling at risk and the 
unforeseen, related to the various themes and academic approaches in the 
various chapters and main parts. 
Based on this, we have further consolidated and concentrated the 
various basic processes, and aggregated these terms (structures), and 
expressed this in combined theses for the three main parts of the book. 
The individual authors have also contributed to the quality assur-
ance of the various joints and semantic aggregation processes, among 
which they have proposed adjustments and agreed to recognize their 
main messages in the aggregated and generalized formulations and 
concepts. Having said that, such aggregated and semantically derived 
formulations and models will not be able to capture and express the 
actual nuances and detailed findings found in the individual studies. 
To achieve this, the individual chapters must be studied. However, it is 
emphasized that our chapter is an independent contribution, and the 
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Table 28.1 Overview of some identified SUR-structures from the different parts of the anthology.
Part in this anthology/ 
Academic Approach 
Identified and selected SUR-structures, alphabetic range 
(from the chapters in the part)
1
Educational samhandling 
structures (under risk) 
– EdSUR
• Concurrent learning and framing of objectives and measures
• Extract knowledge out from disorder in information and 
surroundings
• Take into account the moods





(under risk) – OrgSUR
• Cultural awareness in and between organizations
• Knowledge of different leadership styles and organizational 
hierarchies between interaction organizations
• Social support
• Shared leadership





structures (under risk) – 
OpSUR
• «Auftragstaktik» (Mission command)
• Collective acceptance for swift trust, loss of control and flow by 
chaos
• Competence exchanging 
• Creating room for surprise
• Faith of mastering
• Skills in improvisation
• Utilization of sequential, parallel and synchronous interaction
…
other chapter authors are not assigned any responsibility for the content 
of this chapter.
SUR-structures and models
The purpose of such general model statements, on the other hand, is to 
express overall opinion and ideas on the main findings in general. Find-
ings can be used, under the mentioned conditions, for further theoret-
ical building and empiric studies, and as principles in both strategical 
and practical approaches for managers, stakeholders and others in their 
efforts to develop competence for SUR, adapted to their own organiza-
tion and situation. Table 28.1 shows the main findings from the STC work 
with selected SUR-structures (see also Figure 28.1, p. 527).
Further, we have summarized and aggregated these structures into 
an overall definitions or verbal models for SUR related to each academic 
approach represented in the anthology (Table 28.2). 
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With these structures as a basis, the following general definition is 
introduced regarding SUR: 
Samhandling Under Risk (SUR) implies an emphasis on specific educational, 
organizational and operational structures, and these structures can have differ-
ent importance for the effectiveness of samhandling in order to master challeng-
es in the phases of warning signs, incident moment and recovery (cf. the Bow 
tie model presented at the start of the anthology).
The definition above states that it is necessary to emphasize some 
other basic processes to achieve samhandling under risk and unforeseen 
conditions, than in normal situations without risk. However, it does not 
mean that current processes which are necessary in normal situations 
(the 15 indicators introduced in Torgersen & Steiro, 2009) can be forgot-
ten or downgraded. These must be the foundations. In other words, SUR- 
structures function as an addition or supplement, but necessary to achieve 
effective samhandling in the meetings with risk. At the same time, the 
shades and emphasis of the structure will have to be adapted to the situa-
tion and to what tasks the samhandling will support. For example, different 
Table 28.2 Fundamental structures of a basic model for SUR.
Part in this anthology/
Academic Approach
Constructed thesis/Verbal basic models
1
Educational samhandling 
structures (under risk) – 
EdSUR
SUR-oriented learning structures implies an emphasize the value of 
not precise knowing, development for concurrent learning and framing 
of objectives and possible measures during the situations, taking into 
account the moods, and in fellowship extract knowledge out from 




(under risk) – OrgSUR
SUR-oriented organization and leadership structures implies an 
emphasize of social support, shared leadership, cultural awareness 
and trust in and between organizations and stakeholders, knowledge 
of different leadership styles and organizational hierarchies between 




structures (under risk) – 
OpSUR
SUR-oriented operational structures implies an emphasize on faith of 
mastering, «Auftragstaktik» and improvisational skills, competence 
exchange and collective acceptance for swift trust, loss of control, flow 
by chaos and creating room for surprise, and utilization of sequential, 
parallel and synchronous interaction.
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phases in the Bow-tie model could require emphasis on different SUR- 
structures, both in general and depending on the situation and context. 
Organization structure and importance  
for samhandling
The SUR-structures can be seen as similar to those found in other research 
focusing on flexible organizations in general. Decades of research have 
found that organizations, to be successful, must be both structured 
and flexible (Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999; 
Kettl, 1983). The ideal in both cases would resemble the successful self- 
organizing firms that Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) found in the computer 
industry and was argued would be valuable for other organizations as 
well. We also believe this is of great importance in particular for emer-
gency services and armed forces. 
Successful firms did not rely on either a purely mechanistic or 
purely organic process or structure. Instead, successful firms had well- 
defined managerial responsibilities and clear project priorities while also 
allowing the design processes to be highly flexible, improvisational, and 
continuously changing. In this anthology, we have looked in depth on 
what structures are necessary based on what we have seen. We denote 
that organizations in order to be successful in meeting with the unfore-
seen; three elements should be taken into account; the educational struc-
ture, the organizational structure and operational structure. These three 
elements should be aligned, assessed and be the subject of continuous 
development. Demands in operational structures, cannot be seen with-
out looking to the educational and the organizational structure and the 
other way around. 
In order to succeed with adaptation to the surroundings, leaders needs 
to interprets and communicate the conditions their organization stand in 
an appropriate manner, and take necessary measures. The leadership com-
mitment is often seen as the most crucial point in change management 
(Selznick, 2011, 1957; French, Bell & Zawacki, 1990; Torgersen & Steiro, 
2009; Steiro, 2015). Top management commitment is also found to be the 
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most important factor with regards to safety management (Hopkins, 2008; 
Rosness et al., 2004; Kjellén, 2000). 
SUR, leadership and culture
From our point of view, it is important to clarify that an adequate 
focus on SUR structures in an organization, may in many organiza-
tions, require leadership to reach insight in the basic frameworks. This 
includes the understanding of both the nuances of the concept and the 
prerequisites. 
Social support, both from colleagues and leaders, is of great impor-
tance for SUR. Leaders play further a crucial role to make sure that 
the basic competence is in place regarding i.e. emergency preparedness 
planning, exercises and enable material and resources to be available. 
SUR-theory (Figure 28.1) is of limited value if only the single individuals 
base their actions on such insights. Not least, the leadership skills and 
roles of SUR will also be necessary to avoid the development of unfortu-
nate organizational culture, such as “organizational narcissism” (Schultz 
& Hatch, 2002), which can hinder involvement and competency inter-
nally and between organizations and other competence environments 
than itself and its own profession and culture (see also chapter 16, Heier, 
2018). Cross-sector samhandling requires organizational knowledge 
and understanding, and the willingness to adapt between the players 
in order for the interaction to be effective. It can affect both actual and 
experienced learning outcomes, both internally in the individual sector, 
and the more general cross-sector learning, of both exercises and crisis 
management.
The SUR thinking should therefore permeate the entire organization 
at all levels. To achieve this, a clear knowledge-based leadership can be 
one of several measures. Such leadership and knowledge flow will also 
be necessary between organizations. In this way, different organizations 
can develop experiences with SUR, both internally and between differ-
ent organizations (emergency services and/ or armed forces) when such 
inter-organization is required, for example, in major crises and incidents 
in society. 
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A concise theory of SUR 
In summary, figure 28.1 shows an overall theory model for SUR based on 
central main findings in this anthology
EDUCATIONAL structures (EdSUR)
• Concurrent learning and framing of 
objectives and measures
• Extraction of knowledge from disorder 
in information and surroundings
• Taking moods into accorunt
•  e value of not knowing precisely
ORGANIZATION structures (OrgSUR)
• Cultural awareness in and between 
organizations
• Knowledge of dierent leadership styles 








• Collective acceptance for swi trust, 
loss of control and ow by chaos
• Competence exchanging
• Creation of space for surprise
• Faith in master
• Improvisation skills
• Utilization of sequential, parallel and 
synchronous interaction
Samhandling  Under Risk 
(SUR) implies an emphasis 
on specic educational, 
organizational and 
operational structures, and 
these structures can have 
dierent importance for 
the eectiveness of 
samhandling in order to 
master challenges in the 
phases of warning signs, 
incident moment and 
recovery
Parameter level – Indicators (selected) Model level – Denition




Figure 28.1 SUR-theory: A theoretical assembly model of samhandling under risk (SUR), under 
parameter level (selected from this anthology), model level with main definition and conceptual 
framework (SUR).
All these factors (in parameter level, Figure 28.1) must be seen in rela-
tion to each other and be seen as interdependent. We can illustrate this 
theoretical and organizational interplay. Looking into the development 
of the armies between 1930–1945, The US Armed Forces and the German 
Army had a different interpretations of the “Preussian thoughts and prin-
ciples” (Muth, 2012; Chapter 25, Krabberød & Jacobsen, 2018). While the 
German officers where encouraged to come up with solutions. The US 
officer cadets where searching for the The Military Academy’s answer, 
which is in pedagogical terms often called “the school’s answer”, implying 
that something is either right or wrong, there is always an answer, you just 
have to find it. In difference from the German officers, American cadets 
where not accustomed to such an approach at the start. The US Military 
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wanted to adopt to structures like the German “auftragstakik”, but did 
not recognize that the pedagogic had to change accordingly (Muth, 2012). 
However, this is a historical example and the US Military changed to a 
system quite similar and can be seen in the forefront in this field (Albert & 
Hayes, 2003). Nyhus, Steiro and Torgersen (2018) in Chapter 6 discuss the 
importance of the instructors’ role in facilitating a learning environment 
that is suited for training for the unforeseen and find that instructors role 
may differ within the same academy and producing differences both in 
outcome and process. 
Pedagogic use of learning for SUR 
It is insufficient that managers and employees only know the SUR- 
structures. The SUR structures and the foundation on which these 
are based should actively blend with the organization’s strategic man-
agement plans, curricula’s, and manuals and guidance documents for 
planning, implementation and evaluation of training plans and exer-
cises. It is necessary that this is a leadership responsibility to make 
it happen. Thus, SUR competencies will be a part of the leadership 
role and leadership skills, as much as with employees with executive 
roles. However, such competence must be developed and trained con-
tinuously over time. SUR-oriented view of learning must also cover 
more organizational levels, both individual, group, organization and 
cross-sectoral approaches. Even cross cultural and global approaches 
may be necessary (Kawamura & Nonaka, 2016). It is a continuous and 
integrated whole in knowledge development, a form of synergy (von 
Krogh et al., 2000). Our perspective on “learning” in this context is 
pedagogical use of learning (didactic), i.e. learning through educa-
tional intervention. This means systematic planning, implementation 
(execution) and evaluation of SUR-oriented learning through teach-
ing and training. In addition to this, process-oriented organizational 
learning will take place, but such models have a more general and less 
direct intervening approach to the learning process, e.g. SECI model of 
knowledge dimensions (Nonaka, 1990; Nonaka et al., 2000), see more in 
Chapter 1, Torgersen, 2018). However, central focus is on both tacit and 
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explicit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). For SUR, we believe that learning of 
tactical knowledge can be particularly important and it constitutes an 
educational problem. Established educational models have essentially 
explicit knowledge as a starting point.
SUR-based didactic approach
It is not sufficient that managers and employees only know the SUR 
structures. In order to continuously develop such competence, it is neces-
sary to emphasize the EdSUR structures in all types of training. In par-
ticular for leadership education related to risk organizations. However, 
such competence development must be both planned and implemented 
in practice, with specially adapted exercises. In addition, in order to do 
that, the use of extended didactic models is needed (Torgersen, Steiro & 
Saeverot, 2015). Adjusted learning perspectives and strategic planning 
tools are needed for both education and concrete training programs (see 
also Chapter 18, Magnussen, 2018). Torgersen (2015) also showed that tra-
ditional planning models for training, training and exercises were insuf-
ficient to cover competence development in unforeseen events
SUR-oriented view of learning
Although modern education and learning are extensive and consist of 
many different perspectives, there are certain trends. One such trend is 
the so-called visible-learning paradigm. Since the release of the book 
”Visible learning – A Synthesis of Over 800 Meta-Analyses Relating to 
Achievement” in 2009 the New Zealand researcher John Hattie has had a 
huge impact on Western education, in particular for education in schools, 
but also in general for all types education and training. Although Hattie’s 
book consists of an impressive empirical material, he also finds support 
from certain theoretical assumptions on what learning and teaching sig-
nify. One of Hattie’s projects is therefore to develop a theory of what good 
teaching might be (Hattie, 2009). Central to his visible-learning paradigm 
we find direct instruction. This theory involves a clear and defined learn-
ing content with clear learning goals, so that the message is conveyed as 
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directly and clearly as possible, for example through verbal instruction 
and demonstrations (cf. explicit knowledge). As for the learners, they 
can experience what is to be learned without disturbance or interference. 
Such visible learning can also be easier “measured” and evaluated. Ten-
nyson & Foshay (2000) point to similar models for learning and train-
ing in different kinds of organizations, for example different use of goal 
attainment models. We do not doubt that visible learning may be good 
methods for learning and training, regarding basic capabilities and per-
haps some samhandling structures under predictable and safe conditions. 
However, there are obviously a number of aspects that are not thematized 
within the visible learning paradigm, for example, the unforeseen, exis-
tential and ethical aspects, creativity, autonomy and critical dimensions 
(cf. tactic knowledge). 
Invisible learning
In order to educate for samhandling structures under risk and unpredict-
able conditions, other educational approaches are therefore needed. Such 
aspects do require an indirect or, what we call invisible approach as they 
do not contain general or objective truths. Torgersen & Saeverot (2015) 
developed a didactic planning model to train for unforeseen events. 
Central to this model was that learning goals, which naturally were not 
known or apparent under such conditions, had to be replaced by other 
and more generic competence objectives, including improvisation. This 
model also emphasizes indirect training methods. To build expertise for 
SUR, Torgersen and Saeverot (2015) discovered that such an approach will 
be more appropriate than visible learning methods. 
Because of the ongoing impact of the visible-learning paradigm in 
Western education and training, what we term invisible education/learn-
ing and indirect pedagogy (Saeverot, 2013; 2018), runs the risk of being 
marginalized. In terms of practical pedagogy and management, there are 
many forms of invisible education. Take for example the instructor or 
leader who praises one of the operators or students publicly because he 
has done a good job at an exercise. Such a kind of public praise corre-
sponds to an indirect appeal to the other operators to follow the footsteps 
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of the acclaimed operator. The leader or instructor has been indirect in 
two ways. First, by communicating through one of the operators, instead 
of communicating directly to the whole group. However, such indirect 
forms of communication often work poorly in the long run, as opera-
tors can easily reveal such strategies. This is also related to the fact that 
the above-mentioned strategy is invisible, yet restrictive, as it is relatively 
obvious what the manager’s intention with this kind of praise is. Another 
possibility is that leaders can seek to find new and more advanced forms 
of invisible and indirect actions. Perhaps these leaders should invent new 
forms of indirect communication forms, while sharpening the awareness 
about these forms, to make it easier to ward off any manipulations? 
Another example is concurrent learning, as previously described (Chap-
ter, 14, Steiro & Torgersen, 2018). Concurrent learning is important to build 
expertise for SUR, focusing not only on the individual’s learning or unique 
expertise, but also that the learning process occurs jointly and that each 
other’s uniqueness gives strength to the whole (cf. “ba”(場)). What is inter-
esting is that the concept of concurrent learning corresponds to the “three 
arms” symbol of the Japanese expression «kyō (協)». Such learning needs 
to be achieved by raising the awareness of all involved. However, in order 
to train on this, it is not possible to produce detailed learning goals or indi-
vidual sub-processes that are needed to achieve good concurrent learning. 
The reason being that such a learning process will be continuous and thus 
not have a final goal of the learning outcome. The training on concurrent 
learning can therefore best be done with invisible approaches, even if sup-
plemented by direct methods where possible.
Almost all forms of instruction and learning are more or less invisible 
and indirect. Hence, it is more a question of different degrees of invisi-
ble instruction and learning (cf. the concept of “Degrees of unforeseen” 
in Torgersen & Saeverot, 2015). At the core of the degrees of invisible 
instruction is that both the learning content, work tasks, problems and 
solutions, as well as whoever is going to work on the challenge, is unclear 
when the exercise or training starts. 
In other words, the information is not only unclear, but also missing. 
During the learning process, the amount of information may increase, but 
not necessarily the clarity. Thus, one goal being to train the participants 
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to find ways to interact, whilst finding both goals and solutions together. 
In addition, such training will exert both the acceptance and the ability to 
make decisions based on such information, including decisions on dilem-
mas under pressure based on unclear information. Such decisions can be 
seen separately and as part of the process of samhandling. This can be seen 
as a basis for choosing appropriate measures and solutions along the way, 
often in successive ranges depending on whether or not the decisions and 
measures work, how long they give the desired effect and the extent to 
which new other unforeseen events occur. Such invisible methods should 
be introduced and trained with gradually increasing “cloudiness”. 
Towards samhandling in global  
SUR commitment
In essence, as we also suggested in connection with educational 
approaches for SUR, our perspective has largely been rooted in a west-
ern cultural and linguistic point of view. Thus, based on our overall 
basic research question, another question will also appear: How do 
other cultures and languages perceive the phrase “SUR”? Professor Einar 
Thorsrud had similar approaches and experiences when his concept 
of partially autonomous team and participation was adopted by the 
Japanese from the 1960s and beyond and used as an essential compo-
nent of Total Quality Management, largely adopted by Edward Deming 
(Fischer & Sortland, 2001). 
Japanese expressions of samhandling under risk
As a prerequisite for further SUR research in a more global perspective, 
we have considered Japanese expressions of samhandling under risk. 
Given the definition of the Norwegian term, samhandling, there are sev-
eral candidates in the Japanese language. After examining the conno-
tation of each word, the best Japanese word to convey the meaning of 
samhandling, as used in this anthology will be identified below. 
First of all, the Japanese word “sōgo-sayō (相互作用)” seems to be a good 
choice. This word means “interaction,” that connotes a series of actions 
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by actor A and reactions by actor B or some other actors. However, the 
word does not have connotation of “collaboration” or “working together” 
to achieve “common goals.” Simple meaning of “interaction” or “series of 
actions and reactions” would not be a good choice for translation. 
Another Japanese word for “interaction” in English is “sōgo-kōi (相互行
為).” The Japanese word “kōi” means “act” or “action.” Being almost syn-
onymous to the word ”sōgo sayō (相互作用),” it lacks meaning of “working 
together” or “collaboration” to achieve a shared goal. Both “sōgo-sayō (相互
作用)” and “sōgo-kōi (相互行為)” have no hidden assumption of relation-
ship of actors with mutual trust or equal and complementary partnership.
When we look for Japanese words for the English word of “cooperation,” 
“kyōryoku (協力)” and “kyōdō” (協同) are listed in the English-Japanese 
dictionary. The left part of ideogram, “kyō (協)” (which we briefly pre-
sented above, in connection to concurrent learning), consists of a symbol 
of “multiple (or many)” and the right part of the symbol signifies “three 
arms (helping hands),” meaning “working together.” The Kanji charac-
ters “ryoku (力)” and “dō” (同) mean “power” and “same/equal/meet/
put together” respectively. Thus, “kyōryoku (協力)” connotes to “work 
together toward common goal,” and “kyōdō” (協同) also has connota-
tion of “working together or collaboration in order to achieve a shared 
goal.” Another Japanese word with the same pronunciation, “kyōdō” (共
同) also implies “two or more people work together” on an equal basis, or 
sometimes it simply means “common/shared” as in “common cemetery.” 
In addition, there exists another Japanese word with the same pronun-
ciation: “kyōdō (協働).” This word has rather special connotation. Com-
pared to the other two Japanese words, “kyōdō” (協同) and “kyōdō” (共
同), this heterography conveys deeper meaning. The second part of the 
word, “dō (働)” means “work.” Literal meaning of “kyōdō (協働)” is sim-
ply “work in cooperation.” However, the concept assumes collaboration 
among diverse actors. Whereas “kyōdō” (協同) presumes more or less 
equal partnership with clear sense of division of labor or roles to play, 
“kyōdō (協働)” implies ad hoc collaboration among various actors with 
different skills and expertise.
In fact, the word “kyōdō (協働)” was used for translation of “co-pro-
duction” in English, when the academic concept was introduced to Japan 
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in 1990’s. The idea of “co-production” was first developed by Elinor 
Ostrom and other scholars at Indiana University in late 1970’s in the 
field of public administration (Ostrom, et al., 1978; Alford 2013; Pestoff, 
2013). The original concept of “co-production” presupposes collaboration 
between government and citizens, or producer and consumer of public 
service1. The argument for “co-production” eventually led to a new theory 
of service-dominant approach in the field of public service management, 
namely “New Public Governance” with increased participation by not 
only individual citizens but also by civil society organizations (Pestoff, 
2013:384). The concept also presupposes mutual trust and voluntary com-
mitment among the actors. In such a perspective, can therefore, “kyōdō 
(協働)” be the best Japanese word equivalent to the Norwegian concept 
of Samhandling. 
If we understand the concept of Samhandling as “kyōdō (協働)” or 
“co-production or collaboration by diverse actors” with ad hoc or impro-
vised division of labor based on each actor’s own merit or competence, 
it will be of the utmost importance in a risk situation, such as an earth 
quake or war of unimaginable scale with unexpected disaster.
The Japanese word, “ fusoku no jitai (不測の事態)” means “unexpected/
unpredictable situation,” or “contingency” in English. The word “ fusoku 
(不測)” signifies a situation or incident that is not “expected” (yoki予期) 
or cannot be predicted（yosoku予測）, in other words, unpredictable or 
unexpected. 
SUR and “ba”
Unexpected situation would not occur in vacuum. It takes place in a cer-
tain socio-cultural context. This context can be called “ba(場)”, that is “a 
shared context in motion,” and in which “knowledge is shared, created, 
and utilized.” “Ba” can be physical, virtual, mental space, or any combi-
nation of them. The key concept in understanding “ba” is “interaction” 
since “ba” is where knowledge creation takes places as dynamic human 
1 In Japanese, “kan-min kyōdō (官民協働)” means “collaboration or co-production by public and 
private sectors.”
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processes (Nonaka, Toyama & Konno, 2000:14). “Ba” can also embrace 
different and interacting levels (individual, group, organization and cross 
organization/ culture. Continuous knowledge creation is required human 
process for organizational innovation. Samhandling is a Norwegian con-
cept for human process of knowledge creation which will be accelerated 
and energized within a specific ba in an unexpected risk situation. 
Conclusion and the way forward
A traditional view to the unforeseen has been that there is always some-
thing unplanned, unexpected or unforeseen that happens, and it is 
impossible to build competence and prepare for every possibilities. But, 
based on the studies in the present anthology and the developed SUR 
structures, we believe that there are still opportunities to approach 
some solutions and measures. However, it requires a different basic view 
of thinking, for risk analysis and unpredictable events – in addition to 
the traditional approaches. Overall, we see samhandling, at high ambi-
tion level, as essential for meeting the unforeseen. It is by no means the 
full answer, but as we see it, a valuable contributor. Samhandling Under 
risk (SUR) is both dependent of educational (EdSUR), organizational 
(OpSUR) and operational (OpSUR) structures. 
The key point is that top leadership sets the frames of operation, and the 
actors in the sharp ends finds out how to execute. This means that all levels 
in an organizations are important but in different ways. Our concluding 
assumption is that decentralization and flexibility is essential in meet-
ing the unforeseen. In order to achieve effective SUR, it is essential that 
samhandlende organizations know and accept each other’s organizational 
structure and culture – more than they are structurally similar. In that 
sense, we need leadership as enablers for this to happen. The SUR-thinking, 
as stated in this anthology, and summarized in the SUR model, should be 
used as part of strategic plans, action plans and plans for specific educa-
tion and exercises on the basis of preparedness and leadership in almost all 
organizations and in particular for emergency services and armed forces. 
To develop robust SUR competence, new educational and training models 
is needed and one approach might be invisible learning approach.
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Unforeseen events can hit everyone in society and therefore, also to be 
focused on a political level, both nationally and globally. Our approach 
to SUR, including the comparison with how other countries and cultures 
relate to SUR, also show so far that it could be the basis for developing a 
more global approach to the SUR structures. We believe that it can contrib-
ute to a deeper understanding of what is needed to avoid unwanted misun-
derstandings and crises, and not least how different countries and cultures 
can learn from each other and solve situations through samhandling. 
Samhandling does not simply happen in a vacuum.
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tory and the role of emotions in learning.
Gila Hammer Furnes is Assistant Professor and Ph.D. Research Fellow 
at Western Norway University of Applied Sciences. Her work is related 
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samhandling between the areas of research and practice in education. Her 
PhD project aims to develop empirically-based knowledge about sam-
handling with regard to research and development projects in educational 
practice. Specifically, it examines how school researchers and teachers in 
joint school research and development projects perceive samhandling.
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tion. She teaches in the Master’s Program in Organizational Leadership 
at the Western Norway University of Applied Sciences. She has explored 
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hospitals. Halvorsen has been a visiting scholar at SCANCOR Stanford 
University and the Stockholm School of Economics.  
Berit Kristin Haugdal holds a Cand. Paed. (equivalent to a master’s degree) 
in Educational Science from the University of Oslo, and is currently Qua-
lity Leader at the Norwegian Military Academy (Krigsskolen) in Oslo. Her 
work is focused on quality and professional development in the education 
of officers, and studying the similarities between doctrines and curricula in 
the light of teaching, learning and training students of any kind.
Tormod Heier is Lieutenant Colonel in the Norwegian Army and holds 
a PhD in Political Science from the University of Oslo. Heier is a Senior 
Faculty Adviser at the Norwegian Defence University College and Docent at 
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the Swedish Defence University College in Stockholm. He has edited seve-
ral anthologies on Norwegian and European security and defense policy. 
His latest anthology is Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic 
Impact, coedited with Beatrice Heuser and Guillaume Lasconjaras (2017).
Marius Herberg is Lieutenant Colonel in the Royal Norwegian Air Force 
and a PhD Research Fellow at the Department of Military Leadership 
and Management, Norwegian Defence University College. The PhD pro-
gram is located at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
(NTNU) in Trondheim, Department of Psychology. “Competence for the 
Unforeseen” is the overall theme of his doctoral dissertation. He has ope-
rational and administrative experience from various roles and levels wit-
hin the Norwegian Armed Forces. In addition, he has experience from the 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence and international service in the Balkans. 
Herberg has a Master’s Degree of Science in Military Studies from the 
Norwegian Defence University College. In addition, he holds a cand. mag. 
degree from Lillehammer University College. Herberg is participating in 
the research project, “The Unforeseen,” and the research program, “Per-
sonnel and Competence,” at the Norwegian Defence University College.
Jan O. Jacobsen is Associate Professor at the Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy in Bergen. He was educated at the University of Bergen as a 
political scientist and presented his doctoral dissertation about leadership 
and organization in military organizations in March 1997. He has worked 
at the Naval Academy since 2001. He has published several articles about 
different subjects concerning military leadership, such as the meaning 
of duty, military cohesion and the German Auftragstaktik.
Hitoshi Kawano is Professor of Sociology at the Department of Public 
Policy, and Director of the Center for International Exchange at the Nati-
onal Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Japan. He received his PhD from 
Northwestern University in 1996. His research interests include military 
history, the sociology of combat and peacekeeping, mental health, family 
support, gender mainstreaming and diversity management issues within 
the defense forces, and civil-military relations in post-Cold War Japan. His 
publications include “Combat Leadership on Guadalcanal: In Extremis 
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Leadership of the Japanese and American Soldiers in World War II” in 
Leadership in Extreme Situations, (M. Holenweger et al. eds. 2017). 
Tommy Krabberød, Commander and PhD, graduated from the Royal 
Norwegian Naval Academy in 1995. He has served on board Oslo Class 
frigates and has worked as a lecturer on leadership at the Norwegian Naval 
Academy since 2003. His most recent papers are “Task Uncertainty and 
Mission Command in a Naval Context” and “Auftragstaktik zur See - An 
Impossibility?” His main research interest is leadership and organization 
in a naval context.
Tore Listou is Associate Professor of Logistics at the Norwegian Defence 
University College and Adjunct Lecturer at the Swedish Defence Univer-
sity. He holds a PhD in Logistics from Lund University (Sweden); an MSc 
in Business Administration from the Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration (NHH), and an MBE from BI Norwegian School 
of Management. His research interests are related to defense logistics and 
humanitarian logistics, focusing on preparedness and responsiveness. 
He is currently head of the multinational MCDC project Global Integra-
ted Logistics for Rapid Aggregation. Listou has ample experience from 
teaching and tutoring in logistics at universities in the Nordic countries.
Leif Inge Magnussen (PhD) is engaged in his research interests: learning 
trajectories, effects of training, leader development, evaluation and deci-
sion-making. He currently holds the position of Associate Professor at 
University of Southeast Norway (from 2011) and Manager at the Center 
of Emergency Preparedness and Integrated Crisis Management. Furth-
ermore, he is the elected President of the Norwegian Mountain Guides 
Association. His former positions were at the Norwegian School of Sport 
Sciences and the Norwegian Police Academy.
Raino Malnes is Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo 
and Adjunct Professor at the Norwegian University Defence College. His 
main research interests are political philosophy and philosophy of science. 
Among his books are The Hobbesian Theory of International Conflict, 
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Valuing the Environment, Meningen med samfunnsvitenskap [The Mea-
ning of Social Science], Kunsten å begrunne [The Art of Reasoning], and 
Politisk filosofi [Political Philosophy]. He is Member of the Norwegian Aca-
demy of Science.
Ingrid Nyhus has a Master’s Degree in Educational Psychology, and her 
thesis focused on the treatment of young people for trauma after the Tsu-
nami catastrophe of 2004. In her position as Adviser at the Norwegian 
Defence College, she has immersed herself in the topic of how supervi-
sion can be used and developed in different training situations. In her cur-
rent position as Project Manager of the Norwegian Seamen’s Church, she 
supports different organizations in emergency-response preparedness.
Olav Kjellevold Olsen has served as a military officer for 29 years and is 
currently Associate Professor at the Department of Psychosocial Science 
at the University of Bergen. Olav holds a Master’s Degree in Theology and 
a PhD in Psychology. He has published works on operational leadership, 
operational morals, organizational justice, operational training, addiction 
in the military, sleep deprivation and operational performance, team per-
formance, psychological resilience, and trust in operational leadership.
Ann Christin Rivenes is a psychiatrist and Head of Department of Psycho-
somatic Medicine, Psychiatric Clinic, Haukeland University Hospital. She 
has long experience in consultant-liaison psychiatry and with crises and 
emergency management.
Torbjørn Rundmo has a Graduate Degree in Psychology (Cand. Psychol.) 
from the University of Bergen (1983) and is a chartered Clinical Psychologist 
by the Norwegian National Board of Health. He has a doctoral degree (Dr. 
Philos.) from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (1993) 
and was made honorary doctor (fil.dr. honoris causa) by the Stockholm 
School of Economics in 2005. Rundmo is Appointed Member of the Aca-
demy of the Royal Norwegian Society of Science and Letters (DKNVS). He 
is Member of the Scientific Boards of Journal of Risk Research (published 
by Routledge, Taylor & Francis), Safety Science (published by Elsevier), and 
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the International Journal of Quality, Statistics, and Reliability (published 
by Hindawi). Since 1999, he has been Professor of Community Psychology 
at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. From 1998-1999, 
he was also Professor of Work and Organizational Psychology at the same 
university. 
Herner Saeverot is Professor of Education, and Research Director for 
the research group PedLab at Western Norway University in Norway. 
He is Visiting Professor at NLA University College, Bergen, Norway, and 
Editor-in-Chief of Nordic Studies in Education. His research interests 
include the theory and history of education and educational research, the 
academic field of educational studies, and literature and education. His 
latest publications include Education and the Limits of Reason: Reading 
Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and Nabokov (P. Roberts and H. Saeverot 2018), the 
article “Indirect Teaching” in The Wiley Blackwells Encyclopedia of Art & 
Design Education. Volume 1 Philosophy and History of Art Education, (John 
Baldacchino ed. 2018), and the chapter “Invisible Teaching” in the Inter-
national Handbook of Philosophy of Education, (Paul Smeyers ed. 2018). 
At present, Professor Saeverot is Project Manager of the research project 
“Democratic Preparedness Against Racism and Antisemitism,” funded by 
the Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training.
Per Øystein Saksvik has been a professor at the Department of Psychology, 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology since 2001. He received 
his PhD in 1991 in Occupational Health Psychology from the same insti-
tution. He has ten years of experience as a contract researcher. He does 
research in occupational health and safety, organizational interventions, 
sickness absenteeism and presenteeism, and organizational change. 
Trygve J. Steiro is Associate Professor at the Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology, Institute for Teacher Education. Previously he 
was employed by the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy. In addition, 
he has worked for over ten years in risk and safety at SINTEF and also as 
a consultant. Steiro co-authored Leadership, Samhandling and Education 
in Flexible Organizations in 2009, with Professor Glenn Egil Torgersen. 
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He was also an important contributor to the anthology Pedagogy for the 
Unforeseen (Torgersen ed. 2015).
Marianne Storm, Professor, PhD, M.Sc., RN, is currently Norwegian 
Harkness Fellow (2017-18) in Health Care Policy and Practice at Dartmouth 
College, New Hampshire, USA. She is Professor at the Faculty of Health 
Sciences at the University of Stavanger (UiS), Norway. She is part of the UiS 
Centre for Resilience in Healthcare. Storm has been the principal investi-
gator and co-investigator on several research projects which have received 
grants from the Norwegian Research Council. Storm’s research interests 
include quality in healthcare, patient- and user involvement, organizati-
onal culture and patient safety, care coordination and transitions of care 
and e-health. She has developed and conducted complex interventions with 
health professionals and patients in mental health and elderly care, aimed 
at improving the quality of care through mechanisms of organizational 
learning, education and training, and inter-professional collaboration.
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University College. He is also Professor II in Education at the University of 
Southeast Norway, Center of Emergency Preparedness and Integrated Cri-
sis Management. He was formerly a senior researcher in the Department 
of Man, Technology and Organization (MTO) at the Institute for Energy 
Technology (IFE). He holds a PhD in Psychology from NTNU (Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology, Trondheim) and a Master’s Degree 
(Cand. Polit.) in Educational Science (University of Oslo). In addition, he 
is a qualified lecturer (Docent) in Organization and Management, and has 
teaching qualifications in natural science. Key research interests are peda-
gogical theory construction and practical implications for learning and 
training design, specifically aimed at professional education in general 
and emergency-preparedness organizations in particular, in the context of 
risk, the unforeseen, cyber threats, inter-professional and cross-organiza-
tional samhandling [interaction]. His research work also includes pedago-
gical and methodological studies in tutoring, leadership and multimedia 
learning. He is Member of the Academy of the Royal Norwegian Society of 
Sciences and Letters, and has been responsible for several research projects 
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Uforutsette [Pedagogy for the Unforeseen] (2015).
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